



**DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY**

RADEWI UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Cl. No. S 8 H 9

Ac. No. 148102

Date of release for loan

This book should be returned on or before the date last stamped below. An overdue charge of Six nP. will be charged for each day the book is kept overtime.

26 JUL 1972

[Handwritten signature]

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

RICHARD T. LAPIERE

Professor of Sociology, Stanford University

AND

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH

Professor of Psychology, Stanford University

THIRD EDITION

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.

NEW YORK • TORONTO • LONDON

1949

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Copyright, 1936, 1942, 1949, by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. Printed in the United States of America. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without permission of the publishers.

PREFACE

The original edition of this book was undertaken in the belief that social psychology was coming to serve as a bridge between sociology and psychology, much as biochemistry had arisen to unite biology and chemistry, and that the time had come to attempt a synthesis of the psychological and sociological approaches.

Six years later we offered a radically revised and far more definitive second edition in the belief that social psychology had passed its uncertain adolescence and had reached such maturity that a reasonably consistent and systematic statement of the field was possible. By that time the traditional myths regarding the origins and nature of human behavior had been buried beneath mountains of factual evidence, and the great controversies over conceptual problems had largely been resolved. No longer were psychologists and sociologists in need of a bridge between their respective provinces. Those provinces had begun to overlap and blend, a process that became markedly accelerated during the war years; and the relationship of social psychology to the two had passed from that of joiner to that of copartner in the search for an understanding of the ways of men.

We undertook this, the third edition, in the expectation that only minor revisions of the text, mainly in the interests of clarity, and a general overhauling of the references to bring them up to date would be necessary. But we found that our knowledge and understanding of sociopsychological phenomena had "evolved" so much in the past seven years that a more extensive and refined statement of the central point of view presented in the second edition was almost imperative. As a consequence, we have added in this edition three entirely new chapters and a large number of new sections in order to fill gaps of which we had not previously been aware, and most of the materials that were salvaged from the previous editions have been revised and rewritten in part if not in their entirety. What has been retained more or less intact is the analytical framework.

In completing this work, we are impressed with the fact that maturity does not necessarily render a scientific discipline static and that social psychology has apparently entered upon a new and more productive phase of exploration and investigation.

RICHARD T. LAPIERE
PAUL R. FARNSWORTH

PALO ALTO, CALIF.
April, 1949

CONTENTS

PREFACE	v
-------------------	---

PART I

THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND OF SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION	3
--------------	---

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY	7
-----------------------------	---

Interactionism. The How's and Why's of Behavior. *Man According to the Ancients*. Platonic versus Aristotelian Views. Hedonistic Description of Behavior. The Legalistic View. *Medieval Doctrines*. Free Will without Freedom. Machiavellianism. Climate and Conduct. *Neothological Theories*. Early Empiricism. Positivism and Determinism. Racism. Tarde and the Theory of Imitation. *Instinctivism*. The Revival of Aristotelianism. Instincts as the Cause of Society. Society as a Repressor of Instincts. Static Nature of the Older Views. *The Contemporary View*. Cooley and the Neo-Platonic View. Interactionism, the Situational Approach.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR	30
--	----

Nature versus Nurture. The Extreme Hereditarians. The Extreme Environmentalists. The Interactional View. Research Findings. *The Neuroglandular Bases of Behavior*. The Neuroglandular System. *Motivation*. Organic Basis of Motivation. Social Aspects of Motivation. *Emotions*. Socially Acquired Emotions. Emotions and Learning. *Learning*. Maturation and Learning. The Learning Process. Types of Learning. *Summary*.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOCULTURAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR	45
---	----

Dependence of the Individual on Society. Individual "Freedom." *Society*. As a Product of Human Experience. Functional Interdependence of Social Elements. The Individual as a Functional Part of Society. The Social Role. *Society as an Abstraction*. The Fallacy of Oversimplification. The Fallacy of Personification. *The Individual and His Society*. A Child's-eye View of Society. *Summary*.

PART II THE PROCESSES OF SOCIALIZATION

CHAPTER IV

SOCIALIZATION 59

Social Anticipation. Initial Status. "Earned" Status. Status as a Product of Numerous Factors. The "Either-or" Principle. *Cumulative Character of Socialization.* The Determination of Meanings. Effects of Prior Experiences. Cause and Coincidence. *As the Twig is Bent.* The Pattern of Socialization.

CHAPTER V

TYPES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 74

Traditional Categories. Functional Dissection. Dissection of the Behaviors of Man. *Overt versus Covert Behaviors.* Functions of the Overt Behaviors. The Nature of Covert Behaviors. The Delayed Response. Inconsistency of the Delayed Response. Relation between Overt and Covert Behaviors. *Symbolic versus Nonsymbolic Behaviors.* Symbolic Behavior as the Modus Operandi of Social Life. Nonsymbolic Action as the Substance of Social Life. Why the Symbolic-nonsymbolic Distinction Is Necessary. *The Fourfold Character of Behavior.* Admixture of Types of Behavior.

CHAPTER VI

OVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: I. GESTURE 86

Gesture and Its Functions. The Subtleties of Gestural Language. Gesture and Modern Life. Unintentional Use. Pantomime. *The Social Origin of Gesture Symbols.* Lack of Natural Gestures. Differences in Gesture Languages. *Acquisition of Gestural Behavior.* Learning Not Imitative. Response to Gestures. Individual Variations. Self-expression through Gestures. Gestures of Pain or Discomfort. Gestures of "Pleasure." Individual Variations. *Limitations of Gesture.* Abstract Ideas.

CHAPTER VII

OVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: II. SPEECH 101

Speech as a System of Symbolic Behaviors. The Elements of Speech. The Functions of Speech. The "Meaning" of a Word. "Vocal Gesture." Word Combination and the Synthesis of Reactions. *Acquisition of Verbal Behavior.* Response to Verbal Symbols. Words Having Pleasure Value. Words Having "Pain" Value. Response to Tonal Qualities. Individual Variations. Self-expression through Verbal Behavior. The Acquisition of Speech. Individual Variations. *Resymbolization of Verbal Symbols.* Limitations of Speech. The Written Word. Writing and Speaking Contrasted. *The Use of Verbalisms.* The "Talking" Culture. Verbal Attitudes.

CHAPTER VIII

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: I 119

Learning by Experience. *Learning by Human Example.* Imitation. A Trial-and-error Short Cut. *The Human Model.* The Concept of a Model.

The Social Self and Self-roles. The Selection of Models. The Primary Model. Model Fixation. The Negative Model. *Models and Social Maturation*. The Need for Secondary Models. Social Control of Model Shifting. Lack of System in Contemporary Society. Toys as Aids to Learning. *Child Play and Child Models*. Limited Value of Adult Models. Sex Divergence. The Child Society. The Antisocial Gang. Induction into Adult Patterns. *Ambition and Models in Adult Life*. Looking Like versus Being Like.

CHAPTER IX

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: II. SYMBOLIC SOURCES 140

The Symbolic Environment. Symbolic Environment as Peculiar to Man. Symbolic Extension of the Social Universe. *Symbolic Models*. The Story as a Source of Symbolic Models. The Dramatic Pattern. Symbolic versus Actual Models. *Social Change and the Resort to Symbolic Models*. Declining Value of Actual Persons. Motion Pictures, Comics, and Radio Serials. Limits to Use of Symbolic Models. *Formal Education and Overt Nonsymbolic Behavior*. The Classical Tradition. The Teacher as a Model. Natural Science in the School. The School as an "Ideal" World. The Sociopsychological Function of the School. *Social Change and the Composite Model*. Stereotyped Composite Models. Composite Models and the Covert Behaviors.

CHAPTER X

THE COVERT BEHAVIORS 159

As "Intervening Variables." The Private Self. The Clinical Life History. *Covert Symbolic Behavior*. Kinds of Covert Symbols. *Social Significance of Covert Symbolic Behavior*. Directed Daydreaming. Remembering. Thinking. Logic. Validity of Symbols. *Acquisition of Covert Symbolic Behaviors*. Creative Thinking. Educational "Drill" and Thinking. *Thinking and Overt Behaviors*. *Covert Nonsymbolic Behaviors*. Descriptive Use of Subjective Terms. Use and Abuse of Subjective Terms. *Function of Covert Nonsymbolic Behaviors*. Social Motivation. Cultural and Individual Variations. "Emotional" Aspects. *Acquisition of Covert Nonsymbolic Behaviors*. Individual Variations. *Conflict and Psychological Tensions*.

PART III

THE HUMAN PERSONALITY

CHAPTER XI

PERSONALITY 183

Personality: Unique Product of Socialization. Personality Analysis. *Personality versus Overt Behavior*. Personality and the Situational Variables. Personality as Derived from Multiple Inferences. Personality, Basis for Prediction. *Dynamics of Personality Organization*. Self-roles and the Dynamic Organization of Personality. The Dynamics of Role-forming. *Functional Dissection of Personality*. Personality Stereotypes.

Normative versus Deviant Attributes of Personality. The Effect of Group Identification.

CHAPTER XII

PERSONALITY STEREOTYPING 200

The Actuarial Function of Society. The Prediction of Human Behavior. Personality in the Modern World. *Stereotyping*. Stereotyping as a Substitute for Intimacy. Categories of Species and of Variety. Conventional Personality Stereotypes. Conventional Stereotypes and Behavior. Artificial Control of Stereotyping. Individual Stereotypes. Generalization on the Basis of the Particular. *Attempts to Validate Stereotyping*. The Rationalization of Stereotyping. Pseudoscientific Justifications. Physognomy and Phrenology. Pyknic and Asthenic "Types." Somatotypes. The Unrealistic Character of All Stereotyping. *Indirect Relation between Physique and Personality*. Nature of the Relationship. The Either-or Result of Stereotyping.

CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY NORMS 220

Human Nature. The Basic Personality Type. *In-groups versus Out-groups*. Dichotomization into In-groups and Out-groups. Social Determination of Dichotomization. Positive Identification. Negative Identification. Attitudinal Aspects. Individual and Social Consequences of Identification. Bias, Prejudice, and Differences in Personality Norms. The Social Origin of Differences in Norms. The Fiction of Biological Origin, a Rationalization. *Racial Norms*. The Concept of Race. The Aryan Myth. The Cultural Nature of Racial Norms. *Habitational Norms*. Regional Norms. Rural-urban Norms. *Class and Craft Norms*. Class. Social Origin of Class Distinctions. Craft Norms. *Sex Norms*. The Sex Division of Labor. The Changing Status of Women. *Personality in Contemporary Society*.

CHAPTER XIV

PERSONALITY DEVIATIONS 246

The Relativity of Deviant Attributes. Deviations in Kind and in Degree. Lay Recognition of Deviations. The Lay versus the Scientific View of Deviation. *Manifestations of Deviant Attributes*. Trait Analysis. The Covert "Frame of Reference." The Organization of Deviant Attributes. *The Problems of Deviation Illustrated: Leadership*. Leadership Defined. Nominal versus Actual Leadership. Personality Attributes Involved in Leadership. The Times versus the Man. Specific Nature of Leadership. Origin of Leadership Attributes. *Social Change and Deviant Behaviors*.

CHAPTER XV

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROLS 265

Social Control of Deviant Attributes. Distinguished from Mementary Situational Factors. Group Tolerances. Permissible Deviant Roles. *Determinants of Group Norms of Conduct*. Cultural Factors. Experimental Factors. *Group Morale and Group Identification*. Factors Influ-

CONTENTS

xi

encing Morale. Group Morale and Social Control. *Means of Social Control*. Physical Intimidation. Economic Intimidation. Social Intimidation. Social Control and Personality Maladjustment.

PART IV

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

CHAPTER XVI

THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT 287

Dynamics in the Stable Society. *The Physical Life Cycle*. Physical Maturation. Adolescence. Maturity. Accidents and Illnesses. Senescence. Old Age and Death. Indirect Effects of the Life Cycle. *The Social Life Cycle*. The Nature of the Social Role. Childhood and Youth. Occupational Maturity. Marriage and Parenthood. Old Age. Shifting Roles and Personality Adaptation. *Social Dynamics*. Social Disorganization. Long-run versus Short-run Adjustment Values.

CHAPTER XVII

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND MALPREPARATION FOR MODERN LIFE 300

Atypicality of the Family Milieu. Overindulgence. Overguidance. Social Isolation. Irresponsibility. Instability. *Disorganization of the Community Milieu*. Sexual Adjustment. Occupational Adjustment. Marital Adjustment. *The Decline of Religious Faith*. Bereavement. Old Age and Death.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIAL CHANGE AND MALADJUSTMENT 319

Functional Relativity of Personality Attributes. Change and the Devaluation of Personality Attributes. Social Change and Individual Movement. *Spatial Mobility*. Immigration. The "Marginal Man." Urbanward Migration. *Socioeconomic Mobility*. Individual Mobility. The Nouveau Riche. The Nouveau Pauvre. The Liquidated Class. The New Elite. *Occupational Mobility*. Economic Insecurity. The Occupational Way of Life. *War and Revolution*. Total War and Total Revolution. Effects of Total War and Revolution.

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIALLY ATYPICAL PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT 338

Atypical Adjustments. The Atypical and the Maladjusted. *The Criminal*. Origin of the Criminal Personality. The Sociopsychological Definition. The Inveterate or Habitual Criminal. The Incidental or Fortuitous Criminal. The Juvenile Delinquent as a Potential Criminal. *The Prostitute*. The Professional versus the Amateur. *The Sex Pervert*. The Autosexual. The Homosexual. Social Backgrounds of Homosexuality. *The Celibate*. Social Antecedents of Sexual Abstinence. The Celibate and Sexual Abstinence. *The Unsociable*. *The Vagrant*. Professional Migratory Parasites. The Hobo as an Urban Product. The Tramp as a Rural Product. Professional Vagrants. The Bum. Atypical Times and Atypical Patterns of Adjustment. *Summary*.

CHAPTER XX

PSYCHOLOGICALLY ABNORMAL MODES OF ADJUSTMENT 358

The Normal Personality. Abnormality Socially Defined. The Psychopathic Personality. Organic versus Functional Bases for Abnormality. Social Disorganization, Social Change, and the Conflict Situation. A Classification on the Basis of Social Antecedents. *Compensatory Adjustments*. The Conflicts of "Wants" with Actualities. Daydreaming as a Compensatory Device. Fiction as a Compensatory Device. Romanticizing. *Dissociation as a Mode of Adjustment*. Logic-tight Compartments. The "Split Personality." *Escape Mechanisms as Modes of Adjustment*. As Distinguished from Compensatory Adjustments. Psychosomatic Disabilities. Dipsomania. Rationalizing. Amnesia. *The Social Consequences of Abnormal Behavior*. The "Mass Movement."

PART V

SOCIAL INTERACTION

CHAPTER XXI

THE INTERACTIONAL SITUATION 379

Collective Behavior. Nonsocial and Social Behavior. Social Interaction and Collective Behavior. Collective Behavior as More than the Sum of Individual Behaviors. *The Social or Interactional Situation*. Factors Facilitating Interaction. *Aspects of Situational Interaction*. Origin and Membership. Leadership. *Types of Interactional Situations*. Analytical versus Descriptive Approaches. Multiplicity of Situational Types. Metaphysical Concepts.

CHAPTER XXII

CULTURAL SITUATIONS 390

Conventional Situations. Conventional Patterns of Interaction. Conventional Patterns in Modern Life. *Institutional Situations*. The Institutional Basis of Behavior. Institutions and the Institutional Situation. Institutionalization in Modern Society. *Characteristics of the Institutional Situation*. Origin. Constellations of Situations. Ideological versus Actual Function. The Exclusiveness of Institutional Situations. Training for Membership. Selection of Members. Individual Initiative in Institutional Situations. Limitations of Institutional Situations. Social Disorganization and the Institutional Situation. *Formal Situations*. Social Decadence. Self-interest of Participants. The Formal versus the Actual.

CHAPTER XXIII

INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS 408

Congenial Situations. Basis in Recreational Needs. Shifting Leadership. The "Bull Session." Modern Separation of Work and Play. *Fugitive Patterns*. Rumor. Drama and Authenticity in Rumor. Conversational Rivalry and the Spread of Rumor. Conditions Making for Rumors. Rumor as a Substitute for Knowledge. Legend. Other Fugitive Patterns. *Arranged Congenial Situations*. Recreational Clubs. Games.

Conference and Committee Situations. Formal Objectives of the Conference. Recreational Functions of the Conference. Politic Function. Conversational and Morale Functions. *Exchange Situations.* The Sales Situation. Barter. Varieties of Sales Situations. *Audience Situations.* Theater Audiences. Lecture Audiences. The Popular-lecture Audience. The Conversion Audience. The Educational Audience. Audience Size and the Hypothetical Listener. Interaction of Leader and Audience. Audience Interstimulation. Density.

CHAPTER XXIV

PUBLICS 432

The Nature of Publics. Multiplicity of Publics. The Functions of Publics. *Institutionalized Publics.* Traditional Leadership. Regimental Leadership. Democratic Leadership. Dictatorial Leadership. *Indeterminate Publics.* Recreational Publics. Systematically Shifting Leadership. Random Leadership and the Congenial Public. Propaganda and the Conversational Public. The Techniques of Propaganda. Effectiveness of Propaganda. Censorship. Counterpropaganda. Public Opinion. *Public Whim and Fancy.* The Fad. The Boom. The Craze. *Fashion Publics.* Prestige as a Basis for Leadership. Fashion Prestige. Men's Styles. Women's Styles. The Nature of Fashion Leadership.

CHAPTER XXV

ABNORMAL SITUATIONS 460

The Abnormal Situation as Tension-releasing. *The Audience Fanatique.* Evangelical Meetings. *The Uncoordinated Riot Situation.* Mimicry in the Brawl. *The Panic Situation.* Theater Panics. War and Panic. Prevention of Panics. Mutual Aid. *Coordinated Riot Situations.* The Mob. Lynching. Social Disorganization and Mob Violence. Race and Labor Riots. *The Mass Movement.* *The Revolution.* Leadership in Revolution. *Recapitulation.*

APPENDIX 481

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND AUTHOR INDEX 549

SUBJECT INDEX 621

PART I

The Nature of the Individual and of Society

INTRODUCTION

The most significant feature of this period, the "middle ages" of the twentieth century, may prove to be neither atomic fission nor jet-propelled supersonic planes but, rather, man's intense and critical preoccupation with himself. Man has always of necessity been his own best friend; and, for less valid reasons, he has also been his own staunchest admirer. He has usually fashioned his gods in his own image and has commonly made himself hero of his legends and folk tales. Even the sorriest primitive has been man enough to believe himself the center and the purpose of the universe. It was to water his crops that the rains came; and when they failed to come, it was because the gods were angry with him. And while the primitive could only assume that the sun rose and set for his convenience, civilized man has been able to prove that the world and the sun and the moon and the stars were all created for his benefit. For the magic of literacy is that it enables men to document their fictions.

That modern men are intensely interested in themselves and that they consider their affairs of preeminent importance even in the cosmic scheme of things is not remarkable. What is peculiar to the times is the extremely dim view that modern men take of themselves. They seem to find a masochistic delight in criticism, however harsh, and they flay about them at their fellow men with sadistic disregard for truth. They applaud the soap-opera version of men as witless fools, stumbling from one self-wrought difficulty to another. They are omnivorous readers of books that charge them simultaneously with destroying the topsoil which they need to maintain life and with overpopulating the land from which the topsoil has not yet been washed into the sea. They demand fresh rumors of war along with their synthetic breakfast foods, and their newspapers and radio commentators are always able and eager to oblige. Their favorite historian is a prophet of doom, who writes of modern civilization with the solemnly sanctimonious air of a professional mortician; and their most respected high priest is a mystic who assures them gloomily that all their troubles stem from themselves.¹

The peculiarly dim view that modern men take of themselves and of what the future holds for them is but an individual manifestation of the

¹ We refer, of course, to the historian-philosopher A. J. Toynbee (*Civilisation on trial*, 1948) and the practicing disciples of the philosopher-psychologist Freud.

fact that the age is one of violent and fundamental change. Old social norms are being outmoded, and new social norms have not yet crystallized. This is a period of history in the making, a period that the historians of the future may designate as either the epoch of dissolution or the era of reconstruction, depending on the outcome of contemporary events and on the scale of values that the future uses in its judgment of that outcome. But those who live in the present can know only that the time is one of incessant change and concomitant personal and social uncertainty. In the midst of individual and collective confusion and conflict, the only certainty is that tomorrow will be different from today.

Social uncertainty is not peculiar to the modern world, and the philosophers may justly point out that it is during periods of social change that men's minds are most freed from social bondage to work out new and perhaps better ways of social life. But such observations provide slight comfort to those who are distressed by the disorders of the present. That some few survive though many die is hardly consolation to the man who is suffering from cancer. He wants a cure; he wants to know what can be done to restore his body to its healthy state, to make it function normally once again. And because many men suffer from physical disabilities and wish to be cured of them, medical scientists the world around are probing into the nature of organic life and are endeavoring to discern the causes of disorder to that life. Human anguish underlies the efforts of such investigation, for it is pain that makes man curious about the workings of his body.

It is pain, too, that makes man aware of and concerned with his society. When he loses his job and can find no other, when his lifelong savings are wiped out by inflation, when the happy marriage dissolves in misery, when the perfect son turns out a wastrel, when peace is seen as but the prelude to war and political reforms as but a step toward rebellion—when such things happen, man is distressed. That distress is no less agonizing because it is mental.

That the uncertainties and conflicts of contemporary life have brought men perilously close to despair is evidenced by their lack of confidence in themselves and in their frantic struggles to achieve by magic means some sort of social stability, some way of life that will at least give them assurance of continuity, give them tomorrows that stem directly from yesterdays. These struggles take varied forms.)

Individually, men may endeavor to preserve the social practices of the past, refusing to face the inescapable fact that many of these practices are incompatible with present circumstances. Or they may lose themselves briefly in some utopian faith, ignoring all else until they are at last returned, disillusioned, to the chaotic present. Or, utterly despair-

ing, they may retreat into a world of their own imagining or else terminate their personal uncertainty by resort to death, the one unvarying end of life.

Concurrent with individual strivings are varied and conflicting collective endeavors. Some are directed toward a recapturing of the past; some are but an attempt to preserve the present—to freeze the processes of history; some are a sanguine effort to speed the coming of the unknown future. War and peace, revolution and counterrevolution, prosperity and depression are the names we give to the more violent phases of these collective efforts. But these endeavors do not alleviate the uncertainties and the conflicts of present social life; they merely aggravate them.

It is the view of the social scientist that, if he can learn why man is as he is and does as he does, it is possible—just possible—that man can be cured of his social disabilities. To put it another way, knowledge—as distinct from belief and superstition—about the causes of social change may introduce a new factor into the determination of those changes, a factor of deliberate control, just as knowledge of the causes of many organic diseases has made it possible to check or foreshorten the course of those diseases.

As one of the specialists in the search for knowledge, the social psychologist has gradually discovered that the behavior of man is largely a product of the behavior of other men, known collectively and abstractly as “society.” The ramifications of this discovery are many and will be discussed one by one in the chapters that follow. For one thing, we now know in a general way why men are distressed by the conflicts and uncertainties of contemporary life, why they prefer social stability to instability, social coherence to incoherence, the well-worn path to the untracked wilderness. We know, too, something of the ways in which the relatively stable society fits the individual to it, training him to relive the patterns of his forefathers with a complacent disregard for other possibilities. We now also vaguely understand why a changing social order fails to prepare the individual for adapting to constant change and why, on the other hand, it so often malprepares him for the many circumstances he will meet during life. These understandings are not yet complete, but they potentially liberate man from the fallacious and degrading thesis that his troubles are inherent and inevitable. That they have not yet restored man’s confidence in himself and his ability to build a more satisfying way of life is but a consequence of the characteristic lag between the rise of a science and its application to human affairs. Today as yesterday man listens to the politicians and, when their airy promises evaporate, turns to the social and psychological quacks for help.

But a science of social psychology is now emerging ; and although its findings do not support the easy promises of the politicians or the magic cures of the well-meaning quack, they do offer substance for the hope that together and in due time the social sciences will come to the aid of troubled man even as the physical and biological sciences have already done.

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The metes and bounds of social psychology, a specialized discipline within the general field of the social sciences, are not subject to precise definition; they change as our knowledge grows. The general area of study is perhaps best indicated in terms of the particular problems with which social psychology deals. As a specialized discipline, social psychology made its appearance rather late in the development of the social sciences and as a response to the gradual discovery that there were problems of social life not adequately studied by sociology and psychology. This same sort of discovery occurred also in the physical and biological sciences, where geophysics developed to fill in the gap between geology and physics, and biochemistry arose in recognition of the fact that there is no sharp line between chemical and biological phenomena. To put it in the simplest possible terms, social psychology is to sociology and psychology as biochemistry is to biology and chemistry.

The sociologist (and in different ways the historian, the economist, and the political scientist) has taken as his problem the study of the social organizations of men. He studies the patterns of group life, the forces that make for the rise and decline of specific patterns, the relations of group to group, and the like. These patterns of group organization are the elements of society, all of which he studies, as we shall later see in detail, in abstraction. The psychologist, on the other hand, has historically been interested in the nature of the individual human being, endeavoring to discover the processes involved in his adjustments to his environment, the machinery and processes of learning, and the like. As sociological and psychological knowledge increased, it became evident that there is a third problem: the relation between the psychologist's "individual" and the sociologist's "society." This is the general problem with which the social psychologist is concerned.

It is now evident, although long overlooked, that there can be no group life apart from the individual human beings whose coming together forms the group. It is also now evident that there can be no individual human being apart from the groups in which and through which he lives.¹

¹ The May, 1939, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to articles representative of the various modern approaches to the subject of the relationship of the individual and the group.

There could be no pattern of family life were it not for the existence of actual Mr. and Mrs. Smiths and their sons and daughters. There could be no Mr. and Mrs. Smiths and their sons and daughters were it not for the existence of the family as a social group. Social psychologists have endeavored to resolve this apparent contradiction, taking as their problem the study of the relationship between the individual human being and his society.

Interactionism. With increasing study of this relationship, the social psychologist gradually found it necessary to abandon the original concept of one-way cause and effect (*i.e.*, that society causes the individual or that the individual causes society) in favor of the idea of interaction. This shift in conceptualization constitutes a major revolution in sociopsychological thought. Prior to the present century, as we shall shortly see, most ideas about human behavior were based upon the concept of one-way cause and effect. Thus, "human nature" (*i.e.*, the typical behavior of the members of a particular social group) was thought to be the effect of this or that cause. Today we realize that behavior is produced in large part through the interactions of men with men. But before entering upon a detailed analysis of this newer point of view and the findings that gave rise to it, it may be well to consider briefly the prescientific period during which men's minds were dominated by the idea of one-way cause and effect.

The How's and Why's of Behavior. Interest in human behavior is probably as old as history. Men have shown constant concern with how men behave. Generalized statements regarding the characteristic behaviors of men are to be found in the records of all literate peoples. They are descriptions, presumably based on experience, of how people behave under this or that circumstance and, thus, of how they may be manipulated into doing whatever is desired of them. Although usually condensed into proverb form, these descriptions are reminiscent of a modern book on how to win friends, sell merchandise, or secure votes.

Only, however, during periods of social change, when old precepts have lost their effectiveness and life has become one vast confusion and uncertainty, have men sought an understanding of why men behave in whatever way they may behave. And this question, why men behave as they do, is a crude statement of the problem of the modern social psychologists. The prescientific answers were, however, often quite different from the present one.

MAN ACCORDING TO THE ANCIENTS

Platonic versus Aristotelian Views. What the Egyptians and Babylonians thought about themselves when their time of greatness had

passed and their civilizations were crumbling into history is not recorded. But the Greeks and the Romans after them did better by us; they left many records of their thinking, including their views about themselves, their natures, and their potentialities. In its later days, Greek civilization produced, among other things, two diametrically opposed theories of the origins of human behavior. Plato,² an idealist who hoped to save Greece from final dissolution, proposed the setting up of a new social system and in so doing advanced a concept of the origins of human behavior that is now, some twenty centuries later, not entirely incompatible with socio-psychological findings. He insisted that people behave as they do because they have been taught so to behave. They are born capable of learning to act in the ways in which society trains them. If, therefore, we do not like the way that men behave, the system of social education should be adjusted to our ideas of what is desirable. Plato did not make the mistake of thinking that education is simply a matter of reading, writing, and arithmetic. He saw it as the entire process that we now term "socialization," a process which begins shortly after birth and ends only at death and which includes all the directional influences of all the human beings with whom the individual lives. Plato anticipated the idea of innate differential capacity to learn and yet did not, as has since been done, assume a direct relationship between the social position of parents and the biological capabilities of their offspring.

The concept of the origins of human behavior that Plato advanced did not, however, survive the extremely simple, though highly pessimistic, views advanced by his disciple Aristotle.³ Plato believed that the behavior of the individual was a consequence of the society in and by which the individual had been trained. The nature of an individual's behavior would depend, therefore, upon the character of his society. Aristotle, however, reversed the Platonic view and found the cause of society in the "nature" of the individual. He believed that society is but a consequence of the instinctive, and therefore unchangeable, character of the individual. Thus, since it is impossible to change man's nature, it is impossible to modify society. Aristotle buttressed his interpretation with a careful and impressive study of the formal constitutions of the Greek city-states, a factual survey that has led some to acclaim him the first of the social scientists.

Although Plato undoubtedly overestimated the plasticity of society, he did not overestimate that of the human organism. He displayed a

² See *The dialogues of Plato* (B. Jowett, 1892). Plato's most direct statement of a theory of human nature occurs in *The laws* (Vol. V, pp. 708-709).

³ The social views of Aristotle can be examined in *The politics* (B. Jowett, 1885). Note particularly I : 1 and 2 and VII : 13 and 15.

perception and depth of insight that was totally lacking in Aristotle, who suffered from a common human failing—a social form of myopia. Aristotle, from his observation that the people of Greece behaved in a quite uniform manner, fallaciously concluded that this was the only way men could behave. He did not realize that all around the Greek peninsula there were men who lived in social ways that were very different from the Greek pattern. If he had extended his observations, he would not have been able to conclude that society is a consequence of a constant biological cause, a conclusion that reduces men to the status of biological slaves, removed in degree but not in kind from social insects. Aristotle's concept, however, untenable as it subsequently proved to be, nevertheless persisted as a grim and foreboding specter that haunted the thinking of social scientists even into the present century.

Hedonistic Description of Behavior. Whenever men suffer from the consequences of social disorganization, there are always those among them who insist that such disorder is natural and therefore inevitable. Such a philosophy of human behavior arose as a justification for the individual manifestations of the disorders of decadent Greece. Sensitive moralists were apparently pleading with the digressors to give up wine, women, and song for the sober life of their ancestors. For, as though in reply to moralists, there was advanced a theory of individual behavior, usually accredited to Socrates and now termed "early hedonism," which led to the conclusion that men naturally do that which pleases them and avoid that which displeases them. They cannot, therefore, reform or be reformed. This pleasure-pain explanation of human actions survived the decline of Greece to receive acceptance on the part of many Roman philosophers.

Early hedonism ⁴ is exceedingly realistic in its approach to the facts of human behavior but is somewhat futile as a doctrine of causation. The early hedonists succeeded in describing what some men do under some circumstances. Their failure lay in the assumption that it is "natural" for men to do these things and equally natural for them to avoid doing anything else. We now realize that, although it is natural (native or biologically determined) for men to respond in certain generalized ways to a few specific stimuli, most of their ways are socially designated. What is pleasurable to the human animal may, in fact, become "painful" to the social human being. Thus the early hedonists made the same basic mistake as did Aristotle: they assumed that natural, biological forces determine what human beings will do. Like Aristotle, they believed society

⁴ For a discussion of the older hedonistic theories, see *Hedonistic theories* (J. Watson, 1895).

to be an outcome of the "natural" character of man and consequently unchangeable.

The Legalistic View.⁵ Greek civilization withered away, and for a time Rome was the cultural center of the Western world. When, toward the close of the pre-Christian era, Roman social organization began to crumble, a legalistic interpretation of human behavior came into vogue. Based on Greek hedonism, it predicated the view that we can change society by governmental manipulation of the rewards and punishments that follow any given human act. Since men will do only those things that give them pleasure, and since pleasure is obtained from money or the things that money will buy, they can be made to do desirable things if a bonus is given for the desirable act. Conversely, since men avoid pain, they can be made to avoid doing whatever the ruler thinks is undesirable by making physical pain the consequence of such acts.

Many recent practices of meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with governmental ideas of social desirability have been erected upon this legalistic view of the origin of human behavior. Our penal system is, in the main, still operating on the punishment theory. Our laissez-faire economic system is supposed to operate upon the basis of the "profit incentive," which is the other aspect of the same hypothesis. Centuries of failure have not shaken legislators, judges, juries, or executioners from their faith in the legalistic theory. And only recently have even the students of criminology recognized that the professional criminal may at times get far more pleasure from the approval of his associates than he does "pain" from the ever-present threat of brutish physical punishment.

MEDIEVAL DOCTRINES

Free Will Without Freedom. Aristotle had called the determinant of man's behavior, and thus of society, "nature." When the medieval social system entered upon its long slow disintegration, the medieval theologians changed the symbol from "nature" to "God." This change in point of reference necessitated some explanation of the fact that not all men behaved in the ways that the church deemed to be satisfactory to the Creator. Since nature is nonethical, the Aristotelian view had avoided this obvious contradiction. But God, being both omnipotent and good, could not be the cause of evil human behavior; yet men frequently behaved in contradiction to the laws of God. To escape this dilemma, the theologians postulated a personalized force opposed to God. His name was Satan; and he offered men, the creatures of God, rewards (tem-

⁵ See *The political works of Marcus Tullius Cicero* (F. Barham, 1841).

porary but enticing) for living in ways contrary to those designated as satisfactory to man's Creator. Man frequently succumbed to these empty promises, and thus not all men were good. In this way the unethical behavior of man, a divine creation, was explained away.

Now if men could, as they all too frequently did, go the way of the Devil rather than that of God, it followed that God had given them the right and power of free choice. He had created them in His own image. He had also designated, through the church authorities, the divine design for living. But, as though He were above utilizing to the fullest His powers of control, God had granted men the liberty of choosing freely between the right way of life and the wrong.

The idea that men are individually free to decide for themselves whether they will follow the ways of God or the Devil is known as the "theory of free will."⁶ This heritage of medieval theology is interestingly persuasive and exceedingly deceptive. Perhaps the majority of modern men believe, however vaguely, that they possess an entity known as free will and can make free and uninfluenced decisions. Actually the theory of free will does not postulate a human individual who is free from forces beyond his control. It simply divides those extrahuman forces into two mutually exclusive categories and says that the individual is free to decide to which of these behavior-determining force units he will submit. Thus under the freewill concept man is as fully bound as he is under Aristotle's dogma that society is the outward consequence of native human instincts. The freewill concept simply makes the "natural" society of Aristotle a duality: there are, then, two distinct societies or modes of human conduct, one prescribed by God, the other, by His opponent, the Devil. Between these two, man is free to make a choice. But the character of each of these societies is fixed by forces external to man. Man is not, therefore, free to will his own society; it is ready made for him.

As long as the accepted social system is a reasonably effective one, this doctrine serves admirably to keep people in line. They can behave in the ways of the majority of men or else in those of some minority. Those who follow the former ways are the godly; those who follow the latter, the satanic. But in a period of social transition—the later Middle Ages or, indeed, our own era—it is difficult to discern a pattern of majority social ways; and thus the theoretical "choice" loses even its theoretical possibilities. What, the modern man might ask, are the forms of behavior that have divine sanction?

The doctrine of free will, never more than a rationalistic postulate,

⁶ The doctrine of free will was implicit in the writings of all the medieval theologians. See *A student's history of philosophy* (A. K. Rogers, 1907).

granted man no power of self-determination; and with the growth of social disorder and uncertainty it lost even its rationalizing value.⁷ Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that it had long since been discarded as unrealistic by psychologists and sociologists alike, the doctrine of free will reappeared in new garb and new terminology and became one of the stumbling blocks to the scientific approach to human behavior.⁸

Machiavellianism. Before its revival, however, the doctrine of freeless free will was vigorously attacked by a long line of social philosophers who defied the theologians and thereby paved the way for the development of the social sciences. Foremost among those who questioned the idea of freewill choice between the ways of God and those of the Devil was Niccolò Machiavelli, adviser to Italian princes and father of chauvinistic political theory. In the early part of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli revived the concept of the Roman legalists and, mixing it with the bitter wine of experience, proclaimed that man is by nature bad, that he has no choice in the matter, and that he will go the way of the Devil unless he is persuaded to do otherwise by wise and wily political leadership. Thus Machiavelli advised the Italian prince to accept as his burden the duty of preventing men from destroying themselves and one another. Since men are by nature bad, there is no use in pleading with them to do right; they cannot be taught or forced to do the proper thing. Only by tricking them into thinking that they are achieving their evil ends while they are actually contributing to the welfare of the state can the prince succeed in getting good behavior from them.

Under the guise of giving frank advice to political leaders, Machiavelli recorded, perhaps for the first time, the stratagems that successful politicians have no doubt used since the beginning of human history. For saying what every well-informed person already knew, his name

⁷ The terms "rational" and "rationalism" refer to the dogma that the "mind" contains innate ideas and functions with an innate logic. The term "rationalization," on the other hand, refers to the advancing of pseudological or rational explanations for man's behavior after the act (or after deciding to perform the act). When the average man explains to his friends why he bought a new car, he is probably rationalizing. He may say that the new car is a necessity, that it is cheaper to operate than was his last year's model, and that, therefore, the purchase was economically desirable, etc. The actual forces that led him to make the purchase are, generally, entirely beyond his comprehension.

⁸ Even in the early 1930's the notion that man possesses freedom of choice had not lost its appeal. Emboldened by the uncertainties of modern subatomic physics, particularly by Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, certain popularizers of science again offered this dogma to a perplexed world. Thus we read: "The future may not be as unalterably determined by the past as we used to think; in part at least it may rest on the knees of whatever gods there be" (Sir James Jeans, 1930, p. 27).

was made the symbol of all that is mean and underhanded. But his book *The prince*, written in 1513, remains today an excellent manual of political craftsmanship for ward heeler and president alike.

Climate and Conduct. The concept of the native and therefore permanent badness of human behavior did not, however, go unchallenged. For some centuries, while the power of the church was declining and that of the state was ascending, theologians and political realists debated whether man was by nature bad or good. The growth of trade relations in later medieval Europe, the discovery of new lands inhabited by strange peoples, and all the forces that were breaking down European isolation undermined the provincial outlook of European philosophers.

In the early part of the eighteenth century there arose a man so puzzled by the discovery that the members of different societies lived, and with apparent satisfaction, in different ways that he asked, "Just what is good behavior and what is bad?" This man, Charles de Montesquieu, advanced a theory of the origins of human behavior that, although not entirely original with him, was to become the basis for what remains today an important school of social thought and study.⁹ His theory proved to be one of the first significant steps toward a science of social psychology since the time of Plato.

The idea that men are by nature either good or bad is logically permissible only to those who suffer from that social myopia mentioned some pages ago. Unless the behavior of men can be categorically separated into that which is good and that which is bad, it is senseless to consider men as naturally either good or bad. Within the closed circle of a single social system perhaps this is possible: adherence to the social pattern would be good; all else, bad. But, when we look outside the single social system and find that social patterns vary among societies, the entire concept crashes. Montesquieu, discovering that what was accepted as good behavior in Morocco or Algiers was in many instances considered bad in France and England and that practices acceptable in these latter countries might be thought very undesirable in the former, realized that, whatever it was that determined the behavior of men, that cause must surely be a variable.

This realization, which was implied in the theories of Plato, was undoubtedly one of the most important discoveries for the future of the

⁹ For books and articles whose basic philosophy resembles that of Montesquieu, see *The patient and the weather* (W. F. Petersen and M. E. Milliken, 1936); *Mainsprings of civilization* (E. Huntington, 1945); *Climate makes the man* (C. A. Mills, 1942); *Climate and the energy of nations* (S. F. Markham, 1947); and "Season of birth and mental differences" (R. Pintner and G. Forlano, 1943).

social sciences, since it led to the study of social facts and to the discard of ancient preconceptions. It is unfortunate that in casting about for a variable that would explain the variations in human behavior, Montesquieu singled out climate.¹⁰ Climate varies between different geographic regions, and Montesquieu thought he saw a correlation between temperature and what was locally considered to be good behavior. And thus on the basis of the then current theories of human physiology he proceeded to explain such things as the social acceptance of slavery in southern countries and its prohibition in temperate ones in terms of climatic variations. Heat, he said, relaxes the fibers of the body and makes men lazy; so enforced labor is necessary if men in warm climates are to provide themselves with the necessities of life. In temperate regions slavery is deemed an evil because it is unnecessary, since cold contracts the fibers of the body and makes men energetic. In like ways he explained the differences between political systems, class organizations, family structures, and all morals and manners.¹¹

This concept of the relationship between the individual and society gives man the possibility of escaping from unsatisfactory social existence by moving to a different climate. Unhappily it is at odds with the facts. The physician's advice to his patient to take a trip to the mountains or to the seashore may be sound; and if it is followed, the patient's health may improve. But there are at least two factual disproofs for the theory that climate is the important determinant of human behavior and thus of the character of society. In the first place, many of the same social practices are to be found existing under extremely different climatic circumstances. Both monogamy and polygamy can be found among peoples living in temperate, in tropical, and in subarctic conditions. As the basic means of securing a livelihood agriculture, in contrast to dependence on fishing, hunting, or the pastoral arts, is to be found in vastly differing regions from the tropics to the subarctic. Industrialism, although concentrated at present in the more temperate re-

¹⁰ According to Wheeler, the cold periods of history are associated with "atomistic" world conditions, whereas warm periods occur with "Gestalt" conditions. The former are identified with scientific atomism, political chaos, democracy, utilitarian morality, religious agnosticism, philosophical materialism, the flowering of program music, etc. The latter are associated with idealism, religious faith, political harmony, moral law, totalitarian government, the flowering of institutionalized music, and the like (R. H. Wheeler, 1935; R. H. Wheeler and T. Gaston, 1941; K. Moore, 1941; and R. H. Wheeler, 1946).

¹¹ The concept of climatic determination of human behavior was implicitly expressed in *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (J. Bodin, 1572). It was somewhat more directly applied in *La Science nouvelle* (G. B. Vico, 1844) and became the basic means of explaining differential social behavior with Montesquieu in his *Spirit of laws* in 1746. Montesquieu served to dogmatize and popularize the idea.

gions of the Northern Hemisphere, is rapidly spreading into the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere. And Christianity knows no climatic boundaries.

In the second place, migration from one climatic region to another does not noticeably change the social life of peoples. The white man takes his clothes, whisky, and modes of conduct into the tropics. Perhaps for the sake of health and convenience he should take over the methods that the natives have worked out for living in heat and humidity, but he seldom does. He is more inclined to teach the native those forms of behavior that he has brought from temperate climes and thereby to decimate the native population.

The climatic theory of human behavior is somewhat akin to the theological with the ethical connotations left out. Not God but nature, acting through climate, determines the social systems under which men live. The individual has free will to select his climate and thus indirectly his modes of behavior.

NEOTHEOLOGICAL THEORIES

It was not Montesquieu, however, who instituted the revival of the freewill theory, but the followers of the great English epistemologist, Francis Bacon.¹² That revival was accompanied by all the verbal clamor which finally freed us from the theological and metaphysical preconceptions of the past and ushered in the age of science. For centuries the great question had been, "What is the source of human knowledge?" The theologians had contended that the church was the fountainhead and that the source was God. The metaphysicians, mainly German philosophers, had argued in favor of innate or intuitive sources. But Bacon, and after him Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and others, came to realize that human experience is the source of human knowledge. It is upon this philosophic assumption that the world of science rests, and with this assumption no scientist would think to quarrel.

Early Empiricism. But out of this assumption came an unfortunate by-product, an idea of individual psychological processes that is exceedingly flattering to man but is no more than the freewill theory dressed up in new terminology. Known as "early empiricism," this view regards man as a sort of fact-digesting machine. Through experience he gathers the facts of the world about him and then decides upon a course of future action in accordance with those facts. The method by which facts are used in the shaping of expedient human action is logic. From a given set of facts there will be a logically derived specific form of action.

¹² For an account of the British philosophers of this period, see *British thought and thinkers* (G. S. Morris, 1880).

Thus, if a man wants to cross a canyon one hundred feet wide and two hundred feet deep and if he knows that he can jump only twenty feet and that he will be killed if he falls fifty, he is logically prevented from trying to jump across.

But the truth is that men are constantly doing things that cause them or others unhappiness and death. Thus it is obviously necessary to postulate a second realm of behavior—illogical. This is looked upon not as a failure of the human mechanism but as a consequence of inadequate factual knowledge. Thus, if men knew all the relevant facts, the argument continues, they would behave logically; and society would be perfect. Its imperfections are due to the inadequacy of knowledge upon which men base their behavior. Under this assumption the hope for a perfect society lies in the extension of the scientific method.

The tremendous improvement in technological efficiency that followed the application of the scientific method to the study of physical nature is ample evidence that men can learn through experience and that they may apply their knowledge to the achievement of social ends. But the disorders of contemporary social life clearly show that men may fail to profit from repeated experience and may fail to apply the knowledge they do possess to the shaping of expedient behavior. There is, it appears, nothing automatic about the learning process; and certainly no inevitable connection exists between what a man knows and what he does. Men are quite likely to disregard what they know and to do whatever they have been taught to do. Many of the current political movements are based upon appeals to ancient social stereotypes long since deflated by scientists; much of the commercial advertising appeals to beliefs contrary to easily obtained factual evidence; and the universally admitted fact that war between nations is invariably disastrous to everyone, including the self-styled victor, has not checked the social forces making for further war.

Early empiricism is but the freewill theory with logic substituted for God and illogic substituted for the Devil. The same questions may be raised against it as were raised against the freewill doctrine. Just what in human behavior is logical and what illogical? If man's behavior is an outcome of the laws of logic, how does it happen that, although some of us may consider it expedient to postpone marriage until an economic competence has been secured, others with the same body of facts available may consider such postponement quite unreasonable if not actually immoral? Comparison shows that what is considered logical behavior in one society is not necessarily deemed logical in another.¹⁸ Human be-

¹⁸ Logic, it has become evident, is a cultural matter; and the conclusions to be drawn from a given set of facts will depend on the culturally determined system of

terminism were exceedingly naive. The question, "Why do people behave differently or have different social systems?" was answered by saying that different peoples are born with the qualities that make for different societies. But all that could be advanced as proof was the fact that people do have varying social systems. This is altogether too much like asserting that the reason that a man's hair is black is that he has black hair.

The contention that the members of some societies are naturally superior to others and thus have more nearly "perfect" social systems was but an elaboration of early empiricism. Racial determinism did not provide a substitute for this doctrine, which was, it should be remembered, but a modified freewill theory. The breaking of the tradition of free will apparently required a revival of Aristotle's instinctivistic concept.

Tarde and the Theory of Imitation.¹⁷ Of all the theories so far mentioned Montesquieu's is the only one that entirely escapes the criticism that the explanation of human behavior is in terms of itself. He conceived of human behavior as a natural response to climatic forces, which, being variable, could be used to explain variations in human behavior. It remained for another Frenchman, Gabriel Tarde, to fix attention upon another factor external to the individual. A jurist, Tarde had apparently learned by repeated experience that men are not notably responsive to factual argument. After many years of service on the bench he became convinced that the cause of criminal behavior was to be found not, as was the current belief, in the organic nature of men but in society. Thus his experience in dealing with criminals, added perhaps to the fact that he had lived through two great political upheavals, led him to the idea that human behavior is contagious, spreading from one person to another through a process which he termed imitation. Briefly, his view was that men are by nature suggestible and tend to do what they see other men doing. Thus the criminal is a man who happens to live among criminals and, imitating the behavior of those around him, acts in ways that society considers criminal. A revolutionist is one who has been exposed to the sight and sound of revolutionary behavior, to which he responds imitatively.

The concept of imitation is a rather effective descriptive device and will be discussed as such in later chapters. At this point, we need remark only that the failure in Tarde's theory lay in thinking that a description of

¹⁷ See *The laws of imitation* (G. Tarde, trans., 1903). For the application of certain aspects of the theory of imitation to the behavior of groups, see *The crowd* (G. Le Bon, trans., 1917).

phenomena provides us with an explanation of them.¹⁸ It is permissible to say that men do imitate each other. That is a description of observable facts. But we are then faced with the question, "Why and how do they imitate?" Tarde assumed that men imitate the behavior of those around them because it is a natural, an automatic, thing for them to do. He thereby somewhat anticipated the mistake of the instinctivists, whose great fallacy served the useful purpose of destroying the tenacious hold of that equally erroneous idea that man is by nature a reasonable animal.

INSTINCTIVISM

At the opening of this century Charles H. Cooley analyzed human nature as the accumulation of habits acquired out of social experience.¹⁹ E. A. Ross approached the same basic conception from a slightly different angle in his *Social control*, an analysis of the social pressures that operate within society to make the individual conform to the group norms, and he later introduced, as an elaboration of the major thesis, Tarde's concept of imitation. The fruitfulness of Ross's distinctive approach and of Cooley's thesis was not, however, immediately recognized (note 1);²⁰ and for a considerable period, sociologists, like the boy on horseback, were riding off in all directions. Many leaned toward the positivistic view of Comte or toward the highly deterministic interpretation of Spencer. Others were endeavoring to apply the viewpoints of such psychologists as William James and J. M. Baldwin. There was therefore the utmost confusion in regard to the origins of human behavior.

The Revival of Aristotelianism. In 1908 William McDougall

¹⁸ There is a vital difference between describing a thing and explaining it; the difference is, however, one of degree, not of kind. In the sense of final cause only the theologian and, possibly, the philosopher attempt to provide an explanation of any phenomenon. But the scientist endeavors to describe the intimately associated processes that precede and accompany; this type of description may be justly termed a scientific explanation. To say that water runs downhill is to describe the obvious. The reduction of this phenomenon to the mathematical laws of mass "attraction" is not, it is true, an explanation of it in terms of final cause but is, rather, a description of all the perceivable "causal" sequences; this is what we mean by "explanation."

¹⁹ See *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1902); and "Charles Horton Cooley: Pioneer in psychosociology" (R. Dewey, 1948). See also "The beginnings of social psychology" (E. Faris, 1945).

²⁰ Numbers in parentheses refer to the various Appendix notes. These notes consist of elaborations of the statements to which they are keyed and are either descriptions of relevant research findings, discussions of controversial issues, analyses of subsidiary problems, detailed illustrative materials, or summaries of the literature on the topic.

pointed the way out by offering a fallacious certainty. Possibly he, more than any other individual, was responsible for the revival of the Aristotelian view.²¹ In any event his instinctivistic interpretation of individual behavior and thus of social causation came to be acclaimed and adopted by a majority of sociologists and not a few psychologists; and for ten years or more it dominated students of social psychology.²²

Looking back, we find it difficult to see why the particularistic views of the instinctivists gained acceptance. Perhaps it was their very simplicity and gratifying finality that caught the interest and attention of scientists. Possibly the instinctivistic movement is to be interpreted as a violent reaction to the empirical tradition, just as later Watsonian behaviorism was a reaction to instinctivism. Whatever the reason, the McDougallian interpretation of human behavior and the methodology of study gained acceptance.

Instincts as the Cause of Society. McDougall and his followers contended that society is but a resultant, not a cause, and that social phenomena are the consequence of the fact that men are born with roughly similar instinctive tendencies. Thus men, individually expressing their innate natures, act much alike; and society is the result. An instinct was, by definition, an inborn urge, drive, wish, or interest (the terms were various). Further confusing the issue, the instinctivists frequently considered an instinct to be a sort of biological goal, unperceived by the organism but attained through a series of predetermined forms of behavior.

Two types of evidence were advanced to support the instinctivistic interpretation. First, there was the argument by analogy. The behavior of certain insects appears to follow a specific and predetermined pattern. Ants and trap-door spiders live in accordance with predetermined adjustment techniques. They are not notably adaptable and will kill themselves in the effort to act as nature has determined that they should. Although considerable doubt has since arisen regarding the inability of insects to learn through experience, the instinctivists

²¹ See *An introduction to social psychology* (W. McDougall, 1908). For evaluations of McDougall's position in social psychology, see "William McDougall and his social psychology" (E. Heidbreder, 1939) and "William McDougall's doctrine of social psychology" (H. E. Jensen, 1939).

²² The first major attack on the instinct hypothesis was "Are there any instincts?" (K. Dunlap, 1919). More vigorous attacks appeared later in *Behaviorism* (J. B. Watson, 1924), in *Instinct: a study in social psychology* (L. L. Bernard, 1924), and in several other articles and books.

For a recent evaluation of the instinct's utility, see "Anthropological data on the problem of instinct" (M. Mead, 1948).

assumed this to be proved and proceeded to compare men with insects. If this was a good deal like arguing that the directional control of airplanes is of the same order as that of railroad trains since both are produced in factories, this fact did not discourage acceptance of the instinctivistic concept.

The second line of argument was even more disarming. It started with the observation that men do behave much alike. It can be said, for example, that in our society most men fall in love, get married, and eventually rear a child or two. From this observation certain of the instinctivists would deduce as the cause of the behavior an instinct for paternity. Others might, of course, conclude that three or more separate instincts were involved, such as sex love, the instinct for marriage, and the instinct for paternity. The permanent character of the marriage relationship under the monogamous system was commonly explained as the result of an instinct of sex jealousy. And thus from the observed fact that men tend to behave so and so, this behavior would be explained as a consequence of the so-and-so instinct. Some writers held out for four or five basic instincts; others found forty or fifty. In any event, they classified the things that men do and, having given names to each classification, proclaimed that each represented an instinct. Unfortunately for the instinct theory, naming does not explain. The instinctivists explained the phenomena of social behavior in terms of themselves. Why do men get married and have families? Because nature has given them an instinct, or instincts, that lead them to do this. How do we know that they have such an instinct or instincts? Because they get married and have families.

The above was, of course, the line of argument that had been used by Aristotle more than two thousand years before. It resulted in a concept of social causation that is of small comfort to men who are dissatisfied with their society. It is sheer word magic and cannot withstand the slightest factual scrutiny. Yet it dominated our thinking for years. What is even more important for the development of social psychology, it gave us a break with the tradition that man is a "reasonable" animal. Instincts are not, of course, reasonable; they are "natural." The behavior resulting from them may or may not be expedient for the maintenance of life. Whether they are or are not expedient depends on external circumstances, since circumstances may change although the instincts will, by definition, remain constant.

Society as a Repressor of Instincts. McDougall had seen society as a direct consequence of the fact that all men are born with roughly similar sets of instincts. But as the theories of Sigmund Freud gained favor in

the United States, the instinctivistic interpretation was modified to fit the Freudian view; and thus instinctivism entered upon its second phase.²³

Freud was not primarily interested in society or, particularly, in the relation of the individual thereto. His was a problem of psychopathology, the treatment of the unstable individual. But in developing a therapeutic technique, Freud arrived at a theoretical interpretation of causation that profoundly affected the instinctivistic view of society. This was, in brief, the idea that internal mental stress or conflict led to the abnormalities that he was trying to cure and that this conflict was a result of the clash between "natural" drives and social experience.²⁴ Psychoanalysis, the technique of free verbal association by which the nature of the conflict was supposed to be located, probed into the hidden aspect of the human mind, which Freud called "the unconscious." He and his followers traced all psychological difficulties to the conflict between nature and society.

If, as Freud contended, natural drives and society can come into conflict, it follows that society is not a direct consequence of human instincts. A cause does not conflict with its effect. Certain of the instinctivists made an adroit adjustment to this new Freudian idea. They belatedly realized that, if men have instincts, those instincts are an inheritance from prehuman ancestry. Biological changes come slowly; one hundred thou-

²³ One of the first attempts by an American student to apply Freudian concepts to the interpretation of individual behavior can be seen in *The Freudian wish* (E. Holt, 1922). McDougall's *The group mind* (W. McDougall, 1920) was, however, the first systematic attempt to interpret society in essentially Freudian terms. In *Psychoanalysis and social psychology* (W. McDougall, 1936) this interpretation is more fully and dogmatically developed. Another effort to interpret the whole of social life in terms of the Freudian concept and one that inevitably results in the setting up of a fatal opposition between the individual and society is *Individuality and social restraint* (G. R. Wells, 1929).

²⁴ An idea of the original Freudian system can be obtained from *Seven psychologies* (E. Heidbreder, 1933). Modern Freudianism is better viewed in *Psychoanalytic therapy* (F. Alexander and T. M. French, 1946) or in *Psychoanalytic theory of neurosis* (O. Fenichel, 1945). Psychoanalysis tempered somewhat to suit the theories of the social scientist is presented in *New ways in psychoanalysis* (K. Horney, 1939); and an attempt to develop a Freudian social psychology is made in *The psychological frontiers of society* (A. Kardiner et al., 1945). In the latter treatise much of Freud was abandoned in favor of the facts of life, little but the mystic terminology of Freudianism remaining. Kardiner, R. Linton (*The cultural background of personality*, 1945), C. Kluckhohn, and others have fathered a new school in anthropology that goes under the banner of "culture and personality." So far, their labors have consisted mainly of bringing to the attention of anthropologists, usually in new and confusing terminology, the more commonplace of the established concepts of modern social psychology. But the culture-and-personality approach is sufficiently popular to warrant occasional translation into its terms of some of the concepts that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

sand years is little in the process of biological evolution. But even so little as twenty thousand years ago men presumably were bestial, unsociable creatures. And thus the instincts of modern man are probably antisocial. Unrestrained, they would cause the modern man to behave in the ways of his prehuman ancestors; he would rape and murder, pillage and despoil. Therefore, society has grown up as a system of restraints to prevent him from acting instinctively and to force him to live with his fellows in peace and good-fellowship.

In such a manner was the Aristotelian view reversed to fit the theories of the psychopathologists. Society was not an expression of human instincts but a device to repress them. How it came to be, no one seemed to know. All were certain, however, that man was a repressed and thwarted being, inevitably torn between his natural drives and necessary social restraints. For him the outlook was dark indeed. Some hope for individual happiness was offered through "sublimating" instinctive tendencies and redirecting them into socially acceptable channels. Few, however, thought to suggest that society might be modified to permit greater expression of human instincts. Even as these instincts were natural and unchangeable, so, too, by assumption was the society that had arisen to repress them.

Static Nature of the Older Views. A curious note of pessimism runs through the entire history of presociopsychological views concerning the relationship between the individual and society. Since Plato and down to the emergence of a science of social psychology, human behavior has invariably been explained in terms of some static force. To Aristotle that force was biological; and society was but an expression of the individual's inherited modes of action, which as such could not be modified by man. The early hedonistic interpretation did not avoid an equally deterministic and static conclusion. It was, in fact, but a complex variant of the instinctivistic theory. The theological doctrine of free will, although still more involved, left man a choice between only two social alternatives, both of which were fixed by forces beyond the control of man himself. In its individual application the philosophy of empiricism was merely a revival of the theological doctrine of free will. Even the theory of individual biological evolution and racial determinism made natural forces the cause of human behavior, and from those natural forces there was no escape.²⁵ Although the

²⁵ Except, perhaps, by controlled selection of desirable human stocks, a procedure advocated by the eugenists. They would have us apply stockbreeding principles to the development of a superior "race" of men who would, presumably, live in superior social ways. Aside from its underlying fallacy, there are a number of difficulties with this proposal, not the least of these being the fact that there is considerable dispute as to just who is superior to whom.

extension of empiricism to the positivistic interpretation of society allowed social changes in accordance with evolutionary mental stages, it was every bit as fatalistic regarding the future of society as was the theory of empiricism.

Both the climatic interpretation of Montesquieu and the imitative concept of Tarde are free from some of the objections to the theological and empirical viewpoints, but they nonetheless endeavor to explain social behavior in terms of natural forces or mechanisms. Perhaps Tarde's theory is least subject to this criticism; but, if it is natural for a man imitatively to do what those about him do, then imitation is automatic and imperative. Tarde's hypothesis had the virtue of fitting fairly well the observed facts of social behavior, but it had the vice of oversimplicity. The relationship between the individual and society is by no means simple; and the cause of human behavior is not to be found in a single and unvarying force, such as imitation.

Instinctivistic interpretations, largely word magic, served the purpose of counteracting the persistent tradition of empiricism. In both the view that society is a direct outcome of man's inherited instincts and the idea that society arises to suppress his presocial instincts the implication is, however, that society is largely unmodifiable.

THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW

In all this theorizing the experimental psychologists took little part. Traditional psychology, largely an outgrowth of physiology and philosophy, was interested almost wholly in the existence and structure of the individual mind. It devoted its time to general laws and cared little for the comparison of one mind with another. Its technique, introspection, was highly personal in that it could be employed only by a trained observer and only on himself. It is true that W. Wundt, its chief proponent, speculated to some extent about the minds of primitive peoples;²⁶ but this line of interest, termed "folk psychology," did not loom at all large in psychology and in America was gradually merged with cultural anthropology.

With the advent of the American functional psychology of James, Baldwin, Dewey, and Angell,²⁷ to mention only a few of the pioneers, a looser and less rigorous type of introspection that allowed research in

²⁶ See *Elements of folk psychology* (W. Wundt, 1916). In Europe, folk psychology is still regarded by a few social scientists as somewhat different from cultural anthropology (W. Hellpach, 1938; A. Blau, 1938).

²⁷ See *Principles of psychology* (W. James, 1890); *Elements of psychology* (J. M. Baldwin, 1893); *Psychology* (J. Dewey, 1897); *Psychology* (J. R. Angell, 1908); and "Abnormal and social psychology in the life and work of William James" (H. D. Spoerl, 1942).

the several fields of applied psychology came into vogue. With it came an interest in individual differences. French abnormal psychology and the mental-testing movement added to the growing interest in the social aspects of man's behavior. Behaviorism put psychology squarely into the field of the social sciences, so much so in fact that Weiss's definition of psychology, "the science that studies the origin and development of those bodily movements (responses) of the individual which establish his status in the social organization of which he is a member" (A. P. Weiss, 1929, p. 144), could serve as a partial description of the aims of modern social psychology.

Gestalt psychology, which may be looked upon as a correction to some of the limitations of early behaviorism and structuralism, carried psychological study still further into the problem of the relation of the individual and society. This trend was most evident, perhaps, in the topological, field-theory approach (K. Lewin, 1939, 1947). An attempt was made to apply this latter approach directly to the analysis of social phenomena (J. F. Brown, 1937).

Meanwhile, the sociologists were recovering from instinctivism, were rediscovering the sociopsychological import in the writings of Cooley, and were coming to a view that did not do violence to the findings of the modern experimental psychologists.

Cooley and the Neo-Platonic View. Plato, it will be recalled, had seen society as a system of human relationships which was devised by man and into which the individual was forced by the process of education. He had not attempted to explain how the Greek social system had come into being; but he believed that a new and more satisfactory one could be worked out and that by the training of the incoming members into the forms of action prescribed by this system it could be put into effect.²⁸ He had seen society as a summation of human behavior; but, behind that, individual behavior was a resultant of the effect of the mass upon the plastic and at birth "unhuman" individual. Two thousand years later Plato's concept was reexpressed, much refined and elaborated, by Cooley, whose *Human nature and the social order* is a landmark in the historic development of contemporary social psychology.

Although Cooley broke with past tradition and provided an effective conceptual basis for the development of social psychology, he could not bridge the gap between individual psychology and the social sciences.

²⁸ The same idea has become very popular among professional educators. They propose to speed the coming of a social utopia by educating children for the good society of the future, not the "bad" society of the present. They propose, for example, to abolish the examination system, which trains the student to be competitive, since, to their minds, competition is the root of economic malfunctioning.

Psychology was still struggling under ancient preconceptions. Lacking therefore a psychological explanation of the processes involved in animal learning, Cooley could but point out that, by whatever process, men do learn and that they learn mainly through experience with other men. It is this view of the relation of the individual to society that we shall endeavor to trace out in the light of later psychological and sociological findings.

But it must not be imagined that the development of social psychology has come to an end. The "story" we propose to tell is still in the process of unfolding; and before we can begin the telling, one more and as yet unsettled historic problem must be mentioned.

Interactionism, the Situational Approach. Until recently, most sociopsychological attention centered on the processes by which the individual acquires his social attributes through his experiences with other men.²⁹ The major gains in our understanding occurred here, and the study of the social situations in which the individual learns and behaves lagged considerably. As a result, there was some tendency to treat the learning process without reference to the learning situation and to treat the individual without reference to the social interactions in which he operates as but one of a number of variables. Of late, there have been attempts to establish analytical systems that will permit the study of the individual in his social context. The efforts are variously known as the "field," "interactional," or "situational" approaches to social psychology.

For purposes of clarity we shall in this book first treat mainly of the ways in which social participation affects the development of the individual and determines his social attributes and only then turn our attention to the nature of the situations in which this occurs. This procedure is somewhat analogous to that of studying how the actors in a play learn their roles before attempting to analyze the interrelations of the various actors during the enactment of the play itself. The procedure is artificial; for the players and the play are but two aspects of a whole, neither aspect of which can have independent life. Without trained players to enact it, there is no play. Without a play to enact, there can be no actors. And so with real life. For analytical purposes, however,

²⁹ Reuter believed that the field of social psychology should be limited exclusively to this aspect of the larger problem (E. B. Reuter, 1940). Dunlap, on the other hand, went to the other extreme and followed Thomas Hobbes in proposing that only the "groups *qua* group" (K. Dunlap, 1940) should be studied. For a statement of the view that the human being can never be studied apart from the social context in which he develops and behaves, see "Important developments in American social psychology during the past decade" (L. S. Cottrell and R. Gallagher, 1941). For a list, with brief comments of the various attempts that have been made to present a systematic analysis of the field of social psychology, see Appendix note 2.

the individual may be temporarily abstracted from his complex social context so that its effects upon him and his participations in it can be examined piece by piece. Much gain can come from this procedure, provided that one does not for a moment lose sight of the fact that each of the pieces is but a fragment of an inseparable whole.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

At birth the human animal, although a most complex organism, is biologically one of the least competent. Toward the lower end of the scale of organic complexity are the single-celled amoebas—bits of almost undifferentiated protoplasm, which are nevertheless biologically equipped to make adaptations to their aqueous environment. At the other end is the multicellular and highly differentiated human animal—a marvelous complex of organic machinery with vast potentialities, but without the ability to adapt himself to any environment, even the most favorable. Left to his own devices at any time during his first few years of life, the human animal will shortly die, even though food, shelter, and the other requisites for continued life are at hand. If he is to live and grow to maturity, the human animal must to a far greater degree than any other animal be taken care of until he can be taught to be relatively self-sufficient. For ten, fifteen, or even more years, he must be fed, clothed, protected, and trained into those complex patterns of adjustment that make for survival under the particular circumstances surrounding him. It is with that training and what it produces that social psychology is concerned.

The social psychologist is concerned with human, as distinct from animal, behavior.¹ The newborn human infant does not behave in ways that in a social sense are human; he is a human animal, not a social human being. But the organic potentialities and the psychological attributes of the human animal cannot be ignored, for it is upon the basis of these that the social human being will in the course of time be developed. The human animal is, in the main, a creature of biological forces; and nothing that may happen to him after birth can change his inherent nature. Evident is the fact that, since he was not born with wings, he can never learn to fly like a bird. Equally evident is the fact that, with rare exceptions, he comes into the world with an elaborate sound-making mechanism and can, therefore, learn to talk more fluently than can any of the other animals. Some of his organic and psychological limitations and some of his potentialities are not, however, so clearly evident.

¹ There is a rapidly growing discipline devoted to animal social psychology. Its data, however, will be considered in this book only as they bear on human problems.

NATURE VERSUS NURTURE

That biology sets the potentialities of the human animal and that external circumstances (mainly social) develop those potentialities might appear to be a statement of the obvious. Yet a great intellectual controversy has long raged around the respective roles of the biological and social heritages in "causing" human behaviors. At one extreme have stood the hereditarians who have seen man mainly as an integration of inherited capacities. At the other have been the environmentalists who have stressed the role of nurture to the exclusion of all else. There have been, of course, those who have accepted some intermediate position in this nature-nurture controversy. But for many years their less raucous voices could not be heard above the clamor of the embattled hereditarians and environmentalists.

The Extreme Hereditarians. It is an axiom that like begets like. To the uncritical observer and to an occasional geneticist this may mean that, whenever actions of father and son are seen to be similar, the label "inherited" can be affixed to those actions, and social factors can be ruled out. Immersed in their studies of man the animal, biologists have too often attributed all human accomplishments and failures to inherent nature. They have failed to see that nature's "gifts" are not finished products but are, rather, potentialities, or limits, within which social factors operate. Hereditarians have talked impressively of genes and chromosomes, as though findings concerning the inheritance of wing marking in the fruit fly apply directly to the study of human behaviors.² On the a priori assumption that practically all human achievement is a reflection of the genetic structure, they have made superficial studies of family lines to support the genetic principles that they believe underlie human heredity; they have assumed that the social circumstances—the poverty of the backwoods or the wealth of Park Avenue—under which the genetic attributes "unfold" are unimportant. To their minds, an individual born of "Kallikak" stock cannot become an Edwards or even a Harding, no matter how superior the environment in which he is reared. Artists are born, they say, not developed in a social milieu (note 3).

Much of the hereditary argument has been couched in terms of in-

² Morgan, well known for his extremely illuminating work on the genetics of fruit flies, has decried the careless reasoning by which certain geneticists have applied his findings to human genetics. Cultural inheritance, although enormously important in man, is hardly worth mention in the case of the fruit fly (T. H. Morgan, 1934, p. 144). A very critical analysis of these problems can be found in *Nature and nurture* (L. Hogben, 1933). See also *You and heredity* (A. Scheinfeld and M. D. Schweitzer, 1939); *Heredity and social problems* (L. L. Burlingame, 1940); and *Human ancestry from a genetical point of view* (R. R. Gates, 1948).

instincts; some is in the language of outmoded faculty psychology, *e.g.*, "John inherits his father's stubbornness." Statements such as "the man makes the times" have been catch phrases. And, unfortunately, the fact that hereditarianism has come out of an older and better established scientific discipline, biology, has carried weight with many social psychologists, particularly those recruited from psychology.³

The Extreme Environmentalists. When the instinct as an explanatory concept was cast out of American social sciences, many sociologists and not a few psychologists leaped to the conclusion that biological factors could be ignored in the study of human behavior. All behavioral differences among human beings were, they claimed, to be explained wholly on environmental grounds. "Give me," cried Watson, father of this extreme environmental view, "a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specific world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." (J. B. Watson, 1924, p. 82.) Actually, neither Watson nor anyone else for that matter has ever made good this claim.

The extreme environmental view has nevertheless been retained, particularly by a large number of so-called "progressive" educators who possess little or no acquaintance with scientific method and who select and advertise only those data that seem to them to prove the power of their particular brand of educational philosophy. The effect of their wild claims and of the failure of the educational programs erected upon these claims has been to hasten the downfall of the extreme environmental view. This view is, of course, quite as unsound as is the belief that the genes determine once and for all whether a given individual will or will not be a musician, artist, doctor, lawyer, rich man, poor man, or whatever.⁴

The Interactional View. In the early days of the nature-nurture controversy, the moderates, impressed by the rival claims of the

³ One need only glance at Cattell's *General psychology* (R. B. Cattell, 1941) to be assured that hereditarianism in a virulent form is still with us.

⁴ Astounding claims for the potency of environmental pressures in changing IQ can be seen in "Changes in personal, social, and intellectual behavior of children originally classified as feeble-minded" (B. G. Schmidt, 1946). Unfortunately this study has too many obvious errors to be taken very seriously; yet it may show the potency of high motivation. See Kirk's criticism of this article (S. A. Kirk, 1948) and Schmidt's answer (B. G. Schmidt, 1948). Another startling study reports success in raising IQ's by chemical feeding (F. T. Zimmerman *et al.*, 1946). Attempts at verification of these findings are a next necessary step.

extremists, quite understandably assumed that heredity and environment were independent entities that functioned in an additive fashion. The problem, so they thought, was to find what portion (or elements) of human behavior⁵ was "caused" by heredity and what by environment. Behavior was thus looked upon as the result of two independent variables.

Gradually, however, it has become apparent that these two variables are not independent, but are interdependent. Thus the effect of a given biological heritage will depend on the given social environment, and the effect of the latter will depend on the former. In the study of the origins of behavior we are not, therefore, dealing with two separate causes that together produce an effect, but rather with two "causes" each of which affects the other. This interactional view of heredity and environment is one aspect of the shift, described in Chapter I, from one-way cause-and-effect analysis to interactional analysis.

Many of the environmental factors are subject to scientific scrutiny. We can observe, however crudely, the effects upon the child of long social isolation⁶ and the changes in behavior that result from marked changes in environment during the crucial period of adolescence.⁷ No means has yet been found, however, to measure at all directly the effects of the biological heritage. Even the measurement of the so-called "hereditary" forms of feeble-mindedness cannot be handled in a direct, clean-cut manner. For first we must decide what constitutes a deficient biological heritage (*e.g.*, how many defective relatives a feeble-minded child must have before his stock is branded as defective); and this decision must of necessity be arbitrary.

So far, the biological potentialities can only be adjudged from the success or failure of a given environment in producing the expected results. Finding no environmental reason for the fact that one child sang on tune

⁵ "Portion of human behavior" should not be confused with "portion of human behavior variance"—a perfectly proper phrase. For just as the variation in speed between two identically constructed Fords can be wholly due to differences in the gasoline they are using, so the variations in the behaviors of two genetically identical people can be properly attributed to differences in their environments.

⁶ A girl approximately five years of age was discovered in a room where she had apparently been kept since infancy. Following her removal first to a foster home and later to a school for defectives, she improved both physically and mentally. The change, however, was very slow; and she was at last report still somewhat unsocialized (K. Davis, 1940).

⁷ Typical of the studies that deal with abrupt changes in environment are those of the wartime evacuation of children, such as "A study of some effects of evacuation on adolescent girls" (M. D. Vernon, 1940), "Preliminary results of Cambridge survey of evacuated children" (A. Straker and R. H. Thouless, 1940), and *War and children* (A. Freud and D. T. Burlingham, 1943). See also references in Chapter XVIII.

while another hummed in a monotone, we once assumed that the latter lacked the biological potentialities necessary to good singing. But in this instance—and this instance has many parallels—we were later forced to alter our assumptions. Monotones, it was found, can be trained to sing and hence must possess adequate biological equipment for singing.⁸

Research Findings.⁹ Vast amounts of scientific effort, and some not so scientific, have been devoted to the problem of unscrambling the roles of heredity and environment. Since under present conditions it is impossible to experiment with human animals as we can with the subhuman, we are dependent on evidence provided by socially atypical combinations of inheritance and environment. Unquestionably the most striking and useful way to approach the problem would be to study human animals brought up by lower animals; and many are the legends of “wolf” and “baboon” children—so-called “feral men,” who are supposed to take over the attributes of their subhuman environment. But so far, no authenticated cases of feral men have been discovered.

Many actual studies have, however, been made of the effects of foster homes upon the IQ's of foster children.¹⁰ Although some educational psychologists have claimed that a child with a low IQ is markedly improved by removal to a better environment, the weight of evidence is that, for all practical purposes, the IQ is stable; *i.e.*, it is not significantly modifiable by easily caused environmental changes.

Attempts to evaluate the influence of heredity by comparing the performance of individuals with supposedly different heredities and what seem to be comparable environments have not been successful. The difficulty lies in the fact that, although environments might be held reasonably constant in a laboratory experiment, in actual life circumstances no two children are ever affected by quite the same set of external stimuli. Even within a given family, children will be accorded somewhat, and often considerably, different treatment by their parents and friends.

The effects of supposedly identical heredities and obviously different environments have been tested in a number of studies of identical twins¹¹

⁸ During the past forty years or so pitch deafness has grown less and less common. In the early 1900's pitch deafness was considered to be sex linked (more prevalent among boys), inherited, and thus incurable. Now no monotones can be found in classrooms directed by properly trained teachers. For a discussion of a successful attempt at improving the pitch abilities of the pitch weak, see “Improvability of pitch discrimination” (R. F. Wyatt, 1945).

⁹ For the use of the interested student, a more detailed discussion of these findings is provided in Appendix note 4.

¹⁰ The term “IQ” refers to the ratio between the child's mental age as determined by the score he makes on a Stanford-Binet intelligence test and his chronological age.

¹¹ Identical twins are brothers or sisters developed from the same fertilized ovum.

who were reared apart. The results indicate that the IQ's of such identical twins vary slightly more than do those of identical twins who are reared together, but the difference is so slight as to have little socio-psychological significance.

In general, the present evidence indicates that those kinds of behavior that are measurable by intelligence tests of the Binet variety are extremely stable and strongly resistant to change by environmental influences. But these findings have somewhat limited significance for social psychology. In the first place, the IQ cannot be ascertained until the individual has for some time been exposed to environmental influences. As a result, it is never certain whether IQ differences reflect differences in inherent potentialities or differences in early environment. To the extent that they reflect the latter, the great stability of the IQ would suggest the primary importance of early, as contrasted to later, environmental influences. In the second place, that aspect of behavior measured by the intelligence test (which will later be discussed as overt symbolic in type) is often less important in social relations than are those aspects which are usually covered by the term "personality," aspects which are less subject to accurate measurement and appear to be much less stable,¹² *i.e.*, more easily affected by changes in environment, than those intellectual achievements which are measured by Binet tests of IQ.

THE NEUROGLANDULAR BASES OF BEHAVIOR

Since behavior is, as we now understand it, the result of an interaction between biological inheritance and environmental stimuli, and, since no means has yet been found to isolate one from the other, most of our knowledge of the biological machinery involved in human behavior is necessarily inferential. Anatomists and neurologists have given us detailed descriptions of the structure of this machinery; but of its operation we know very little. As we have said, the human animal has at birth vast and little known potentialities. These potentialities are twofold: provided that circumstances are favorable, the human animal can grow physically, acquiring in time those organic attributes that distinguish the infant from the mature man; he can, at the same time, acquire specific patterns of response to specific stimuli of external or internal origin. As we shall see, these two potentialities are interrelated: maturation affects learning, and experience affects maturation.

The Neuroglandular System.¹³ The nervous system serves as

¹² This instability has not deterred certain workers in applied psychology from developing a personality quotient, or PQ, analogous to the IQ (H. C. Link, 1936; W. A. Thomson, 1938; and S. Roslow, 1940).

¹³ In view of the lack of verifiable data, it is the belief of the authors that an ex-

a vehicle by means of which a rapid transmission of impulses from the sense organs (the receptors of the body) to the muscles and glands (the effectors) is made possible. Through the nervous system there is an opportunity for practically any receptor to be connected at some time or other with any effector.

Of the nervous system, that division which is termed the autonomic system is of primary interest to the social psychologist. This system is concerned with the smooth muscles that function in breathing, blushing, and the like, and with the endocrine glands. Impulses over the cranial portion of the autonomic system and from that section which emerges from the tail or sacral region tend to activate the normal bodily processes of digestion, assimilation, and excretion. Impulses over the middle or sympathetic division tend to elicit changes that are associated with the preparation of the body for intense behavior.

The endocrine or ductless glands affect behavior in varying ways and to varying extents. Especially important are the adrenals, some of whose secretions intensify the internal "emotional" changes that are initiated through the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system. The internal sex glands are associated with certain of the secondary sex characteristics, such as the voice change in the male and the hair patterns in the pubic regions. The thyroid glands have psychological importance in that an undersecretion may be associated with those forms of low intelligence termed myxedema and cretinism, whereas oversecretion seems to be linked with emotional disturbances. A number of the other ductless glands, especially the pituitary and the endocrine portion of the liver, affect growth and energy; but as yet our knowledge of their functions is such as to make them of little more than passing interest to the social psychologist.

To the social psychologist the primary importance of the neuroglandular system is that it makes learning possible. Although it limits the ultimate possibilities of learning, it does not determine what shall be learned. Thus, whether it is a snake, a pretty girl, or the idea of a ghost that stimulates the ductless glands to abnormal activity depends entirely on how those glands have been trained to operate within the organic machinery of the particular individual.

tremely superficial acquaintance with neurology and with the physiology of the ductless glands will suffice for the novice in social psychology. For more detailed descriptions, see *Physiology of the nervous system* (J. F. Fulton, 1943); *Endocrinology; the glands and their functions* (R. G. Hoskins, 1941); *Fundamentals of neurology* (E. Gardner, 1947); and *Physiological psychology* (G. L. Freeman, 1948).

MOTIVATION¹⁴

All organic life is dynamic. Even in the simplest of organisms life consists of a continuous cycle of biochemical occurrences. Conception is the beginning of this cycle and death its end. Among the external evidences of life are tissue growth and organic adaptability. In the relatively simple organism, this adaptability takes such forms as movement through its environment, selection and absorption of food, etc., all of which appear to be unlearned abilities. In the human animal adaptability consists in the first instance in the ability to respond to stimuli of external or internal origin. It is this ability to respond that is basic to the learning process; and, in turn, it is learning that makes most of the difference between a human infant and a social human being.

The act of responding may be described mechanistically as a result of an organic disequilibrium that ceases when organic equilibrium is re-established. Stimuli, such as those produced internally by the distended bladder and those produced externally by the playfully pinching parent, induce a state of disequilibrium that in turn leads to some sort of activity. The forces that elicit the activity are usually termed motivational.

When a rat, bumping its nose against the sides of a maze, backs away and tries some other passage, the question may be asked, "Why does it try this other passage? Why does it not lie down and rest?" Motivational terms are customarily used to answer this question. It "wants," says the layman, to reach the other end of the maze, for from this point come the food odors it smells. When a human infant whimpers or a politician takes the stump and shouts himself hoarse, a motive is given as an immediate antecedent of the action. The baby may "want" a bottle, the politician, a vote. In the study of human behavior, it is the source and nature of such "motives" or "drives"¹⁵ that are of primary importance. Thus it is asked, "Is the profit motive natural?" "Is the poor man one whose economic drives are inadequate?" "Do all men possess similar motives?"

¹⁴ The sole modern text on human motivation at this time is *Motivation of behavior* (P. T. Young, 1936). See also *The fundamentals of human motivation* (L. T. Troland, 1928). There are, of course, many other books and articles that treat of motivation rather indirectly. The methodology of research in motivation has recently been surveyed in one of the chapters of *Methods of psychology* (P. T. Young, 1948).

¹⁵ "Drive" has been defined as "the action tendency, initiated by shifts in physiological balance—which is accompanied by sensitivity to particular types of stimuli so that eventually a consummatory response occurs" (G. Murphy, 1947). The characteristics of "driven" behavior include activity, rhythm, facilitation, inhibition, sensitivity, variability, and modifiability (M. H. Elliott, 1935). See "The 'validation' of drives" (G. H. Seward, 1942).

To say that all animals want to live, that man has a will to live, is not helpful. Quite obviously, such a concept is totally inadequate either to explain or to describe the more complicated motives involved in human behavior. In view of our present knowledge a distinction can be drawn between animal drives and social motivation.

Organic Basis of Motivation. The field of animal psychology has furnished the best data on the biological aspects of motivation (note 5). Although it is dangerous to reason analogically from subhuman animals to human beings, man is biologically an animal; and all animals have roughly the same types of organic drives or tissue needs—those for food, water, urination, defecation, sex, etc. Like the subhuman animals, man has ductless glands that pour various compounds into his blood stream and so alter his metabolic level. If he is aware of these changes and the ways of relieving them, he may speak of a “desire” to do this or a “need” to do that. If he is excited, his glandular balance is altered, his metabolic level is changed, and some sort of observable activity occurs.

Numerous and sundry have been the speculations concerning the biological mechanisms that are basic to the motivation of human behavior. Instincts, prepotent reflexes,¹⁶ Freudian libido or sex energy (S. Freud, 1933), Jungian archetypes,¹⁷ Adlerian organic deficiencies (note 6), and many other mechanisms have been postulated. Although all these speculations are based upon observations of behavior, the manner in which they are knit into the problem of social motivation reflects to a great extent the social training of their proponents, who differ one from another in philosophical background and in experimental interests.

The psychoanalysts—Freud, Jung, Adler, and the rest—have undoubtedly contributed to the problem of motivation. But with missionary zeal they have stretched their theories far beyond scientific limits. In many instances they have interpreted their data in terms of loose and sometimes mysterious concepts. Withal they show the abnormalist bias; *i.e.*, they see the normal person in terms of the abnormal. Like Christian Science, psychoanalysis claims to possess both a worth-while

¹⁶ In the early 1920's when the instinct, particularly as a vitalistic principle, was being fiercely attacked, a number of rivals appeared for its place. The prepotent reflex had at least the advantage of being mechanistic and of referring only in part to innate behavior (F. Allport, 1924). However, it was regarded by some as “bringing back the instinct by the back door.” The Allport list of prepotent reflexes includes starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive-zone reactions, and sex responses.

¹⁷ Jung has put forth the claim that the social experiences of earlier human beings are biologically inherited by their present-day descendants (C. G. Jung, 1939; J. Jacobi, 1943). Suffice it to say that modern biologists do not generally hold to this Lamarckian view of heredity.

therapy and a scientifically valid theoretical system. Both faith systems assuredly get results in many instances.¹⁸ But their therapeutic value in no wise proves that the theoretical systems themselves are valid. That man is affected by hormones and his own hunger contractions and that he has important reflexes that are somewhat functional shortly after birth is undisputed. But that he possesses complicated systems of inherited behavior patterns (instincts) is now generally disbelieved.

Social Aspects of Motivation. So far as we now know, the human organism, like all other animals, is at the outset motivated only by physical stimuli. Biological "drives" serve as the basis upon which are built the complex and specific patterns of activity that are characteristic of the human being. But the activities of the social human being cannot be explained by reference to biological motives. So much that is social has happened between the time when the infant squirms because of hunger pangs and the time when the adult enters a restaurant to order dinner that it is ridiculous to explain the adult pattern of action in terms of organic hunger.¹⁹ If motivational terms are to be used to explain such complex patterns, it must be clearly recognized that they do not refer to biological drives, but rather to complex social developments upon the original organic bases (note 7).

With even the basic biological drives, social factors are operative. An individual must control his animal drives to some extent, or he can hardly be labeled as human. Even in so-called "primitive" cultures this is a necessity. But it is not to controlled biological drives that the layman refers when he employs the terms "wish" and "desire." The question, "Why does John want to enter the medical instead of the legal profession?" has only a remote relation to John's organic drives. Such motivation involves so many complex social antecedents that no one can give a scientifically accurate answer. A detailed clinical study of John must be made before even a tentative answer can possibly emerge. The quack may have a ready answer, but the scientist must proceed more slowly. In a later chapter we shall return to this problem and consider it in detail.

EMOTIONS

The importance of human motivation to social psychology lies mainly in the fact that the intensity of the disequilibrium caused by any stimulus affects the intensity of the organism's activity. On the social level this

¹⁸ R. R. Sears has sifted the data of psychoanalysis to find which analytic principles are based on experimental findings and which are not. For an examination of this worth-while study, see "Survey of objective studies of psychoanalytic concepts" (R. R. Sears, 1943).

¹⁹ The subhuman animals, too, have learned, or "social," drives (N. M. Locke, 1936).

may be illustrated by the fact that the intensity of the want that the sight of candy arouses in the child will in part determine not only what the child will do but how actively he will do it. Since sheer activity is one factor in learning, socially acquired motivation is, thus, an important aspect of human achievement. Unless a man has learned to want to be wealthy (a way of describing the existence of internal disequilibrium as the result of lack of wealth), he will not make the efforts that might ultimately lead to his becoming wealthy.

There is, however, another aspect of internal disequilibrium, the role of which is by no means evident. This is the so-called "feeling-state," or, in lay language, emotion.²⁰ The various feeling-states involve the hypothalamus and activity of the ductless glands, which at times affect the rate and intensity of heartbeat, respiration, and other physiological processes.

Socially Acquired Emotions. Early students of child psychology concluded that three basic emotional states—fear, rage, and love—were innate. It is now believed, however, that the newborn child possesses only the bare potentialities for his future emotional behavior.²¹ Like organic motives, the natural emotional responses, whatever they may be, do no more than provide the basis upon which social responses are developed.

Apparently the majority of feeling-states have been learned. In a subsequent chapter, considerable attention will be given to the processes involved in this learning. It will suffice to say here that there is no reason to believe that there is anything natural about the reverence we may feel during the course of an impressive religious ceremony, the fear we may have of ghosts, and the like. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the terms that we may use to indicate our own feeling-states and what we judge to be the feelings of others are never definitive. Of such a term as "love," for example, all that can be said is "I mean by love exactly what I mean by love." Although the names given to feeling-states may conceivably aid the poet, they do little but muddle the work of the social scientist.

Emotions and Learning.²² Some forms of activity, specifically those that involve well-established patterns of a somewhat manual sort, seem

²⁰ In lay usage the term "emotion" is usually employed by the individual to refer to feeling-states known only to himself. It is in this sense that we here use the term. But there are several other meanings in which it is used. See Appendix note 8.

²¹ See "Emotional development in early infancy" (K. M. B. Bridges, 1932), and "Emotional development" (A. T. Jersild, 1946).

²² For a detailed account of some of the relations between the emotions and learning at the college level, see *Emotional factors in learning* (L. B. Murphy and H. Ladd, 1944).

to be relatively little affected by intensified feeling-states. It is for this reason that school children, ship passengers, soldiers, sailors, and others who are likely to be subjected to conditions that provoke violent emotional response are drilled into patterns of behavior that may be called into operation when such conditions occur. A well-drilled school child will march down the aisle and obey the teacher's command, however frightened by the fire that is consuming the school building; a well-trained soldier will charge, when so ordered, although his chances of survival are almost nil. It is even possible that actions that have been well automatized are more effectively carried out when the individual's feeling-states are intensified.

Learning, on the other hand, is often affected adversely by intensified feeling-states. This is particularly true if what is to be learned calls for abilities of an intellectual sort. Most creative work is more easily carried to completion in the absence of strong emotion-provoking stimuli (J. R. Patrick, 1934).

LEARNING

Maturation and Learning. The problem of the role of the organic potentialities of the human animal is further complicated by the fact that they continue to develop long after birth. The human infant must live for many months before he is organically capable of "learning" to walk, many years before he can possibly acquire complete sex behavior, etc. As a consequence, the learning process is constantly limited by the state of the organism's development. Maturation, the name given to this development of new potentialities, thus limits what can be learned at any particular time in response to a given set of environmental stimuli. The effect of such and such an experience upon a child, for example, will be quite different from the effect of a similar experience upon an adult, if for no other reason than that the child is organically less mature (note 9).

The Learning Process. At birth²⁸ the child reacts more or less en masse to most stimuli. A pinch on the arm, for example, will cause movements in almost all parts of his body. Some specificity of action is present; the newborn infant will, for example, blink his eye when something moves rapidly toward it. But such unlearned reactions, often termed "reflexes," are few; and of these even fewer are perfect at birth. In a short time, however, the infant comes to respond more and more specifically to each stimulus, until a pinch of the arm will cause a withdrawal of the arm, a prick on the foot, action in that member, etc.

²⁸ For a description of the behavior of the newborn, see "The neonate" (K. Pratt, 1946).

Just how soon it is that the infant "learns" something, however, depends upon how learning is defined. If learning is defined as "change in the strength of an act through training procedures" (E. R. Hilgard and D. Marquis, 1940, p. 347)—and this definition seems to be generally accepted—learning must be said to start very early indeed. For even the infant reflects in the strength of his cries the training that his mother unwittingly gives him when she rushes to his side in answer to his cries. In a remarkably short time the sound of her footsteps or the opening of the door will be sufficient to quiet the cries at least temporarily.

Types of Learning. Although we know very little about the physiological nature of learning, we now have a considerable body of knowledge concerning the conditions under which learning can occur, the relations of learning to fatigue, age, sex, etc., and the nature of loss of memory. There are probably no fundamental differences on the physiological level between the several so-called "types of learning," but descriptively certain differences seem worthy of mention.

Loosely employed, the term "conditioning" means little more than the association of a new stimulus with an old response.²⁴ There is usually assumed to be a minimum of trial-and-error fumbling involved. Thus, during the first few weeks of life the child displays many sorts of grimaces, one of which we call the "smile." Just what stimuli are at first necessary to elicit this grimace we cannot ascertain. But as soon as an obviously social stimulus complex calls it forth, *e.g.*, when the infant's smile occurs in answer to the mother's smile, we say that the infant has learned to smile socially. At first the infant's smile occurred as the result of undetermined processes; in time the mother's often repeated smiling became associated with this grimace. Had the mother and the others who entered the nursery room smiled only when the infant stuck out its tongue, this latter act, rather than the smile, would have been the associated response.

Somewhat different quantitatively, if not qualitatively, is what is described as relatively undirected trial-and-error learning. The human or subhuman animal, driven by some strong motivating factor, tries out first this bit of previously acquired behavior, then that, then another, etc., frequently employing certain of them over and over again. After a period of failures, he may find that one of his actions leads to success, *i.e.*, to a situation in which the need is satisfied. In common-sense terms, he "wants" something and then tries out his tricks until one of them leads to his getting what he wants. If the want reappears day after day, the same process is repeated with less fumbling; the goal is reached in a progressively shorter time. Thus, in learning to ride a bicycle, the child tries out

²⁴ For the more technical meaning of the term, see *Conditioning and learning* (E. R. Hilgard and D. Marquis, 1940).

his various tricycle and walking habits, as well as many others. All these are at first inadequate. Eventually, however, he hits upon the trick of balancing on the bicycle. During subsequent attempts at learning to ride, he probably will have further tumbles but more prompt success.

Many of the acts that lead to success in the trial-and-error process are never clearly perceived by the learner. When, however, the functioning of the successful act is clearly perceived, learning is termed "insightful." Let us suppose that a rat, an ape, and a child are all placed in cages from which they must free themselves by depressing the first and third but not the second of three identical levers. Day after day the rat will scamper about, getting out in less and less time. But it will never get out immediately. Its success seems to come largely from increases in the speed of its activity. If it moves faster, the rat will accidentally hit the proper levers more speedily. The rat has no real, or at any rate no complete, insight into the situation. But the ape and the child, if sufficiently bright, will learn to solve the problem. They may never learn why the experimenter caged them, but they will identify the levers as the tools that they must use to get out of the cage.

Some of our social learning, such as the acquisition of the social smile, is more on the order of what has been termed association or conditioning. Much, however, is relatively undirected, with enormous amounts of trial and error. A portion is of the insightful sort.²⁵

SUMMARY

Throughout our subsequent discussions it must be kept in mind that man is both an animal and a social being. In his former capacity he shares his structures and his biological needs with the higher subhuman forms. Although his potentialities, like those of all living creatures, are known to be limited by his genetic constitution, there are at present only indirect methods for investigating them. Certain human characteristics, commonly discussed under the heading of Binet intelligence, are so fixed by nature and early environmental influences that only gigantic modifications of later environment can alter them appreciably. Other characteristics, attributes of personality, are far more amenable to change.

(Motives, the wellsprings of behavior, arise as both the result of tissue needs and the result of social forces.) With tissue needs and the theories that trace back all social motives directly to them, the social psychologist is little concerned. His chief interest lies in the analysis of social motives.

The excitements that upset and interest mankind—the physiological

²⁵ For further discussions of learning, see *Psychology of learning* (R. A. Davis, 1935); *The psychology of learning* (E. R. Guthrie, 1935); *The psychology of human learning* (J. A. McGeoch, 1942); and *Theories of learning* (E. R. Hilgard, 1948).

changes and the introspective "feels"—have been termed feeling-states or emotions. When feeling-states are greatly intensified, behavior, unless extremely automatized, tends to become disorganized. Under milder excitements, the quantity but not, ordinarily, the quality of the activity may be enhanced.

The older notion that the child begins his life as a bundle of reflexes that are later to be conditioned has given way to the idea of a progression from generalized or mass activity to increasing specificity of behavior. The child matures, meets stimuli, and learns. In considerable measure these stimuli are social; they are the controlled consequence of the fact that men live together in a society of some sort. Thus, much of what the child will learn is determined by the character of the society into which he is born. We must turn to the sociologist, therefore, for some understanding of the nature of human society. It is in this society that man, the animal, gradually becomes man, the socially behaving human being.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIOCULTURAL BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Unlike the ant and the other "social" insects, man is not born to live together with members of his kind in fixed, biologically determined patterns of relationship. But if he is to live at all, it will be in and through membership in some sort of social grouping. For, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, if left to his own devices, the newborn human infant would quite promptly die. He is born physically immature—without the organic developments that are necessary for his walking about to gather food, find shelter, and protect himself from sun, wind, rain, and the other hazards to continued life. If he is to live, he must, therefore, have food brought to him, have shelter provided, etc., until he has grown in the physical sense from an infant into a child. Such dependency during infancy exists to some degree among most of the higher animals; and in this respect the principal difference between man and the subhuman animals is that the infancy of man is considerably prolonged. The fledgling can leave the nest in a few weeks; the bear cub can wander afield in a few months. But the human infant does not reach a comparable state of development until a few years after birth.

DEPENDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ON SOCIETY

There is, however, an even more important difference between the human infant and the fledgling or the bear cub; for the world of the human being is far more complex than is that of the bird and the bear. Whereas the latter must learn to adjust themselves to nature, the human being must learn also to live in a society.¹ Once the fledgling and bear cub have become capable of effective movement, they explore the world about them, learning largely by direct experience (unguided trial and error) how to maintain themselves. During this process fatalities are high, but those who survive do so because they have learned more or less by themselves to adjust to nature. Conceivably the human child could also learn by direct experience to survive in a favorable natural environment. It

¹ Animals have, of course, relations with members of their own species; and these relations may have in rudimentary form some of the attributes of human society. Animal "society" is, however, exceedingly simple in comparison with the societies of human beings. See Appendix note 10.

is inconceivable, however, that he could ever learn by this means to live in even the simplest social system, so complex are the behaviors necessary for survival in a society. By undirected trial and error a child might learn within a relatively short time to get a drink from a nearby brook; but it is doubtful whether, without being taught how to do so, he would ever hit upon the complex pattern of sounds necessary to procure a drink from the soda-fountain clerk in a city drugstore.

Thus the society that makes possible the survival of the individual through infancy and childhood also makes necessary the acquisition by him of social adjustments which are so complex that they can be learned only under social guidance. As the infant grows into the child and from thence on until death, society more or less effectively and always in exceedingly complex ways trains him into the social patterns of behavior necessary for survival under the particular conditions of social life. Upon the efficiency and appropriateness of this training will in the first instance depend his success as a human being—his ability to secure through the social system those physical and psychological satisfactions necessary to his well-being. If his society is such that it trains him adequately, he will want what it is possible to achieve within the confines of the system and will acquire those skills necessary for such achievement. His life will then be, to use lay terminology, one of relative happiness and contentment. If his society is such that it fails to train him adequately, he will want what cannot be obtained and will lack the skills necessary for achieving whatever is socially available to him. His life will then be one of unhappiness and discontent, if not untimely death.

But even after he has learned how to adjust himself to his society, he is not independent of it. Except for the mythical Robinson Crusoes, human adults do not by themselves secure their livelihood from nature or determine the conditions of their life. Today and to a lesser extent in all societies of the past, each individual—even the well-trained adult—is dependent on the activities of his fellow human beings for his food, his habitation, and his security. Any breakdown of the systematic procedures by which these are provided will leave him more or less helpless. If the milkman forgets to leave the morning cream, he will have to drink his coffee black. If the economic machinery is disrupted, he may lose his fortune, his job, and his self-respect. If his country is plunged into war or if revolution sweeps the land, he will certainly lose many of his possessions; and he may lose his very life.

Individual "Freedom." In view of these facts, it would be absurd to speak of individual freedom as though freedom were an absolute. All men are and have been dependent on a society, first for their physical support during their helpless infancy, second for their ability to find their

way through the complex social world, third for the continuing existence of a society in which it is possible to maintain themselves. The range of individual action will vary somewhat from person to person, from class to class, and from society to society. The unmarried man may ask his stenographer out to lunch, whereas the married man has lost this right. The rich may select their dinners from long and varied menus, whereas the poor must be content simply to eat. The modern American can, within some limits, work hard or not as he personally "pleases," whereas the ancient Egyptian slave could "choose" only to work or to die. But whether wide or narrow, the individual's range of action is socially determined.² The individual does not himself create such "freedom" as he may enjoy.

Today it is especially necessary to keep in mind the extent to which the individual is socially dependent. For contemporary societies are undergoing rapid change, more rapid perhaps than any that has occurred in times past. There is much speculation as to whether modern civilization can even survive this period. Certain at least is the fact that under conditions of rapid social change many individuals will be badly trained for social life, many will be harshly affected if not actually destroyed by the forces of that change, and all will be in great or small degree baffled and confused. Under such conditions the individual's dependence on his society often proves irksome, and many and varied are the efforts to break the bonds of that dependence. But these efforts, as we shall later see, are themselves a social product. They may somewhat modify the character of the individual's social dependence; they do not, however, free him from it.

The true freedom of man is collective rather than individual and long run rather than immediate. It stems from the fact that his society, which has made him into the sort of human being he is, is itself a product of human effort.

SOCIETY

The society into which the human infant is born and on which he is dependent is a heritage from the past and is no more of his own making than is the biological heritage which determined his organic potentialities. But there is a vital difference between these two heritages: whereas the biological heritage is a product of natural forces, the social heritage (or, as the anthropologists prefer to call it, the culture) is a consequence of human experience.

² The kind of eminence that it is possible for a person to achieve is limited by the social times (J. Schneider, 1937). Botanists, for example, have been "allowed" to flourish at some times in some societies, but not in others (J. Schneider, 1937).

As a Product of Human Experience. During periods of comparative social stability, such as the early Middle Ages of western Europe and the Golden Age of China, the accepted social practices have been looked upon as the consequence of divine or natural laws. But the modern sociologist, working with the historian and anthropologist, has discovered that there is nothing "natural," and hence nothing inevitable, about the particular social system that is utilized by a given people. It is man-made and is thus subject to being changed, just as a house is man-made and subject to remodeling. Out of ages of experience in living together, people have learned by trial and error that certain methods of adjustment to physical nature and to the presence of other human beings are effective. But there is more than one way for men to secure a livelihood and to live together. As a consequence of varied experiences, different peoples have, by independent invention or by borrowing from other societies, worked out and passed down to their descendants very different social heritages.*

The biological heritage of an individual is fixed at conception and cannot be changed. For better or worse, it must be accepted for what it is. But his social heritage, the particular society into which he is born, has been fashioned by man to fit the exigencies of new experiences. This is not to say that the individual can in any major way fashion his society to his personal ideas of what it should be like. The vast complex of social practices that constitute his social heritage or culture is the summation of the endeavors of countless people during the whole of human history; and the contribution of one person—however important he may seem to himself or to his contemporaries—is of relatively little consequence in itself. All the people of the present, operating in terms of all that was derived from the past, will make the society of the future. To this extent man shapes his society; only to this extent is man free from his social heritage.

Functional Interdependence of Social Elements. Most difficult perhaps for the layman to comprehend is the fact that no one of the "parts"—the specific modes of adjustment to nature or to other men—of a society can be validly considered apart from the whole. The layman is prone to evaluate a given mode of action in terms of some scale of absolute or moral values. Functionally, however, no social practice has any inherent value; whether it will help or hinder human survival depends, not on the character of the practice, but on the way that the

* By contrasting the social heritages of different peoples, we may gain a certain objectivity toward our own social background. That societies differ markedly is shown in *Our primitive contemporaries* (G. P. Murdock, 1934). See other titles listed in Appendix note 63.

particular practice fits into—functions in relation to—all the other practices that in total constitute the society.

It is because a society is a system of interdependent parts that a change in one part disturbs the functioning of the entire social order. The introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, for example, would throw tens of thousands of people out of work, make necessary a change in present methods of cotton cultivation, modify the land-use system now existing in the South, etc. Historically, our own social system has been thrown and kept out of balance by a succession of changes comparable with the introduction, now in prospect, of the mechanical cotton picker (note 11).

The Individual as a Functional Part of Society. According to the analytical problem he has in mind, the sociologist classifies the various elements of a social system in one of a number of ways. In so far as our concern is with the relation of the individual to his society, we shall view the various aspects of society in terms of the demands they make upon a given member.

Just as the functional value of any mode of behavior depends on the extent to which it fits into the entire social pattern, the social acceptability of any individual depends on the extent to which all his varied behaviors fit into and are coordinated with those of the total social membership. Socially, then, no individual has a value apart from society. This means that, whatever the society—a primitive community in darkest Africa or a modern community in civilized America—and whatever his social status at birth within that society—the unwanted child of tenement-dwelling parents or the idolized offspring of a middle-aged professor—the human infant has much to learn about the particular social system before he will be accepted as a human being.

Any social system is a vast complex of variegated behaviors. Perhaps the simplest aspect is that complex of ways to behave toward physical and biological nature which is known as the technique of nature control. This includes all the skills and knowledge by which men produce the material necessities and luxuries of life, the means by which they move from place to place (whether by oxcart, sailing ship, or modern airplane), the ways by which they take care of their bodies, etc. Each individual must master some aspects of each of these techniques. Thus, although most of us need not become automotive technicians, we must know how to drive, or at least dodge, motorcars; and, although few of us become physicians, all of us must know the rudiments of modern hygiene. Each individual will ordinarily be required to master at least one of these techniques in detail. Thus in the modern world the individual becomes a doctor, lawyer, stenographer, musician, housewife, etc.

But even in the modern world, where technical developments have outstripped the ability of men to adjust themselves thereto, the technical skills and knowledges required of the individual are so much better understood than the social skills required of him that the social psychologist tends to take the learning of technical skills for granted and to concentrate his attention upon the complex processes by which social skills are acquired.

Although interwoven with the techniques of nature control, the social skills are conceptually distinct. They are the techniques by which a people get along with one another—their social organization. Some of these techniques must be mastered in entirety by every member of the society. Such, clearly, is true of the language, which is the *modus operandi* of social relations. Although the deaf-mute manages to survive, his social membership is necessarily limited; and, although the person who speaks a foreign language may be accepted as a tourist, he will not be accepted into full membership in the community until he can speak the language of the community. The morals of the society must also be learned in total by each member. Those who deviate from them may be considered sinful and cast out or adjudged criminal and cast into prison. The infant has, of course, no morals; but before he can become an acceptable human being, he must learn the particular morals of the society. Specifically, he must learn to avoid doing all those things which those around him consider sinful, improper, in poor taste, or unkindly and to do all those things which they consider natural and normal for decent people to do.

The Social Role. No one individual will, however, need to learn all the behaviors that are functional parts of the social organization. For the individual is assigned a more or less limited and defined social role.⁴ To be socially acceptable, he must learn the behaviors appropriate to that role, but need not, and ordinarily will not, learn to behave in terms of other than the designated role. In other words, he specializes in the part he takes in the social organization just as he specializes in the part he takes in society's technique of nature control.⁵

⁴ The idea that some persons readily change their social roles while others stubbornly cling to a single role has been used to explain the fact that only certain people—the ready role changers—can be hypnotized. See "The concept of role-taking" (T. R. Sarbin, 1943).

⁵ In any rather fixed social system the role of the individual is customarily thrust upon him. Being born into a particular family, he becomes a stonemason because males in that family are traditionally stonemasons; or he becomes a priest because he is of the House of Levi. But in our highly dynamic social system he may achieve entry into a given role through one of a variety of routes. And, since we rarely take

In every society the social roles of the sexes are somewhat distinct. Thus a male learns to behave in those particular ways appropriate to males but need not—in fact, must not—learn to behave in the special ways appropriate to females. Each age level also has something of its own role. There is in effect a society of small boys, of youths, of mature men, and of old men. The small boy learns to behave in the ways of small boys, not of old men; conversely, the elder must remember his dignity and not relapse into childish forms of action. And within each sex-age grouping, there are roles for the leaders and other roles for the led. As the puny little boy will sadly discover, he must not endeavor to usurp the rights and privileges of the biggest boy in the neighborhood.

In addition to those for sex and age groups are the special sets of roles for each class and occupational grouping. The difference between a landlord and a tenant, an employer and an employee, or a rich man and a poor one, for example, involves much more than the ownership of land, a factory, or other wealth;⁶ wealth is but one of the factors involved in social status. For each status position there is a more or less clearly defined set of appropriate behaviors. Each status role (note 12) places upon the individual some special obligations and gives to him some particular privileges. The poor man may have to address his superior as "Sir" and be humble in his presence; but he can, perhaps, eat in his shirt sleeves if he so prefers, whereas the great man who can demand obedience from his inferiors may be obliged by the duties of his station to eat his meals in uncomfortable splendor.

Becoming human and thereby socially acceptable is, therefore, at once less than and more than learning the "ways" of the society. It is less in that the individual need not learn all the social ways, more in that he must learn those specific ways that are appropriate to his special role or roles and at the same time learn not to transgress upon the ways that belong to roles other than his own. Failure to learn his role makes him a social incompetent. Failure to remain within his designated role makes him a social irritant, an "upstart," or, at the least, an object of amusement; boys must be boys, shopgirls must not put on airs, and members of the

the trouble to investigate the reasons for his travel along one rather than another of these routes, we say that he "chooses" his own role.

⁶ Under some conditions status is little affected by wealth. Thus in Boston a generation or two ago the prestige attached to belonging to one of the "best" families was greater than that accorded to wealth; and in nineteenth-century England, the impoverished landed gentry had greater status than did the wealthy industrialists. For an unscientific but extremely interesting analysis of the values, standards, and conduct of Boston's old elite, see *The proper Bostonians* (C. Amory, 1947).

"cultured" class must refrain from using the pungent language of the common folk.

SOCIETY AS AN ABSTRACTION

We have observed that the human being is born into a society; that he is in numerous ways dependent on the existence of that society; that a society consists of a great complex of interdependent parts; and finally that, to gain acceptance into social membership, the individual must learn those aspects of his society which are appropriate to his particular social role. Actually, however, the individual is born, not into a society, but into the presence of a few human beings; for a society is an abstraction.

The abstraction "society" and its various parts and attributes is a conception of the social scientist. The social scientist perceives that the behaviors of human beings who live together are well defined and patterned. Considered as an isolated unit, the behavior of any single human being is much like a lost piece of a complex jigsaw puzzle. It has little meaning in itself. When, however, the behavior of many people living together is examined as a system of human relationships, it, like the assembled puzzle, is found to be a picture; it has a pattern. It is that perceived pattern, not the persons into whose presence the human infant is born, which we term "society."[†]

Social scientists, whether economists,^{*} sociologists, political scientists, or anthropologists, are primarily concerned with the patterns of social life. They are interested in fitting together the pieces of the social jigsaw puzzle in order that they may perceive the total picture. Each has his particular interest and therefore sees the picture through a special pair of glasses. The economist concentrates upon that part of the abstract pattern which, within the particular society, has a value in terms of material goods. From all the behavior of all the human beings who relate themselves one to another, the economist abstracts that which has to do with the production and distribution of material goods and studies the pattern that is thereby revealed. He talks of an economic system, of economic processes, and of changes in the pattern of economic life. Much of human behavior is thereby excluded. The splashing colors in a sunset, for example, may be of great human value; but, since they

[†] Depending on what particular aspect is to be stressed, society is referred to by such terms as the "social system," the "social heritage," the "culture," and the "social group."

^{*} Little attempt has been made to bridge the gap between economics and social psychology. A pioneer study in this overlap area is *War without inflation* (G. Katona, 1942).

are of no economic worth, they are ignored by the economist. The political scientist abstracts that behavior of human beings which is related to the forms and processes of government. The sociologist and anthropologist study the rise, persistence, and change in the pattern of social life, with their attention focalized upon the functional interrelationship of the parts of the totality.

The Fallacy of Oversimplification. Failure to realize that the term "society" refers to an abstraction rather than to a tangible and homogeneous entity underlies both a popular misinterpretation of the modern sociopsychological view and one of the attacks that have been made upon it. Some of the environmentalists that were mentioned in the previous chapter leaped at the idea that society shapes the nature of the individual human being and promptly arrived at such oversimplifications of the facts as that crime breeds criminals, poverty poor people, wealth rich people, etc. They visualized society as a sort of mechanism that automatically shapes human beings into predetermined patterns, much as a giant press stamps out duplicate automobile fenders from sheet steel. They so oversimplified the structure and processes of social life and the ways in which social participation affects the individual that they opened themselves to attack from those who believed that it is biological nature rather than society that determines human behavior. Accepting the oversimplified social interpretation at its face value, the biological determinists pointed with much reason to the fact that society does not accurately reproduce itself generation after generation. The son of a criminal may become a policeman, the daughter of a fine lady a prostitute; the successful man may have risen from poverty, the failure slid down from a family of high estate. *Ergo*, they argued, society does not determine the behavior of the individual human being.

But within the limits of the biological heritage and allowing a certain margin for chance⁹ factors, the society into which the individual is born—more specifically, that aspect of it represented by his kith and kin—does determine his behavior. Society is, however, exceedingly complex and does not operate to determine behavior in simple and readily predictable fashions. To say that a boy's father is poor is to suggest very little regarding the nature of the social stimuli that will affect the boy; for in addition to being poor, the father as a human being may be almost any assortment of a great many other characteristics. Furthermore, his poor father is but one of the very large number of human beings who represent the society for the boy. Any one of these may be as important as or even more important than the father in the boy's

⁹ The term "chance" refers to the many variables not as yet subject to analysis.

development. To say that a boy's father is a stern disciplinarian, pious, or thrifty is likewise to say very little. Whether a spanking will deter repetition of a pattern of action or serve only to encourage it depends on a multitude of factors. The stern parent may inadvertently produce a wayward child; stress upon piety may foster revolt therefrom; dwelling upon the virtues of thrift may encourage improvidence.

The Fallacy of Personification. A somewhat different kind of oversimplification, and one that leads to mystical ideas of the relation of the individual and society, is that which was ponderously propounded by the German metaphysician Hegel (G. S. Morris, 1892). It, too, is based upon failure to realize that the term "society" refers to an abstraction. Hegel personified the many, varied, and complex behaviors of peoples that we abstractly designate society and treated the state (the apex of social organization) as though it were a single, homogeneous entity, much as a child may personify as the sandman the complex physiological phenomena that result in his finally falling asleep each night. Hegel's verbal meanderings need not be described here. The final result was what has been called the "group-mind fallacy." It involved the mystical idea that human beings through association with one another generate a sort of collective (group) mind or spirit, which in turn directs and coordinates the behaviors of the individual members of the society. This "group mind" is presumed to secure its physical manifestation in the person of the leader of the state, who must, naturally, be obeyed without question, since he is but the embodiment of the will of the people. This mystic doctrine was used by the Germans as the ideological justification for their recent attempt at forcible unification of European peoples into "total," *i.e.*, absolute or totalitarian, states. It has at times made its appearance in somewhat dilute form in social psychology as an explanation for the fact that otherwise "rational" men will upon occasion be found running in mobs or joining fantastic social movements.¹⁰

THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIETY

The society that provides the human infant with his physical maintenance and in time trains him into social membership is, then, neither a simple mechanism nor a mystic entity. As an abstraction, society is the perceived system of behavior utilized by a people in living together. The members of a society seldom realize, however, how their own be-

¹⁰ For an example of the mystic interpretation of collective phenomena, see H. Blumer's essay "Collective behavior" in *An outline of the principles of sociology* (R. E. Park, ed., 1939). For extended discussion of the group-mind fallacy, see Appendix note 13. The various forms of mass behavior will be considered in the concluding chapters of this book.

havior dovetails into that of all the other members to make the system. Seldom do they comprehend that what they are as individual human beings is irrevocably bound up with their social membership. The viewpoint of the social scientist is exceedingly sophisticated; it is a consequence of social self-consciousness. Normal social membership seems generally to be naive; it involves little recognition that the forces that make for individual behavior are largely social and that they direct the individual into practices that fit him into the social pattern. Thus, when the child asks, "Why must I do that, Mama?" the mother usually falls back upon the conventional, "Because I want you to." The act in question may be required for effective functioning of the social system. But the mother will probably never see it in this light, and certainly the child will not.

A Child's-eye View of Society. The newborn infant perceives little or nothing. In order to perceive, the organism must be capable of synthesizing light stimuli into meaningful configurations; and this ability comes only with the passage of time. If we were to put ourselves into the place of the infant and analyze his society from his point of view, we should not see a technique of nature control and a system of social organization; we should not see sex groupings, age groupings, and class divisions; we should see persons—a specific and tangible community of human beings.

The exact character of the persons who surround the infant depends, of course, on the particular society in which he finds himself and the peculiar "choice" of parents which he has made. He will not, of course, be aware of the many other "choices" that he might have made, the partial range of which is indicated by an imaginative comparison of the differences between the persons who surround the newborn infant of a wealthy New York socialite and those who surround the infant of a lowly boatman's wife on the muddy Yangtze Kiang.

As he grows older, he will discover, not that he lives in a certain kind of society, but, rather, that the persons surrounding him are fixed in their ways and have rather fixed ideas of how he should act. Among other things, they will decide when and what and how he will eat, and nothing that he can do will significantly affect their ideas of how he should be fed. He will continue to discover that the persons around him do this on certain occasions and that on other occasions and that if he does one thing they will scold or spank him and if he does another they will smile and praise. Each such discovery will be, in fact, a step toward his becoming human and will bring him that much farther into membership in the society that he will probably never perceive but on which he will always be dependent.

SUMMARY

The sociologist keeps the social pattern in the foreground and the behavior of individual human beings in the background. He observes the behavior of the individual mainly in terms of its appropriateness for the total pattern or as a possible contribution to changes within that pattern. The social psychologist, on the other hand, keeps the behaving individual in the foreground and the social pattern in the background. His principal interest is in determining how the human animal comes to behave as a social human being. And this, as we shall see, becomes a study of the socializing processes—the processes through which the individual is affected by the social system. These processes always operate, however, through the medium of other human beings, real or symbolized, rather than through the abstracted pattern of human behavior that we term society.

Societies differ, and consequently the behavior of human beings differs. But, whatever the patterns of human behavior, the processes by which they are passed on from generation to generation seem everywhere much the same. These are the processes that we are to examine in detail in the following part of this book. They are the processes by which the human animal is fashioned into a social human being.

PART II

The Processes of Socialization

CHAPTER IV

SOCIALIZATION

The adult human being has acquired from past experience a vast number of adjustment patterns. These are the durable products or consequences of the interactions that have occurred between him and his environment, much of which is social and all of which is socially mediated. These patterns of adjustment serve as his preparations to behave in subsequent situations, most of which will also be social. It is these acquired adjustment patterns that constitute his human attributes and distinguish him from the ape, whom he physically resembles.

The development of human attributes in the individual is termed "socialization" to suggest that the human animal becomes thereby a social human being. Socialization is not, however, a single process, operating in a unitary way, so much as it is a number of separate processes, each one of which may, as it were, go its independent way. The multiplicity of processes involved in the socialization of the individual may be likened to the number of separate manufacturing processes that go into the making of an automobile—casting, machining, forging, stamping, etc. In the making of such a tangible and comparatively simple mechanism as an automobile, the various processes involved are so coordinated that the finished product is a patterned and integrated structure. In the making of human beings, however, the various socialization processes often work toward divergent and sometimes conflicting ends, with the result that the product, the human being, may behave in ways that are socially inconsistent. Thus the physician may have been trained to give his patients excellent advice and yet at the same time to have learned through other processes to treat his own body with slight concern for its welfare.

Nevertheless, although the various socialization processes may work somewhat independently and even at odds, each does supplement the others; the behaving human being is a product of all of them, not just of one. It is failure to recognize the "wholeness" of the consequences of socialization that has led many professional educators to overestimate the importance of formal education to the life of modern people, that has led moralists to exaggerate the evil effects of motion pictures and radio programs on children and the potentially good effects of Sunday-school attendance, and that has led many modern parents either to dis-

claim any responsibility for the unfortunate way their children have turned out or else to claim total credit for them if they have turned out in a satisfactory fashion.

Just as the human organism is an interdependent whole that lives or dies in terms of all the factors that affect it—not just its diet, for example, as the food faddists imagine—so the behavioral attributes of the human being, later to be described as his personality, are a product of the total impact of the various socialization processes. For purposes of analysis, however, the various processes of socialization will be discussed separately in the following chapters. It may be well, therefore, at this point to consider in some detail the totality or wholeness of their joint operation.

SOCIAL ANTICIPATION

One of the most intangible and yet profoundly important influences on the socialization of any individual is the particular way, or number of distinct ways, in which his society is prepared to treat him, which in turn reflects what that society hopes and expects of him. In most societies most of the time, the newborn child is welcomed and expected to become in due course a recognizable and acceptable human being. But this general anticipation is subject to wide and significant variation. Obviously, a Chinese family and community expects the infant born into its midst to become Chinese, and an American family and community expects its infants to grow up to be Americans. But in much more subtle and intangible ways a given family and community may have markedly different anticipations for each of several infants, and it is in part such differences in anticipation which, carried over into differential treatment, result in the fact that Mary Jones is quite a different sort of person from her brother Bill and that both of them differ in many salient respects from their baby brother John.

Initial Status.¹ The employee who blunders during his first day in a new job may thereafter have considerable difficulty in proving to his employer that he is trustworthy; the worker who gets off to a good start may subsequently ride on his reputation with considerable success.² So,

¹ The concern here is with the relatively subtle and highly personal aspects of an individual's status. It is very obvious that the status of any male is different from that of any female, that of the Negro different from that of the white both among other Negroes and among whites, etc. These status differences relate to group identification and involve sex, racial, and other forms of in-group and out-group stereotyping, which will be dealt with in a subsequent part of this book.

² The problem of initial status has appeared in a number of widely different fields. When two strange pigeons meet and battle, any temporary weakness shown by one may not only cause its defeat in the first encounter but may so affect the attitudes of

too, the infant who was unwanted before he arrived will have a harder—or at least somewhat longer—time “winning his way” into parental affections than will the one who was eagerly awaited.

The initial set of parents and others toward a newborn child, and of any community of persons toward the stranger coming into their midst, is determined by factors entirely external to that infant or stranger. Parents may not want a child because he threatens to disrupt their way of life, because they already have more children than they can provide for, because there is a war going on and it is an exceptionally inconvenient time to have children, because they had hoped for a girl and the child turned out to be a boy, etc. Conversely, an infant may at the outset be most highly prized by his parents for any one of a great number of cultural or personal reasons.⁸ Whatever the particular set of the parents and others toward a newborn child, that set will inevitably influence in some way and for some time the tone if not the quality of their behavior toward him and, thus, his own socialization.

The literature shows that the unwanted child⁴ may be left on the steps of a foundling home, granted a bare minimum of care and beaten at the slightest provocation, treated with reluctant care, or, when parents try to correct for their feelings, with forced affection. It is clear that being brought up in a foundling home or by irresponsible and brutal parents will have different, however unpredictable, consequences to the child than would his being brought up by loving and indulgent parents. His environment is markedly different, a difference traceable to the fact

both birds that the winner will assume a superior status and continue to win battles even though the defeated bird is the stronger and is ordinarily the more skillful fighter (W. C. Allee, 1938). Similarly, the child who enters the third grade with a brilliant record arouses expectations in the new teacher that make her prone to give him higher grades than he deserves.

During World War II certain college students were asked to separate a large number of photographs of Orientals into two categories—Chinese and Japanese (P. R. Farnsworth, 1943). At that time, of course, the initial status of the Chinese in the student mind was that of “friends” and that of the Japanese that of “enemies.” And it is a common assumption that friends resemble each other more than do enemies. So, when the students at a later date were asked to rank these same photographs on a scale from “most to least Caucasian looking,” it was not surprising that the Chinese were given the “whitest” ratings. (The most Caucasian-appearing were really Japanese.) Thus it can be seen that initial status can arouse attitudes that greatly affect later contacts.

⁸ When one parent initially dislikes and the other prizes a child, the initial status of the child is a dual and conflicting one. Any such lack of homogeneity in the initial status is likely to result in some contradictions in the socialization of the child and, hence, what will later be described as conflicts within the personality.

⁴ There is a growing literature on the unwanted, and so often rejected, child. See the article entitled “Parents as the makers of social deviates” (M. E. Bonney, 1941).

that he was an unwanted child. But the unwanted child of responsible and considerate parents may also have a somewhat different environment from what he would have had if these same parents had initially wanted him. They may treat him to the best of their ability as though he had been wanted; yet their feelings toward him may influence in some important ways their conduct toward him. Perhaps they will be more irritated than alarmed by his infantile wails, disturbed rather than pleased by his early vocalizings. Perhaps, on the other hand, they will lean over backwards to prove to him and to themselves that they do love and cherish him. But in any event his social development will be conditioned in one way or another by his initial status.

Although initial status in the family and other groupings helps to determine the direction that socialization will take, that status does not necessarily remain constant. The initially unwanted child may in time become the object of strong parental affection, and the prized one may fall from grace. Often external factors are largely responsible for any change that time brings in status; thus the very necessity—necessity in view of tradition and other social factors—of taking care of an unwanted infant may very rapidly give parents a vested sentimental interest in the child. On the other hand, some accident, such as parental illness, may make the initially cherished child seem an intolerable burden.

"Earned" Status. But at least in our society it is the individual's own conduct, together perhaps with his physical appearance and other physical characteristics, that determines to some degree and often in major measure his status through time.⁵ Through his smiles, his gurgles and coos, his evident pleasure with food and the parental presence, the infant may worm his way into the affections of parents who were initially reluctant to give him a place in their lives and thereafter be the wanted rather than the unwanted child. Likewise, although presumably less frequently, the prized child may make himself such an infernal nuisance that his parents come eventually to wish that he had never been born.

The initial status and what may be termed the "earned" status may not, therefore, be equivalent; and this is as true, although seldom as evident, of the child in the home as of the stranger to the new community. But with the infant, if not with the adult newly come to a community, initial status tends to determine in some degree the direction of socialization. Hence, there is always considerable possibility that the effects of initial status will in turn determine the character of earned status. At the least, the former will prejudice or bias the latter. As an extreme case, for example, the child who is treated carelessly and brutally may

⁵ For a study of differential earned status among children, see *Popular and unpopular children* (M. E. Bonney, 1947).

thereby acquire behavioral characteristics that subsequently give him adverse initial status as a "nasty brat" on the playground, in the school, and elsewhere. Thus he would "earn" much the same status that he had been born into, and the two would be causally related. Although their interpretations seem sometimes far of the mark, the Freudian emphasis on the importance of parent-child relationships is, therefore, quite realistic. Because initial status may to some extent determine earned status and thus to further the direction of socialization that it began, what might appear to be minor aspects of parent-child relationships may actually have profound consequences in the socialization of the child. The most respectable of parents may through some inadvertent mishandling start a child off on a disreputable career, while some pretty shabby parents may also inadvertently father solid citizens. Such contrasts do not invalidate the principle of socialization; they simply point up the fact that the conditions under which socialization takes place are always exceedingly complex, a fact that was almost completely overlooked by the early environmentalists.

Status as a Product of Numerous Factors. The foregoing discussion is not to be taken as descriptive but, rather, only as illustrative of a common condition of socialization. Actually parents can "want" or "not want" a child in various degrees and various ways; they, or one of them, may want a child very much but only for the specific purpose of having someone to aid in due time with the work around the farm, to sell in due time into slavery, or, as might be the case in modern societies, to "hold the marriage together." The modern upper class mother may want a child mainly because being a mother adds to her own prestige; the father may want the child so that there will be someone to carry on the family name; and perhaps many parents want children only because they feel it their moral or social duty to procreate. Obviously, the effects upon a child of being wanted or not wanted depend on the degree and kind of parental anticipation involved.

Moreover, the anticipation of parents will seldom constitute more than a part of the initial status of the infant; the relatives, friends, and neighbors of the parents will in most societies and certainly in our own contribute their bits to the making of the total of that infant's initial status. And these other bits may supplement, conflict with, or even cancel out parental anticipations. Thus it may happen that the child who is unwanted by his mother is so wanted and tended by one of his grandmothers that his effective initial status is that of a wanted child. Seldom does a single person determine *in toto* the initial status of a child. A wise father may considerably offset the overindulgences of an unwise and overly fond mother, a sympathetic neighboring woman may moderate the an-

guish of the child who is ignored by his parents, and a selfish elder sibling may somewhat counteract the training of a kind and considerate mother.

In sum, initial status is compounded of the many and various anticipations of numbers of individuals. The effect upon the early socialization of an infant of one anticipation held by one individual is therefore quite unpredictable. That the father of a boy ardently hopes and expects his son to grow up to follow in his own occupational footsteps will certainly have some effect upon the child; but just what that effect will be will depend on a multitude of other factors, including those others who enter into the making of the child's initial status.

Earned status, too, is a highly variable product of numerous factors. To say of a small boy that he has beaten his way to leadership of his play group or that he has won a reputation as a "tough" in school is to say very little indeed. His associates may all look up to him as their leader, but in various ways and to different degrees. Thus, one of the gang may fairly worship him, while another is simply awaiting an opportunity to usurp his position. His teachers may agree that he is a "little tough," but some may look upon him and treat him with sympathy and others with harsh intolerance. Seldom does a single playmate or teacher or any other person determine the effective earned status of an individual in any life situation. This is in part the reason why the youngster who seems destined, in view of his associates, to become a criminal may instead grow up to be a priest and why another boy who has had all the apparent advantages of good family and good schooling may come to no good end. It is also in part the reason why the benevolent efforts of the parish priest, the truant officer, the kindly teacher, the humanitarian judge, and the earnest director of the home for delinquent boys may fail to secure the results for which they labor.

The "Either-or" Principle. A further complication arises as a result of the fact that the effect upon the individual of any factor in his earned status depends in part on the intensity and frequency of that factor. A father who spansks his disobedient son with discretion may thereby succeed in improving the boy's behavior; but should he spank him brutally and frequently, he may succeed only in making the boy rebellious. Should he spank him mildly and infrequently, he may, on the other hand, teach the boy only that his father's spanking does not hurt and that his father does not mean it anyway. This same possibility of variable consequences arises whenever we consider the socializing import of any life circumstance. A penurious family background may contribute to a child's developing habits of caution and foresight concerning economic matters;

life in such a family may, on the other hand, inculcate in the child either extreme miserliness or the attributes of the spendthrift who lets each succeeding day take care of itself. A religious family background will ordinarily, and especially when it is given the support of a religious neighborhood and larger community, develop religious sentiments, values, and practices in a child. Yet there is always the exception that does not prove the rule but actually violates it. Religious families and communities sometimes produce religious fanatics and, conversely, atheists.⁶

In these and all similar instances that seem to run counter to the environmental interpretation of behavior, the most important variables are in part, and sometimes in the main, the intensity and the constancy of the environmental circumstance. A child who is brought up in moderate poverty may simply learn to live in the manner becoming to those of this station in life. But the one who has the hardships of poverty stressed for him by being brought up in extreme deprivation (as measured, of course, by local standards) may come to rebel against poverty and learn, in part on his own, either to fight against this low estate by earning as much and spending as little as possible or else spending everything that comes to hand and not worrying about the future. In the same way religiousness that is taken for granted in a family may lead the child also to take it for granted; where religiousness is stressed above all else, it may, on the other hand, provoke exceptional religious zeal in a child or else develop in him a marked distaste for all things religious. A youth who is forced by the puritanicalness of his parents to forego all the good things of life that he knows are enjoyed by others of his age may either retreat into religious idealism or else break away from his family and the church at the first opportunity and join in the fun.

Thus the effect of each environmental factor is not only modulated or aggravated by the presence of many other factors, but it is also dependent in part on the intensity and frequency of the factor itself. This latter circumstance can be simply, if rather crudely, described as the "either-or" principle. This principle should not be interpreted as meaning that the resultant behavior must fall at one or the other of the extremes of behavioral possibility. It merely emphasizes the fact that polar extremes of behavior may emerge from what look to be similar environmental pressures. As will be indicated in detail later, the influence of a mother's facial expression on her child, the effects of a father's

⁶ For a recent study of the variable effects of religious training, see *Radicalism and conservatism toward conventional religion* (P. M. Kitay, 1947). The study reported in "Social background and musical taste" (K. F. Schuessler, 1948) also illustrates the operation of multiple effects.

manual skills on his son, the bearing of early or delayed physical maturation on the socialization of the individual, and many other conditions can never be predicted with certainty.

CUMULATIVE CHARACTER OF SOCIALIZATION

The socialization of the individual is still further complicated by the fact that the effect upon him of any experience, social or otherwise, is invariably mediated by what he has already become. A sharp parental word, a cold reception at the hands of the neighborhood play group, or a frown of reproof from a teacher may have significant effects upon the child who has become socially sensitive, whereas the same experience might have little meaning to the child who has acquired a strong sense of self-importance. A child who has long been harshly treated by his parents may read into the actions of any adult a harsh intent; should the policeman on the beat pat him on the shoulder, he may cringe as though he were about to be thrashed; should a kindly intentioned stranger speak words of approval, he may imagine that behind them lies some evil purpose. On the other hand, the child who has known mainly kindness and affection will more likely tend to see—as well as to provoke by his own behavior—kindness and affection in the world about him.

The Determination of Meanings. Each society has its own culturally determined scale of values and meanings that are applied to the various experiences which the individual in that society may undergo. To the youths of certain primitive societies the painful puberty rites are culturally defined as a wondrous experience; they mark the transition to young adulthood. To an American youth the same experiences would probably seem torture without rhyme or reason. To most American children a spanking is just punishment for disobedience, whereas a cuff on the ear is an unwarranted indignity. In some societies, however, the cuff is a usual form of punishment and a spanking quite unheard of.

But the individual does not always, and in our own society he frequently does not, give to his experiences their culturally defined values and meanings. Probably most American boys can take a parental spanking in their stride, neither worrying much about it nor as a matter of fact being very much deterred by it from repeating the act that provoked it. To any particular child, however, a spanking may mean anything from fun to disaster. What it will mean will depend in part on what he has already become at the time of this particular spanking. And so it is with all experiences, at least from late infancy onward until death. The socializing effects of an experience depend not alone on the character of that experience but also on the previously acquired characteristics of the individual involved.

What the infant, the child, the youth, or the adult perceives in the world about him is always a small part of the total that is there to be seen. The individual learns, largely through social direction, to see, hear, taste, and feel certain things and no others.[†] Because the signs of changing weather are of continual interest to the adults around him, the country boy learns to be attentive to those signs; because no one remarks upon them, the city boy learns to ignore the sounds of everyday street traffic. Because it is a part of his occupational training, the automobile mechanic hears the faint clatter of a loose tappet; but since she was never taught to hear machinery, his wife may burn out the motor before she is at all aware that something has gone wrong.

Not only does socialization determine what will be perceived, but it also determines the meaning of what is perceived, *i.e.*, the response it provokes. To few if any things is there a wholly "natural" reaction. As a consequence of differences in training, two children may perceive in the behavior of a common parent quite different things; for example, one may tend to consider the parent a prime object of exploitation, the other to see him as an erratic and irascible tyrant. The one may regard a spanking as just retribution for misbehavior, while to the other a spanking is just further proof that "Father is mean, and I am a victim of mistreatment."

Effects of Prior Experiences. Because the particular effects upon the individual of any experience depend largely on what values and meanings he has previously learned to accord to such an experience, his socialization tends to be cumulative. Socialization thus proceeds always upon the basis of what is already there; what socializing effects any circumstance will have depend as much perhaps or even more on what went before as on the character of the circumstance itself.

Moralists, alarmists, and reformists have consistently overlooked the fact that the socializing import of any experience is always relative. The drunken father may be a "bad" influence on his son; but that will depend on what the son himself has become. For all that one can tell in advance, what the son will learn from his drunken father is the evil of drink. Likewise, the sex-laden motion picture can have no certain and consistent effect upon the children or the adults who see it. To most, young and old, it will probably be just two hours of pleasant relaxation;

[†] A striking illustration of the fact that perception is in part socially directed can be seen in a study in which both rich and poor children were asked, among other things, to reproduce with a spot of light the size of several coins which they could clearly see. While both groups overjudged the sizes of all the coins, the poor children, with their greater social need for money, overjudged to a far greater extent (J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman, 1947).

to some it will perhaps be only the first picture of a double bill; to the critics it may be another "B" picture; and to young lovers it may be nothing but an opportunity for holding hands. Only those who are excessively concerned about the welfare of children and view everything possible with alarm will see it as a morally degrading example for the child to emulate. If any child does find in it a bad example, it will be because countless other and prior experiences have prepared him to define the motion picture in this way. The child who frequents motion pictures which depict a different standard of morality from that of his family may come more quickly to question the validity of the latter than he would if the portrayals were of the "approved sort." And attending a great number of motion pictures of this sort may succeed in directing his attention to sex and other matters that could be better handled were they introduced to the child less early and less dramatically. But that the motion pictures alone can put the child on the road to sin does not follow.

What is true of the presumed bad influence is also true of the one that is conventionally supposed to be good. A religious service, a symphony concert, an "inspiring" lecture, membership in an uplift organization,⁸ or even a college education will have no fixed and consistent effect upon numbers of individuals. Some of those who attend church may do so from force of habit and may find in the service neither inspiration nor consolation but only the satisfaction of having gone through a familiar routine. Some may find the service an opportunity for displaying new clothes, seeing old friends, hearing a bit of gossip, or getting out of cooking Sunday dinner. Some may obtain from that service a renewal of the faith in man and God that gets worn so thin during the course of the week. But whatever it is that the churchgoer gets from the service, it is in part determined by what he has already become before he enters the church.

Cause and Coincidence. From time to time proof is advanced that this or that circumstance "causes" this or that mode of behavior. The fact that delinquent children attend motion pictures more often than non-delinquents do was once advanced as proof that motion pictures cause delinquency.⁹ The belief that persons who consistently attend church are

⁸ Boys who belong to the Boy Scouts are more honest, on the average, than boys who are not concerned with this movement. This is true, however, not so much because of the effectiveness of the institutional training there received, but rather because the Scouts were more honest than the average boy before they became members (H. Hartshorne *et al.*, 1929-1930).

⁹ Although properly selected motion pictures can, temporarily at least, alter the expressed opinions of children (M. J. Wiese and S. G. Cole, 1946) and tend to crystallize stereotypes (R. H. Gundlach, 1947), their other immediate effects upon behavior are few and difficult to demonstrate. They have been shown to affect the

less prone than the rest of the population to patronize bars and brothels and to gamble and commit crimes has been cited as proof of the good effects of church attendance. The claim, quite possibly valid, that divorces occur more often between spouses who sleep in twin beds than between those who use the old-fashioned double bed has been advanced as evidence that twin beds cause divorce. But in these and all similar claims regarding sociopsychological relationships, there is a confusion of cause and coincidence.

That two things occur together does not necessarily mean that one of them has caused the other.¹⁰ It may well be that there is no other relation between them than that of time; this is certainly the case when acquaintances happen to meet at a certain place and time or when a man who has just exclaimed, "Strike me dead!" falls dead. Ordinarily, not even the layman is inclined to mistake this kind of coincidence for causation, at least in his interpreting of human behavior. But there is a more complex and deluding form of coincidence—that in which two or more occurrences which are otherwise unrelated are produced by a common antecedent ("cause"). For example, a billiard player may simultaneously hit two balls with his cue ball, but each would then go its independent way. Their movements would be related in time and space but not causally. They have a common "cause"; but unless they should hit together, neither ball would affect the motion of the other. Human actions that are so related are frequently judged to cause one another, although in fact they do not.

Consider, for example, the assumption that, if delinquent children attend motion pictures more often than nondelinquents, motion pictures cause delinquency. But do they? It is far more likely that the same

subsequent sleep of children (S. Renshaw *et al.*, 1933) and to elicit psychogalvanic changes (W. S. Dysinger and C. A. Ruckmick, 1933). One researcher believes that they can cause a rise in body temperature (N. Kleitman, 1945), but the validity of this finding has been questioned (R. B. Brock, 1945). A number of those who have worked on motion-picture problems, particularly Forman in his popularization of the issue (H. J. Forman, 1933), appear to have been motivated by a desire to prove that the motion pictures have exerted a bad influence rather than by the scientific wish to see the problem solved in a cool and unbiased manner. See "Moulding of mass behavior through the motion picture" (H. Blumer, 1935); "The motion picture experience as modified by social background and personality" (P. G. Cressey, 1938); *America at the movies* (M. Thorpe, 1939); and "Sex and age determinants of theatre and movie interests" (R. Lassner, 1944).

¹⁰ Using for illustrative purposes the possible relationships between physique and behavior, Barker and his colleagues (R. G. Barker *et al.*, 1946) discuss four major possibilities of association that demonstrate the dangers in assuming in any analysis simple cause-and-effect relationships. For details of this discussion, see Appendix note 14.

long and complex series of experiences that leads the child to excessive attendance at motion pictures also pushes him in the direction of violating the law. The motion picture and the delinquent act may very well serve the child in comparable ways, satisfying acquired needs and interests that he is unable to satisfy in any other ways. If so, then it might be better to encourage him to go to the motion pictures than to prevent him from doing so; for the more motion pictures he sees, the less time he will have in which to be tempted to commit juvenile crimes.

The same principle applies to church attendance and goodness, and perhaps even to twin beds and divorce. Attendance at church may contribute to the moral development of an individual; but since the effect of church attendance depends in great part on what the individual already is, the relation between church attendance and moral conduct may be one of coincidence rather than of causation. Good people brought up in good homes and good communities learn (a) to go to church and (b) to stay away from bars, brothels, etc.

AS THE TWIG IS BENT

All that has so far been said in this chapter may be reduced to the following generalization: *The process of socialization invariably involves many interdependent variables, and of those variables one of the most important is the effect that prior variables have had on the individual who is being socialized.*¹¹ But it is much simpler to say, in the manner of the folk, that as the twig is bent, so the tree is inclined to grow. All things, the sun, the winds, the rains, and the character and contour of the land on which it stands, influence in some degree and all together the direction and rate of a tree's growth. But once the tree has started to lean to the south or north or east or west, then the effects upon it of these external forces working together will be tempered by the way it already leans.

And so it is with the socialization of the human animal into a social human being. The initial reception accorded him by his society is compounded from the sets toward him of all those who have anything to do with him in his infancy. And that initial reception has profound in-

¹¹ An appreciation of the great complexity of socialization may be secured from the following recent general treatises: *The sociology of child development* (J. H. S. Bossard, 1948) and *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, 1948).

Studies of socialization in specific and relatively simple societies are reported in *The people of Alor: a social-psychological study of an East Indian island* (C. Du Bois, 1944) and *Children of the people: the Navaho individual and his development* (D. Leighton and C. Kluckhohn, 1947).

fluence upon him; it starts him off in the direction of becoming this or that special variety of human being. Then, what he acquires through his initial status in turn influences how people will treat him subsequently—what his “earned” status will be—which also in turn adds to his socialization, often thus pushing him further in the direction in which he has been going.

Meanwhile, the cumulative nature of socialization is making itself felt. As he learns to influence his status, he also learns to interpret that earned status in some special way or other, to give to his experiences, themselves conditioned by what he is, meanings and hence effects that are in part determined by what he has already become. Thus in two related but conceptually distinct ways the individual undergoing socialization enters into the socializing process. How unrealistic it is, therefore, to say of motion pictures or of a college education or of any other complex of external circumstances that they have this or that narrowly specific impact and effect upon the individual.

The statuses of the students in a college or university are, for example, fully as varied as their names. In addition to all the more formal status factors—class, sex, fraternity affiliation, etc.—there are the variations in position and treatment that stem from the varied behaviors of the individual students themselves, what has here been termed earned status. Largely because of his own actions, one freshman becomes characterized and treated as a “grind,” another as a playboy, another as a campus big shot, etc. To no two will the college world present quite the same face. Moreover, the impact, the socializing effects, of a given status will itself vary in accordance with the character, largely acquired, of the individual. To one “grind,” college life may be four years of frustration, four years of trying ineptly to win friends and influence people but of succeeding only in acquiring a collection of A’s; to another, the granted freedom from distracting social life, the exceptional interest taken in him by the faculty, and all the other attributes of his status may seem and serve as a wonderful opportunity to learn whatever it is he has his heart set on learning.

The Pattern of Socialization. Probably more time and thought and study have gone into attempts to ascertain the causes of juvenile delinquency than of any other atypical form of human behavior. The history of that effort well illustrates the fact, only now becoming evident, that the socialization of the individual is a patterned and complex process that cannot be understood in terms of its parts.

A century or so ago, those who thought about the matter at all were inclined to trace the criminal action of child, youth, and adult to “willful violation of the law” or to “bad” biological inheritance. As students of

crime became more observant and less speculative, they began to locate the cause of criminal action in some condition external to the criminal. Tarde, it will be recalled, found it in the example of other criminals. Here in America the theory evolved that crime (as well as poverty and other forms of social inadequacy) was the consequence of ignorance, which was in turn caused by lack of opportunity to obtain knowledge. Free and universal formal schooling was prescribed as the cure for crime and all other socially undesired forms of behavior.

But the establishment of widespread public-school education did not bring about the expected decline in crime, juvenile or adult; and for the past fifty years the finger of suspicion has been pointed at first this and then that particular environmental circumstance as the "cause" of juvenile delinquency. At one time, for example, full blame was placed upon impoverished family circumstances; the child was thought to be "driven" by poverty and the universal desire for material things to resort to illegal activities. But in due time it was discovered that only a relatively small proportion of the children brought up in impoverished circumstances become delinquents. So this theory was abandoned in favor of others, equally particularistic. Among the others was the idea that it was not poverty but "bad"—*i.e.*, immoral, disorganized, or simply inadequate—family circumstances that produced delinquency; but again it was found that only a relatively few of the products of such families get into trouble with the law. Then there was the playground theory, the belief that it is not in the home but in gang play life that the child learns to be a delinquent. Where play groups must resort to the streets for their play, they inevitably come into conflict with adult society, so this theory ran, breaking windows, etc., and thus are set off along the road that leads to crime.¹² And then, to cite but one more of the many particularistic theories, there was the belief that it is really the police and the courts and the jails that make little boys who have unintentionally erred in some little way into big boys who are deliberately criminal. Reform the courts and the reformatories, and the potential delinquent will be prevented from becoming an actual delinquent. But experience demonstrates that the best of court treatment and reformatories will not always succeed in this endeavor.

Of late the students of juvenile delinquency have reluctantly come to the conclusion that no single circumstance can be interpreted as the cause of this or of any other form of behavior. Only when a multitude of related social factors happen to fall into a certain pattern, as yet but vaguely

¹² This thesis was most vigorously advanced and highly documented in *The gang* (F. M. Thrasher, 1936).

understood, is a child socialized into those modes of conduct that are defined as delinquency.¹⁸

What is true of the delinquent is true of those socialized into more acceptable modes of conduct. Socialization is always a patterned and continuous process, a fact that should be kept constantly in mind throughout the abstract and piecemeal analysis that will be undertaken in the chapters that follow.

¹⁸ See *Problems of child delinquency* (M. A. Merrill, 1947) ; *Juvenile delinquency* (P. Tappan, 1949) ; and Appendix note 57.

CHAPTER V

TYPES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Ideally, socialization should be analyzed in terms of its total and continuous impact upon the individual, for this is the way in which it actually operates. But even as it is impossible to see all that goes on in a three-ringed circus, so it is impossible for words to convey or the mind to grasp *in toto* the various processes that together operate to equip the individual with his human attributes as he grows from infancy to adulthood. Analysis will, therefore, be made in a piecemeal fashion. The whole of what is acquired through socialization will be broken down into kinds, or types, of behavior; and the process by which each kind is acquired will be examined in turn. But it must constantly be kept in mind that in actuality the individual is not socialized part by part and that the type of behavior undergoing analysis is really but one aspect of an interdependent whole.

Traditional Categories. As was mentioned in Chapter I, medieval theological theory postulated two kinds of human behavior—good and bad. The theory held that good behavior was caused by the individual's willingness to follow the dictates of the divine Creator and that bad behavior was caused by a failure of the will of the individual which made it possible for the Devil to exercise influence over him. The church was, of course, the final authority on what constituted good and bad behavior.

The good-bad dichotomy has persisted under various names, such as "reason versus emotion." But it has no value for scientific analysis, since the criteria used in determining what is good and what is bad are entirely subjective (matters of personal and group evaluation) and vary, therefore, from place to place and from time to time. What was considered good by the Roman Catholic Church during the period of the Inquisition (*e.g.*, the torturing of heretics) is now considered bad by the church. What is considered foolish by Scientist Jones (*e.g.*, the consumption of alcoholic beverages) may be considered sensible by Scientist Smith.

Dismembering the behaviors of the human being and putting the pieces into categories of the good-bad order have led to interminable argument but to no advance in understanding the nature and causes of those behaviors.¹ Under this procedure, the category into which an act would

¹ Throughout the 1920's, for example, this procedure was applied in distinguishing

be placed depended entirely on the personal preferences and viewpoint of the classifier. If he approved the act, it was for him a good, or rational, one. Since no objective criteria can be used, and, since men, particularly modern men, frequently have varying if not conflicting ideas of what is good and what is bad, such classification is conducive to theological disputation rather than to scientific progress.

Functional Dissection. In marked contrast to the dismembering of phenomena in terms of predetermined categories is that of dissecting a complex whole into its functional elements. It is this that the physiologist does when he conceptually breaks down the human organism into its functional systems and that the ecologist does when he groups into types various organisms that may on the surface appear to be unrelated.²

Every science makes some sort of dissection of the phenomena it studies. The system of dissection is not absolute, nor is it an end in itself. It is a scientific tool, a prelude to subsequent analysis. The method of dissection itself changes as knowledge of the phenomena being studied increases. Physicists once broke matter down into atoms, believing them to be the smallest functional units. As their investigations progressed, they developed a new system of dissection, one in which matter is broken down into several sorts of subatomic bits. Where they will go next, no one can foretell, least of all the physicists, who will be guided by what they find out about matter rather than by their personal preferences and preconceptions.

Dissection of the Behaviors of Man. In terms of the present state

between propaganda and education, with the result that one man's propaganda was another man's education, and vice versa (R. T. LaPiere, 1935).

². Crude classification of phenomena on the basis of superficial similarities is technically known as "phenotypical"; that which is made on the basis of functional similarities, usually revealed only by careful examination, is known as "genotypical." To illustrate, the layman, analyzing human populations on the basis of eye color, might lump all brown-eyed persons together. His classification would be phenotypical. The geneticist, on the other hand, would divide brown-eyed people into two groups, for he knows that certain brown-eyed people can beget only brown-eyed children, whereas other brown-eyed people have both brown- and blue-eyed offspring. His dissection would thus be based on genotypical similarities.

Lewin and the topological psychologists have borrowed these genetic terms *in toto* and have used "phenotypical" to describe data arrived at by superficial dissections and "genotypical" to describe those come upon after more functional and basic work has been done (K. Lewin, 1936). The classifications of behavior that are here offered are not so completely genotypical as are the classifications of the geneticists and the plant and animal ecologists; they are, however, as genotypical as our present knowledge permits and will serve as a useful theoretical framework for subsequent discussions.

of our knowledge regarding human behavior and in view of our purposes in this part of the book, the many and varied behaviors of man may be separated into four general types. A different system of dissection will be utilized later in the book. The divisions here made are neither absolute nor final, and the distinctions drawn are not ends in themselves but are only means to the more effective analysis of the nature and causes of human behavior.

OVERT VERSUS COVERT BEHAVIORS

All the behaviors of all human beings may be divided into those that have the potentiality of stimulating other persons and those that do not. This distinction has the important virtue of being objectively verifiable and the value, for reasons that will be made clear later, of facilitating the study of the processes of socialization.

All the behaviors of a human being that can be perceived directly by another human being are overt. Such behaviors are subject to verification; *i.e.*, they can be measured and recorded, and the observations of one investigator can be checked against the observations of another. Acts such as walking, sitting, spanking, eating, smiling, and untold others fall into this category. In contrast are those responses to stimuli that can be known directly only to the one who makes the response. Such knowledge, sometimes termed "introspective," has not yet become subject to objective verification. Certain aspects of this kind of behavior were discussed earlier under the topics of emotion and motivation, and some writers designate the entire category as "implicit" behavior. To avoid confusion, we shall use the term "covert" in referring to it.

Many scientific devices have been constructed that measure overt behaviors with almost microscopic exactitude and that supplement ordinary visual, auditory, tactual, and olfactory observation of the overt behaviors of other people. But the covert behaviors of other people can be known only by inference. Some, notably the Freudians, claim to possess a technique for investigating the inner life of man. But their ritualistic procedures often yield unverifiable data, however much they serve to impress the subject with the omnipotence of the analyst. Psychologists have endeavored to make instruments by means of which some of the covert behaviors could be directly ascertained and thereby rendered overt in character. The existence of internal disturbances can be verified by the measurement of changes in pulse rate, respiration, and blood pressure, or by measurement of changes in the electrical conductivity of certain areas of the body. But what these measured changes mean in terms of socially significant covert behaviors is not yet entirely clear.³

³ The advent of various physiological devices to test a person's veracity has led to all

Functions of the Overt Behaviors. There is considerable truth in the statement that all the world is a stage and we are the actors on it. It is how we "act"—what we do and what we say—that affects others and thus directly or indirectly determines our welfare. A lover may "feel" love; but if he wishes to please his loved one, he had better act lovingly—bring her flowers, tell her that he loves her, watch her adoringly, etc. It is the overt behaviors that are the substance of human relationships, and it is through the overt behaviors that fields are planted, harvests are gathered, and the other work of the world is accomplished. The covert behaviors, except as they affect overt acts, are of no moment to anyone except the individual who experiences them.

In our daily life we constantly speculate about the covert behaviors of other people. But all that we actually know about the people with whom we live is what they do and say. And this is all that, at any given moment, is really important to us. A wife might hate her husband, but it will not matter to him if she treats him lovingly all their lives and he never suspects her hate for him.

The Nature of Covert Behaviors. To some social psychologists, and more specifically to the early Watsonian behaviorists, only overt behavior can and need be considered data for science (note 16). One might well wish that this were so. Since the covert behaviors can be known only by indirection, attempts to study them have often resulted in futile speculation, more revealing, perhaps, of the covert preferences of the investigator than of the covert behaviors of the people being investigated.

Nevertheless, any sociopsychological investigation that ignores the existence of covert behaviors and makes no attempt to examine their nature and social significance is fragmentary and incomplete. It simply

sorts of fantastic beliefs as to the effectiveness of these instruments. That the famous "lie detectors" are excellent methods of third degree is certainly true enough; but that they can infallibly detect an untruth is absurd. Keeler, the developer of what is perhaps the best known of these instruments, has given a lucid and fair statement of what takes place when "lie detection" is said to be occurring (L. Keeler, 1934).

Great claims have been made in recent years for the usefulness of "truth serums." While their effectiveness cannot as yet be relied upon, they do show promise. With the introduction of a drug narcosis, some persons have spontaneously or with some encouragement described their earlier traumatic situations in extremely dramatic fashions. In fact, in some cases the individual has acted out and thereby virtually relived the episode. So far the best use of this procedure has been in psychiatry. See *Narco-analysis* (J. S. Horsley, 1943).

See also "A comparison of the cardio-pneumopsychograph and association methods in the detection of lying in cases of theft among college students" (J. E. Winter, 1936); *Lie detection and criminal interrogation* (F. E. Inbau, 1942); "Lie detection" (W. M. Marston, 1946); and Appendix note 15.

does not do to dismiss the covert behaviors with a shrug and some remark to the effect that they are the province of the poet rather than the scientist. Covert behaviors may have no immediate significance for a given social interaction; but they do have great, if little understood, significance in the long run.

The Delayed Response. The behavior of physical objects is highly consistent and predictable. Under the appropriate conditions, oxygen and hydrogen immediately and invariably combine to produce water. But the behavior of human beings is not always consistent and is never entirely predictable. The man who has seemingly been devoted to his wife for twenty years may murder her during the twenty-first; the one who has seemed "perfectly normal" during the first fifty years of his life may destroy himself on his fifty-first birthday. Obviously, there was more to the nature of these men than was directly perceived. Such apparently inexplicable acts can best be described as delayed overt responses to events of the past.

The delayed overt response is a commonplace of everyday life. We may not get the point and laugh at a joke until some time after hearing it; we may not answer the question or obey the request until we have finished completing some other action; we may not turn off the radio program until, as we should probably say, it has driven us to distraction. Even such minor delays in response cannot be understood without reference to the existence of some sort of internal behaviors.⁴ A physical object may remain static, to be used or not as occasion warrants. But all psychological phenomena are processes, events that either continue or else cease to be. Thus, during the moment, the minute, the day, or the year, between the stimulus and the ultimate overt response to it, internal processes of some sort or other have been occurring. It is these processes that we shall consider under the term "covert behaviors."

Inconsistency of the Delayed Response. Not only are ultimate overt responses often delayed but, when they do come, they may be inconsistent with prior and more immediate responses to the particular stimuli. It is this fact more than any other that makes exceedingly difficult any prediction of individual behavior. We recognize this difficulty in our person-to-person relationships and tend to proceed somewhat cautiously with the individual whom we judge to be touchy or temperamental, *i.e.*, unusually unpredictable. Such unpredictability would appear to result from the fact that the overt reaction that seems so inconsistent (the

⁴ Much research has been done on the delayed responses of subhuman animals. Here covert speech is presumably absent or at least reduced to a minimum. See "Delayed response and discrimination learning by chimpanzees" (H. W. Nissen, A. H. Riesen, and V. Nowlis, 1938).

grouchy response to the cheerful greeting, for example) is really a delayed response to other stimuli that has simply been set off by the immediate situation.

Relation between Overt and Covert Behaviors. In many instances, the overt response to a situation can be said to be parallel to the covert. This is what happens when we smile and say, "Good morning!" and are "pleased" with the morning and the encounter that has provoked the greeting. It should be observed, however, that the "being pleased" is a separate response from the smiling and speaking.

When, as often happens, the parallel overt response to a situation is delayed, the immediate overt behavior is in contrast to as well as distinct from the covert response. The fact that at any given moment a person's covert behaviors may be out of line with his overt is a commonplace of everyday life. No one, not even a member of her audience, seriously believes that an actress "lives" the part she is playing on the stage.⁵ She moans quite realistically, she weeps, she wrings her hands; and in the end the death rattle sounds in her throat. But it is no surprise to the members of the audience when she appears for her curtain call bowing and smiling. And should they read next morning that after the final curtain she hurried to the bed of her dying son or was rushed to a hospital for an emergency appendectomy, they would only shrug and say, "Such is the life of the theater." But such, in fact, is all of life.

The child may squirm and squall when he is pained; months later he will, perhaps, be observed in the act of "thinking" out loud. But among the many things that the adult has been taught is the art of keeping his feelings and thoughts under control—which really means following socially prescribed patterns of overt behavior, regardless of his covert responses. There are cultural differences in this respect; in ancient China people wailed and tore their hair at the death of a relative; in ancient Japan no sign of anguish was permissible. There are also individual differences within a given culture. The strong, silent man may be so silent as to raise doubts that he ever feels or thinks; the gushing, gesticulating adolescent may express so much that it would seem improbable that any human being could feel so intently about last night's party, the new "boy friend," or the latest hair-do.

In general, society teaches us to keep secret all those feelings and

⁵ The James-Lange theory of the emotions (C. G. Lange and W. James, 1922) holds that, whenever the actress weeps, she necessarily feels sad. Introspections from stage celebrities, however, are not in agreement on this point. It should be noted that weeping is only one of a constellation of the expressive signs of sorrow. Perhaps if all the expressive signs were present in their "proper" proportions, the actress would feel sad. But at present the most that can be said is that the covert parallel, if present at all, appears to be slight and of very short duration.

thoughts that are unconventional or fantastic; and we usually learn to keep to ourselves those feelings and thoughts which, if expressed, might offend others. Thus, people rarely describe their so-called innermost hopes and ambitions; they infrequently reveal the nature of their day-dreams; and they are seldom so inconsiderate of the feelings of others as to inform them that their breath is bad, that they are very dull company, or that the tie was a very thoughtful gift but a quite unwearable one. Frequently, of course, it is to one's own advantage to say other than one thinks. A man may think that what his employer has ordered him to do is foolish; but for his own best interests he had better say, "Yes, sir," in an eager and energetic tone.

Since there is no necessary relation between covert behaviors and overt behaviors, there can be no certainty that what a human being does overtly is a reflection of how he is feeling and what he is thinking. The smile and the pleasant word of greeting may be indicative of pleasure at the meeting; the air of self-assurance may reflect self-confidence; and weeping may be a manifestation of sorrow. But there is nothing to assure that such relationships exist.

The distinction between overt and covert behaviors is a reflection of the fact that the processes by which the individual learns the former are significantly different from those by which he acquires the latter. The child may be taught the outward manifestations of loyalty to his country, affection for his parents, and consideration for his inferiors, without necessarily acquiring the covert thought and feeling behaviors that these acts imply. In time, and particularly in the face of new situations, this lack of covert training may become evident in his overt behaviors. Thus, as a schoolboy he may have pledged allegiance to his country, fervently saluted his country's flag, and marched bravely with a wooden gun. But unless he has somehow acquired those complex covert patterns that we term loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice, he may as a man turn out to be a Quisling or a deserter from the field of battle.

SYMBOLIC VERSUS NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

The overt-covert distinction cuts through the totality of human behaviors along one axis, giving us two large and general categories. There is another direction, or way, in which the totality of these behaviors may be dissected. This distinction is independent of the first, although the reason for making it is much the same, *i.e.*, to facilitate the study of the processes of socialization.

Many human actions, both overt and covert, are primarily significant in that they are representative of some other action or of some object. These may be designated as symbolic, as opposed to those actions that

are significant in and of themselves. The symbolic act secures its effect only because it has been given socially designated meaning and has, therefore, some relatively specific "reaction value" to the user and to others. Nonsymbolic behavior, on the other hand, secures its effect directly and in terms of itself. The threat of a spanking, whether it be made by words, by brandishing a slipper, or by the lifting of an eyebrow, is symbolic. The application of the slipper to the child belongs, in contrast, in the nonsymbolic category.

For purposes of illustration, we may contrast the symbolic behavior of an actor going through the motions of hoeing a row of corn on the stage and the nonsymbolic behavior of a farmer hoeing corn in his fields. The actions are similar. Both men lift their hoes, swing them down to a point slightly ahead of their feet, lift them again, step forward, and repeat the series of motions. But the first man, we should say, is only "acting," whereas the second works. This distinction arises from the fact that the behavior of the first is significant only if an audience of other human beings is present, either in reality or in imagination, to interpret or react to his actions, whereas the behavior of the second man has its effect directly upon physical nature. The distinction between symbolic and nonsymbolic behavior must not, however, be thought of as based upon the contrast between productive and unproductive actions. The actor may be providing his audience with relaxation and amusement, whereas the farmer's hoe may chop down corn plants rather than weeds.

Since almost everything that a human being does has some symbolic implication for others, it is often impossible to classify any given action as entirely symbolic or completely nonsymbolic. These categories are not mutually exclusive; many behaviors are of mixed character; and in some instances the classification made will depend in part on the point of view of the classifier. Nevertheless, most human actions, particularly those which are overt, can be placed in one category or the other on the basis of objective criteria. It may at times be a matter of personal opinion whether the wearing of a fraternity pin is of primary significance to the wearer as a means of informing others of membership in a fraternity or as a thing that binds parts of the dress together. But there can be no doubt that the word "Henry" is significant only as the symbol of a person or that taking a bath removes dirt from the surface of the body, whether others are present or not.⁶

Symbolic Behavior as the Modus Operandi of Social Life. Practically everything that human beings do as well as every object that they use has its symbolic counterpart or verbal term. Much of social life

⁶ It should, however, be observed that little Henry's bathing may be more symbolic than dirt removing unless his mother has him under surveillance.

consists of the use and manipulation of these symbols. They are the means through which most person-to-person adjustments are effected. By symbolic acts we communicate with others, telling those around us what we intend to do or wish to do, and thus enabling them to plan their behavior accordingly. Through symbols, nonsymbolic behavior is controlled; and by them, individual acts are directed to the end that they fit into the social pattern discussed in Chapter III. Except in disciplining children and in periods of acute social disorder—during wars and revolutions—nonsymbolic behavior is used very little as a means of controlling individual behavior.

The role of symbolic behaviors in person-to-person relationships is clearly illustrated in the life of a campus community. The majority in the sorority or fraternity control the minority by talking them into doing what is required; or, if this does not work, by sneering at refractory members; or, as a final resort, by subjecting them to social ostracism. The administration may keep the faculty in line by the possibility of a symbolic "regret that your services are no longer required." The teacher may maintain some degree of regularity in classroom attendance and some measure of attention to his lectures and to the work he assigns, by the threat of giving failing grades. Even the campus traffic policeman uses symbolic behavior in controlling local motorcar traffic. His very presence at an intersection is generally sufficient to assure compliance with the letter of the law.

Most of the control of life on a campus is, thus, accomplished through symbolic means. Much of the action which that control effects is, like the medium of control, but symbolic behavior. The contents of a book symbolize something. The student at study is reacting symbolically to symbols of things, ideas, and actions. Most of the behavior of the teacher in the classroom is symbolic. He writes symbols of things, ideas, and actions on the blackboard; and his lecture consists of actions that are signs of things rather than the things themselves. The student listening to the lecture reacts symbolically. He is also behaving symbolically when he writes a brief history of World War II for an examination in history. And the grade he gets is a symbol representing the behavior, mainly symbolic, of the instructor who reads his paper.

Nonsymbolic Action as the Substance of Social Life. But unless symbolic controls operated ultimately to obtain nonsymbolic actions, there could be no living human beings and hence no society. Someone must till the field, draw the water, fabricate the house, tend the baby, etc. Symbolic behavior is thus but the means; the end is adjustment of person to person and of person to nature. For it is by nonsymbolic action that man maintains himself.

The complexity of contemporary society and the large role that symbolic behaviors play in it often confuse this fact. But the lone cast-away will quickly discover that symbolic behaviors will not of themselves maintain his life. However diligently he thinks ways out of his predicament, however noisily he assures himself that he will have a habitation to protect him from the elements, food in the pantry, and water in the well, he will soon die unless he actually builds himself a shelter, gathers food, digs a well, or locates a spring.

Why the Symbolic-nonsymbolic Distinction Is Necessary. Not only are the functions of symbolic and nonsymbolic action quite different, but there is no necessary and automatic relation between the two. This latter point is a matter of common recognition. People frequently doubt that a promise will be fulfilled; doctors and clergymen sometimes urge others to "do as I say, not as I do," "realistic" politicians evaluate treaties and other international agreements as worth their weight in paper, etc. The social psychologist would frequently be misled if he were to assume that what people say they will do is a certain indication of what they will do.⁷ The lack of necessary relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic behaviors is a reflection of the fact that these two kinds of behavior are learned by significantly different processes.

THE FOURFOLD CHARACTER OF BEHAVIOR

For purposes of clarity of analysis, we have dissected the totality of human behaviors along two different axes: overt-covert and symbolic-nonsymbolic. When these two axes are considered together, behavior is seen to fall into four functional types. Each type of behavior is acquired by a somewhat distinct process; and no one of them is, therefore, of necessity directly correlated with any one or all of the others.

The behaviors of an individual that are significant not in themselves but in their socially designated meanings for others are overt symbolic. Included in this category are all speech, gesture, and representations thereof, such as writing, telegraphing, pictorial drawing, and the like. All other behaviors that are capable of stimulating others but are not dependent for their effect on their meaning to others are overt nonsymbolic. Such acts as driving a car, digging a ditch, cooking a meal, and the like, belong to this category.

Logically, the covert behaviors, like those which are overt, might be divided into symbolic and nonsymbolic. Some covert behavior is mainly,

⁷ Altogether too many social psychologists have been so misled, as is evidenced by their uncritical reliance on such paper-and-pencil methods of investigating human behavior as the attitude or opinion scales and questionnaires—techniques that are discussed in Appendix note 17.

if not entirely, symbolic in character. These are the covert processes that make up most if not all of what is called thinking or inner speech. It is not certain, however, that after the period of infancy there are any covert reactions that are unaccompanied by symbolic elements. Certainly the internal responses that occur when one is awakened at night and is "frightened of the dark" are a mixture of symbolic and nonsymbolic elements, *e.g.*, the idea of a burglar and the feeling that accompanies the disequilibrium of the neuroglandular system. But it should be noted that, although certain covert behaviors can be symbolized, much covert behavior cannot—a fact that has led to the notion of an unconscious.

Admixture of Types of Behavior. In some instances the behavior of an individual may for a brief period be wholly of one order. Dreaming occasionally seems to take the form of simply talking to oneself. If, then, the dreamer is not muttering aloud as well as talking to himself, his behavior is essentially covert symbolic.

But during most of their waking and some of their sleeping hours human beings behave simultaneously in two, three, or all four of the categories. The relatively passive act of reading a novel, for example, certainly involves two and possibly all four. The reader moves his eyes along the line of type, turns pages, shifts his position, and perhaps smokes. These behaviors are essentially overt nonsymbolic. Meanwhile he is responding to (reading) the words that his eyes see. He may at the same time be running ahead of the story, taking brief side trips, converting words into pictures, etc. All this is covert symbolic. He may also, and the author of the book certainly hopes he will, be experiencing mood changes provoked by the symbolic manipulation. If not, he may soon throw down the book in disgust, for the pleasure in reading fiction is apparently derived in large measure from its effects upon the feeling-states. These, whether they be pleasurable or otherwise, are primarily covert nonsymbolic. Should the reader smile, frown, chuckle, or read aloud to a friend, he would be behaving also in overt symbolic and, thus, in all four ways.

Normally, then, the behavior of a human being is a mixture of overt symbolic, overt nonsymbolic, covert symbolic, and covert nonsymbolic behaviors. These behaviors may at a given moment parallel one another. Such is the case if the ardent lover feels and thinks lovingly while he acts and talks lovingly. But the various aspects of the totality of the individual's behavior do not necessarily run parallel; indeed, they may run counter one to another. Such is the case when a man, hurrying to catch a train that he calculates he will just make, slows down out of consideration for a shorter legged companion, whom he smilingly assures that there is ample time. As we have already pointed out, such a mixture of

contrasting elements is a reflection of the fact that somewhat different processes are involved in the development of behaviors belonging to the various categories.

In the following chapters of this part of the book, these different behaviors and the processes by which they are developed will for the sake of clarity be considered one by one.

CHAPTER VI

OVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: I. GESTURE

All overt symbolic behavior (note 18) may be roughly divided into that which involves the complex mechanism of speech and that which does not.¹ We indicate the former by such terms as talking and writing; the latter, by "looking" and "acting" surprised, happy, puzzled, annoyed, etc. In both a twofold problem is involved: how does the individual acquire the ability to react in the socially specified way to the symbol? and how does he acquire the ability to express himself through the medium of this symbol?

GESTURE AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The term "gesture" will be used hereafter to designate all overt symbolic behavior other than the use of words or visual representations of words.² Gestures are not so fully conventionalized as words and are therefore not so accurate in conveying meanings as are words; they may, nevertheless, be considered as constituting a language that is useful as such within any society. This nonverbal language of a people consists of all their humanly meaningful actions except what they say or write.

Ordinarily we do not realize the extent to which we use gesture. Whereas the actor and actress must make a careful study of the gesture

¹ At least since the time of Coover's classical monograph on telepathy (J. E. Coover, 1917), the scientific world has assumed that all communication must occur through sensory means. In recent years, however, this thesis has been attacked by Rhine of the Department of Parapsychology of Duke University and by the social psychologist Murphy (G. Murphy, 1946). Rhine and his followers have published several books (J. B. Rhine *et al.*, 1940) and many articles (largely in the *Journal of Parapsychology*) in an attempt to establish the validity of telepathic communication. Up to the present, however, their data have not been accepted by any appreciable number of scientists. Suffice it to say that their alleged telepathic phenomena tend to evaporate as their experiments become more rigidly controlled (J. L. Kennedy, 1939; and L. D. Goodfellow, 1938). We can tentatively assume, therefore, that all communications are received through the known sense organs. See also "The human element in probability" (L. D. Goodfellow, 1940).

² See *The language of gesture* (M. Critchley, 1939); "The social and psychological significance of gestures" (M. H. Krout, 1935); and *Gesture and environment* (D. Efron, 1941). A slightly broader definition of gesture is given in "The social character of gestures" (P. Weiss, 1943). Here verbal exclamations are also regarded as gestures.

language of the theater and use it self-consciously, we are seldom aware of our response to the gestures of others or of the extent to which we express ourselves by gesture symbols. Only when something interferes with the normal use of gestures in effecting person-to-person adjustments are we at all likely to observe our dependence on them. Thus it was that the pioneers in the field of radio broadcasting soon discovered that there is normally more to a speech and a song than vocal sounds. Radio depends entirely on auditory stimulation for its effect; only the sounds made by a lecturer, singer, or actor reach the radio audience (note 19). Consequently, many platform and stage celebrities, unable to communicate with their radio publics by nonverbal, meaningful motions, especially the facial expressions, had little appeal on the radio. Many a singer who was entertaining to an audience that could see her, was dull and uninteresting to a public that could only hear her voice. To be successful in radio, one must have a good "vocal personality"—a voice enriched by vocal tricks which in some measure "tell" the hearer what the singer or speaker looks like. The fact that there need be no relationship between what is so conveyed and the actuality is obvious.

The development of television is now forcing radio dramatists and performers to a rediscovery of the functional effectiveness of gestures as a supplement to speech, and it is already evident that some of the people who have been very successful in radio will not be able to shift directly over to television. For in television, as in the motion picture and on the stage, physical appearance and most especially gestural behavior are quite as important in determining the success of a performer as is his speech or song. The small size and somewhat fuzzy image of television necessitates recourse to gestures that are, perhaps, even more exaggerated than are those of the stage.⁸ It is probable, therefore, that television will have to develop its own language of gestures, its own corps of performers, and its own methods of blending speech and gesture before it will be capable of telling stories effectively.

The Subtleties of Gestural Language. Under ordinary circumstances gestures are a supplement to words, enriching them and giving

⁸ An interesting point and one worthy of mention is that normal human behavior is not effective on the stage or the screen. To seem natural on the stage or before the camera, one must act unnaturally. Because of the distance between actor and audience, all speech must be sharpened and all gestures exaggerated. The magnification of human figures that occurs in the motion-picture reproduction, on the other hand, tends to exaggerate all gestures. To have the picture give the illusion of reality, screen actors must restrain their gestures and be less spirited and aggressive than is normal. By failing to realize this necessity and by carrying over stage techniques to the screen, actors contributed as much as did technical flaws toward making the early motion pictures crude and unrealistic.

the hearer something to look at while he listens.⁴ They may even change the communication value of words or phrases—a fact that is reflected in the common admonition, “Smile when you say that!” Although they are not so definitive for interhuman communication as are written or spoken words, gestures are occasionally far more effective. Supplementing (note 20) and often modifying the effects of the spoken word, they provide a much more subtle means of communication than does speech. The effects of gestures are, however, somewhat intangible and difficult to study.

Our first impression of a person is often a rapid reaction to his physiognomy and gestures. This is especially noticeable in the case of very young children who, incapable of understanding what a stranger says, watch the stranger’s face and respond not to his words but to his expression. The child apparently studies the stranger’s behavior, trying to “read” from it what sort of person the stranger is.⁵ An adult may do much the same sort of thing. He probably gains his impression quickly, perhaps without any realization of what he is doing. The response that we frequently describe as character reading is primarily an unrealized reaction to gestures (note 21).

Gesture and Modern Life. In the older societies, where people tended to live together in intimate groupings from birth to death and had, therefore, a great deal of experiential knowledge of one another, reliance on gestural symbols was probably limited to evaluating from them the momentary feeling-states and moods of one another.⁶ In modern society such usage of gestures is normal in the interpersonal relations of intimate friends and acquaintances.

But many person-to-person relationships in modern society are highly impersonal and very dynamic in character. Hence we are often forced to make quick evaluations, not only of the momentary moods and feelings of the persons we meet, but of their basic and enduring characteristics. Thus the salesman must try to judge the intent, values, and financial

⁴ At one time, the overflow from a class in one of our larger universities was put into a well-proctored second room, which was equipped for radio reception. While the instructor lectured directly to the students of the original classroom, only his voice via microphone came to those in the second room. These overflow students could hear almost perfectly, but they had no speaker on whom to fix attention. They seemed ill at ease; the predominant posture soon adopted was that of resting the head upon the hand. The grades received by this overflow group averaged lower than those received by the students who both heard and saw the instructor.

⁵ Even caricatures yield meaningful gestural stimuli. Otherwise the incomplete sketches of the cartoon would not be understood (M. R. Samuels, 1939).

⁶ From this point on contrasts will frequently be made between what may occur in the small, highly integrated society and what is more likely to be the case in modern society. For a useful typification of the basic characteristics of the small, integrated society, see “The folk society” (R. Redfield, 1947).

status of each of his many customers; and the shopper must try to estimate how much of the salesman's apparent sincerity and frankness is real and how much is just superficial salesmanship. The girl must often try to estimate the real character of the handsome young man she has met for the first time, and he in turn may have to judge whether it will be worth his while to ask her for a date. Even the modern employer usually has to choose on the basis of very short observation from the available candidates that one whom he thinks most likely to prove worthy.

In the making of such snap judgments⁷ (personality stereotyping, as it will be termed later), gestures seem to be an important criterion. But since the language of gestures is not standardized and there is no certain relation between a given gesture and the personal characteristics that it is supposed, at least by the one who makes the judgment, to reflect, there is enormous possibility for error in all snap judgments. The man who is deemed, on the basis of his manner and expressions, to be a pleasant, honest, and competent person may actually prove himself in time to be quite the opposite. The man who actually is pleasant, honest, and competent may, on the other hand, smile or otherwise act gesturally in ways that lead many who meet him for the first time to judge him to be rude, untrustworthy, and egotistical. And since in modern society the welfare of both those who make snap judgments and those who are the objects of them often depends on the validity of those judgments, the importance of gestural behavior is much greater in contemporary society than in earlier societies. It is probably true that in many instances a charming manner is one of the most priceless possessions that a modern man or woman can have. Certainly that is the case with the politician and courtesan; it is only somewhat less certain with the rest of us. As a consequence, the uses to which gestures are put and the processes by which they are acquired assume considerable importance both to the individual and to social psychology.

Unintentional Use. Communication by gestures of which both the initiator of the symbols and the responder thereto are unaware explains many of the common mysteries of human behavior. Although careful

⁷ Although the ability to make successful snap judgments is traditionally termed "woman's intuition," it is not true that women are better in all areas where quick judgments are called for. But that women as a group are better than men at reacting speedily to facial gestures has been demonstrated in a simple laboratory experiment where the reactions were to complexes of visual gestures (facial expressions as seen in photographs were interpreted as expressive of anger, fear, disgust, and the like). It should be noted that awareness of the proper meanings of the facial expressions does not ensure ability to analyze the gestural complex into its elements. In fact, most of the reasons given for such judgments (*e.g.*, his eyes look so truthful) are sheer rationalizations.

of what he says and does, a person may convey undesired impressions through unintentional gestures. Perhaps he smiles pleasantly upon being introduced and says the proper things in the proper ways; yet some unrealized movement of the eyebrow, some unintentional but effective detail about his posture, or the action of a hand or finger may result in an unfortunate first impression. Since gestures may effectively offset words without either the speaker or the listener being aware of them, a professional lecturer has to avoid developing platform mannerisms that will unduly distract his audience or that will cause it to feel that he is hesitant and uncertain or to think that he is insincere. Some people cannot tell lies successfully, even the so-called "white lies," because their manner or expression gives them away. Others cannot tell the truth without arousing the suspicion of being deceitful. They "look" as though they were trying to convey a false impression. Just what it is that makes them look this way is seldom susceptible to exact analysis.⁸

Although many of our snap judgments about the people we meet are made on the basis of stereotyped reactions to their gestures, the growth of intimate acquaintanceship is, of course, invariably accompanied by the gradual establishment of more effective and more accurate understanding of their gesture symbols. It is in part by learning the true significance of a person's gestures⁹ that we gain insight into an understanding of him. Most of this learning comes about without our being aware of it.

Pantomime. Gesture can, however, be used with deliberate effort to influence others. Some of the most spectacular public speakers depend almost as much on posture, movement of hands, and facial expression as on speech to obtain the effects they desire. Some, in fact, seem to depend almost wholly on gesture.

The art of communication by gesture alone is called pantomime. The silent motion pictures depended for their effectiveness to an enormous extent on the power of gestures to convey ideas to the members of the audience. Because the actors lacked skill and because the audience was untrained in response to the subtleties of motion-picture pantomime, the action in early motion pictures was crude and unrealistic. When the hero wanted to convey a fear that the heroine might have suffered some harm, he staggered, beat his breast, tore his hair, and screwed up his face. To indicate her love, the heroine flung her arms wide and jumped

⁸ Because gestures are ordinarily indefinable and ability to use the right ones is such a large part of what is commonly called a "pleasing personality," books on personality "improvement" and schools of "charm" cannot possibly make good on their promises.

⁹ Moderately high retest reliabilities ($r = .765$) indicate that single habits of gesture are rather stable characteristics (P. Eisenberg, 1937).

into the hero's arms. When actors became more skilled in the use of gesture and when audiences became more responsive to it, an almost imperceptible change of facial expression was sufficient to communicate with the audience.

The use of pantomime is not restricted to the motion pictures. The Chinese dramatists have long depended on stereotyped gestures to convey ideas, *e.g.*, a slight spreading of the hands to indicate the opening of a door. By turning "thumbs down," a gesture that still signifies contempt or finality, the Caesars gave their victorious gladiators the right to partake of the glories of victory and to kill their victims. The American Indians of different linguistic groups are reputed to have been able to communicate with one another by a universal sign language that consisted entirely of gestures. The traveler in a foreign land may be forced to resort to gestures; it is indeed surprising how effectively one can converse in pantomime. Deaf-mutes use a highly conventionalized gesture language; it is, however, based upon the spoken language and substitutes gestures for the letters of words (R. Paget, 1936). Soldiers are often trained in a formalized gesture language for use when the noise of battle prevents communication by sound.

There are many obvious uses to which gestures are put, but the subtle and frequently unintentional communications by gesture are of far greater significance for social life. These communications may be difficult to analyze, but they cannot be ignored. For much that is otherwise inexplicable in human behavior is found to result from response to subtle but nonetheless effective gestures (note 22).

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF GESTURE SYMBOLS

Lack of Natural Gestures. Fond parents and relatives frequently claim that they can tell how an infant is feeling or what he is thinking by the way he looks or acts, but their doing so is probably an indication of their desire rather than their ability to communicate with the infant. Such evidence as we have indicates that the infant who "looks" hungry according to the mother is just as likely to need a change of diapers as a bottle of milk.

Many years ago John B. Watson endeavored to ascertain the exact number of congenital emotional expressions. He concluded that there are three—fear, rage, and love. But it is now clear that he was doing only what the fond mother does when she says, "Baby loves me." Like the mother, he was judging from his knowledge of the conventional relationship between gestures and body states rather than from a careful analysis of the child's behavior. If an adult falls suddenly, he is "frightened" and indicates his fear by the "fear expression." But to argue that,

when the face of a newborn infant assumes something akin to the "fear expression," the infant is afraid is as unjustified as to conclude that falling causes him to become afraid.

Apparently few modes of self-expression are congenital.¹⁰ The majority do not appear until some time after birth. The uncomfortable infant moves arms, legs, body, and facial muscles; but about all that is known regarding the congenital basis of self-expression is that discomfort, of whatever origin, causes or tends to cause bodily activity. Although it is the basis for learning, such movement is not gesture; *i.e.*, it is not meaningful behavior.

Differences in Gesture Languages. Gesture is one form of symbolic behavior; thus, the meanings of gesture symbols are of social rather than natural origin (D. Efron and J. P. Foley, Jr., 1937). The human infant is incapable of communicating with the human beings around him because he has not learned to use their symbols; and he cannot be communicated with because he has not learned to respond to those symbols.

Each society has more or less its own gesture language, which must be learned by the infant born into the society and by the adult stranger from some other society as well. When we speak of the "emotional" Latin and the "impassive" Chinese, we are merely indicating our ignorance of the gestures of these peoples. The Chinese may seem curiously uncommunicative to the American, although to another Chinese his expressions and mannerisms are probably quite understandable; for the Chinese tend to use gestures that are less vigorous and less apparent than those we generally use. The Mexicans, French, and Italians, on the other hand, seem to us extreme in their use of gestures (E. C. Dickey and F. H. Knower, 1941).

Differences in the gesture languages of societies are indicated in an exaggerated way by the fact that in dramatic characterization certain stereotyped gesture usages are associated with the members of various groups. The Italian is generally portrayed as one who shrugs and gesticulates wildly; the Chinese, on the other hand, as one who maintains a calm, cool manner, whatever the circumstances. There is certainly an element of truth behind these stereotypes. The Italians may not be more "expressive," but they do tend to express themselves by gestures more obvious and the Chinese by gestures less obvious than those that we use.

¹⁰ Few if any definite defensive or other particularized responses characterize the infant at birth. His behavior is, in the main, generalized and diffuse, becoming particularized only with the passage of time (K. C. Pratt, 1946).

ACQUISITION OF GESTURAL BEHAVIOR

The language of gesture, being social, must be acquired out of social experience just as surely as must the language of speech. How does the human infant learn to express himself through the gesture language to which those of his society respond? Equally important and quite distinct, how does he learn to respond to the gesture language that those about him use?

Learning Not Imitative. The easy answer to these questions would be that the child learns by "imitation"; *i.e.*, he comes to smile because those around him smile, and he comes to understand the meaning of a smile because those around him have such understanding. But the easy answer is not the valid one. Actually, almost the reverse is true: the child learns to smile because those around him respond to smiles, and he learns to respond to smiles because those around him smile.¹¹

Response to Gestures. Children are often more dependent upon gestures than are adults. The mother may without intent "tell" her child by gestures that the medicine that she says is nice is really quite distasteful. She may inadvertently convey through gestures her personal distaste for spinach, her dislike for the woman who lives next door, or even her suspicions about her husband, although she dutifully eats spinach "to set a good example," always speaks of the neighbor in complimentary ways, and does her best to hide even from herself questions of her husband's loyalty. How does the child come to recognize the meaning of the mother's gestures? How does he learn to read gestures that parents themselves often do not realize they are making?

The development of response to gestures is one aspect of the complex and little understood problem of learning. We know that learning is a consequence of experience—in this instance, of experience with human beings who use gesture symbols. The early stages in the gesture experience of the child are reasonably easy to perceive; but, as subsequent shifts are made, it becomes quite impossible to discern the specific experiences that are involved in the development of responses to specific gestures. We can therefore indicate only the nature of the process involved.

The underlying process in learning to respond to gestures would seem to be the gradual association of visual stimuli—gestures—with other

¹¹ Thus it is possible for blind children to develop facial gestures although they cannot see the smiles and frowns of those around them. When very young, the blind do in fact show approximately as much facial activity as normal children. As they grow older, blind children do not, however, keep pace with the gestural development of normal children (J. S. Fulcher, 1942).

stimuli, such as food, fondling, bathing, and the like. The mother¹² tends to express herself in gestures as she cares for and plays with her infant. Different aspects of her treatment of the infant are more or less consistently accompanied by different gestures. Thus, she may smile while she feeds him, frown while she changes his diapers. At the outset her gestures have no effect upon the child, but her overt nonsymbolic behaviors do. In time, then, the sight of her smile may become associated with the feelings evoked by being fed and the sight of her frown with the feelings of "being changed." If the mother never smiled and never frowned, this particular order of association would not develop; and the infant's training in response to gesture would be delayed. But it is a rare mother who can refrain from expressing herself in the gestures of her society while tending her infant. Such gestures are, at the outset, a smiling and frowning to herself, since they do not affect the infant. But because she does smile and frown as she nonsymbolically ministers to her child, the child comes in time to respond to her smile and her frown as he originally responded to her ministrations. From such crude beginnings he gradually learns to some degree or other those subtle gesture discriminations that are conventional for the adults of his society.

Individual Variations. How attentive any individual will become to gestures and the specific meanings that he comes to associate with a given gesture will depend largely on how expressive through gestures are the persons who contribute to his socialization. There is of course considerable individual variation in gestural usage in any society. The child whose mother happens to be exceptionally expressive through this medium will tend to become unusually observant of and responsive to gestures, and he may thereby be started off in a developmental direction that results, years later, in his being a remarkably good "reader of character" or exceptionally sensitive to the moods and feelings of others. In some walks of life exceptional training in responsiveness to gestures is a distinct advantage; salesmen, psychiatrists, palmists and mind readers of all varieties, and even wives may in considerable part owe unusual success to exceptional awareness of the gestures of others. Exceptional

¹² The term "mother" is used throughout the text to mean the sociological mother. The sociological mother is the predominant person in the child's life, whether that person be the biological mother, a nurse, the grandmother, an elder sister, the attendants in an orphanage, or, more rarely, the father. Particularly in our society, the biological mother may have little if any social significance for the development of the child's social behavior. Not infrequently, of course, a playmate is of far more significance for the social development of a child than are its parents. Such is the disorder of contemporary life that for no two children in our society will biological relationships have quite the same social significance.

awareness does not ensure unusual ability to evaluate mood and character through gestures. Should the mother who makes her child exceptionally responsive to gestures herself use socially atypical gestures, the child might thereby be maltrained in gestural interpretation. As an adult, then, he might be prone to make strong but mistaken judgments of people. Should the mother be one who is inclined toward the theatrical—who looks anguished when she is only disturbed, etc.—the child may actually fail to become sensitized to her gestures; for here as elsewhere in the socialization of the individual what in moderation has a pronounced effect may in excess have very little. In this case, the child would learn, not the importance of his mother's gestures, but their unimportance, their lack of nonsymbolic meaning.

In those instances where the mother is to a marked degree unexpressive through gestures, the child may develop little dependence on gestures; and if other persons around the child do not counteract this aspect of his socialization, the child would presumably grow up to be less than normally aware of gestural meanings. The result would be a sort of social myopia, a tendency to miss much that transpires through gestures in person-to-person relationships, and perhaps a related inclination to be unusually literal regarding what people say because of unawareness of what they "look." Sometimes, indeed, such behavioral characteristics as those which are described as rudeness, social awkwardness, and ineptitude may be traced to insensitivity to the gestures of others. But here also what in extreme degree may have one effect may in a moderate degree have quite a different consequence. The mother who is to a marked degree unexpressive through gestures and exceptionally expressive through speech might socialize her child into subnormal response to gestures and exceptional responsiveness to speech. But the one who is somewhat unexpressive gesturally and verbally—who seldom smiles and rarely speaks—might, on the other hand, inadvertently train her child to a high sensitivity to the few and modulated gestures that she does evidence.

At any event, individual differences in responsiveness to gestures, often described as ability to read character, are clearly a consequence of the differences in the gestural behaviors to which the individuals have been subjected in infancy, childhood, and, less importantly, in youth.¹⁸

Self-expression through Gestures. The development of an understanding of gestures is only a part of the problem of gesture communication; and as regards sociopsychological analysis, it is the simpler. The

¹⁸ On the assumption, of course, that there is equally good vision. Unless the child with myopic eyes is unusually adept with auditory and tactual gestures, he becomes of necessity somewhat socially myopic.

development of ability to communicate by means of gestures is more complex, and the processes involved are somewhat more subtle. Since we no longer believe that the human infant is born with innate neural linkages that cause his eyes to twinkle when he is amused or his lips to smile when he is pleased, the explanation must be found in the experiences of the child.¹⁴

The problem of self-expression through gestures divides itself into two distinct and separate ones: how does the human being come to express discomfort and all its variants by the gestures that are conventional signs of these feelings within the society to which he has been born? and, second, how does he come to express "pleasure" by another set of such gestures? This separation arises from the fact that there appears to be some native basis for the expression of the former but little or none for the latter.

Gestures of Pain or Discomfort. The "crying expression" of the newborn infant is a natural consequence or expression of body disequilibrium. Like that of laughter, which appears much later in the infant's development, this expression consists of the play of certain facial muscles. When a healthy newborn infant is deliberately pained, as when he is stuck with a sharp instrument, he screws up his face. Somewhat similar is the body movement, likewise present at birth, which we term "squirming." These bodily movements are not symbolic behaviors but are only a generalized response to a wide range of different internal states. The crying expression and the squirming mean only that the infant's physiological equilibrium is disturbed; they do not indicate the specific nature of that disturbance.

Because the mother has herself learned to respond to gestures, however, the infant comes in time to acquire the ability to express himself specifically through gestures. When her infant cries, the mother's response tends to be selective. That is to say, she "reads into" the child's nonsymbolic behavior, including facial and body movement, such significance as is determined by the symbols to which she herself has been trained to respond. The child's perceptible behavior is in the nature of unpredictable movements and has at the outset no symbolic significance. But the mother treats him "as if" he could express body discomfort with the gesture symbols of her society. She treats the child one way when he "acts as though" he were hungry, another when he acts as though he were thirsty, and another when he acts as though he were too warm. Thus the child apparently comes to associate certain specific actions on his part with distinctive responses on the part of the mother. Because

¹⁴ Three-months-old children are much more apt to laugh than to cry when vociferously scolded, so meager are their experiences with the world (C. Bühler, 1930).

she is relatively consistent in these responses, he gradually learns to use the conventional gestures of discomfort when his body states are such as may be corrected by the mother's response.

In the beginning, the mother is ordinarily rather liberal in her interpretation of the various aspects of the crying expression. She experiments and explores in trying to find out just what the infant is endeavoring "to say." In the course of time she becomes more demanding and less patient. Thus the child is forced to conform more and more exactly to the social standards of gesture expression.

Gestures of "Pleasure." The development of ability to express "pleasure" also arises from the fact that the mother responds selectively to the infant's nonsymbolic behavior. Such ability comes more slowly than the ability to express discomfort, since the infant less commonly makes violent movements when his body is equilibrated. When the physiological equilibrium of the newborn infant is not upset, the infant is relatively quiet. It is an unusual mother, though, who does not claim that her child smiled at her a week or two after he was born. Such impressions indicate only that the mother is prepared to recognize and encourage a "smile expression" when and for whatever reason it does occur. It may be many weeks before this happens and still more before it is a true mode of symbolic behavior.¹⁵

It is evidently because the mother recognizes and encourages the smile that in the course of time the child learns to express pleasure by smiling. That encouragement takes nonsymbolic forms of action on the part of the mother. She is pleased because her infant looks pleased, and therefore she fondles or otherwise pleases him. It is not always necessary for the mother actually to give pleasure to the child through nonsymbolic behavior. Once the child has become responsive to verbal symbols, the mother's exclamation of pleasure at the "smile" may be sufficient to arouse mild pleasure in the child and thus to encourage an association of pleasure with the muscular sets involved in the smile.

Individual Variations. The same points that were made in regard to individual differences in gesture responsiveness apply, but in reverse, to differences in expressiveness by gesture. Because she watches for and responds to the body movement of her infant more than do most mothers, a mother who is exceptionally sensitive to the gestures

¹⁵ The first smile appears on the average about the fifty-eighth day after birth (M. C. Jones, 1926). See also "Laughing and crying of preschool children" (C. W. Brackett, 1934); "An experimental test of two theories of social smiling in infants" (W. Dennis, 1935); "La psychologie génétique du rire" (C. W. Valentine, 1936); "Tickling and laughter: two genetic studies" (C. Leuba, 1941); and "Development of facial expression of emotion in blind and seeing children" (J. Thompson, 1941).

of others tends to accelerate the child's acquisition of gestures and to that extent to make him more than normally expressive in this mode. Thus the child who strikes people as being unusually "bright and alert" may have learned his quick smile and wide-eyed glance at least in part through the provocation of a mother who is sensitive to and depends much on the gestures of others. And the Thespian proclivities of the youth or adult may be partly the result of his having learned as an infant and child, because his mother was an exceptionally good audience, to grimace and posture and bat his eyes.

The origins of specific gestures, most particularly those that are socially atypical, are usually lost in the midst of history, the life history of the individual. But it is fairly safe to say that an odd gesture, such as smiling with downturned lips or "lifting an eyebrow quizzically," was acquired as a consequence of the fact that someone thought the gesture amusing, attractive, or otherwise expressive and encouraged its being repeated. That it may later have quite different meaning to other persons is another matter; a child's smile may be one that his mother considers particularly charming, but years later it may earn him as a man the reputation of being supercilious or egotistical.

When his mother and the others around an infant are less than normally responsive to his gestures, their treatment of him tends to make him less than normally expressive through gestures. Unresponsiveness to the random movements of the infant, which normally serve as the materials from which social gestures are made, may result from any one of a number of circumstances. The preoccupied mother will be an inattentive one. The woman who was herself brought up by a gesturally unexpressive mother may be relatively unresponsive to gestures. And the myopic mother may be unresponsive simply because she does not see the finer random movements of her infant. In any event, the result may be that the child will develop some degree of that facial blankness which in the extreme case is labeled "dead pan" or "poker face." A person who is facially blank is rather disconcerting to others, at least on first acquaintance, although in certain walks of life, gestural unexpressiveness is a decided asset. The diplomat, the gambler, and the mortician must if they are to be successful hide their true feelings; and they can probably do this more easily if they have failed to learn to express their feelings gesturally. It is doubtful if a person trained to normal gesture usage can easily cultivate an unexpressive face and manner. Attempts to do so usually result in artificiality of gesture behavior that is more revealing than concealing.

LIMITATIONS OF GESTURE

Although it is a far more important means of communication than we commonly realize, gesture has distinct practical limitations. To be effective, gestures must be seen.¹⁸ The gestures of the speaker in the next room can have no direct effect upon us. In the thick of a London fog the policeman finds it very difficult to give his questioner directions. Pointing is of no use. He must tell him which way to go, since he cannot demonstrate by gesture symbols. Gestures are, thus, effective only under physical conditions of adequate light and short range, a fact that puts a primary limitation on their use.

A similar limitation may appear under entirely different conditions, as when a policeman is holding back the traffic by his outstretched arms. He cannot then demonstrate which direction is south because his arms are already employed. This secondary limitation to the use of gesture is more extensive than might be supposed. There are many times when we wish to communicate with others while we are at work or at play when to do so by means of gestures would necessitate stopping whatever we are doing.

Abstract Ideas. By far the most significant limitation upon gesture as a means of communication, however, is the fact that gestures are not easily susceptible to combination and synthesis. It is true that the pantomimist may "tell" a story, the pattern of which is unique. But in doing so, he must use gestures whose meanings are already known to the members of his audience. He cannot establish those meanings. God may be symbolized by a lifting of the face to the heavens; but the idea "God" is for the members of his audience the result of a synthesis of many experiences involving tangible persons or things. It would be exceedingly difficult to develop this idea by gesture communication alone.

The distinction here involved may be seen when we compare the child's response to the mother's frown and his response to the idea "grandfather," who has never appeared as a person. The frown is a gesture symbol of, perhaps, a spanking. Although the spanking is potential, it is tangible and simple. But if the idea "grandfather" has any meaning to the child, that meaning is a synthesis of the many things that the child has been told about "grandfather." When the mother influences her child's behavior by saying, "Darling, your dear, dead grandfather would not have liked that," she is appealing to an abstraction. It is a psychological but nonmaterial reality. Although derived from experiences with

¹⁸ Our discussion here is limited to visual gestures. For a consideration of what are sometimes called "vocal gestures," see the following chapter.

reality, the abstraction as a synthesis of those experiences has no external manifestation.

The synthesizing of many experiences into an idea or concept is vital to society; and much of social life revolves around such abstractions as liberty, God, our ancestors, etc. Once such abstractions have been developed, they might be easily symbolized by gestures; but their development through this medium of communication is difficult and is perhaps seldom accomplished. The synthesis of an idea, such as that of God, is more likely to be accomplished by another means—speech, the second and by far the most important form of overt symbolic behavior.

CHAPTER VII

OVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: II. SPEECH

The human infant, in common with most animals, is capable of making noises. There is the cry by which he usually announces his arrival into this world and the wail with which he will irritate the neighbors for some months thereafter. The cry is uncontrolled sound. It is a generalized response to a wide variety of stimuli and therefore lacks any specific meaning. It is a relatively uncoordinated playing upon the pipes of the vocal organ. It is not speech any more than the discordance that would follow the turning loose of a small boy on the keys, stops, and pedals of a church organ is music.

Speech as a System of Symbolic Behaviors. Speech consists of highly conventionalized verbal sound patterns. It is much more than vocal sound; it is controlled sound, having definite meaning or value to others as well as to the speaker. It differs sociopsychologically from gesture not only in that it is auditory rather than visual but also in that it utilizes a restricted and specialized aspect of the organism, the vocal folds.¹

Speech, like music, is a social rather than a natural thing. In both cases the tonal attributes—pitch, loudness, etc.—are a consequence of natural factors; but the patterns they form, and thus their meanings, are entirely social. Vocal sound patterns have no natural meanings or reaction values. Some students have considered a few words—such as tinkle, splash, and squawk—onomatopoeic (note 23); but it is generally recognized that the meanings we find in words are a consequence of social training rather than of some quality that the words themselves possess.² If the word “stink” is distasteful and the word “idyllic” is pleasing

¹ The major linguistic organs of deaf-mutes are the fingers, parts that also function in writing.

² In the construction of artificial words it makes little difference what sounds are employed; no more pleasantness is given to the artificial constructions when sounds from pleasant words are used than when sounds from unpleasant words are used (E. L. Thorndike, 1934). See also “The affective value of first names” (W. E. Walton, 1937). Ease of saying a word appears to be at least slightly associated with its pleasantness. But the major determinant of the pleasantness of a word is to be found in particular events in the development of the language in which the word is found (E. L. Thorndike, 1945). See also “The psychology of semantics” (E. L. Thorndike, 1946).

to us, it is only because these vocal patterns have become associated, respectively, with distasteful and pleasing things. The same is true, too, of reaction to vocal qualities. The "harsh, nasal twang" of the Northerner, which grates upon ears accustomed to the more "melodious and soft" accents of the Southerner, may sound sweet and pleasing to the northern ear, which may, in turn, find the southern manner of speech saccharine in quality. The human vocal mechanism is capable of a remarkable variety of sounds. From all the possible combination of tone qualities, pitch relationships, etc., each society has utilized a few specific patterns and has given to each pattern a separate meaning or a number of meanings. (These combinations and their associated meanings, then, form the verbal language of that society.) Although a language contains some thousands of words, which may be run together in many different grammatical forms, the natural capacities of the mechanism are barely tapped. Speaking a language is much like playing a simple tune on a vastly complex organ.

The Elements of Speech. Verbal sound patterns are a consequence of a control that is little short of miraculous. As in music, the patterns of verbal sound are constructed by the controlled use of a number of distinct elements. Absolute pitch is seldom important. A word or phrase can be "played" in any key. Relative pitch, however, is of considerable importance in vocal symbolism;³ monotone, speech from which pitch changes, or inflections, are partially eliminated, is quite difficult to listen to, being soporific, if not actually uncommunicative.⁴ All languages use inflection, although some use more than others. The Romanic language group depends on inflection to a greater extent than does English. With the dialect-speaking Chinese from the region around Canton the use of inflection is so extensive that a conversation sounds to Western ears like a "group sing" or singsong. Even slight differences in inflection are significant, as is indicated by the fact that Americans are often amused to hear the English end their sentences and phrases with a rising rather than a falling pitch.

Inflection is only one of the elements from which vocal patterns are

³ In north China, for example, there is a sound combination, "ma," which when spoken with a low rising pitch means "house," with a high rising pitch "hemp," with a high level pitch "mother," and with a low falling pitch "scold" (L. Bloomfield, 1933).

⁴ Formerly, deaf-mutes who were taught to speak lacked the usual speech melodies. But it has been found that the speech inflections of deaf-mutes can be improved if they are allowed to compare their speech records with those of normal speakers. Instruments are employed by which the sound patterns are converted into moving visual lines. The subject observes the "picture" of a normal speech melody and attempts to imitate it (M. F. Meyer, 1934).

devised. Placement shifts constantly in speech and contributes to the fashioning of speech patterns. In both German and French a wide range of tonal qualities is involved, but the placements used are quite different. German is often described as a guttural language and French as a nasal one. Every language uses shifts in tonal quality so subtle that, as a rule, only those who speak it as the mother tongue can escape a foreign-tonal accent. It is said, for example, that no white man ever completely masters the "click" of the Bantus, a percussive sound produced by tongue and soft palate.

Percussive sounds, made by smacking the lips, sucking the tongue away from the roof of the mouth, etc., are not frequent in the European languages. Variations in intensity, however, provide a kind of explosive sound that is used in forming rhythm patterns. Rhythm is also produced by the slight and quick shifts in pitch that we have already mentioned and by relative shifts in timing. Even the gossip whose "tongue rattles on unmercifully" does vary the minute but significant pauses between the sounds she emits. These pauses form a rhythm pattern that contributes to the meaning of the sounds. In speech, even silence has its meaning.

We take our language and our usage of it very much for granted. Not until we attempt to learn a second language do the complexities of speech control impress us; and, even then, we see them only in terms of a difficulty.⁵ It is this very complexity of verbal control, however, that makes speech a more flexible and extensive means of communication than gesture.

The Functions of Speech. There is no doubt that words constitute the greatest single tool that man has yet devised.⁶ Through them is exercised much of the control necessary for the maintenance of social life. By speech a mother lulls her infant to sleep; by it great political leaders have aroused nations from apathy. Through it men devise, perpetuate, and destroy the complex patterns of nonsymbolic behavior by which they live or perish.

The lower animals, especially the apes, may live together. But their ways of living have neither the cumulative characteristic nor the adaptive quality which make man the dominant organism. The ape does have

⁵ A major difficulty often encountered in using a foreign tongue is the finding of permissible literary descriptions. While we look "drawn and haggard" when worried, the Chinese "clap the hands." Anger for us is often described in terms of "hectic flush and narrowed eyes." But for the Chinese, anger is associated with "round eyes and a chilly smile" (O. Klineberg, 1938).

⁶ It is quite evident that during the course of a war the word (treaties, threats, promises, and the like) is not so mighty as the sword (guns, tanks, combat planes, etc.). But it is words that have made possible the development, manufacture, and use of the swords of physical conflict.

many of the anatomical attributes of man. But its most serious inadequacy lies in the limitations of its speech behavior. Like other animals, the ape can learn to respond to the spoken word, and one or two have allegedly learned to speak two or three words. But the ape has failed to learn to speak a well-differentiated language and thus has been unable to develop to any great degree human ways of behavior (note 24).

The "Meaning" of a Word. The spoken word is a verbal symbol. It may symbolize a concrete object (such as dog, cat, ball, and milk), spatial relationship of objects, or abstractions from them. Or it may symbolize a bodily state, such as love, pain, pleasure, fear, or apprehension. For each word in a language there is a corresponding meaning or counterpart—in some cases two or more such meanings, the particular one being indicated by the mode of usage. This is the conventionally specified, *i.e.*, the dictionary or denotative, meaning of a word.

The usage of words in their denotative values permits exact and refined communication. By such usage the scientist describes his discoveries and the teacher endeavors to convey his ideas to his students. Teachers and scientists are endeavoring to obtain highly refined responses and to secure rigidly controlled communication. Unfortunate for the student, perhaps, is the fact that when words are used in their denotative values, they are often relatively impotent.

"Vocal Gesture." Supplementing and sometimes modifying the dictionary meaning of each word is a wealth of subtle implications that are conveyed through unconventional and conventional inflection, accent, stress, or other variations from the normal pattern. These variations in usage provide the overtones, without which speech is flat and soporific. The word "love" is defined as strong personal attachment or ardent affection; yet in speech it may mean anything from adoration to sadism. Dictionary meaning is thus but the starting point. It provides a medium of denotative communication. Inflection, context, and variations of usage, which are frequently spoken of as "vocal gestures," round out the language, give it richness, and make it a stimulating (note 25) means of communication.⁷

Not only what words one uses, but how one uses them is, thus, important in ordinary conversation, in lecturing, etc. Flattering words may be made insulting, provocative words made pleasing. The most startling scientific discovery may be made dull and unimportant when

⁷ The poet, the politician, and the song writer almost never use words in their denotative meanings; thus they say, "his heart was singing," "I consecrate my life to the welfare of the people," etc. For an attempt to ascertain how words gain meaning, see *The meaning of meaning* (C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 1930) and "Meaning and the study of symbolic behavior" (I. L. Janis, 1943).

presented to laymen by the scientist who uses words at their specific values. The most unimportant observation, when artfully handled, may become the basis for a stimulating, startling lecture. The professor's joke may be original and leave his audience cold; the radio comedian may carry his hearers with timeworn gags. Because word values can be controlled by the user, a brilliant conversationalist need have little to say. He may depend for his effects entirely on the manner of the saying.

Word Combination and the Synthesis of Reactions. The flexibility of verbal behavior does not end with the fact that words may have many meanings. Unlike gestures, words are susceptible to synthesis—to being combined into a multitude of patterns. Ten words may be combined into a hundred different meanings, each of which may be given a number of separate values by the manner of expression. Words are like building blocks: a number of words, each with its definite meaning, may be combined and recombined to evoke almost any desired response. It is through this recombination of well-known words that an abstract idea, such as God, is synthesized.

Although the child may never leave his birthplace, he may through words gain a comprehension of the world external to his own experience. Our ideas about the universe are, in fact, far more a product of word communication than of direct experience.⁸ By verbal synthesis of experienced elements we can build up a concept of the unexperienced, be it China, Africa, or South America. The concept is, of course, entirely symbolic and may be extremely unrealistic; but we may act nonsymbolically upon the basis of it. Few of the pioneers in California had been to China; but since many had the idea that China was a land of heathens and barbarians, they often treated the Chinese immigrants accordingly. And it is by verbal synthesis that much of the social heritage is passed down from generation to generation. We know of the past through words and convey many of our experiences to future generations through words. Indeed, without words there could hardly be a social heritage. It is mainly through the medium of words that we are prepared for future nonsymbolic adjustments. This is "education," the development of adjustment techniques before the occasion for their use has arisen. The value of words to us cannot therefore be overestimated, although it may, as we shall see, be misunderstood.

⁸ The child's concept of the world varies from society to society (W. Dennis and R. W. Russell, 1940). Small French-Swiss children, for example, tend to regard all things as alive; such animistic notions are not found among young Melanesian children but are held by older Melanesian children as a result of the teachings of those older and "wiser" (J. Piaget, 1929; M. Mead, 1932; J. M. Deutsche, 1943).

ACQUISITION OF VERBAL BEHAVIOR

Although a great deal of conscious effort goes into speech development, the process by which the human infant acquires the ability to use and to respond to verbal symbols is little understood. The problem is similar to, and has the same two major aspects as, the development of gesture techniques.

Response to Verbal Symbols. We may start as we did when considering response to gestures with the statement that, if those around the human infant did not express themselves through symbols, the infant would not become responsive to symbols. This is but a way of saying that verbal behavior is entirely social. Apparently it is through experience that is directed—intentionally or otherwise—by the people about him that the child comes to associate certain sound patterns with the nonsymbolic behaviors of those people. These sound patterns then have the meaning for the child that the nonsymbolic behavior originally had. Because the verbal symbols that the mother uses to express herself are mainly the conventional ones, the associations that the child develops between verbal sound patterns and body reactions tend to be those of his society.

Words Having Pleasure Value. Music may lull the savage breast, provided that the savage likes music. But lullabies have no proved soporific value to the newborn human infant. If he squirms restlessly in the crib, only release from physical irritants will be likely to soothe his little "mind" and set him off to sleep. But when, with the passing weeks, the time comes to change his feeding schedule, a lullaby may stop the midnight squall and soothe his disappointed stomach for a time. In the course of his short life experience, he has learned to associate being fed with certain of his mother's vocal sounds. These sounds have gained a vague symbolic meaning. They have a "pleasure" value; they are the small beginnings of a rapidly developing series of increasingly specific "pleasure" responses to verbal symbols. Much of this development comes about without intent on the part of the mother, for she is accustomed to accompanying her nonsymbolic acts with a flow of symbolic behavior, verbal as well as gestural. The basic process involved is aptly summed up in the contention that it is possible to train even the family cat, provided that you wait until it is doing what you want it to before issuing the command.

This process is, in effect, what occurs when the mother feeds her child to the accompaniment, in whatever language, of a steady stream of verbal sound. "Does 'ou darling wants 'ou's milk?" is hardly enlightening to the infant and may later be actually embarrassing. But the fact that the

mother coos as she cares for her infant is probably the reason why, in time, her happy tones come to have a pleasing value for the infant. Because feeding and other nonsymbolic care are frequently accompanied by certain recurrent forms of maternal verbal behavior, the latter gradually come to serve as partial substitutes for the former.

Words Having "Pain" Value. With words of restraint and prohibition, as with those of encouragement and pleasure, the "meaning" is evidently first established by doing and not by saying. Only when the doing and the saying have occurred together over and over is it possible for the words to have the meaning of the actions. Apparently the fact that the infant is told "Don't" and then is nonsymbolically restrained from continuing the disapproved act or is physically punished for doing it eventually gives the word a "pain" or inhibiting value. Although she may fully realize that the infant cannot understand her words of reproof or restraint, the average mother seldom refrains from involuntary use of them while she is taking direct and effective measures of control. It is the simultaneous occurrence of these words and the reaction-invoking nonsymbolic behavior that accounts for the fact that these words in time gain symbolic meaning to the child. When, therefore, the mother is inconsistent in what she says and what she does, the child may not develop the desired response to words. This failure is particularly noticeable in the case of words of restraint and prohibition, apparently because parents are seldom consistent in the punishment that they administer to children. They say, "No!" and then permit, or else punish and promptly "make up." Thus "No!" may on occasion have almost as much "do" value as "don't" value.

Response to Tonal Qualities. In the early stages of the development of verbal response it is probably tonal qualities and speech melody, rather than the verbal patterns, that gain meaning for the child. Thus a mother can obtain the same response from her baby by saying, "Naughty baby, now I'm going to spank you!" as by, "Nice baby, see the pretty milk bottle?" if she says it with similar speech melody, quality, and loudness. Words, as such, do not become distinguishable for months; and even then only a few of the more simple word patterns will have specific meaning to the child. The distinction between response to words and that to melody, quality, and loudness is often overlooked by the fond parent; but it is a vital one, since the early and generalized reactions to voice quality are not susceptible to that synthesis which is the prime value of word usage. Thus it is probably because the dog never gets far beyond this first stage that we cannot "tell" or explain to him how to do new things.⁹

⁹ Although dogs ordinarily respond to differences in speech melody and loudness

Refinement of response is encouraged because the mother ordinarily makes a deliberate effort to teach her child the meanings of words. As he becomes more and more responsive to vocal sounds, she will become more and more inclined to stress by repetition those word symbols that represent persons and objects important to the child's welfare. The development of specific responsiveness to words is, however, no more than a beginning in the speech training of the human being. Patterns of words—phrases and sentences—must come to have meaning as such. Having learned a definite response to each of ten words, the child must then learn to synthesize these responses for various combinations of the ten words. The patterns, like the words, are highly conventionalized; and in time the child learns to recognize those patterns, as distinct from the words with which they are formed.

The average child will employ few words until about the sixteenth month, at which time an acceleration in the use of words takes place. But his understanding of words, as distinct from his ability to use them, appears somewhat earlier. This responsiveness to words is, of course, dependent on the verbal behaviors of those around him; any atypicality in the speech of the mother and other intimates may be reflected in the responsiveness of the child to speech.

Individual Variations.¹⁰ Just as awareness and responsiveness to the gestures of others vary widely between individuals, so attentiveness and responsiveness to speech behavior differ considerably from individual to individual. Some few individuals seem never to listen, some are exceptionally good listeners, some are prone to misunderstand much of what is told them, and some are so sensitized to speech that they figuratively read between the lines of every conversation. Most such differences are presumably the consequence of atypical socialization, the occasional exception being that of the individual who is for physical reasons incapable of hearing the speech of others in a normal fashion or who is too stupid to be affected by language stimuli.

It is obvious that a child reared solely by deaf-mutes will not acquire an understanding of the spoken word. Likewise, if the mother and others around a child talk relatively little, that child will most likely lag behind his fellows in responsiveness to speech sounds. Conversely, an excep-

rather than to words per se, one four- to five-year-old German shepherd dog is reported to have been so well trained by his owner that "there seems to be no doubt that scores of associations between verbal stimuli and definite responses have been fixed" (C. J. Warden and L. H. Warner, 1928). See also *Working dogs* (E. Humphrey and L. H. Warner, 1934).

¹⁰ For a detailed consideration of the problem of individual differences in the mode of verbal expression, see "Speech and personality" (F. H. Sanford, 1942).

tionally talkative mother will tend to accelerate her child's learning to respond to speech. The effects upon the child of either kind of atypicality will, however, depend in part on the degree thereof and in part on other variables. The mother who talks incessantly, as some people do, may succeed only in desensitizing her child to speech; for if what she says really means nothing to her, it can come to mean very little to the child. This possibility is illustrated by the fact that the common parental practice of nagging and scolding often results in the child's learning to ignore such treatment and by the fact that the word "No!" so common in parental speech, frequently comes to mean nothing at all. Although subnormal talking by those around him ordinarily tends to discourage the child's acquisition of responses to speech, it may of course encourage it. The mother who speaks rarely but who speaks with meaning when she does—*e.g.*, who seldom says that she is going to spank but does spank when she threatens—may make her child more responsive to speech than the one who talks much but says little.

Self-expression through Verbal Behavior. Response to the spoken word involves the auditory mechanism;¹¹ whereas expression through words is achieved by control of the vocal folds, lungs, throat, and mouth. Speaking a word requires the delicate and accurate adjustment of many muscles. In view of the fact that each sound requires its own muscular coordination and that speech is a series of rapid shifts, it is obvious that learning to speak involves a tremendous amount of trial and error. The child in learning to use new words and to make inflection and accent variations must "feel out" each one, much as the beginner on a trombone feels out his notes. But, whereas the latter has to deal with only three variables (lip tension, breath pressure, and slide position), the child learning to speak has to deal with a large number—and the range of each is great. The mistakes that can be made are many, and only persistent trial and error will lead to eventual success.

Although trial and error is a large element in the development of verbal behavior, it could never by itself result in the acquisition of a language. Social direction, social selection, and correction are necessary if the child is to learn to express himself in the verbal symbols that

¹¹ Most mutes are without ability to speak because of auditory defects. Being unable to hear those about them, they lack the ordinary mechanism for that association between sound and object or function termed "language." In teaching them to speak (and many of them really learn to talk surprisingly well), visual, kinesthetic, or tactual cues, or some combination of these must be substituted for the auditory. Some can visually perceive the lip-and-tongue movements; others perceive the air vibrations through the skin of the hand (R. H. Gault, 1933). Blind, as well as deaf and mute, the noted Helen Keller learned to "feel" manually the changing shapes of the mouth opening and the vibrations in the head, especially the throat.

are conventional in his society (note 26). Some of this training is unintentional; more of it is deliberate.

The Acquisition of Speech. The cries, gurgles, coos, and other vocalizations that issue from the infant constitute the starting point for the development of speech. In the course of time, those in the infant's immediate vicinity may narrow the range of the babblings to which they will respond. If the mother thinks that her child has said "drink" and responds accordingly, she apparently thereby encourages the child to use this sound pattern. As time passes, she tends to ignore relatively more of the sounds he makes that are unlike those of her own tongue and to repeat after him those that resemble her language sounds. She may imagine that the child is trying to say "Daddy" or that he says that he "wants to go to Mamma" and tell him how to say these things. In time he becomes able to repeat what he hears, parroting the words of others (note 27).

True verbal behavior cannot be said to be acquired, however, until the child associates a specific sound combination with some object or occurrence in his environment. The sound combination need not be a proper one; in fact, baby talk satisfies all the requirements of a language. Thus, if the child says "Bo" when and only when he quite obviously awaits or sees his milk, he is using language—not, it is true, the language of his society, but language nevertheless. The symbol has meaning, if only to him. Upon the responsiveness, both symbolic and non-symbolic, of those around him will depend in large measure the rapidity with which the child abandons baby talk and acquires the language of adults.

Individual Variations. In any society, speech behavior is an important determinant of the status of the individual, and a deviation from the verbal norms of his society will either damage or enhance his position among his fellows. An easy command of pleasant words is one of the ways by which an individual may "win friends and influence people."¹² Success in certain social roles depends very largely on ability to talk more convincingly, entertainingly, or rapidly than most people do. This is clearly the case with the radio commentator, whose stock in trade is ability to make the obvious or the false sound profound. Actors and motion-picture performers must also have exceptional verbal abilities, as must the public speaker, the politician, and the high-pressure salesman.

¹² But it does not follow, as Dale Carnegie has contended, that deliberate flattery will make one popular. For one thing, gesture that cannot be deliberately controlled may nullify the verbal flattery. For another, the flattery that is deliberate is often obvious and, hence, self-defeating.

Even the executive in business or government may owe his success largely to his ability to talk persuasively.

Exceptional verbal ability may consist of an unusual way of saying commonplace words or it may consist of putting words into unusual patterns. The former is illustrated by the man who can "read" his lines in a play or deliver a stock political speech, sermon, or sales argument in an effective manner; the latter, much more rare, is illustrated by the one who can successfully ad-lib on a radio program, extemporize an effective speech, or verbally soothe the feelings of an irate employee or associate.

Some individual differences in speech development may be traced to physical factors. The lisping adult may lisp because of a split palate or other physical abnormality, the woman with a whine in her voice may be physically incapable of speaking otherwise, and the man who has lost his teeth can hardly avoid speaking moistly. Some vocal mechanisms are better adapted to the making of high rather than low tones or of soft rather than harsh timbres. Possibly some deep-voiced men could not have learned to speak at the pitch range of tenors; and it may be that an occasional night-club singer has a low, husky voice because of the odd shape of her oral cavity or some disorder of her vocal cords. But most of the verbal differences between individual members in any society are undoubtedly the result of differential training rather than of peculiarities of their vocal mechanisms.

The woman's childlike lisp, for example, is less likely to be the result of some physical abnormality than of the fact that during her childhood those around her responded so promptly and willingly to her lisping childhood efforts that she was never forced to refine her speech techniques. The lisp may then have been perpetuated by the fact that, as she grew older, people considered her lisp "cute," thereby discouraging her from outgrowing and encouraging her in maintaining this verbal peculiarity (note 28).

By way of generalization it may be said that exceptional maternal attentiveness to a child's needs and desires tends to discourage speech development. The child who does not need to ask for attention may not bother to learn to do so. On the other hand, if the mother is somewhat inattentive to the child or if she demands much in a verbal way of the child, the child may be encouraged by that circumstance to practice much and to learn quickly. If the mother and others around the child are distinctly inattentive to the child, they may, of course, teach him not to speak but rather to "do for himself," which is one of the various possible bases for the development of exceptional self-reliance. In any event, as the child grows older, encouragement will consist of listening ap-

preciatively to what he says, asking questions, etc., rather than of simply giving him what he expresses a desire for. So encouraged, the child may practice speaking assiduously, become something of a chatterbox, and thereby secure a good start toward developing a very verbal personality.

The conditions that make for qualitative differences in speech behavior—tonality, word choice, etc.—are much more subtle and complex. In the later stages of speech development there is probably a considerable reliance on the verbal example of others. Thus the father who speaks softly may set a “soft-speaking” example for his son; and if he and the boy’s mother at the same time respond disapprovingly to loud, harsh speech and approvingly to the softly spoken word, the boy will in many ways be encouraged to learn to speak softly. The parent with a large and flexible speaking vocabulary will in similar ways foster the development of a large vocabulary in his child, while an environmental poverty¹³ of words will more than likely preclude the child’s learning to use many words, however much he uses the few that he knows.

RESYMBOLIZATION OF VERBAL SYMBOLS

Limitations of Speech. Speech, like gesture, has distinct limitations. The range of the unaided human voice is to be measured in rods rather than in miles. Except for simple vocal symbols, such as calls, the effectiveness is often a matter of feet. We cannot, therefore, communicate through any considerable distance by the spoken word. Radio,¹⁴ of course, makes it possible to transcend this limitation. The President can now speak to millions scattered over the American continent. But these millions cannot as yet talk back. Although the telephone permits two-way distance communication, its use is limited. It is, for example, difficult to hold conferences over the telephone when more than two people are involved. By extending the effective range of verbal behavior these artificial aids to verbal communication are, no doubt, bringing about modes of social life otherwise quite impossible. But they have come about only in the last few decades, and their consequences are not yet fully apparent.

By the drum language, a type of long-distance auditory but non-

¹³ In an extensive study of children in the first half year of life it was found that orphanage children use fewer sorts of sounds and vocalize less than infants with families (A. J. Brodbeck and O. C. Irwin, 1946).

¹⁴ Some of the more important references on radio communication are *The psychology of radio* (H. Cantril and G. W. Allport, 1935); *Radio and the printed page* (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1940); *Radio research, 1942-43* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton, 1944); “Radio as an instrument of reducing personal insecurity” (H. D. Lasswell, 1941); and “Radio research” (J. G. Peatman, 1946).

verbal communication, the Africans were able partly to transcend the distance limitations of verbal communication.¹⁵ By the telephone, telegraph, and radio we are more efficiently accomplishing the same ends. Yet none of these means gives permanency to the verbal symbol. The spoken word "dies a-borning."¹⁶ Generally its effect must be immediate, although by relating it verbally from generation to generation, experiences of the past may be preserved for the future. Such communication is, however, imperfect, inaccurate, and subject to gross distortion. The primitives, dependent on it, have but the vaguest record of their ancestral history; and such as they have is probably mythological. For accurate and detailed communication through time, we are dependent on resymbolization of verbal symbols.

The Written Word. Historically many methods have been devised for the permanent recording of symbolic behavior. In the earlier forms, pictures representing acts or things were often used. The limitations of such a method are self-evident. A more flexible method is that of assigning word meaning to written characters, a method that is still used by the Chinese. It permits a flexibility and accuracy almost equal to that of speech; it is, however, cumbersome and difficult. Since a separate character is required for each word in the language, the total number of characters, the meanings of which must be remembered, runs into many thousands. As a consequence, literacy has historically been limited under such a system of writing to a small and privileged class (*e.g.*, the priests of Egypt and the scholars of old China). Simpler and more easily learned is the system we use of symbolizing the basic sound patterns of the language and building up our words from these. With but twenty-six graphic letters we can unmistakably represent the more than two hundred thousand words of our language.

¹⁵ Although broken up into many linguistic groups, the African primitives long had a universal language of the drums, by which messages could be relayed from village to village over the entire length of the continent. So effective was this language that the whites of South Africa were notified of the death of Queen Victoria by the natives several days before telegraphic reports came through. Because it was exceedingly complex, this drum language was almost as definitive and flexible as speech. As many as six drums, each with its own shifting rhythm, contributed to the complex sound patterns by which drum "words" were made. The words were not spelled out in letters, as with our telegraph, but were "spoken." The technical skill that was required to understand this language would appear to be equal to that necessary to understand vocal symbols, and the skill that was involved in beating out the sound patterns would put to shame our most dexterous trap drummers (R. T. Clarke, 1934).

¹⁶ The phonograph and such subsequent developments as the motion-picture sound track and tape and wire recorders have made possible the preservation of speech and its reproduction. So far, however, these devices have had little but recreational significance.

The written word, permitting as it does a permanent recording of symbolic behavior, could not, however, serve as a means of communication for the masses until the development of printing techniques made possible cheap reproduction of what had been written. Today most of the adults in the United States can and do read, although what they read is quite another matter. Whereas the child depends on the spoken word for much of his knowledge of the outside world, adults can now obtain this knowledge through symbols of the spoken word. The symbolic behavior of men in New York City is made available to men in San Francisco by the newspaper. Travel books, descriptive works, and statistical and scientific treatises on almost every region and people in the world permanently symbolize the past and present. We can "hear" Plato speak through *The republic* and "see" Roman society disintegrate through Gibbon's *Decline and fall of the Roman Empire*. In symbols of symbolic behavior much of the past is available to the present, and much of the present will be recorded for the future. The effect upon the individual of this "symbolized" symbolic behavior is pronounced and will be discussed at length in Chapter IX.

Writing and Speaking Contrasted. But the written word suffers from certain disabilities. It lacks the shadings and variations of meaning that unconventional inflection, etc., can give to the spoken word; and it cannot be accompanied by gesture. Effective writing, therefore, requires rather different techniques from effective speaking. The skilled lecturer may write ineffectively; the literary genius may be a very dull speaker. The written presentation of a subject may read well but sound tedious when read aloud. By his method of reading, a clever reader can make the ineffectively written passage sound dramatic; a poor reader can dull the sparkle of a literary gem.

When speech is transcribed directly to writing, it may sound highly artificial and often seem involved and verbose. The speaker obtains many of his effects by vocal tricks and by gestures, which, shorn from the written word, reduce its effectiveness. Although in the lecture an idea is commonly presented less logically and in much less coherent terms than in the textbook, the lecture may be far more stimulating, effective, and even more accurate as communication than the textbook. Punctuation marks are not a very satisfactory substitute for tonal inflections, vocal stress, and gestures—all of which the written word must do without. Underlining, punctuation, and unusual styles of handwriting or type may, of course, be considered as a sort of static gesture. But their effectiveness is slight in comparison with that of "vocal" and visual gestures.

THE USE OF VERBALISMS

As was indicated in a previous chapter, there is no necessary relation between the overt symbolic behavior of an individual and the other aspects of his behavior. When his training in overt symbolic behavior outruns or takes a different course from his training in overt nonsymbolic behavior, a spread or contrast appears between the two. He then tends to verbalize in one realm and act in another. Usually the spread is between speech and action, although occasionally gesture is involved, as it is in the case of the little boy who facially as well as vocally refuses to eat spinach while he is eating it.

The child can be taught to use words whose conventional meanings are quite beyond his capacity to understand. He parrots those words, and they have no more vital significance for him than they would for a parrot. "I'm a bad boy, Mummy," the child will announce happily. In adult social life the use of verbalisms—words that have little or no meaning for the user—take somewhat more complex forms and may have grievous individual or collective consequences, as is the case with impractical personal promises, sanctimonious political-party platforms, and idealistic international agreements.

The "Talking" Culture. Societies differ widely in the cultural stress that is placed upon speech behavior. In some societies the ideal type of person is what might be described as the "strong, silent man." In others, such as that of the Samoan Islands, the social status of a man depends largely on his talking ability; speechmaking is highly ritualized, much palaver is necessary before anything can be done, and the individual's reputation and position in the group depends to a great extent on his ability to deliver long, involved harangues. Such a society might be said to have a "talking culture," for in a society of this sort it is not what a man can do but what he can say that counts.

Modern society is often characterized by its detractors as "materialistic"; and it is true that our culture has a very highly developed material technology, that it places considerable stress on productive efficiency, and that it values material goods above such intangibles as angels and the promise of rewards in heaven. Nevertheless, our society is in many of its aspects a "talking culture," although with us "talking" should be understood to include writing as well as speaking. The politician is characteristically judged by what he says rather than by what he does; the physician with a good bedside manner is often more highly esteemed than the one who is merely a good medical technician; journalism is a better paying occupation than farming; the actress is paid more than

the waitress; and in many other areas (in law, business management, etc.) it is generally more profitable to manipulate symbols than to work with things.

The corollary to this cultural stress on the symbolic is that contemporary society fosters, by means of formal education and other factors, more rapid and adequate development of overt symbolic than of overt nonsymbolic behaviors. We are trained to talk like adults long before we learn to act like adults. We are trained, in school and out, to respond to the symbols of things rather than to the things those symbols represent. As a result, we are likely to be what the layman would probably term more intellectual than practical. The consequence is a social system that has marked elements of superficiality, that has many contrasts between what is "said" to be and what actually is.

Parroting one set of social precepts while behaving nonsymbolically on the basis of another makes an unintentional hypocrite. Pious men are sometimes victims of this spread between what they do and what they say that they do. The medieval priesthood, for illustration, was noted for its verbal adherence to Biblical ethics and its nonsymbolic indulgence in "sin." The impractical professor, the drawing-room radical, the sophisticated preadolescent, the pious crook, the doctor who gives excellent advice but never takes it himself—these are people whose overt symbolic and overt nonsymbolic behaviors do not run parallel. They are but extreme illustrations of a commonplace fact—that there is no automatic relationship between the symbolic and the nonsymbolic aspects of overt behavior.

Verbal Attitudes.¹⁷ In a society so very much concerned as ours is with the symbolic aspects of behavior it is perhaps understandable that even social scientists should at times become preoccupied with the symbolic aspects of social life. Economists, in deriving their "laws" of economic life, have devoted more attention to study of the bookkeeping transactions of the market place than to the actual activities of men at work. Political scientists have traditionally been more concerned with the constitutions, legal structure, and formal process of government than with the actual operations of politicians and the informal and often illegal means by which men are governed. In social psychology preoccupation with the symbolic has of late taken the form of more or less systematic measurement of what people say that they do or will do under varying circum-

¹⁷ The reader will find the following articles on verbal attitudes thought-provoking: "Attitudes: a note on the concept and its research context" (W. M. Fuson, 1942); "The concept of attitude in social psychology" (A. Strauss, 1945); "The psychology of 'attitudes'" (M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1945, 1946); and "The behavior of attitudes" (L. W. Doob, 1947). See also Appendix note 17.

stances. This effort has centered around the term and concept of "attitude."

An attitude is usually defined as a preparation or set to behave in some way toward some object or situation, *e.g.*, toward Negroes in general, toward Negroes in a specific situation, or toward a certain kind of Negro in a specified kind of situation. Attempts to ascertain attitudes have usually been made with verbal questionnaires or scales. The construction of such paper-and-pencil techniques has been highly refined, and the statistical manipulation of the findings of attitudinal questionnaires has become a complex and specialized field.¹⁸ There are now available masses of data on the attitudes as so measured of Americans toward a variety of objects and situations, most especially on those of the members of one racial group toward the members of another.¹⁹

Attitudes as so measured do not, however, necessarily indicate what people will actually do when they encounter a given object or enter into a given situation. The attitudinal questionnaire measures only what people say that they will do when they encounter a given object or enter into a given situation; *i.e.*, it measures verbal attitudes toward symbolic objects or situations. What verbal attitudes indicate regarding the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of people toward actual objects and situations is at present mainly unknown.

In so far as verbal attitudes are concerned, the present data suggest a number of tentative conclusions. In the first place, through socialization the individual acquires, along with the ability to speak the language of his group, a stock of things to say under appropriate circumstances. Some of these are merely conventional devices, such as the "How do you do?" or, in another stratum of our society, the "Howaryah?" with which he greets acquaintances. Some are folk sayings, bits of codified verbal philosophy and social wisdom, which he will toss off from time to time. Some are stock jokes; and some are more extended and complex conversational pieces, such as the "line" with which one adolescent attempts to impress another and the "argument" for war, peace, revolution, or whatnot that the pseudo intellectual turns on whenever he can find a listener. Along with an assortment of such items, the individual acquires out of the mouths of those around him a variety of verbal attitudes toward the symbol, if not the reality, of various kinds of persons,

¹⁸ A much-needed warning of the many pitfalls in work on attitudes and opinions is given in "Opinion-attitude methodology" (Q. McNemar, 1946).

See also "A skeptical note on the use of attitude scales toward war" (S. C. Erickson, 1948).

¹⁹ One recent book in social psychology devotes a full one-third of its attention to this single aspect of American life. See *An outline of social psychology* (M. Sherif, 1948).

things, social forms, and abstract social programs, such as that of world government.

Most of the verbal attitudes of an individual are cultural in origin, *i.e.*, they have been derived directly from the group or groups by which he has been socialized. If he is brought up in the state of Maine, for example, it is almost inevitable that he should acquire a strong attitudinal bias (attitude of approval) toward New Englanders, the Republican party, and the capitalistic economic system and a strong attitudinal prejudice against Southerners, the Democratic party, and Communism.

Most of the individual's verbal attitudes are, moreover, quite stable. Formal education, newspaper and other forms of propaganda, and even direct experience that runs counter to the attitude seem to have little durable effect upon many verbal attitudes. New and logically conflicting attitudes can on occasion be superimposed upon old ones without disturbing them, with the result that expressed attitudes are often confused and contradictory.

But the personal and social significance of these and similar findings regarding attitudes is not yet clear. For the problem that must be solved before all the effort that has gone into attitudinal measurement can be at all fruitful is what relation verbal attitudes have to behavior, symbolic and nonsymbolic, in real-life situations. Does a verbal attitude of prejudice against Negroes or Jews or Democrats or Communists lead to adverse action against members of these groups? Does adverse experience with one or a number of Negroes lead to the development of a prejudice against Negroes as a group? Does a verbal attitude of approval of the Republican party mean voting for the Republican presidential candidate, active support of the legislation proposed by leaders of that party, and willingness to pay the higher prices the Republican tariffs so commonly cause? To these and the many related questions there are at present no answers.

Such little evidence as is at hand indicates only that there is no necessary relationship between verbal attitudes and other behavior. When and under what conditions a relationship does exist and which is then "cause" and which "effect" largely remain to be found. Until that time, members of minority groups toward whom there is expressed attitudinal prejudice, possessors of objects held in verbal disapproval, candidates for public office who are the subject of verbal assault, and proposers of programs that violate old attitudes and arouse violent prejudice might perhaps be justified in replying, in the manner of the small boy, "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me." That they seldom reply in this way is but a further demonstration of the awe in which modern men hold their various symbols.

CHAPTER VIII

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: I

The human infant, it will be recalled, comes into the world equipped with a complex vocal mechanism that is capable of producing noise and a set of facial muscles that are capable of considerable movement. The two previous chapters discussed the processes by which these organic potentialities are so developed that the adult human being is able to speak and to respond to the language of those around him and to use and to respond to their gestures.

In this and the subsequent chapter attention will be directed toward the processes by which the infant learns the overt nonsymbolic behaviors by which as an adult he will make his way around the house and through the countryside or city, don his clothing, farm his land, build his airplanes, operate upon his patients, care for his aged mother, make love to his wife, spank his children, etc. Nature has provided him with a remarkably complex body. He has, for example, the appposable thumb, which gives to his hands potentialities possessed by no other creature, and the upright posture that releases those hands from the more prosaic business of serving as forefeet. But he must develop the potentialities of his body—he must learn to use his legs, his arms, his hands, etc., in the particular ways that are appropriate to his society and to his special roles therein.

Within any society the patterns of overt adjustment, like the symbols of communication, are highly conventionalized. The very nature of social life prohibits the human child from working out many of these adjustments for himself. Specific modes of conduct, detailed forms of actions, are prescribed by the social heritage and are brought to him through the medium of parents, playmates, neighbors, and verbal myths and legends, and in literate societies by written history, biography, fiction, etc.

Learning by Experience. The crudest but in some respects most effective means by which an animal, human or otherwise, can be taught to behave in a predetermined mode is to "let nature take its course" and so to arrange things that the animal will be rewarded when it does what is desired and punished when it does that which does not fit the required pattern. To a considerable extent society proceeds in just this way with the child. The result is socially, as contrasted to naturally, selected

trial and error; what constitutes success and failure is here determined by human beings rather than by nature.

Socially selected trial and error is, as we have suggested, one of the processes involved in the child's development of overt symbolic behaviors; and it is probable that a good deal of overt nonsymbolic behavior is acquired through different manifestations of the same process. The arrangement and operation of social rewards and punishments are, however, so complex and their effects are so subtle that the trial-and-error aspect of human learning is easily lost sight of. When a mother threatens her child and when the father, returning from his daily work, administers the punishment, both father and mother are endeavoring to make a "failure" out of some action of the child. When the mother expresses approval and the father brings home a bar of candy, they are trying to make some one of the child's actions a "success." In the former instance, the purpose is to discourage repetition; in the latter case, to encourage it.¹

To the small child life must seem to consist mainly of "don't's," since so much of what he does comes into conflict with the behavior of those around him. These "don't's" are analogous to the walls of a rat maze; by bumping against the walls, the rat eventually learns what not to do in the effort to reach enticing food. The developing child, and the adult as well, blunders through the complex maze of social restraints, learning by experience to avoid this turning and to take that. On the character of his society will, of course, depend the nature of the "don't's" and the "do's." But the problem still remains: how do the actions from which socially determined successes are selected first arise or, to put it otherwise, why does the growing child attempt to do so very many things, most of which will be discouraged and a few of which will be encouraged so that they are learned and become an established part of his personality?

LEARNING BY HUMAN EXAMPLE

When a child has developed specific responses to a number of gestural and verbal symbols, these may then, of course, be combined to evoke a synthesized and thus new response from him. This is what the parent attempts to do when he explains, argues, and pleads. This method of teaching new modes of overt nonsymbolic behavior is effective to a limited

¹ We may unwittingly encourage the child to proceed with acts that we wish him to discontinue. In our society we may, out of sympathy for his hurts, cuddle and otherwise baby him when he has behaved so clumsily as to harm himself. In certain other societies, however, great effort is made to discourage clumsiness (M. Mead, 1930).

degree.² But it often happens that pleas, explanations, and even physical punishment will not discourage the child from acting like the idolized boy next door. The boy next door sets an example by his behavior, demonstrating how to achieve a given end; and that example may at times have more effect upon little Johnny or Mary than mother's pleas or father's spankings.

The action that sets an example may be either nonsymbolic or symbolic. A boy throwing stones at the windows of an empty house may be an effective example for other boys; here the action is in the main nonsymbolic. A Robin Hood, robbing the rich and succoring the poor, may also be an effective example for the same boys, although his action is brought to them only through the means of verbal symbols.

In this chapter, we shall consider in some detail how the overt nonsymbolic actions of those around the growing child tend to set examples for him.

Imitation. Although the power of example is tremendous, it is as unnecessary as it would be trying for adults to set a good example for very young children. The small child can no more copy the behavior of his parents than the dog can copy that of his master. Although many of our sporadic waves of moral reform are based upon the belief that man is an imitative animal and that imitation is an instinctive, automatic process, the truth seems to be quite the opposite. The child may learn much on the basis of examples set by others. He does not, however, become a carbon copy of them; for the process of learning by example is exceedingly complex and has definite limitations.

Many years ago Tarde observed that men take over modes of behavior from one another. He used the term "imitation"³ to name this

² Analysis of fifty detailed case studies led Sears to the conclusion that control of the child through persuasion and argument is greater than that which can be achieved through physical punishment (L. Sears, 1932). His study did not, however, include the effect of example on the child's behavior. A later study by Johnson, which did, shows that verbal efforts will be effective only when they are part of a complex of other controls, including example (M. W. Johnson, 1939).

³ The term "imitation" was originally used in *Laws of imitation* (G. Tarde, 1903) as an explanatory device. It was established in American sociological literature through the work of Ross, especially his *Social psychology* (E. A. Ross, 1908), only to be dislodged by the term and concept "instinct." In 1926 Bernard revived and redeveloped the term "imitation," making it descriptive rather than explanatory (L. L. Bernard, 1926). More recently, Miller and Dollard have examined the imitative process in great detail and with special attention to what they call the reward factor—another way of saying that motivation is necessary before imitation will occur (N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, 1941). For a brief history of the term and its usages, see "Imitation" (K. Young, 1932). See also "A doctrine of suggestion, prestige and

observed fact (note 29). Unfortunately he and many since him thought that naming a thing explains it. Men do imitate each other, but this statement does not tell us how or why they do so. Nor does it indicate how uncertain and varied is the occurrence of imitation. A man may remain honest in the presence of crooks or become a thief even though his associates be models of integrity. In the midst of ignorance one man may grow wise; in an atmosphere of intelligent, kindly men another may develop essential stupidity and gross selfishness.

Used to cover a number of complex and exceedingly subtle socio-psychological processes, the term "imitation" so often becomes a cloak for ignorance and thus a contribution thereto that we shall refrain from using it. As a descriptive symbol, it might be useful; but since it so commonly connotes explanation, we prefer to use the more cumbersome but unmistakably descriptive phrase "learning by human example."

A Trial-and-error Short Cut. The value of having an example upon which to base trial-and-error learning is self-evident. Some overt behaviors, such as riding a bicycle and swimming, although they involve delicate, dynamic muscular patterns, must be learned by trial and error with little assistance from the direction of others. It is possible to show a novice how to sit upon the seat of a bicycle, where to put his feet, and the method of using handle bars. These things can be demonstrated for him. Yet he cannot be saved the many falls that every beginner has in learning how to ride. Those falls are but the failures in trial-and-error learning.

Most overt behaviors, however, could never be learned by unguided (not to be confused with socially unselected) trial and error. Left to himself in the watchmaker's shop, the apprentice might experiment indefinitely without learning how to assemble the parts of a watch. There are so many ways not to assemble a watch that he might devote a number of lifetimes to these before hitting upon the way or ways it can be done. He needs, therefore, to be shown the steps required; he must have them demonstrated to him—over and over perhaps. He will learn, if at all, by trial and error that is guided by the master craftsman. The example of the craftsman does not preclude failures; it serves, though, to limit the range of experimentation and thus to increase the chances of success.

Some overt symbolic and probably most overt nonsymbolic behavior is acquired by trial-and-error "learning by human example." The human being who serves as an example for the developing child is often

imitation in social psychology" (S. E. Asch, 1948). A review of the literature on animal imitation is given in "Observational learning by cats" (M. J. Herbert and C. M. Harsh, 1944).

unaware that he is doing so. And the child who is trying "to be like mother" or "to act like the football coach" is certainly unaware that such endeavor is an important part of his socialization. Yet to this process of learning by example can be traced the acquisition of many of those specific patterns of behavior that within any given society constitute being human.

THE HUMAN MODEL

The Concept of a Model. The person whose behavior provides the example for learning has been aptly termed a "model."⁴ To the model the fact that another is learning by his example may be a cause for joy or sorrow. Mothers are often delighted by the fact that their children "love" them so much that they want to do just what they are doing. In time this demand may become so insistent as to be annoying and may lead to a pathological condition. Being able to set the example for other children is what makes the position of play-gang leader valuable to the boy. But the college student may find himself only angered when he is aped too crudely by the callow high-school youth.

The use of a human model by the child in trial-and-error learning is analogous to the commercial illustrator's use of a model or models when he makes copy for a magazine cover or advertising page. The illustrator is a reproducer, converting to lines and color on paper what he sees arranged before his easel. But the illustrator must have certain kinds of skills before he can use a model; he must be trained to draw, to reproduce colors, etc. These skills consist of habits of action previously learned; they are the elements that make the pattern of action that produces the picture of, say, a girl in a bathing suit. That pattern of action is but a new integration of old elements, a specific synthesis of what was already there.⁵ But the synthesizing of old elements involves trial and error. In employing a model, the illustrator limits the range of trial and error and thereby saves himself many errors.

⁴ The term "model" was first used by Bernard to describe the fact that children usually fixate to some extent upon one person at a time in the process of learning by human example (L. L. Bernard, 1926). In his analysis Bernard tended, however, to oversimplify reality in describing the successive models (mother, father, etc.) which the average child uses. So disordered is our society that there is little system or uniformity in the process of growing up. Bernard's description would no doubt be more appropriate for conditions two or three generations ago than for those of the present.

⁵ Although the layman frequently thinks that the inventor is one who creates something unique, anthropologists and sociologists have found that to understand any invention it is often more fruitful to study the cultural medium in which the new makes its appearance than the individual who is responsible for it. All originality appears to consist primarily in arranging old cultural elements into a unique pattern.

The Social Self and Self-roles. The learning-by-example process is sometimes discussed in such subjective terms as "the social self" and "self-roles." * These terms refer to the covert and presumably symbolic concept of the model that the individual uses in learning by example. Thus the child who is using her mother as a model would be said to have a social self patterned on the mother or to have taken, perhaps only for the moment, as her concept of self, the role of mother. The terms "self" and "self-role" are also applied to the complex idea that an adult has built up from elements taken from a number of persons of what sort of person he is or should become. The young air-line hostess, for example, might be said to have as her concept of self that of a charming, beautiful girl who graciously ministers to the needs of air-line passengers and who eventually will fall in love (as many have before her) with a prosperous and handsome young passenger and get married and live happily ever after. Or it might be said of her that she sees her role in society as that of one who is beautiful and gracious in the eyes of air-line passengers, etc.

There is no real objection to describing the learning-by-example process in terms of self and self-roles, and for certain purposes this subjective universe of discourse is perhaps more effective than the objective terminology that will be utilized here. But it sometimes happens that those who use the one terminology imagine that they are describing entirely different phenomena than are those who use the other, whereas in fact both are examining the same thing with different verbal tools. All that will hereafter be described in terms of models could be converted into such subjective terms as "self" and "self-role." But the authors believe that such conversion would confuse rather than clarify what occurs when an individual learns by example.

The Selection of Models. The illustrator must have a commission or the expectation of one before he will attempt to paint the picture. He wants to do this thing; from it he expects to obtain some satisfaction. Just so, the child must have come, through prior experience, to the stage at which some sort of satisfaction can be gained from the pattern of behavior demonstrated by another; or he will not attempt to learn by the example of that potential model. When the child selects the mother as a model, he does so because most of his satisfactions have so far come

* Cooley used the term "social self" extensively (C. H. Cooley, 1902); and it appears as a fundamental concept in Mead's *Mind, self, and society* (G. Mead, 1934). As they used the term, it meant just about what Sherif and Cantril have more recently discussed under "ego-involvement" (M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1947)—i.e., "ego" as a product of socialization rather than, as in the Freudian concept, something that is innate.

through the mother and "being" mother seems to him to be a way to extend those satisfactions.

Having a model and wanting to copy it are not, of course, sufficient to ensure learning by example. The small boy may very much want to be an aviator and may have a model for this in the person of the aviator who lives next door. Yet, until the small boy has become a grown man and has in the process learned how to do a thousand and one things, he cannot learn to be an aviator. Learning by example is the process of synthesizing in a specific way a number of previously acquired habits of action. The model provides a pattern for the specific synthesis but not the elements of behavior that are to be synthesized. Just as the illustrator must have certain types of skill before he can effectively use a model for the painting of a picture, so the child must have the elements of behavior before he can put them together in the pattern of his father and so be "just like daddy." It is, therefore, more or less futile for the father to set a "good example" for his son until that son has learned to walk and talk and do the many things which, combined in a certain manner, may constitute "acting like father."⁷

A person can serve as a model for the behavior of another only when the life experience of the user has been of such character that the behavior of the model is both usable and useful as a pattern of adjustment. But the child selects his models in terms of short-time results—getting attention, a piece of candy, a new dress—and these may or may not be of adjustment value in the long run. If he is to become an effective member of society, he must, therefore, have guidance in selecting his models. One attribute of the functioning social system is that it prepares the child to use socially appropriate models and provides him with socially appropriate models.

The Primary Model. The first important model in a child's development may be spoken of as the primary model. From this model the child will obtain some of the basic patterns of behavior, patterns that will have much to do with the direction of his later development.

In our ancient and now disrupted family system circumstances were such that children tended to use rather exclusively the biological mother as a model during the first two or three years of life.⁸ She was con-

⁷ It can be said, of course, that a motion-picture gunman served as a model to the highly moral child who, after viewing a motion-picture in which the villain shot the hero, playfully shot but killed his playmate. The motion-picture gunman did not, however, serve as a criminal model in any strict sense; he served as a temporary play model, and the gun was unfortunately not a play tool.

⁸ For a history and description of the old family system, see *A history of the family as a social and educational institution* (W. Goodsell, 1915). The modern family is a changing, dynamic, loosely knit, and irregular pattern of interaction. Since the

ventionally the child's primary model. The child, therefore, became patterned upon the mother, who was presumably a desirable representative of the social system and thus set a good example for the acquisition of modes of behavior basic to all members of society. In contemporary society the biological mother may mean much or almost nothing to the child. Under some circumstances she may be the primary model; but, under different circumstances, the father, an aunt, a nurse, or an elder brother or sister may be the primary model. There is in modern society no systematic sequence of model usage, no specific and universal pattern for childhood. This fact complicates analysis by the social psychologist but probably improves the modern child's preparation for living in our unsystematic society.

Where and when the mother is the primary model, the child will be found tagging the mother around the house from morning until night. "Let me do that, Mamma!" But it should not be supposed from the fact that a child uses his mother as a basic model that the child necessarily will become a small replica of her. Many factors enter into determining the extent to which the mother is effective as a model. For example, the mother may by punishment discourage the child's doing some of the things which she herself does; although the mother spends much time at her dressing table, the child may avoid it like a plague. Powder on the floor and lipstick on clean clothes may result not in the joys of "being like mother" but in the "seat ache" of a spanking.

Model Fixation. When the mother encourages her child to use her excessively as a model, she may be laying the basis for a fixation (R. Bain, 1945). Mother fixations are particularly common in contemporary society, in part because of the decline in family size, the decline in domestic activities, the loss of the father through divorce, and the anonymity of life in modern urban communities.⁹ With insufficient work to do and

student is likely to think of "The Family" in terms of his own family background and thereby to generalize from the particular and possibly unique, he might profitably consult one or more of the following: *What the American family faces* (L. F. Wood and J. W. Mullen, eds., 1943); *The sociology of the family* (M. C. Elmer, 1945); *The family: from institution to companionship* (E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, 1945); *Your marriage and family living* (P. H. Landis, 1946); *The contemporary American family* (E. R. Groves and G. H. Groves, 1947); *The family in American culture* (A. G. Truxal and F. E. Merrill, 1947); and *Marriage and the family* (M. F. Nimkoff, 1947).

That the mother is no longer as much of a model as she used to be in the nursery-school period is reflected in the fact that only low positive resemblances were found between scores of mothers and children on personality inventories, ratings, and other devices (C. H. Patterson, 1943).

⁹ How these and other aspects of contemporary disorganization operate to malpre-

with few external activities to engross her attention, the mother may be as psychologically dependent on her child as the child is physically dependent on her. Encouraged to do so by the mother, the child may "fixate" upon the mother. The mother may "cling" to the child, discouraging any tendency of the child to drift away from her. The consequences may be quite unfortunate.¹⁰ Though the mother may be a most useful example for the child in many ways, she cannot by her example alone teach the child to make a normally effective adjustment to society. In the first place, the behavior of the mother may be in some regards inexpedient for the child. This is obvious when the child is a boy. Less obvious, perhaps, is the fact that the mother cannot provide her daughter with a full complement of adequate adjustment patterns. The mother is not a little girl; she is a woman, married, and with a child. It is as a child with a father and mother that the girl must make her adjustments. Furthermore, the mother's behavior as a woman may even be quite inexpedient for the girl when she becomes a woman, especially in our dynamic society, in which people change with the times.

Freudians have thought that there is a natural basis for such fixations and the consequences that grow out of them. They have been particularly interested in the boy-mother (Oedipus complex) and the girl-father (Electra complex) fixations.¹¹ The results of such fixations are often

pare a good many individuals for adult life will be discussed in some detail later (Part IV).

¹⁰ The Balinese go to considerable effort to ensure that no parental fixations occur. The small child is forced to watch neighbors' babies nursed by his mother and is carefully taught to understand that his parents will not come to his rescue whenever he gets into a difficult or even dangerous situation (G. Bateson and M. Mead, 1942).

¹¹ Our typical family situation seems to be one in which both boys and girls prefer the mother to the father, from age five through age seventeen. From age five to age ten, and perhaps for some time longer, the preference for the mother over the father tends to increase. The smaller the family, the closer to the parents the children feel themselves to be. See "Parent preferences of young children" (M. Simpson, 1935); "Mother-father preference" (S. M. Mott, 1937); "Child-parent social distance" (E. DuVall, 1937); "Survey of experiments on children's attitudes towards parents: 1894-1936" (R. M. Stogdill, 1937); "Correlational study of personality development and structure" (R. Stagner and M. H. Krout, 1940); "Sex differences in children's attitudes to parents" (H. Meltzer, 1943); and "An analysis of children's attitudes toward fathers" (L. P. Gardner, 1947).

Studies of young college women show that the "husband ideal" tends to resemble the current "boy friend" rather than the father or any other male member of the family (A. H. Mangus, 1936). On the other hand, there is also some slight resemblance between the physiques and personalities of one's parents and of his or her spouse (A. Strauss, 1946).

tragic, but there is no reason to believe that they are due to natural drives. There is no reason to impute an instinctive basis to the fact that in our society some girls fixate upon the father and that some boys fixate upon the mother. Examination of family backgrounds will indicate that, where such fixations exist, conditions within the family setting were responsible. A woman may, for example, find her husband an unsatisfactory companion; and thus she may seek in her son what she does not get from her husband and thus mother her son into incompetence. A man may see in his daughter what he fails to find in his wife and encourage an attachment that may end disastrously. It often happens that, in a family having both a son and a daughter, the father will favor the girl, the mother the boy. But all this is quite understandable in purely social terms. The father has never been a girl and may, therefore, tend to be less realistic in his demands upon his daughter than upon his son, from whom because of comparable experience he expects much more. The reverse may be true of the mother. Case studies of the social antecedents of fixation in our society provide ample evidence that no instinctive explanation is required. Anthropological studies of the parent-child relationship in other societies confirm the view that the social setting determines the nature and extent to which children will identify themselves with adults.¹³

The Negative Model. The antithesis of model fixation is the use of a person as an example of what not to be. That person then serves as a negative model. The use of a negative model is comparatively rare, but it does occur to some extent in those cases where the child violently rebels against extremes of the parental or community environment. It will be recalled that in an earlier chapter the point was made that the effect of any factor in socialization depends in part on the intensity of that factor;

¹³ Mead found little evidence of parental fixations among the children of Samoa (M. Mead, 1928). There the looseness of family ties permits every child to roam from household to household, to live with aunts and uncles if they are more congenial than parents, and totally to disregard the parents for months on end. Among the Manus of New Guinea she found that women are never used as models by children (M. Mead, 1930). The father is a model for both sons and daughters soon after they are weaned and for a year or two is a constant and eagerly sought companion. But even here no fixations result; for, as soon as boys and girls are able to swim and handle a boat, they are diverted from the father model to join the play of other children and to live a life almost apart from adults.

The child-parent fixations so common in our society seem quite rare among the Chinese. With them the family is seldom a small parent-child unit but is rather a small commune, comprising grandfather, grandmother, uncles, aunts, and paternal cousins, as well as parents and brothers and sisters. Under these circumstances, no single adult is of such predominance in the life of a developing child that the child uses him or her exclusively as a model.

repeated and brutal punishment, for example, may defeat the purpose that would be served by less frequent and more relevant modes of punishment. This same principle seems to operate in at least some instances to produce the reverse of the learning-by-example process.

Normally the child patterns himself positively on the person or series of persons who have through their behavior won his admiration, such as his mother who can do such wonderfully interesting things or his elder brother who can ride his bicycle without holding on to the handle bars. But when some member of his little world is markedly atypical in terms of that world and does great violence to what the child has come to consider permissible, he may define that person as the embodiment of evil and use him as an example of what not to become. The negative model serves the purpose of demonstrating things to avoid doing.

The use of a negative model involves, of course, the simultaneous use of some positive model. Thus the child who has become antagonistic to a drunken, cursing, untidy, and improvident father may try to cultivate, using such positive example as is available, habits of nicety in speech, neatness in dress, and forethought in economic matters. Conversely, the boy who discovers as he grows older that his father is, in community terms, ridiculously precise and prudish may rebel from the influence of the father and, using him as a negative example, learn to act in rugged and virile fashion.

MODELS AND SOCIAL MATURATION

Given the opportunity for obtaining new models, no child will fixate indefinitely upon his mother or any other model. He will learn what he can and what he finds useful from his mother, and then shift his attention for a time to a secondary model—his father, elder brother, uncle, or someone else. It is in part through shifting from model to model that he grows psychologically from the child into the youth and from the youth into the adult.

The socially isolated child will be underdeveloped, if for no other reason than that he lacks an adequate variety of people to draw upon. A few generations ago social isolation was a spatial matter; the farm-bred child, for example, was often prevented by distance from associating with any people other than the members of his family. Today social isolation is more likely to occur in the presence of many people and to arise out of peculiarities of parental status, the parents' way of life, or the like. Thus the apartment-dwelling child of busy parents may be restricted in his "choice" of models to the maid, the elevator operator, and the friendly old lady who lives down the hall. All these will have very limited value for him; and unless and until he can extend his range of action and thus en-

large his opportunities for obtaining models, his development will be restricted. Under the conditions of contemporary life it frequently happens that the models that are available to the child are not sufficient for his needs.

The Need for Secondary Models. The need for secondary models is twofold. In the first place, life adjustment is expansive; no set pattern will be adequate for very long. As the child grows older, his socially defined role changes. Thus what is expected of the child of five will be quite different, quantitatively and qualitatively, from what was expected of him when he was four. Whereas he might obtain quick attentive response at four by climbing up on parental knees, he may, at the age of five, be required to do something more complicated to get that same response. To maintain his station among others, the child from time to time will be required to develop new adjustment techniques. This often means shifting attention from one model to another. At five he can, perhaps, win his father's approval by sewing "like Mamma." At ten he must be able to do manly things "like Father," or Father will consider him a sissy.

The second element that makes secondary models necessary to the growing child is the fact that under normal circumstances the child endeavors not only to maintain his status but to enlarge upon it. New wants constantly develop; and, although these are a consequence of social experience, they provide motivation for new social experiences.

Not always, however, can the child's shifting from one basic model to another be explained either as externally demanded in the need to retain old satisfactions or as a consequence of the desire to satisfy new wants. To all outward appearances the child may simply get "fed up" with the primary model. The healthy child is active and therefore gradually exhausts the possibilities and novelties around him. The learning of simple action patterns can provide an adequate outlet for his physical energies during the first few years of life. To the child who has learned to walk there is opening out a whole new world of activities within the home, activities for which the mother model might provide a satisfactory basis. But once an activity pattern, such as sweeping the porch, has been learned, it can be performed with a minimum of energy. That action is not, then, a very satisfactory outlet. Ultimately the child can do in an hour or two all the things that he has learned by using the mother as a model. He then becomes tired of these things without being physically fatigued. Prevented from finding new outlets, the child may become cranky and irritable. The need for new activities, as distinct from new "wants," and the search for them are commonplaces of everyday life. With adults this need may be manifested in such ways as going to a party after a hard day's work. With children it frequently leads to a shifting to new models.

Social Control of Model Shifting. In some social systems effort is

made to prevent the child either from fixating on one model or from shifting to a model that is not socially adequate. From the child's point of view any person who shows him how to do new things, things that can be done without too great effort on his part, will be satisfactory as a model. From the social standpoint adequate models will be those that contribute to the child's eventual adjustment to society. The systematic presentation to the developing child of socially adequate models—desirable in terms of future life and graduated according to the child's ability—was an integral part of our old patriarchal family, of many primitive social systems, and, most noticeably perhaps, of the Chinese organization.

In any intimate large-family or village community socially adequate models are available to the developing child; and their selection can be encouraged, unintentionally perhaps, by adults.¹³ The Chinese particularly had great respect for the power of example. Under the old and now disintegrating system the young children of the family, all the sons and daughters of the sons of the patriarch, played together. Since there was generally a matriarch to "ride herd" on the mothers, there was little chance that they could overindulge their children. But, as the children developed, they were forced to select models in keeping with their capabilities and future positions in society. For a girl there were usually older girls or younger women within the family through whom she could learn the domestic techniques.¹⁴ A boy might follow in the footsteps of his elder brother, his uncles, or his father. Outside the home he would find companionship and youthful models from those boys of the community who met with parental approval.

Lack of System in Contemporary Society. In our dynamic and disordered society, however, there can be little system, little order, and less social effectiveness in the models to which children turn. It is perhaps symbolic of our situation that every boy should be "destined" to become President someday and that many girls should feel, at one time or another, that Hollywood is the only desirable goal. The family seldom contains,

¹³ Among the Samoan Islanders small children become attached to their older brothers, sisters, and cousins, who are held responsible by adults for the welfare of the younger children. The older children, in turn, have the youths of the village to idolize and, to the extent of their abilities, to emulate. As they reach maturity, youths are, however, freed from child-care duties and encouraged to follow actively in the footsteps of the unmarried men and women of the community. Thus a gradual induction into adult social life is made possible by the use of a hierarchy of graduated models (M. Mead, 1928).

¹⁴ *Life in Lesu* (H. Powdermaker, 1933) gives an excellent description of the use, among a primitive people, of the power of learning by human example, particularly in regard to the process by which the young girl acquires from older girls and women an orderly introduction to the techniques of domestic life.

within itself, a sufficient variety of models ; and those that it does contain may be anything but adequate.¹⁵

A trivial but interesting consequence of this circumstance is the types of models to which boys and girls of even the best of our families often turn. The child of three or four who plays that he is a railroad train and romps around the house "choo-chooing" is using an inanimate object for a model. When he hitches himself to a play wagon, he is "being" a horse. This is his way of surmounting a lack of interesting human models. It is not at all unusual to find children who are isolated from other children and are without adequate adult associations using the family dog as a model. The results are such as to indicate the urgent need for socially satisfactory human models.

Few things so clearly reveal the disorder of contemporary society as do the types of secondary adult models to which modern children commonly resort. It is almost conventional for children in our society to become, at some time or other, enamored of the postman, the policeman, the fireman, and the garbage man. These are often the only interesting adults whom the child of six or seven knows, since the mother may for the moment be exhausted as a model and the father far too busy to make himself available.

Toys as Aids to Learning. The extensive use of toys to assist the child in "learning to be" is somewhat peculiar to our society ; and it, too, is indicative of the character of our milieu. A stroll through a toyshop before the Christmas holidays leaves a vivid impression of the types of adult activities that children find interesting. There are, of course, domestic toys—dolls, miniature household furniture and tools, and elaborate playhouses. But adult nondomestic equipment is also featured. The police uniforms, small trucks, elaborate electric railroad systems, complicated mechanical sets, cardboard grocery stores, and, especially during wartimes, tanks, dive bombers, etc., all reflect the types of models upon which young boys and girls most often fasten when the people within the family and immediate neighborhood have ceased to be interesting and exciting persons.

Toys such as these are more than just playthings. A big, inflated rubber ball is a true plaything. The child bounces it, kicks it, and throws it around. In the process the child may learn many useful muscular coordinations (note 30). But in such play he is not presumably "being"

¹⁵ When no adequate models are available, the child often seizes upon imaginary companions. In a study of unselected children 13 per cent reported "vivid and sustained" fantasies concerning companions (M. Svendsen, 1934). In a later study over 21 per cent of nursery-school children were found to be imaginative in this fashion (L. B. Ames and J. Learned, 1946).

someone else, as is the youngster in headgear with a toy football under his arm who plunges an imaginary line in the back yard, calls signals to himself, and finally wins the imaginary game. The latter has, no doubt, taken as a model—perhaps only for the day—some football player. He is “being” that person to the best of his abilities. The headgear and football assist in the make-believe. The extraordinary use that modern children make of miniature adult equipment is mute testimony to their frequent lack of playmates.

CHILD PLAY AND CHILD MODELS

Limited Value of Adult Models. Exclusive dependence on adult models can have unfortunate consequences. Almost characteristic is the plight of the child who is without brothers or sisters and is isolated because of the social setting from other children. Under such circumstances the child must depend in large part on adult models, who, although they may be satisfactory up to a point, are incapable of providing the child with those social adjustment techniques that are suggested by the term “good fellow.”

Strive as they will, the best of parents cannot be good playmates for their children.¹⁶ When the adult plays with the child, the relationship is never that of equals in stature; either the adult bends down, or the child looks up. In the latter case, the child may get some exercise; but he cannot acquire much in the way of new adjustment patterns. In the former case, when the playing adult gets down on hands and knees to romp with a child, he may amuse himself. About all the child can learn from this, however, is some elementary points for getting along with playful elders.

Play is more than exercise; it is a process of socialization. For the complex, subtle, and necessary modes of behavior involved in the give and take of social life are acquired by the child mainly through association with other children. In most social systems provision is made for child-play activities. The children of primitives are noted for their happy-go-lucky play life, which is little interfered with by adult regulation. They do not need toy soldiers, dolls, or other miniature adult equipment; for they are not forced by circumstances to play grown up. Young children tag those who are older, run with the pack, learn to do those things that the older already know how to do, learn to play the part of humble subordinates, and gradually rise, as those who are older go on to more adult pastimes and occupations, to places of leadership.

¹⁶ By the very nature of things parents' attitudes toward children are quite different from children's attitudes toward other children. See “Experiments in the measurement of attitudes toward children” (R. M. Stogdill, 1936).

Except upon isolated farms the play gang was a major aspect of child life in America a half century ago. Today we have somewhat overcome, through the establishment of community playgrounds and the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and other children's organizations, the physical and social limitations that subsequently arose.¹⁷ There is some doubt whether these organizations serve the same function as does the undirected play gang, but they have certainly become of increasing importance to the social development of the average child.

Sex Divergence. It is largely through the social selection of secondary models that sex differences in personality get their inception. In most primitive societies there is little sex segregation; girls and boys are permitted to play together. However, in those systems where the sex division of labor has made of woman an essentially domestic creature, boys have been given more play-gang freedom than have girls. As a result, the male learns forms of behavior that the female does not learn.

Gang play is an effective means of developing techniques of cooperation, of group cohesion, and of effective group activity. It inculcates those attitudes, loyalties, concepts of communal values, and objectives that are so useful in warfare, in teamwork, or in any activity that demands the subordination of the individual to the totality.¹⁸

The work of women in the home is seldom communal; it is either individualistic, as it is when a woman weaves, sews, or cooks, or else subservient, as it is when she assists her mother-in-law or sister-in-law. Such work is of a quite different order from work "with" others. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the female of the species is innately incapable of acquiring those give-and-take modes of behavior that are developed in gang play and the nature of which is suggested by such terms as "cooperative," "good sport," "considerate," and the like.¹⁹ But the belief that women are "naturally" vain and selfish, like the idea that

¹⁷ An increasingly common phenomenon of contemporary life is the nursery school with its gatherings of youngsters of nearly equal age who might otherwise be more or less isolated from their kind. As the number of nursery schools increases, we should expect to find that personality differences between only and non-only children will practically vanish. Even now no very significant differences in personality adjustments distinguish groups of only children from their fellows (D. T. Dyer, 1945). See *Nursery education; theory and practice* (W. E. Blatz, D. Millichamp, and M. Fletcher, 1935) and *A bibliography of nursery education* (D. E. Bradbury and E. L. Skeels, 1939).

¹⁸ The terms "attitudes," "loyalties," etc., as here used refer to the covert aspects of overt forms of group cooperative activities. The nature, function, and development of covert behaviors will be discussed in a later chapter.

¹⁹ Among the Tchambuli, a Melanesian group, the women work communally and possess the "good sport" personalities traditionally expected of men (M. Mead, 1935).

woman's place is in the home because she is "naturally" inferior, still persists.

In our own society, where the distinctions between the activities of men and those of women are gradually breaking down, the socializing processes have not kept pace with these changes. It is certainly the failure of many girls to receive as much play-gang training as do boys that is responsible for a part of the friction between the sexes. Many divorces are laid to the fact that the woman is a "poor sport" or the fact that the man is "too good a fellow." Much of the antagonism toward women in positions of business administration is explained by the charge that they do not "play the game" according to masculine rules. The wife who will not make the best of an unfortunate situation may consider her amicable husband quite unjustified in calling her a poor sport. He has probably learned through gang play what she has not—certain principles, codes, or mores of conduct. These make him seem to her unreasonably tolerant of the conduct of others. Thus she does not understand his shrinking from "letting the party down" although it is long past the time to go home. If she will let him, he will stick with the "gang," although his feet are tired, his head aches, and some of the party have become disgustingly maudlin. That kind of loyalty he learned in gang play. Her failure to understand his point of view is often traceable to the fact that as a child she did not participate in gang play.

The Child Society. When given the opportunity, children have something of their own society—a fact that adults tend to overlook. It consists of local myths, legends, games, and modes of conduct, local child "heroes"—not the least of which is the bully—and local objects of unveiled contempt—the "fair-haired boy" or the sissy of the neighborhood. Some of the myths and legends and some of the games and tricks have persisted through the years; some are almost universal. Associated with these cultural elements of child society are the loyalties, the mores, and the practices that arise from gang play and often contrast sharply with adult standards.

Children have a power of control over other children that frequently exceeds that of adults. The child can, for example, often select a much more effective mode of punishment for another child than can the adult. The sneer, the taunt, and the pummeling of a boy are usually far more to be feared by another boy than are the pleas, the tongue-lashing, and the spanking by his parents. Thus a child of ten is frequently the most efficient teacher for a child of eight or nine.

Because the power of child over child is greater, the child who is inducted into the gang will often adhere to gang values rather than to those

of his family. Neat and clean, he is sent out to play; dirty and bruised, but proud and happy, he comes home. He may become secretive, act "tough," pick up words that shock his parents, and swear by ideals that baffle them. He may lie about the broken window and take a thrashing at home rather than betray the gang.

The Antisocial Gang. Gang play frequently takes directions that are irritating and otherwise disturbing to adults. Under certain conditions, it can hardly fail to take distinctly antisocial directions. It is almost impossible for the boys of a city slum to avoid doing some things that bring them into conflict with adult society.²⁰ When the only place to play is in the streets, even a game of baseball may result in broken windows and eventual friction with the policeman on the beat. Inadequate play space, therefore, may of itself cause youthful activities, otherwise entirely harmless, to result in unfortunate social consequences. The "cop," defender of adult standards and protector of property, may come in time to stand for all that prevents gang play. He is then opposed in the minds of the gang to all that is interesting, all that is desirable, and all that is worth while.

In antisocial gang play it is inevitable that the toughest, the most fearless, and the least socially desirable youngster in the neighborhood should rise to leadership. He can show the others the way to "beat the racket," the way to get away from policemen, and the way to steal, to destroy, and to escape punishment for these activities. Thus he tends to set an example for the others; his behavior outlines the pattern for the gang. In a later chapter we shall observe how professional criminals may be trained by gang life for a career of crime. For the present it should be noted that antisocial gang play can be a consequence of unsatisfactory play opportunities, of antisocial leadership, or of both.

Induction into Adult Patterns. In anticipation of our subsequent discussion of the role and acquisition of covert behaviors, it should be noted here that the fact that play-gang activities invariably develop the child in ways that set him to some extent at odds with adult standards does not of itself mean that the attributes acquired from such play are not contributions to later adjustments. The blind loyalty to the gang may be transferred into equally blind, but socially satisfactory, loyalty to wife and children, to some business organization, or to the community at large. Except for the danger of antisocial gang play, the only danger of gang play is that it may be perpetuated through childhood into adult life. Children must in the course of time grow up socially and come to take their parts and places as adults.

It seems necessary for mental stability that the individual be inducted

²⁰ See *The gang* (F. M. Thrasher, 1936) and "Corner boys" (W. F. Whyte, 1941).

gradually, through small and progressive steps, into those patterns of behavior that society requires. The play gang can be one of these steps, and the child who misses it may become a less effectively adjusted adult than would otherwise have been the case. The child who does have gang play must in time, however, shift his attention from the gang leader to someone whose behavior is a little more complex and thence to still more complicated models. Unless there is progression in the models he uses, he may face adult status entirely unprepared for it. If the transition is too abrupt and too great, he may never succeed in making it; he may break under the strain of being treated as an adult when he is prepared only to act like a child. The consequences are somewhat comparable to what would happen were a high-school student suddenly forced to take on the work and responsibilities of a university professor.

In our society the lack of gradual and effective training for adult life is an important factor in the difficulties, to be discussed in detail in a later chapter, that youth faces today. On the one extreme we have the child who is forced to depend for examples mainly on adult models; he may fail to learn those techniques of social give and take demanded in later life. At the other extreme stands the child whose play is too long continued; he may fail to acquire those responsibilities and capabilities that adult status imposes. Formal education is supposed to bridge the obvious gap between childhood and adult social life. But formal education develops, as we shall see, behaviors that are mainly of the overt symbolic sort. It does not provide a substitute for adequate models, models which are necessary if the child is to grow into an adult on overt nonsymbolic levels.

AMBITION AND MODELS IN ADULT LIFE

During the course of growing up, the child will ordinarily utilize a good many models, learning from each that which is appropriate to the given stage of his development. From the mother, some adjustment techniques are secured; from the father, others; from the gang leader, still others. The models that the child selects and the extent to which he uses them depend in part on the supply available and in part on what value they appear to him to have.

In the stable social systems of the past, where the behaviors appropriate to each social role were well defined and where most individuals were well trained for their roles, there was relatively little striving to better one's position. The unmarried man wanted, of course, to become a husband and father; the apprentice probably wanted to become a master craftsman; and the middle-aged man wanted to become in the course of time a respected elder. As he grew older and moved progressively

through his various social roles, the individual could rely to some extent upon the example of those older than himself. This he did in the attempt to behave in the ways expected of him. Only an occasional individual aspired to do more than was expected of him; rare was the peasant who aspired to become a townsman, the merchant who aspired to become a scholar, the bandit who aspired to become a king.

Neither lack of models adequate in terms of her station in life nor socially inappropriate ambitions drove the girl of a Chinese peasant family to aspire to be like the daughter or wife of the local magistrate. She was, in fact, encouraged to keep her place and to aspire to be like her elder sister or an admired aunt and, later on, like her grandmother. A boy likewise was discouraged from using as models persons whose behavior would not be in keeping with his station, which under a stable social system was determined largely by the status of his father. The mothers and fathers of old China did not expect their sons to become emperors. They preferred that they should become satisfactory, however humble, members of society.

But under the conditions of social disorganization that are characteristic of the modern world, many children acquire, by example and otherwise, ambitions to do better than their parents did—to become wealthier, more famous, or more notorious. Such ambitions are, in fact, the individual aspects of the forces that make for further social change. The shopgirl may acquire the ambition to become a motion-picture actress, the farm boy a scholar, the faculty son a politician, etc. (note 31). In the endeavor to become whatever it is that they want to become, they may unwittingly pattern their behavior on some person or persons whose behavior provides, or seems to provide, the way to success. Thus the bank clerk may come to act like the cashier whose job he covets, even to the point of wearing shirts of the same color. The cashier may pattern himself upon the first vice-president, who in turn patterns himself upon the president. In the modern world, where few of us are entirely content with our lot and most of us aspire to be "better" than we are, it is common for adults to use their "superiors" as models, since it is in part by this means that success can be achieved. Thus the social climber apes the leader of the local four hundred, the petty crook apes the local "big shot," and the would-be political leader apes the current President.²¹

²¹ An extreme form of the patterning of behavior upon models appears among the insane. Every institution has its quota of Napoleons, Caesars, and Jeanne d'Arcs. Occasionally a patient chooses another inmate, an orderly, or a physician as his model. In one hospital, this patterning proceeded so far that almost every movement of the model was copied. The patient continually followed and aped the model. Whenever

Looking Like versus Being Like. But being a certain kind of person is more than simply "acting like" that person. When an overly ambitious person uses a model that is far beyond his capacities to understand, what is learned from that model may be only how to "act like" and not how to "be like." The latter involves many attributes that cannot be acquired through the learning-by-example process, *i.e.*, the covert elements of the model's personality.

The child must, of necessity, learn by example many forms of overt action, the covert implications of which he can neither understand nor at the time acquire. When this spread between overt learning and covert development continues into adulthood, the result may be the sort of man who wears the right clothes and the correct manner but who knows nothing about banking, diplomacy, or politics. He may be only "acting like" a banker, a diplomat, or a politician. Being, as distinguished from looking like, a banker, for example, includes a great deal of knowledge that is derived from experience and does not show on the surface. Such knowledge cannot of course be secured simply by using the banker as a model.

the model seated himself on a chair, the patient would look around for another; if none was at hand, he would literally sit on the air in a most awkward position for a surprising length of time. See *Textbook of abnormal psychology* (C. Landis and M. M. Bolles, 1946) in which the unconscious process of modeling is termed "identification."

CHAPTER IX

OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR: II. SYMBOLIC SOURCES

THE SYMBOLIC ENVIRONMENT

That man is a consequence of special creation and therefore does not belong to the same class of things as do the animals was an axiom of early Christian theology. Since the time of Darwin, however, and to some extent before this, biologists have come to minimize the difference between man and animal and to fit all organic creatures into a scale in which they differ from one another in degree but not in kind. Accordingly, man is considered as differing from the apes less than they, in turn, differ from, say, goats or horses. Elaborating this concept, psychologists have gone to considerable pains to show that the methods by which apes learn do not vary greatly from those utilized by human beings.¹ The essential difference would seem to be in what is learned rather than in how the learning takes place. Like the human mother, the ape mother can teach her offspring those adjustments to the external world that she has learned; she does this both by punishing it and by rewarding it with food and fondling. And the ape mother, like the human mother, can administer rewards and punishments symbolically. The ape child can even learn by example; it can integrate patterns of behavior on the basis of ape models, just as the human child can on the basis of human models.

Symbolic Environment as Peculiar to Man. The fact remains, though, that apes do not become human; and they have not developed a social heritage. There is thus a fundamental difference between the ape as an animal and the human being as an animal—a difference of degree, perhaps, but of such great degree that, for all practical purposes, the difference becomes one of kind. As was intimated in Chapter VII,

¹ At least for a time the young child and the ape learn in quite similar fashion, the ape at a slightly faster rate. But as soon as the child begins to speak, his speed of learning begins to outstrip that of the ape. See *The mentality of apes* (W. Köhler, 1925); *Almost human* (R. M. Yerkes, 1925); *The ape and the child* (W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, 1933); "The social psychology of vertebrates" (M. P. Crawford, 1939); *Chimpanzees: a laboratory colony* (R. M. Yerkes, 1943); "Primate psychology" (H. W. Nissen, 1946); and various articles from the primate laboratories of Yale University.

apes are unable to go far in the development of symbolic behavior and consequently are restricted to learning from experience with the present only. Learning by parentally controlled trial and error and by the use of parental models may explain why the child, ape or human, comes to behave in ways like those of the parents. But the human child, unlike the ape, can extend this learning by using as models persons who are dead. These "persons," who have lived in the past and from whose experiences the child may profit, are brought to the child through the medium of verbal symbols. From these symbolized persons he may learn patterns of adjustment. Thus because his great-grandfather was a sea captain, the boy may in a social sense "inherit" some interest in the sea.

In this chapter our concern is with the processes by which human beings obtain some of their patterns of behavior from symbolized persons. If John's great-grandfather's maritime life had been continued by his son and in turn by his son's son, the forms of learning we have already considered would serve to account for the fact that John "took" to the sea. It is a commonplace experience of modern life, though, that people frequently strive to be different from those about them. The son of a banker may display, as did his great-grandfather, a love of the sea; or an insignificant Austrian may drive himself into fury and the whole world into war by trying to be a Napoleon. Men do such things because the overt symbolic behavior of those around them brings to them as a heritage the overt nonsymbolic behavior of men long dead.

Man is in a sense a dreamer, and sometimes his dreams come true. The materials for his dreams may be drawn from many sources besides his direct experience—from myths, legends, history, biography, and fiction. When man converts his dream into successful action, that action may be patterned on a model constructed out of words. The legendary hero may be the model for the primitive child; the Biblical Jesus, the inspiration for the Christian man; the idealized Rothschild, the example for the ghetto boy. In each case the example is brought to the user through the medium of verbal symbols.

Symbolic Extension of the Social Universe. All peoples have drawn upon the past for behavioral examples, if only through their use of mythological and legendary figures. In the modern world this drawing upon the past is augmented by ability to draw upon persons living at a distance and known, like those of the past, through symbols. The development, quite recent in human history, of cheap printing and of widespread literacy began an extension of the social universe of the individual that is still in process.² Two hundred years ago it was the rare

² The social behaviorist Weiss has developed at some length the thesis that man's

man who knew anything at all, save perhaps vague word-of-mouth rumors, of the world beyond his personal range of action; and because of primitive transportation devices and limited inducement to traveling, that range of action was likely to be no more than the village or farmhouse and its immediate environs. With the coming of the newspaper, however, more and more people were made aware, however inaccurately, of a larger and ever-enlarging world. Subsequent developments in communications, the telegraph, telephone, motion picture, radio, and now television have continued that enlargement.

As the "known" world of the individual has expanded, the persons whom he might use as models have multiplied and become diversified, until today the average American child can use as a symbolic model the current president of the United States as well as George Washington or Abraham Lincoln; he can use a living noted general as well as the dead Napoleon or the near-dead old soldier who lives down the street; and he is more likely to become enamored of a Hollywood cowboy as known through the motion pictures than a clown in the circus that has just been to town.

SYMBOLIC MODELS

Although verbal and other kinds of symbols may influence the development of overt nonsymbolic patterns of behavior in any one of a number of ways, it is in the establishment of symbolic models that they most subtly and powerfully affect the development of patterns of overt nonsymbolic behavior in the growing child and in the mature man. Symbolic models are either imaginary persons or visualized persons who are not present in the flesh. We may say that they are visualized when the elements from which they have been constructed are drawn from or at least imputed to an actual person. Thus Grandfather—long dead, but living through what the child's mother and other relatives say about him—would be a visualized person, whom the child may manfully strive to emulate. In almost every household, primitive or civilized, there will be a number of persons who are frequently talked about but are never seen. The mother says, "When I was a little girl, your grandmother told me that good little girls always obey their mothers." She talks about Grandmother not only to her daughter but to her husband; she comments upon Grandmother to relatives and neighbors; and she constantly recalls the nice things Grandmother did, ignoring the unpleasant

symbolic environment has helped him onto the road to omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence (A. P. Weiss, 1923).

For a general analysis of the rise of modern communication techniques and their impact on social life, see Chap. X in *Sociology* (R. T. LaPiere, 1946).

aspects of Grandmother's character. It is, perhaps, this last factor—that the dead or distant can be made such good examples—that account in some degree for their popularity with those who are responsible for the training of children. The uncle who occasionally drops in for a visit may exhibit attributes that are not to be desired for the son of the family. But the uncle who lives at a distance or is dead can be given any number of ideal attributes.

From all that he hears about his grandfather, grandmother, or uncle, the child may construct a symbolic concept of that person and use the concept as a model in forming his own behavior.³ Such visualized models are especially necessary and useful when the supply of actual persons is inadequate or when their behavior is undesirable. Decadent families are likely to stress the glories of their ancestors. This is, perhaps, a form of compensation, a sort of living in the past. But it may serve to provide the growing child in such a family with models for his own behavior. Endeavoring to "be like" the person whose memory the surrounding adults so obviously revere is for the child, and even for the adult, one means of securing that admiration for himself.

The Story as a Source of Symbolic Models. Imaginary persons, as contrasted to visualized persons, are made up from many and often entirely fictitious elements. They are usually derived from stories in which fictitious persons are the protagonists. In the heroic characters in the stories that are told them, children may occasionally find interesting symbolic models. The art of deliberately using this sort of symbolic model in the control of the behavior of children has been rather lost in the Western world, but primitive peoples often use legendary and mythological figures with what appears to be a recognition of their inspirational value for the young. Most primitives have a considerable fund of dramatic stories about former heroes and noted villains, which they tell for both entertainment and moral values. The Chinese, too, have made storytelling an art; and the stories told are so much conventionalized and so obviously in keeping with social morality that their use must often be a deliberate training device.⁴

The Dramatic Pattern. All children's stories—primitive, Oriental,

³ The ideas about such a person are, of course, covert. But we are for the moment concerned with the development of overt behaviors; and the same learning processes are presumably involved whether the model is symbolic and only "within the mind's eye," or is an actual person known through visual, auditory, and other means.

⁴ Storytelling was a recreational activity for adult Chinese. At neighborhood and family gatherings someone especially noted for his dramatic abilities would regale the group with oft-told tales not unlike *The Arabian nights* in their interest value, but different in that they invariably contained pointed morals. The moral was for the children who were listening wide-eyed at their elders' feet.

an Occidental—follow a well-defined pattern. Suspense is maintained by the setting up of a conflict. This is a most effective means, for conflict is an element in the experience of all human beings: the child asks for candy, and the adult refuses him; the child does not want to take a bath, and the adult says he must do so; etc. In the story the basis for the conflict will be some opposition between two human beings or between a human being and nature.⁵ The resolution of the conflict is always postponed so that the story may hold interest to the very end. Dramatic value is enhanced both by repetition (*e.g.*, he walked and walked and walked) and by sudden contrasts (*e.g.*, and then the wind came and blew the dark clouds away). For vividness and clarity everything is set in absolutes; nothing is relative. The night is dark, not dim. The boy is brave, not both brave and afraid. The hero is all hero. The villain is all villain; he beats his wife and mother as well as his tenants. The villain may, of course, be nature—drought, flood, or sterile soil. Adhering to these basic principles, the story unfolds to prove that virtue (in terms of the particular culture) is invariably rewarded and that vice is always punished. The hero and heroine represent virtue; the villain is personified vice. To make this moral a bit more palatable and the reward for virtue somewhat more certain than it is in real life, resort is had to magic forces. When all the hero's virtuous strivings seem about to fail and sin seems about to win, the "spirits" enter to take the side of virtue. There is in this itself something of a moral: trying to be a hero may at times be discouraging; but, in the end, it will prove to be worth while.⁶

Our brief analysis of the dramatic elements and pattern of the children's story may seem a bit irrelevant. The same principles, however, underlie the adult story, the written novel, the play, and the motion picture; and, as will be made apparent in Chapter XXIV, the political speech,

⁵ Frequently in the Chinese stories the conflict is between the mother and the paternal grandmother, between the father and the hardhearted merchant or landlord, or between the child's desire to see the mother happy and whatever it is that makes her unhappy.

⁶ The following is one of thousands of Chinese stories used to demonstrate the desirability of filial piety. Note that nature is the villain, the mother the heroine, and the boy the hero. In brief, the story runs as follows: A boy's mother is dying and can be saved only by eating a rice fish. But it is winter, and the rice paddies are frozen. The boy wanders throughout the land searching for one of the necessary fish. At last, exhausted by the privation that he has undergone, he lies down by the banks of an icy stream and drops to sleep. In his dreams the river god appears and, in admiration of such a display of filial piety, brings the boy a fish. He takes it to his mother, who thereupon recovers; the boy is showered with the admiration of all the neighborhood. Even the magistrate calls to show the youthful hero homage.

the commercial advertisement, the "issues" of a war, and the platform of a revolutionary party. Perhaps the moral is toned down, perhaps the villain becomes something of a lovable character, and perhaps the operation of magical forces is not so apparent; but the basic pattern is the same as that of children's stories, ancient and modern.

Whereas the effect of the story upon the adult may be negligible, its effects upon the child may be quite remarkable. Relative to the adult, the child is in the process of rapid development. Constantly shifting adjustment demands are being made of him, and new wants are demanding satisfaction; and therefore he needs new models from which to learn new modes of conduct. When the actual human beings around him and the visualized persons that have been provided him are for some reason inadequate, the imaginary persons brought to him through the medium of the story may be of enormous value as symbolic models, that is, of course, if the models are of a sort that he can utilize.

Symbolic versus Actual Models. The conditions that encourage the use of symbolic models are numerous and are always complex. The behavior of the symbolic model is vague; it does not show in detail how to do a certain thing; it is not insistent, as the constant presence of an actual person may be; and it does not encourage the user, as actual persons often will. Thus, when an actual person can be relied upon, a symbolic model probably will be resorted to rather infrequently. If the child or adult wants something he cannot get by following the example of those around him, the story person may suggest, in general outlines, some new mode of behavior by which this objective can be reached. The boy who has not tried to gain the admiration of his gang by boastfully claiming the attributes of Robin Hood, one of the Rover Boys, the Lone Ranger, or Superman has never really been a boy. If he has not tried to escape punishment for some taboo act by emulating George Washington's cherry-tree performance, he does not know his American mythology—and he has saved himself grave disappointment.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE RESORT TO SYMBOLIC MODELS

Declining Value of Actual Persons. The extent to which modern children are dependent on symbolic models is a reflection of the dynamic character of our society. Although the legendary heroes may prove something of an inspiration for him, the child of a primitive society has relatively little need for such models. Here the range of adjustment techniques is limited, and actual persons are available as models for the working out of those techniques that are required. Even in civilized societies the child has no great need for symbolic models as long as the

social system remains stable. Thus, some years ago, when China was more stable than it is now, the Chinese child could learn almost all that was required of him from actual persons.

In contemporary societies, however, adjustment patterns are not standardized; and the conditions to which adjustment must be made are constantly changing. The actual persons available as models to the child are therefore of decreasing value and are often restricted in number. The farmer, for example, has definite limitations as a model for the son who wants to become a city businessman; the mother can hardly demonstrate to her daughter how a woman should "get along" with her husband, since the fashion in family relationships is changing so rapidly that the girl who tries to use the techniques that her mother used might soon become a grass widow. The dynamic character of the modern world thus leads the individual to rely, in ever-increasing degree, on symbolic models.

The sources of such models are many and varied and have multiplied remarkably within the last fifty years. Newspapers, magazines, books, motion pictures, radio story programs, and, for the future, television programs are all potential sources of symbolic models. The modern child and adult are continually bombarded through these mediums of communication with suggestions, and sometimes rather detailed blueprints, about people real and fictitious. The symbolic representations of real people—the man in the White House, the newsworthy captain of industry, the notorious swindler who finally was caught, the much-publicized motion-picture star—may occasionally provide usable, however impractical, symbolic models for children. But it is doubtful whether the fictitious characters that are also made available to him through print, motion picture, and radio have equal value.

The fact is that the symbolic environment upon which the modern child must increasingly rely is an inadequate substitute for actual and known persons. By and large the new mediums of communication offer the needy child, not useful and practical examples of how to live in our changing and disordered world, but useless examples of how to live in a world that does not and cannot exist. This is clear enough in the case of the Sunday-school heroes of the Bible, who have long since lost much adjustment significance for people who must live in a bitterly competitive society; and times having changed, the utility of schoolbook history's somewhat mythical Washingtons and Lincolns is quite obviously limited.

Motion Pictures, Comics, and Radio Serials. Equally if not quite so obviously useless are most of the models that are provided by the more popular modern means of storytelling. The motion pictures, comics,

and radio serials which have replaced the dime novels of a half century ago and which occupy so much of the time and attention of many American children consist largely of symbolic fantasy. They may constitute a "bad" influence on the developing child in that they divert him from more psychologically profitable activities, keep him cooped up in theater or armchair when he might be out exploring the world of reality, and unduly arouse and play upon his feeling-states. But in these respects the motion pictures, comics,⁷ and radio serials do not differ qualitatively from the tales of supernaturalism and horror that mothers and nursemaids of an earlier day traditionally told to children. For they present symbolic persons in a symbolic world that has little if any relation to reality. The child simply cannot emulate, except in his own daydreaming, Superman or any of the countless other fantastic figures that people the make-believe world of the kind of motion pictures that children enjoy, of the comics, or of the blood-and-thunder radio serials. The child cannot fly through the air with the greatest of ease, push over buildings with a casual pat of his hand, shoot through interstellar space, or fight strange creatures in the caves of the earth. He lives in a different world from that of Superman and the like, and he knows it or soon discovers it.

For most modern children the motion pictures, comics, and radio serials serve mainly as entertainment devoid of enduring meaning, even as novels, short stories, motion pictures, etc., provide recreation and nothing else for most adults. The exception is the child who is seeking in the fantasy provided through these mediums of communication satisfactions that he cannot procure elsewhere, the child who is driven by the poverty of his real-life circumstances to find some fantasy-life substitutes. The child who has an inadequate real life because of parental preoccupation, lack of siblings, and a place in which and companions with whom to play—*e.g.*, the apartment house or hotel child—may become an excessive consumer of commercial fantasy; so, too, may the slum child who is left to fend for himself in a world that is characteristically hostile. With such children, and for that matter adults who are similarly isolated, the world of fantasy may be the only available alternative, the only way in which they can fill out the inadequacies of social reality. For them, excessive reliance upon motion pictures, comics, and radio is actually symp-

⁷ See *The comics* (C. Waugh, 1947) for an analysis of this popular modern form of the children's story. There is, of course, little that is comic about them, but those who worry greatly over the effects of the comics on modern children may get some consolation from the fact that literate American children of a century and a half ago were presented, through the children's books of the time, with an exceedingly dire and dismal picture of the world and their place in it, a picture that was fully as unrealistic as the world now presented via the comics. See *American children through their books: 1750-1835* (M. Kiefer, 1948).

tomatic of underlying adjustment difficulties and is in no direct way a "cause" of them.

This is not to say that the motion picture and other modern mediums of storytelling have no bearing upon the socialization of the individual in contemporary society. The stories of pure fantasy can perhaps be dismissed for what they are; but those stories that purport to represent reality, and by and large those of the motion picture do, may contribute in some measure to the ideas of the larger social universe that all modern children acquire and thereby provide occasional models for an occasional child. But they can do so only to the extent that the world so presented is compatible with the world that is otherwise brought to the child and to the extent that the models so provided fit into the established needs and opportunities of the child.⁸

Limits to Use of Symbolic Models. Symbolic models are, moreover, abstractions and, as we have said, can at the most provide only a vague and general pattern for the child to use in synthesizing established habits into a new pattern. Learning by the example of symbolic models is subject not only to the same restrictions as those involved in the use of actual persons but to some others as well. It does not follow that the child who is told a story, who reads a story, or who sees a motion picture in which the hero is not all that conventional morality might desire will promptly pattern himself upon the behavior of that hero. It is true that the old dime novel, with its idolization of two-gun men "quick on the draw," stimulated countless American boys to robbing stagecoaches and shooting down sheriffs and Indians with a bold disregard of consequences. But what they did was only play. Since they were without guns, without stagecoaches to rob, and without Indians to shoot and since they lacked the basic behavior patterns which, had these things been present, could have been integrated to form the actions of Deadwood Dick, his example could not lead to the development of stagecoach robbers or Indian killers. If these things had been present, the example of the symbolic model would not have been necessary; only a little more trial and error would have been required in order to achieve the same results. Likewise, the example of modern gangster heroes, such as the now legendary Al Capone, may help a few potential gangsters to become actual criminals; but it cannot make gangsters out of law-abiding youths.

The power of the symbolic environment can be and often is exaggerated.⁹ The poetic record of a man's reaction to the beauties of dawn

⁸ This fact is frequently overlooked by those who urge strict censorship of literature, drama, objects of art, music, and the motion pictures. See Appendix note 32.

⁹ A complaint frequently made these days is that in an interdependent world most

may be learned by heart without its encouraging early rising. The child can be told that the colors of a sunset are "beautiful, inspiring, impressive beyond the power of words to convey" and may dutifully repeat these words without their increasing his awareness of actual sunsets. Unfortunately, in view of the character of our educational system, what is true of dawns and sunsets is equally true of many of the facts of life as brought to the child through the medium of words. By this means the child may be made symbolically proficient, but it does not automatically follow that he will also become nonsymbolically efficient.¹⁰

FORMAL EDUCATION AND OVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Our system of formal education was originally erected upon the assumption that man is a "reasonable" animal, one whose behavior is a logical response to the known facts of the world external to him. Abandoned by social psychologists long ago, this concept of the origin of human behavior is implicit in the conventional practice of stuffing the incoming members of our society with "facts." This has been done upon the assumption that, if a human being knows the nature of the world to which he must make adjustments, those adjustments will follow automatically as a consequence of human "logic."

The Classical Tradition. When we break down our traditional process of formal education, we find it consists of three distinct elements: training in certain techniques, the provision of certain adult models, and the inculcation of certain verbal "facts." Some of these "facts" symbolize external reality; others are but conventional fictions; and few have the effect upon the overt nonsymbolic behavior of the student that the layman has been led to expect.

Training in the techniques of reading, writing, and computing constituted a considerable part of former educational effort and generally

peoples, including Americans, are staunchly provincial and think and act in "tribal" terms, *i.e.*, in terms of small, independent groupings. And it is true that in spite of the easy access that the modern European and American have to the world at large through symbols, they are, as will be shown in detail later, still mainly attached by sentiments and loyalties to much the same kinds of groupings as were their ancestors before them. Today, as a century ago, the "citizen of the world" is but an ideal. This seems to mean that today, as a century ago, the most important of an individual's social attributes are acquired out of direct person-to-person relationships.

¹⁰ Parents have often worried unduly over the dangers supposed to be inherent in symbolic training. Conservative parents have feared that the antitariff verbalizations taught in college courses in economics might pollute their young. But there is little evidence that such symbolic training leads to important nonsymbolic results (K. N. Lind, 1936). The college student can receive a high grade in his economics course and then help elect that congressman who cries loudest that he will strive to put across the highest of tariffs.

contributed to the welfare of the student. These techniques are a part of the equipment for social life which almost every individual in the modern world must have. The need for these techniques is so pressing and so obvious that, under ordinary circumstances, it will be fulfilled. Some educators feel, however, that even now the procedures used for developing these techniques are so crude and inefficient that experiments must be undertaken for the development of new methods. Nevertheless, most children do in time learn to read, to write, and to do simple calculations, all of which are quite important if they are to live in a world given to these usages.

Even so, it was conventional until recently for educators to depreciate the importance of practical arts in the school and to concentrate on classical subjects. Years ago, for illustration, it was a favorite argument that training in higher mathematics was a developer of certain of the "higher mental faculties" (note 33) and was advantageous for this reason alone.¹¹ Even then it was quite evident that few school children would ever use higher mathematics; and now the impression is abroad that, aside from those who are going into some occupation requiring mathematical abilities, training in anything more than simple arithmetic is little more than mental calisthenics. Chess, bridge, and even poker would do quite as well in training the "higher mental faculties" and probably would be better, since such games do involve social adjustments of the give-and-take order.

The Teacher as a Model. The second element of formal education results from the fact that, so far, it has been impossible to dispense with the teacher, a human being who may serve as an actual model for the student.¹² As a teacher, the teacher deals with verbal "facts"; as a human being, he or she acts in overt nonsymbolic ways as well and thus provides an example that the student may use in the development of his own overt nonsymbolic actions. It is perhaps because of this latter possibility that schoolteachers have long been required to act as models of propriety and have been expected to set good examples for the children of the community.

¹¹ A modern version of this peculiar doctrine is to be found in the views of Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago. In brief, he believes that the philosophers of antiquity discovered virtually all that was worth knowing and that the "higher mental faculties" of the students of today should be developed by a diet consisting mainly of the classics. See *The higher learning in America* (R. M. Hutchins, 1936).

¹² One effect of teacher models can be found in "The emotional stability of teachers and pupils" (P. L. Boynton, H. Dugger, and M. Turner, 1934). Pupils of teachers who were judged to have good mental health were themselves judged to have better mental health than were the pupils of teachers with poorer emotional balance. See also "Do teachers cause maladjustment?" (W. U. Snyder, 1947).

The extent to which the schoolteacher will become a model for students depends on his value to them as an example. The sanctimonious or overly pious man could have little effect upon the behavior of a class of hardy mountain boys; the rough-and-ready man could hardly serve the students of Groton as a model. Probably most of us during our course through school found some teacher, man or woman, whom we admired and upon whom we tried to pattern our behavior. The majority of the mathematics, history, spelling, or whatever it was he taught may never have been put to use and may long since have been forgotten. But the way he walked, dressed, held his head, or acted in the presence of the principal may have had definite bearing on the way we do somewhat similar things.¹⁸

Like the home or any other social agency, the school sets up and enforces certain standards of conduct, which the child may take over as his own standards. Although enforced mainly through symbolic means, these standards may profoundly affect the child's overt nonsymbolic behavior. The older conventional school system emphasized few if any of these elements, excepting perhaps deportment; it too commonly failed to build child character and frequently did away with whatever enthusiasm for school life the child may originally have brought with him from the home. Every effort was made to minimize the importance of the teacher, to make the school impersonal, and to stress the value of symbolized "facts." Teachers are still selected mainly on the basis of their proficiency in these facts, little consideration being given to their exemplary value for the students as behaving human beings. Thus during recent decades it has come about that the athletic director, the manual training teacher, and other teachers of nonacademic subjects in the high school are often more significant to students as human beings than are the majority of the teachers of academic subjects.

Natural Science in the School. Verbal knowledge of the facts of physical nature is of far less adjustment value than has been claimed for it. What counts is not so much what we know as what we do. Drill in the facts of chemistry, elementary physiology, and hygiene has been a

¹⁸ This use of the teacher as a model is not without some academic significance, for there is a close relationship between liking the teacher and liking the subject he teaches (S. M. Corey and G. S. Beery, 1938). The patterning of behavior on teacher models is especially obvious among adolescents. One of the biggest objections to the private girls' school is its lack of adequate models. Here the spinster teacher is often the only older model available, and she is frequently a poorly adjusted individual. The girl may thus tend to prolong her attachments to girls of her own age, with the possible result of homosexuality. A somewhat comparable situation exists in certain of the preparatory schools for boys, although the male teachers are as a rule better adjusted and are thus more adequate models.

regular part of our public-school curriculum for some years now. Theoretically, the indoctrination of millions of school children into these facts should have resulted in the widespread abandonment of many forms of conventional behavior and in the development of new modes of conduct.

But, as we have said, man is not a "logical" creature. He does as he has been taught by experience to do, and the verbal knowledge that his behavior is inexpedient does not go far to change it. The recognized fact that carrots are good for us cannot of itself make all of us like and eat them, although we presumably desire to live as long and as comfortably as possible. The market for impotent or dangerous medical nostrums has not been decreased by formal education to the extent that we might anticipate. The abuse to which we habitually subject our bodies has perhaps been discouraged a trifle by the dissemination through the schools of facts regarding our bodies, but the abuse still flourishes. In recent years, students of education have been trying to discover a method by which the "meaning" of the facts of nature could be taught to the student. But it has been found to be much easier to train students to parrot the facts than to utilize them in the working out of nonsymbolic adjustments to nature.¹⁴

The School as an "Ideal" World. The problem of teaching the "meaning" of social facts is an even more difficult one. It would appear that here the failure of verbal behavior to result automatically in nonsymbolic adjustments has, however, been somewhat fortunate. By and large, the school has offered a highly artificial environment. The teacher is traditionally and often in actuality an idealist. He has tended to glorify the social life about him, if not to himself, at least to his students. Furthermore, the older books of history, civics, etc., that were used in the classroom did not describe the realities of social existence. They, like the teacher, emphasized the pleasant aspects and avoided direct reference to the difficulties of living in a chaotic social system. The result was that the school attempted to inculcate ideals of the highest order,¹⁵

¹⁴ This is not to depreciate the role of the natural sciences in the development of technology. The point is that it is not the layman but, rather, the technician (physician, biologist, engineer, or the like) who converts scientific discoveries into actions. Science made the radio possible; but few of those who profit by this development know, or need know, anything about electronics.

¹⁵ The unrealistic point of view presented to students below college level by textbooks in social science must be looked upon as one of the means utilized by vested interests to prevent the rise of severe criticism. The public-school system represents these interests; and it is not surprising that textbooks revealing the conflict between minority and majority groups are seldom written and, when written, are shouldered aside by those that are "sound."

But the present gap between textbook ideals and social realities is by no means as

although, when the student became an adult, he had to live in a world that was real, not ideal. Had he, then, actually learned to apply these ideals of social behavior, he would have been definitely misfit for life external to the school. He would have left the school a naive and trusting youth, only to be devoured promptly by the ruthless realities of contemporary society.

As a matter of fact, the obvious impotence of old pedagogical techniques has tended to prevent the unrealistic character of the world as presented by the school from greatly accentuating the individual's problems of social adjustment. The ideals of the schoolroom have in the main been verbal idealisms—copybook precepts to be memorized and then disregarded. And so, whereas the history and the "social studies" of the grammar and high school have been anything but realistic, the manner by which they have been taught has prevented them from doing much positive harm to the students.

The fact remains, however, that true social science has not been effectively applied by the public schools to the fitting of the growing child for social life. We have the factual records of the socially disastrous consequences of international strife. We have the records of many bursting economic bubbles. But a knowledge of the consequences of war seems to have had surprisingly little effect upon the human forces making for further wars; and the available information regarding the exploded economic myths of the past does not seem to discourage men from investing in still newer get-rich-quick schemes or from turning, when they are distressed, to the most absurd of political panaceas. Man's behavior is a consequence of experience; and that experience is with much more than the dry, dull verbal "facts" of history, civics, and economics.

A distinction is frequently made between the use of verbal symbols for purposes of education and for purposes of propaganda. It is assumed that, in the former instance, the symbols represent some external reality and are presented in a logical manner to appeal to intelligence rather than to emotion. In propaganda, on the other hand, it is assumed that the symbols are empty and that the presentation is calculated to appeal to human emotion rather than to reason. We shall discuss this distinction later. But in the present connection it might be well to note that, if the distinction means anything at all, it is that in education as it has existed in the past there has been an ineffectual use of verbal symbols, whereas in propaganda there has been an effectual use of them. Much as educators may regret it, the fact is that commercial advertising, the yellow

great as it was a century ago when the little red schoolhouse fed its inhabitants a brand of moralistic pap concocted by the famous McGuffey. See *Making the American mind: social and moral ideas in the McGuffey Readers* (R. D. Mosier, 1947).

journal, popular and prejudiced literature, political speeches, and radio addresses contribute far more to the molding of behavior in contemporary society than do the natural science, history, and civics that have been taught to school children.

The Sociopsychological Function of the School. A formal educational system is intended to provide partial substitutes for the educational activities of the home, the field, and the shop. Its failure adequately to do so has not gone unrecognized, and the last few decades have witnessed great changes in our views regarding the function of the school. No longer do schoolmen consider that a smattering of Greek and Latin, a bit of mathematics and literature, and some doubtful history provide the growing child with adequate equipment for living in a troubled social world.

At the opening of this century John Dewey inaugurated a movement for the reform of our educational system.¹⁶ He realized that the schools were not teaching children how to live the "good life" and that what they were unwittingly aiming toward were highly standardized human products, who must live in a society that is anything but standardized. He pointed to the fact that at present there is no single mode of behavior that will serve all members of society at all times and that we must, therefore, learn by trial and error as we go along to adjust to specific circumstances. It is this point of view that now leads the more enlightened teachers to stress independent thought rather than routine educational drill.

Many of Dewey's followers, however, came to question the value not only of verbal drill but also of adult guidance. These extremists appealed to fond parents who imagined that their offspring had within them some urge to "express themselves." As a matter of fact, when small children were permitted to express their inner urges, the result was behavior more fitting to monkeys than to human beings—a fact that somewhat discredited this theory, although it still has many adherents.

Recently many professional educators began to realize that somehow less emphasis must be placed upon purely verbal learning. As a start, the so-called "project method" was introduced into some elementary schools. It consists of setting a problem, manual or verbal, and of assisting the child toward the solution of this problem. In effect this is an attempt to teach by example rather than by verbal drill in symbolized facts.

It is a peculiar commentary upon the formal education of the preuniversity level that social psychologists have apparently felt little need to

¹⁶ The educational reforms urged by Dewey are expressed in *The school and society* (J. Dewey, 1899).

analyze the school in an effort to trace the relationship between contemporary society and individual behavior. Their writings would leave one with the impression that formal education is totally unknown to our society, a reflection no doubt of the fact that the school has played a remarkably small part in the molding of human behavior.

Through teaching the child to read and by providing him with books of history and literature, the school has, of course, made some symbolic models available. These will be used when and if they seem to offer adjustment value. But the figures of history are rather dulled in outline when presented by the textbook method, and their practical utility is slight.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE COMPOSITE MODEL

Legendary or historic heroes may have real value as symbolic models for those who live in societies that are comparable to those in which the models rose to fame and power.¹⁷ But in a society as dynamic as our own, social changes tend to make the behavior of the outstanding men of yesterday ineffectual examples for those living in the present.¹⁸ As a consequence, the modern person is often forced to "make up" a model, a synthesis of those elements of the behavior of persons, both actual and symbolized, that seem to fit his peculiar adjustment problems. This vague and synthetic person is a compound of all the persons, actual and symbolized, whom he has admired and whom he has found, in some regard or other, useful as models. That "person" is, therefore, a sort of "composite" model.¹⁹

The use of composite models as the basis for learning by example is made necessary by the character of our milieu. No single person or single symbolic model can be adequate for the adjustment needs of the individual. Under an integrated and established social system, such as China possessed some years ago, the course of the social development of the individual was definitely laid out for him. Choice, or, more exactly, un-

¹⁷ Possibly one of the best means by which we can gain an insight into the fundamental aspirations and ideals of the people of any place and age is through study of the characters of their heroes. See "Hero worship" (G. Salmon, 1932). An excellent bibliography on hero worship is included in this article.

¹⁸ The practice of rewriting the biographies of the great figures of the past is necessitated by the fact that what is significant for one period may be quite incomprehensible in another. Heroes must be up to date; and it is to modernize such men as Napoleon that biographies are rewritten every few decades.

¹⁹ Stressing the covert aspects of the process, some social psychologists prefer such terms as "ideal self" and "projected self." The term "composite model" is here used to indicate that the elements are derived from experience with persons or symbolizations thereof and are used as the basis for learning by example.

directed trial and error, entered into it but little. Because the daughter usually followed in the footsteps of her mother, aunts, and grandmother, and the son in those of his father, uncles, and grandfather, each could use these relatives as effective models for his or her own behavior. When, for whatever reason, the youth's ambitions exceeded the achievements of his father, uncle, grandfather, or all other available persons, he could resort to some symbolic model, some legendary hero. The use of such a traditional model might assist the individual in his progress toward his life goal.

In our society, however, constant social changes make following in the father's or mother's footsteps not only improbable but often quite impossible. Even the farm boy can no longer "follow in his father's footsteps"; for, if he is to survive as a farmer, he must keep up with the times, both technologically and economically. No longer is it true, if it ever was, that "what was good enough for Father is good enough for me." Furthermore, the breakdown of social stability has encouraged the development in the individual of life ambitions often far in excess of the status of the parents. Few sons of ditchdiggers are today content to be ditchdiggers; few daughters of domestic servants are content to become domestics. They have been taught to want to become "better." Even as the life-achievement value of the father or mother model has declined, so, too, and for the same reason, has the value of symbolic models.

Neither actual nor symbolized persons can, of themselves, be adequate models for the ambitious modern youth. If he wants to become a physician, he must build from his experience a concept of the Physician, compare his own behavior with the behavior of this vague but often significant model, and try to shape himself into the pattern of that model. The Physician is a personification of many elements. If the youth's father is a physician, certain elements will be drawn from this source, but by no means all. In our dynamic society it is the exceptional man who can keep abreast of all the important new developments in medicine and maintain a practice at the same time; and the Physician is, of course, right up to the minute. He will be part Pasteur, part Harvey, part the various physicians whom the youth has known and admired, part the teachers he has met in medical school, and, of course, part sheer fiction.

Stereotyped Composite Models. Some composite models are provided ready-made for ambitious youths. Moreover, the style in ready-made composite models changes from time to time. Sixty years ago the financial buccaneer was a heroic figure in America. Novelists stereotyped his characteristics; dramatists made him the hero of many plays. No doubt some youths did use this idealized stereotype as a model. But

it went out of fashion and was replaced by the Great Engineer, who conquered the jungle with his brain and brawn, built bridges, opened mines, and laid railroads. Richard Harding Davis was his eulogist, and many were the young men in America who entered engineering schools with dreams of conquest and the Davis-made model in their minds. In time the supply of engineers outran the demand for them and discouraged this ambition. In later years we witnessed the rise and decline of the Executive, the Banker, and the New Deal reformer—stereotyped personifications of the behavior of many men, real and fictitious. Women, too, have had their success types: the Suffragette, the Businesswoman, the Flapper, and, later, the Career Woman.

Some stereotyped models are hardy perennials that come and go with the tide of historical events but are little changed through the centuries. During periods of warfare the ideal of the military man is brought out from the archives, to be returned to storage when peace finally comes again. During the progress of internal revolt, violent or otherwise, the radical, builder-of-utopia ideal is popular; when the reaction to revolution comes, a new and contrasting ideal appears. For no two individuals will any of these stereotyped composite models be quite the same. For most, they are but vague projections of what the individual from his specific experience has come to believe is the way to attain his chosen goal in life. But composite models can be quite useful to the modern youth, who must so frequently adapt himself to a world that changes almost as rapidly as he learns new adjustments and that no longer provides well-defined paths for the "good life." Composite models cannot show the way—they are too vague and indefinite—but they can be and often are a help in working out adjustment problems. In a stable social system they are unnecessary; actual people and perhaps a few symbolic models are sufficient. But ours is not a stable system, and the models that we use must be both vague and flexible.

Composite Models and the Covert Behaviors. From the foregoing it should not be assumed that the adoption of an appropriate composite model is assurance of successful adjustment to life in the modern world. Far from it. In many instances the very adoption of a currently popular stereotyped model indicates a lack of those personal qualities that are normally the concomitants of success in any walk of life. And at best the composite model can provide only a rough guide or measuring stick by which the individual can evaluate his outward and largely nonsymbolic conformity to the ideal at the moment.

Success, small or great, in most fields of endeavor (motion-picture acting illustrates the exception) is a long-run matter; and in the long run it is the individual's covert attributes that are of the most significance.

It will be recalled that there is no assurance that the acquisition of the overt behaviors of a model, real, symbolic, or composite, will be accompanied by the acquisition of the covert attributes that in the long run enter into the making of overt behavior. For example, it is quite possible to acquire through learning by example most of the outward characteristics of the successful physician, politician, scholar, businessman, or military leader as of a given time, without developing those covert qualities—motivations, feelings, and personal values and sentiments—that really make the great man great. Success, whether in wresting a livelihood from the land or rising to a position of wealth and prestige, usually requires, in addition to external opportunities and the overt skills involved, persistence in the face of repeated failures, concentration on a single goal in spite of numerous and insistent distractions, and some ability to think creatively. Such qualities reflect over the long run the covert attributes of the individual, attributes that are not acquired directly through the learning-by-example process.

CHAPTER X

THE COVERT BEHAVIORS

By definition covert behaviors are not open to direct observation, and most attempts to study them have led only to debate about them. But, as was said earlier, their existence cannot be ignored; an adequate science of human behavior cannot be developed on the basis of overt behaviors alone. In order to gain an understanding of the factors that affect the overt behaviors of the individual, it is often necessary to probe into his covert behaviors, since the latter may be the source of the former. This is presumably the case when marked and otherwise inexplicable changes in overt behavior occur.

When the child who has been romping gaily with his dog turns to acting pained and otherwise distressed, the sting of a bee, a bump on the head, or some other observable antecedent event may have been responsible. But if parental investigation reveals no evidence of such external happening, the parent would be foolish to ignore the possibility that an event of internal origin—a malfunctioning stomach, for example—is responsible for the change in the child's overt behavior. Just so, when the man who has long behaved in friendly ways toward another abruptly murders that friend, the student of human behavior would first seek an explanation for this act in external, immediately observable events. If the murderer is a hardened criminal, it may be that he was in great need of money and that the only way to secure it that seemed feasible to him was through the murder of his friend. Such circumstances being involved, the study of the antecedents of the act of murder would, for a time at least, follow along an obviously related chain of immediately observable events. But if the murderer is clearly a mild person who has previously obeyed the laws of the land, it would be necessary to explore the possibility that the act was a long-delayed response to distant, and on the surface unrelated, events. In the former instance a relatively short¹ sequence of covert behaviors is, presumably, involved. But in the latter case a long sequence of covert phenomena must have been occurring between the chain

¹ Actually everything that has happened to the murderer since birth will have been in some way and to some degree a part of the complex of events that caused the act of murder. But for practical purposes we mark off a portion of the series, the supposedly more significant events.

of events that "began" the murder and the murder itself. Perhaps during their long apparent friendship, the murderer, starting with some small event, has gradually built up attitudes of resentment that finally terminated in this overt act.

As "Intervening Variables." Much of what seems unexplainable and most of what is unpredictable in the behavior of human beings are traceable to unknown peculiarities on the covert level. These are the behaviors to which the layman applies the general term "emotions." (The psychologist currently designates these internal behaviors as "intervening variables" to indicate that they come between the stimulus and the overt response and that they vary with situations and individuals.) The mechanism of an adding machine "intervenes" between the pressure on one of its keys and the figure that appears in the tabulating window; but since the mechanisms of adding machines are both consistent and standardized, two plus two almost invariably comes up as four on the same machine and on any number of different machines. Human beings, on the other hand, are covertly unstandardized. Thus the small child who has not yet stabilized his "adding ability" may say "five" the first and "three" the next time he is asked what two and two make. And a class of small children may give quite a variety of individual answers to the same question.

It is often apparently the involvement of different intervening variables that makes the behavior of an individual seem inconsistent; the man pats the dog one time and kicks it the next because different covert factors have operated in the two instances. It is also in part at least because the covert involvements are different that one well-trained soldier keeps firing at the enemy until he is killed, while in the same situation another well-trained soldier throws down his gun and runs away.

The Private Self. The whole complex of the covert behaviors of an individual may be conceived of as his private self, that which he knows, however vaguely, but which others can know if at all only by inference from his overt behavior (his "social self," as it is sometimes termed). The covert self is private partly because, as was indicated earlier, there are no consistent outward manifestations of the covert behaviors. Even when an individual endeavors to indicate to others his covert experiences, his expressions are crude and unstandardized and subject to variable interpretation. As every physician knows, descriptions of pain and other internal disturbances are often untrustworthy. What one patient may describe as intense pain may be described as considerable discomfort by another. The same difficulty arises in any attempt to describe motivational or other covert behavior; where one person may say "I must have," another may say "I should like to have."

Since there is no objective scale by which to measure covert behaviors, each individual necessarily develops and uses his own personal scale; and there can be no assurance that the units of measurement of any two such scales are identical. For all that can be known, the man who says and, we shall assume, thinks that he enjoyed a concert may have responded covertly much less and perhaps in somewhat different ways from others who also claim to have enjoyed the concert. And it may eventually turn out that the man who believed that his hate toward another was "sufficient to drive him to murder in the end" was quite wrong, while the man who considered himself incapable of murder ultimately learns the contrary.

The covert self is private, moreover, in part because of social training; "repression" is the term usually used here. Every society makes the expression of some presumably common covert behaviors taboo. In the simplest form, the taboo applies to public use of words or gestures that are conventionally supposed to represent certain specific feeling-states. Thus in old Chinese society it was not socially permissible for any but the youngest children to cry, except in bereavement when even the elders were required by custom to do so. And until her husband was a corpse in his coffin, a wife was not supposed to indicate in any way how she felt about him. Indeed, the Chinese and Japanese and to a much lesser degree the English have in the past made something of a point of avoiding the display of feelings in public.

Even we Americans, who by contemporary English standards are "open-faced," have many taboos against overt actions that are conventionally supposed to reflect specific covert states. The child is soon taught, as children are in most societies, to defecate in some special place or places and later to do so in private. It is then but a step to training him not to indicate, except perhaps in some secret code and to his mother, that he even feels the need to defecate. Meanwhile he has been taught to refrain from commenting to a visitor upon such matters as her ugly, red nose or very large wart; and he will soon begin to learn that to speak honestly does not always pay and that a big boy may be afraid of the dark but a big boy is not supposed to admit to it.

As time goes on and the covert behaviors of the child grow more complex and, perhaps, more specific, he learns either that he cannot communicate them to others or that he must not attempt to do so. They constitute his enlarging and increasingly private self.

In lay language there are a great many terms that refer to presumed aspects of the private self, some of which are used in quasi-scientific discourse. Currently there is much concern, particularly among child psychologists and parents, with the need for establishing in the child a "sense

of security" and of avoiding anything that will make the child feel "insecure."² The idea is that orderly and loving treatment in infancy and early childhood will build up strong feelings of what in other connections may be termed "self-confidence," "assurance," "poise," and the like, which will protect the private self from becoming demoralized (and here another class of subjective terms may be applied—"hurt feelings," "oversensitivity," "lack of confidence," etc.) in the normal hurly-burly of later life.

As was indicated earlier, all interpersonal relationships involve some reliance by the various participants upon a presumed ability to "read" the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the others. What is actually read, however, is gestural behavior and the more subtle aspects of language behavior. And whether these overt behaviors actually indicate what they are interpreted to mean is quite a different matter. For although we are forever attempting to explore and evaluate the private lives of those about us and often imagine that we have been able to do so, the private self expresses itself indirectly and then usually in the form of a delayed response.

The Clinical Life History. Even to ascertain after the fact the nature and causes of the covert factors that have preceded a long-delayed overt response has proved to be exceedingly difficult. Many methods have been tried—dream analysis, free and directed association tests (note 34), and the like. In the Freudian technique the "unconscious" is patiently probed for words whose meanings are taken to be entirely unlike those normally assigned to them. But since Freudianism flourishes more as a therapeutic cult than as a scientific discipline, the "findings" of the analysts need not concern us here.

In recent years many useful data have been coming from the work of clinicians who endeavor to secure, from every available source, a factual life history of the individual who is being studied (note 35). From such a history, inferences concerning covert elements are drawn. Unlike the orthodox Freudian, the clinician does not attempt to pull his evidences by verbal magic from a postulated unconscious. The clinician is a sort of sociopsychological detective; he studies the family background, the early associations and experiences, the schooling, etc., of his subject and draws his inferences from a great body of facts rather than, as the Freudian does, from selected and biased observations. The clinical life history is never so complete as we might like, and the clinical method is exceedingly laborious. Furthermore, the validity of the inferences drawn de-

² Psychologists are currently much interested in the relation between length of breast feeding and later feelings of security. While certain studies showed no association and others a fairly close relationship, a rather crucial piece of research (A. H. Maslow and I. Szilagyi-Kessler, 1946) seems to disclose a U-shaped relationship.

pend in the end on the skill and the insight of the investigator. But the life-history method of the clinician is by far the most promising so far developed for the study of the delayed-response sort of behavior.

The following general analysis of covert behaviors and of their functions, origins, and relations to overt behaviors represents, in condensed form, our present understanding of these matters. Further clinical study will no doubt refine, correct, and augment what we now have to say.

COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Kinds of Covert Symbols. There would appear to be many forms of covert symbolic behavior, and it is probable that each form may involve several kinds of covert symbols. Probably the most characteristic kind of symbol is the verbal. Just as the small child may go about talking aloud to himself, adults seem to make more or less constant subvocal verbal comments to themselves concerning the things that are happening to them.

With literate peoples, this covert use of the spoken word can be supplemented by use of covert visual-verbal symbols, *i.e.*, "mental pictures" of the written word. The process is apparently derived from ability to read; and individuals seem to vary considerably in their ability to "read" what is in their "mind's eye" (an element, presumably, in the art of effective writing) just as they do in their skill at reading a printed page. Artists, architects, and many others may also use covert symbols of a visual order—"mental pictures" of objects, color combinations, etc. When we visualize, if we actually do, a person or thing, the mental picture is a symbol and may be manipulated as such.

Musicians and others who deal much with sound are evidently skilled at using still another type of covert symbol—"mental sounds." Composers frequently write out on paper rather than work out on the piano or other instruments the compositions that they hear in their "minds' ear."

Finally, it is possible that kinesthetic sensations produced by slight, covert muscular movements may at times serve as symbols, as is the case when we "feel out" the spelling of a word. Such symbolization is, however, so ill-defined that it borders on the category of covert non-symbolic behavior.

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR

Each of the various types of covert symbolic behavior has, presumably, its individual significance. Not all, however, are of interest to the social psychologist. The running covert comments that a person makes to himself as he overtly adjusts to other people and to objects may have no more than personal importance. Random reverie, a fragmentary

and often fantastic series of covert responses, would seem to be little more than self-amusement and to have few, if any, long-run consequences.

Directed Daydreaming. When, however, covert symbols are directed and controlled to the end that they "tell" their user a story, the process may be quite significant. In such fantasy, the storyteller may be either the hero or the heroine. Through the story he symbolically gets what he wants, or she is won by the one she wants to win her. The fact that a person does such things on a covert level rather than on an overt one suggests that he wants events to go the way of the daydream but often cannot in actuality make them go that way.³ Daydreaming, although common to all, is therefore symptomatic of minor and sometimes major personal maladjustment. We shall later see that it is one of the commonplace compensatory devices.

In contrast to daydreaming are the covert aspects of the process of learning on the basis of ideas of persons that was discussed in the previous chapter. Ideas of persons are, obviously, complex covert symbolic constructions. When used as a guide in the working out of overt modes of conduct, ideas of persons facilitate adjustment to the external world. Daydreaming, on the other hand, is a substitute for such overt adjustments. Although it is a mode of adjustment, it never "gets us anywhere."

Remembering. All acquired patterns of adjustment, all habits, are from one point of view records of past experience. Man not only uses verbal symbols to a great extent but is also capable of preserving many of his past experiences, both with symbols and with things, in his memory.⁴ Much of this preserved "knowledge" is subject to ready recall, and it is symbolic remembrance of the past by those around him that constitutes the symbolic environment of the individual that was discussed in the previous chapter. Out of the memories of parents and others, the child secures many of his ideas of people and much of his understanding of the nature of his social and physical world. In symbolic form he preserves for future use many of the precepts that are provided him in anticipation of future needs (*e.g.*, what he should say if a hostess offers him a second piece of cake). From his memory he draws the symbolic materials that he uses when he thinks out a solution to an unprecedented adjustment

³ Covert planning differs from directed daydreaming in that the planner expects or at least hopes to gain his wish in real life, not in the world of fantasy, and that he uses symbols which to the best of his knowledge represent external realities.

⁴ Memory should be thought of not as an entity, a box in which the individual stores ideas, but rather as a process. It should be kept in mind that we are referring to the ability to react to present stimuli with the aid of symbolic tools—"mental" images of various sorts that symbolize past experiences. Recall is best when the recaller is "ego-involved," *i.e.*, when the material to be recalled is in line with the recaller's own opinions (F. J. Shaw and A. Spooner, 1945).

problem. Memory is, therefore, a prerequisite to social life ; and some of the more important differences between individuals can be traced to variations in what and how much they remember.

Thinking. The ability to think out a solution to a problem rather than having to work it out on the basis of overt trial and error is one of man's most precious possessions. This ability makes possible his engaging in trial and error without suffering the consequences of his errors, an ability that the lower animals do not have to as significant a degree. When one of the lower animals is faced with a situation different from any he has previously experienced and for which he has not by training been prepared, he usually resorts to trying out the various things that he can do. Thus the dog who is trying to solve a getting-across-the-stream problem may try out his various tricks. He may bark, run up and down the bank, step gingerly into the water, and circle back and forth. These actions being unavailing, he may finally try swimming. The try may be a success or a failure, depending both on the ability of the dog and the nature of the stream. If the try happens, however, to be just one more unsuccessful attempt, the consequence may be death.

Many of the adjustment problems with which man is faced are of such a character that an attempt to solve them by overt trial and error would be hazardous, and error might preclude further attempts. Such is the case when an individual must treat an unprecedented illness, when he and a train are approaching an intersection, or when on the field of battle he is caught by the enemy in an unfamiliar situation. In other situations a trial that proves to be an error may not result in death. It may result in hunger, as when he plants his crops at the wrong times, unhappiness, as when he selects the wrong girl as his wife, sickness, as when he eats the wrong food, or the like.

But man can conduct his experimentation on the covert symbolic level ; and when he does this, his errors may be painlessly discarded. By covert trial and error he may calculate whether he can get across the intersection before the oncoming train, he may decide upon the feasibility of trying to fight his way out of the shell hole in which he is entrapped, etc. The process seems to consist of symbolizing the situation, probably in terms of prior experience with elements of the new problem, and trying out a variety of possible acts that have also been reduced to symbolic form.⁵ When a satisfactory solution has been found on the symbolic level, that solution can then be translated into overt action.

It does not follow, however, that the thought-out solution will necessarily be a successful resolution of the problem. Whether it is or not will depend on the validity of the symbols used and the judgment in-

⁵ For a detailed illustration of this process, see Appendix note 36.

volved in distinguishing between trials that are failures and the one that is a success, *i.e.*, the one that leads to expedient results.

Logic. Philosophers have long held that there is one valid procedure to be used in arriving at a sound symbolic solution to a problem. This process is termed "logic," and the Aristotelian version of logic has been believed to be the basis for the development of modern science. Perhaps it is, but there is certainly nothing universal about the principles agreed upon as sound. For what is sound reasoning seems to depend entirely on the society, which sets the values which are used in determining whether a given solution is a success or a failure.⁶ To most of the members of one society and to some individuals in other societies, it may appear entirely logical to resolve a given situation by self-inflicted death. Others will consider reasoning that leads to this conclusion as completely illogical. Only when there is agreement on objectives can there be agreement on the validity of thought procedures.

Validity of Symbols.⁷ The soundness of thinking within any given system of logic depends on the validity of the symbols that are used. If the motorcar driver calculates that he is closer to the intersection and is going as fast as the train when he is actually farther away and going slower, his solution to the problem may be fatal because the symbols he used were not valid. Many of the values or meanings of symbols are derived from limited personal experience, and that experience may be very misleading. Limited experience with tomatoes, for example, led some of our forefathers into the error of thinking this fruit poisonous. Some symbols derive their meanings from association with other symbols, as is invariably the case with an abstraction, such as "God," and as is usually the case with ideas about places and events that are beyond our direct observation. Such symbols may have significant cultural validity without having any necessary value for the solution of individual adjustment problems. The idea of God is basic to religion; and religion in turn may, as we shall later see, be of great adjustment value to the individual. But the starving man who assures himself that "the Lord will provide" and does not, therefore, endeavor to find himself food will have made a fatal miscalculation.

⁶ The study of the social determination of logical systems of thought is developing around the term "sociology of knowledge." For a brief résumé and a good bibliography on the subject, see "Language, logic, and culture" (C. W. Mills, 1939). See also *Ideology and utopia* (K. Mannheim, 1936).

⁷ The study of the processes by which symbols secure their meanings is known as "semantics." The pioneer work in this field is *The meaning of meaning* (C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 1930). A superficial but nevertheless suggestive examination of some of the words to which we commonly give false meanings is *The tyranny of words* (S. Chase, 1938). For further discussion of this subject, see Appendix note 25.

In every society the individual is trained to behave in terms of some symbols that have no nonsymbolic counterparts. The word "ghost" appears in all languages, and many people believe in the reality of ghosts. They then act at times as though there were ghosts, although scientists have never been able to verify this belief. The ideas of the primitive and the premodern concerning the nature of the physical world, the causes of physical phenomena, and the like have mostly been unfounded beliefs. Modern people, or at least the scientists and technicians of the modern world, have at their command a great many validated symbols representing the nature of the physical and biological world. It is for this reason that they are so eminently successful in solving problems of nature control.

Such is not the case, however, with many of the symbols that constitute our ideas of the nature of our society and our roles therein. Some of these symbols have been rendered invalid by social change. They may mean to us just what they meant to our forefathers; but, since the days of our forefathers, the "realities" that the symbols once represented have so changed that the validity of the symbols is destroyed. Thus the word "family" may still mean the system of neopatriarchal social relations that was common to the people of America a hundred years ago, although that system has become archaic, and new, ill-defined, and varied marital and child-parent relationships have come into existence. The young man who thinks of settling down and becoming a "family" man may, therefore, be thinking in terms of former realities but present impossibilities.

Other symbolizations regarding society are invalid because they represent something that does not yet exist and may never come into being. "Manifest destiny" is one such phrase (A. K. Weinberg, 1935). It has played its role in the development of nationalism, but it is only the symbolization of a hope, not a fact. Those Germans of prewar days whose personal calculations involved the assumption that their nation must inevitably rise to greatness must have been bitterly disappointed when the manifest destiny did not become manifest.

ACQUISITION OF COVERT SYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Although educators have proceeded upon various assumptions, such as that language training develops certain of the mental faculties, the processes by which men learn to think are largely unknown. All that can be said is that learning to think involves practice and that practice is fostered by certain kinds of social conditions and discouraged by others. Not only does the society either facilitate or inhibit the development of skill at thinking, but it also provides most of the symbols that will be used in thinking. Without social training in overt symbolic behavior,

more particularly of the verbal sort, it is inconceivable that the individual could develop to any large degree the ability to think.

Under conditions of relative social stability, society provides its members with ready-made solutions to so many of their adjustment problems that they seldom need to think out solutions to problems for themselves. But under conditions of social instability many new, unprepared-for problems arise. At the same time many individuals are inadequately trained into acceptance of the socially established solutions to such recurrent problems as birth, marriage, and death. Such individuals will, then, tend to resort to trial and error in the working out of better adjustments either to nature or to their fellows; and much of this trial and error will be covert in character.

This point is illustrated by the way in which the New World was discovered. Changes in the social economy of medieval Spain made it desirable to find a better solution to the problem of getting spices from the East. Columbus had, for reasons of class position, not been trained into the general belief that the world was flat; and for some reason he had not been trained to accept, as did most educated men of his time, Pliny's ancient estimate of the diameter of the globe. He came at length to the conclusion that the world was only one-third the size scholars believed it to be and that therefore the Orient could be reached more quickly by going west than by traveling east. He was wrong, but what happened when he endeavored to put his conclusion into effect is now history.

Creative Thinking.⁸ The necessary biological equipment being present, learning to solve problems by means of covert trial and error is dependent on social training in complex overt symbolic behaviors, the existence of problems to be solved, and a degree of liberation from the ready-made solutions of the social heritage. These conditions being present, learning to think seems to be a matter of practice.⁹ But even in our society, where the general social conditions would seem to be conducive to much rigorous thinking and where the rewards for originality

⁸ Much of what may pass for creative thinking is no more than a justifying of solutions that have already been made to problems. When the philosopher "thinks" up new justifications for old solutions to the problems of social life, he is only rationalizing. When a man "thinks" up reasons to explain why he has bought a new car, he is not, of course, solving the problem, "Should I buy a new car?" That problem has already been solved. Many of the established patterns of social life will have their ideological explanations—complex and systematic verbal justifications. The repetition of such ideologies is not thinking.

⁹ Obviously, biological equipment for thinking varies among individuals; hence, the effectiveness of any given amount of practice will vary. We are here, as elsewhere, dealing with multiple variables. For a detailed discussion of the topic of individual differences, see *The psychology of human differences* (L. E. Tyler, 1947).

are often high, it is the exceptional individual who is capable of anything more than rudimentary thinking, the kind of thinking that is involved in solving such commonplace daily problems as whether to buy beef or pork for dinner and whether it will be possible to get across the tracks before the train reaches the intersection. For every modern inventor who has thought out some new and more efficient way to do a thing, there have been thousands of workmen who did it in the old way day after day and year after year. Even the leaders of our society seldom give evidence of having thought on any level above the commonplace; politicians are prone to repeat the same airy promises and to make the same legislative and administrative errors generation after generation; all but a few generals try to win each new war with the tools and tactics that won, under quite different circumstances, the previous war; and even the businessman, symbol of progress that he is, rarely improves on traditional products or marketing procedures unless he is driven by intense competition to do so.

Just what peculiarities of socialization develop in an occasional individual the ability to think creatively it is impossible to say. Motivation, which will be discussed shortly, is a prerequisite; and apparently exceptional motivation is required to overcome the inertia of established habit and force the individual to apply himself to the working out of some new solution to a problem. But why one child of many will have acquired through long and persistent, and at the time unrewarding, practice in the covert manipulation of some order of symbols exceptional ability to think is not evident. Perhaps those who train the child may encourage such practice through adroitly setting problems to be solved symbolically and by rewarding him for having worked out successful solutions. This is what is done on a simple and often nonsymbolic level when the child is given certain kinds of puzzle games and is praised for having worked out the answers. But the conditions that will keep an individual practicing covert problem-solving until he becomes highly skilled in this realm are too complex to be deliberately controlled. About all that can be said is that of the many little boys who are parentally encouraged to become architects, lawyers, doctors, writers, etc., most do not, and of the few who do, only one out of many displays significant originality. Most architects, lawyers, doctors, writers, etc., repeat with only minor variations the things that they have been taught to do.

On the negative side, it may be said with some confidence that the child who is meticulously trained in correct social usages and protected from the harsh realities of life will have no opportunity or occasion to work out adjustment problems for himself and little chance to learn to think creatively, however complete his overt symbolic training may be

Later we shall have occasion to see that even in our disordered social system many children are so guarded and protected that they do not learn how to think for themselves, although they will most certainly be called upon to do so in later life. Under conditions of social disorganization, willingness and ability to experiment in matters of social relationships is one attribute of the well-adjusted personality. The child who has never been allowed to think for himself will lack what is usually described as self-reliance and will be unable to work out problems for himself when the occasion arises.

Educational "Drill" and Thinking. In general, formal education has consisted of drill in overt symbolic responses rather than practice in covert symbolic trial and error. By and large, the student who has acquired during school hours some skill at thinking has done so in spite of rather than because of his schooling, if his schooling has been at all typical. At least prior to the college level, and far too commonly even here, "education" has traditionally consisted of learning to give the right answers to stock questions. Text and teacher have determined what is the right answer; all the student has had to do is to associate answer and question. What is commonly called a "good memory" is a prerequisite to thinking about certain kinds of problems. It is not, however, a significant end in itself. Some of the techniques now being experimented with, such as the project method, are attempts to make the school functionally more important for the student by providing him with circumstances conducive to the development of skill in thinking.

THINKING AND OVERT BEHAVIORS

Fantasy, daydreaming, and much recalling in symbolic form of experiences from the past are ends in themselves. They are modes of self-entertainment. But thinking is a means to an end. It is an attempt to solve adjustment problems. The end is the adjustment act—making a faster airplane, winning a wife, earning an honest dollar, or the like. It does not follow, however, that the thought-out solution to a problem will necessarily be converted into overt action any more than the thought-out solution is necessarily an expedient one. Just as we can act without also thinking, we can think without necessarily acting upon our thoughts.

There is probably a stronger tendency to convert the consequences of thinking into overt symbolic than into overt nonsymbolic behaviors. The man who talks, and presumably thinks, in terms of the verified facts of organic life may nevertheless treat his own body in ways which he "knows" are contrary to its welfare; the motorist who decides that he

can beat the train to the crossing may boast that he can do so yet at the same time bring his car to a stop.

Since the processes by which we acquire our overt nonsymbolic behaviors are different from those by which we learn to think, it is always possible that the circumstances of our training have taught us to behave one way on the one level and another on the other. In view of the invalidity of many of the symbols of social life with which the modern man thinks, this lack of relation between thought and action is perhaps fortunate. Few people actually commit murder, although many of us have at some time or another decided that the solution to a predicament was to murder some one or many of our fellow men.

COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Social workers and others who deal with what are often called the "underprivileged" are constantly hampered by the fact that so many of those whom they would help do not make any great effort to help themselves. During the early 1930's, for example, the zealous New Dealers came up against the discouraging discovery that in large measure the effort expended on the underprivileged (WPA, Rural Resettlement, etc.) did not elevate the socioeconomic status of these people but only made it possible for them to maintain their former status with less effort.¹⁰ The fact that under comparable circumstances one man sits comfortably in the shade while another labors to procure the largest possible crop from his land is usually described in terms of ambition, desires, wants, and other presumed covert forces.

Descriptive Use of Subjective Terms. Every language contains many terms that are used to indicate that overt behavior is a consequence of some particular inner "force" or some specific feeling-state. The "forces" are symbolized as the motives behind actions. Thus we assume the existence of an inner "force" and give it a motivational name when we say of a person, "He wanted to make a good impression on his boss." We imply knowledge of the specific motivational antecedents of a complex of actions in saying, briefly, "He married her for her money." Actually, however, such use of motivational terms is only a quick—a literary or poetic—description of observed behaviors. By saying, "He married her for her money," we suggest some significant phase of his complex behavior toward her, *e.g.*, that after their marriage he was attentive to her money but tended to ignore her.

¹⁰ A literary description of the way some of the people whom the government was trying to help during this period became passive wards of the government is given in *Men working* (J. Faulkner, 1941).

Comparable is the practice of describing the complex actions that are produced by this or that object or event by reference to this or that specific emotional state.¹¹ Thus we may say of a person, "He fell in love with her at first sight." But such a statement is at best only a more or less artful suggestion of the observed fact that he was attentive to her during their first meeting, that he arranged for subsequent meetings with her, etc., until they did, or did not, get married.

The use of subjective terms simply as a means of short-cutting descriptions of observed behaviors has certain advantages in science as well as in lay life. To describe in detail the antics of a rat in a maze, for example, makes laborious and quite often dull reading. The character of these antics may be indicated by briefly describing them as aiming to secure the reward for successful running of the maze. We have further abbreviated this description when we say that the rat "wants," or "desires," to get through the maze. This procedure is even more expedient in describing human behavior, which is far more complex than that of the rat. Indeed, it is difficult to describe human actions without using subjective terms. We are so much habituated to this usage that to think and speak of behavior in any other way may seem exceedingly artificial. It is at least as communicative to say of the child that he wanted the candy as it is to say, objectively, that he raised the right arm, glanced toward the table, clutched the chair with the left hand, and rose up on his toes. The latter statements omit reference to the child's past experiences, which the motivational term "wanted" implies, since, if the child wants candy, he must have had previous experience with sweet food.¹²

¹¹ Particularly in lay usage confusion often arises from the fact that the terms used are partly at least a function of the situation, and different people may define the situation in different ways. If we were to see a man running away from a wounded bear, we should probably say that he did so because he was afraid. Should this same man see a stranger beating a horse and approach and force the stranger to desist, we should probably say that he was angry. Possibly the man could differentiate his emotions, although of this we cannot be certain. He might not be able to give his felt emotion a name, or he might maintain that fear as well as anger was present while he was arguing with the horse beater, particularly if the latter were a giant of a man. It must be kept in mind that, although the poets and philosophers have talked of literally thousands of emotions, many of the latter may be only empty words. Perhaps no words can describe at all accurately an oscillation of fear and rage. Moreover, there is no way of telling how much one man's felt emotion of fear resembles the fear experienced by another. In extreme instances a man may approach a happy situation with every indication of sorrow or a sorrowful situation with raucous laughter. Persistent behavior of this sort is termed "psychopathic."

¹² For an illustration of one of the more elaborate uses of motivational terms as descriptive devices, that of W. I. Thomas, see Appendix note 37.

In "The imputation of motives" MacIver goes farther than the present authors in his dependence on motivational analysis (R. M. MacIver, 1940). He would, ap-

Use and Abuse of Subjective Terms. But the descriptive use of subjective terms must be clearly distinguished from the use of these terms to designate actual and specific covert antecedents of overt behavior. Failure to recognize that giving a subjective term to an observed overt act is not providing an explanation of that act has led to so much loose thinking that the social psychologist approaches the subject of covert nonsymbolic behaviors with the utmost caution. Terms such as "the instinct of maternity," "the profit motive," "the desire for prestige," and the like are short-cut descriptions of observed overt behavior. But they have all too often been taken to symbolize definite and specific—and usually biologically determined—covert forces and states. This procedure is, of course, identical with what the animistic primitive does when he "explains" the behavior of falling objects by saying that they "want" or "will" to fall.

Sociopsychological consideration of covert nonsymbolic behaviors at once transcends the purely descriptive use of subjective terms and at the same time avoids the fallacy of assuming that an act is explained by the attaching of a subjective term to it. Since nonsymbolized internal disequilibria can be known only by inference from observed behaviors, no attempt will be made to break them down into specific motives or emotions and to assign to each a given name.¹³

FUNCTION OF COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

Sociopsychological concern with covert behaviors is made necessary, it will be recalled, because these behaviors would seem to be involved in the making of delayed and apparently inconsistent overt responses to external circumstances. The fact that many internal occurrences cannot be readily symbolized does not, however, preclude inferential analysis of them from their social consequences. For purposes of discussion, we shall think of this kind of inner disequilibrium as covert nonsymbolic behavior. Ordinarily associated with it are some sorts of covert symbolic elements.

Social Motivation. Both the well-trained dog and the small child can usually be aroused to activity by the offer of a piece of candy. Presumably their activity is in part an expression of internal disequilibrium induced by the sight of candy. But in both instances, the overt reaction

parently, seek the explanation of social behavior in imputed human motives. The present authors, on the other hand, consider that motivational analysis can never be more than a tool to be used in the search for those causative factors that lie outside the individual.

¹³ The difficulty, indeed the absurdity, of trying to distinguish between various covert nonsymbolic states is thoroughly demonstrated in *A study of jealousy as differentiated from envy* (T. M. Ankles, 1939).

to the candy is prompt and direct. We need not go beyond the learning situations in which the overt actions were originally acquired in an attempt to explain this specific instance of candy-getting behavior. In adult social life, however, many activities cannot be so easily "explained." We observe some men industriously painting pictures that no one will buy, diligently working their way up in ward politics, laboriously earning their way through a college course, devoting long hours to the acquisition of money they are too busy to spend, etc. We see other men who do none of these things, but sit, rather, in passive acceptance of the things that happen to come their way. We find every degree and many variations between these two extremes.

It was long the belief, and still is with some, that all variations in intensity of activity and all differences in the direction of that activity are biologically determined.¹⁴ Thus traditional economics was based upon the presupposition that man's economic endeavors are an expression of his innate greed or instinct for material wealth. Much of the protest against proposals for revision of our economic system have been based upon the claim that they would run counter to nature, *i.e.*, to man's acquisitive instincts.

But, as was indicated in an earlier chapter, the organic "drives" cannot possibly explain the feverish painting of pictures, the earning of money, or other social activities.¹⁵ The internal disequilibriums involved in such activities may have been built upon organic drives, but they are so far removed from these drives in terms of the stimuli that produce them and the circumstances that will restore equilibrium that the relationship between the two is only historical. Whether a woman will be "impelled" to buy a new hat for Easter or a man to buy a bigger car than his neighbor's is a matter of social training. Furthermore, what course either will take, if any, to resolve his internal disturbance also depends on social training. Comparative studies of the overt behaviors of various people, particularly anthropological comparisons of the characteristic behaviors of the members of various societies, lend no support to the

¹⁴ Certain physiological conditions, such as those resulting from hookworm and malnutrition undoubtedly lower organic energy and thus discourage overt activity. But it is to be observed that, although such conditions secure their effects through organic channels, they are not a part of the individual's biological heritage. Certain forms of glandular unbalance, some of which seem to result in subnormal activity, are, however, congenital in origin. But even these would appear subject to at least partial correction by proper environmental treatment, although much low intelligence with its associated apathy appears to be inherited and not subject to correction.

¹⁵ It should be recalled (Appendix note 7) that the Freudians have ingeniously interpreted social motives as a sublimated manifestation of thwarted organic drives, *e.g.*, artistic endeavor is a substitute for taboo sex expression.

assumption that inherent wants, drives, or the like are directly responsible for the specific social activities of men.¹⁶ Only by a study of his cultural milieu and his particular life experiences can we hope to gain any insight into the reasons why the artist works feverishly, the businessman struggles to amass a fortune, and the healthy sluggard does little but sit in the sun.

Cultural and Individual Variations. In fact, the only thing that may be said with confidence about the motives of men is that they vary both in direction and intensity between societies and between individuals within the same society. Each society and each special group within the society has something of its own motivational norms. In terms of directions, these range from the East Indian mystic's preoccupation with the afterlife to the American's concern with life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In terms of intensities, they range from the middle-class American's strong desire to improve his material and social position to the Kentucky hillbilly's modest hope that he can continue to enjoy the squalor into which he was born. Of course, all this is just another way of saying that activities of the members of various societies and of groups within each society differ in kind and intensity. These are cultural differences, and their origins are a sociological and anthropological problem. Nevertheless, the norms of activity for each group are maintained and perpetuated through the establishment in the members of the group of appropriate motivations as well as appropriate overt patterns of action.

An essential part of the socialization of the individual into his society and his roles therein is, therefore, the establishment in him of the motives relevant to those roles. On the relevance of his motives will depend in considerable part the persistence, especially in the face of adversity, with which he conforms to the roles assigned to him. In a dynamic society like our own, however, many individuals are apparently mistrained motivationally for some of their roles. On the one hand, the individual may not acquire the motivations appropriate to his station in life; on the other, he may acquire motivations that presuppose some other position in society. Thus the country girl may be discontented with the simple life of the farm because she has motives more appropriate to a motion-picture star than a farm wife. And the playboy son of the successful businessman quite

¹⁶ From what some of our great industrialists say, one would conclude that we human beings have inherited a strong competitive spirit without which no social order would survive. Anthropological evidence, however, makes clear the fallacy of such a belief. Various societies differ enormously in the amount of competitive spirit they show. Although the Kwakiutl (F. Boas, 1925) are more competitive than we are, most primitive societies show fewer competitive behaviors (M. Mead, 1937). The Zuffi, for example, have so little competitive spirit that they discourage originality and the display of unusual abilities (R. Benedict, 1934).

obviously has motives that differ in direction if not in intensity from those of his father.

Perhaps the most characteristic motivational deviation in American society is the drive to climb, in terms of our current scale of values, above the station in life to which one was born. Most Americans, like most people everywhere, live and die in the social class, the region, and the occupational level into which they were born. But an important part of our culture is the ideal of social and economic climbing and the social opportunity for doing so. Many children no doubt acquire the success ideal in symbolic form; they say and believe that they are ambitious. Fewer, however, would seem to acquire the motivational attributes that make for the exceptional effort and persistence that are usually associated with success in any walk of contemporary life. Many, in other words, wait for success to come to them; a few go out and look for it.

"Emotional" Aspects. We have here used the term "motive" to suggest those internal disequilibriums that seemingly lead to overt achievement, in contradistinction to the internal disequilibriums that presumably disorganize overt action and lead to intense but random and irrelevant behaviors.¹⁷ The distinction can be illustrated by a comparison of the chess player who diligently concentrates upon the problem before him and the one who makes many frenzied but inappropriate moves.

In many instances the intense behavior follows closely upon the stimuli that provoked it. Such is the case with the confused and disorganized behavior that frequently appears as a response to unfamiliar circumstances (*e.g.*, "stage fright") and as a response to objects culturally designated as dangerous (*e.g.*, snakes). The antecedents of all such overt behaviors are clearly social, and as social psychologists we need not be especially concerned with the covert emotional elements that are involved. Once it is recognized that social experience rather than inherent nature determines the particular stimuli that will cause disorganization of the overt behavior of an individual, attention centers on the analysis of the external conditions that have caused snakes to be "feared," villains to be "hated," inadvertent display of the body or of its animal processes to be an occasion for "shame," etc.

The problem is quite different, however, in the case of intense responses that have been long delayed, such as a man's ultimately "blowing up" and smashing some inoffensive object, killing his wife, drinking himself into a stupor, participating in a lynching party or other mob activity, or otherwise behaving in vigorous and unprecedented fashion. The covert

¹⁷ These disorganizing internal states may not differ in kind from motives. They may simply be unfocalized or unchanneled motives or a conflict of two or more motives.

nonsymbolic elements involved in such responses are no doubt exceedingly important; and the experiences that have given rise to them date back so far in time, are so complex in nature, and are so many that their analysis in anything but general terms is difficult indeed.

ACQUISITION OF COVERT NONSYMBOLIC BEHAVIORS

The process by which the innate internal responses of the human animal are developed into social motives and emotions is up to a point roughly comparable with that by which the infantile wail is refined into adult speech. In both cases there occurs, as a consequence of experience, an association of some element of the general response with a stimulus that did not originally provoke it. It was upon the recognition of this general principle that Watson and other early behaviorists concluded that by the proper arrangement of external stimuli it would be a simple matter to train the human infant to hate or love his mother, to want rabbits or fear snakes, or into whatever emotional and motivational responses we might choose to establish. But experience has shown that covert training is most difficult to control, for there is an essential difference between teaching a child the overt symbolic behaviors of his society and training him to any given set of covert nonsymbolic responses.

In the case of speech development those around the child can follow the course of the child's learning and can, therefore, correct for errors in the child's verbal training. But since covert nonsymbolic responses are not directly ascertainable, those around the child cannot be certain what responses of this order the child is acquiring or to what stimuli. All deliberate training must proceed on the basis of crude inferences. Since many of the inferences made will be unwarranted and most of the corrections attempted will be speculative, actual training proceeds rather blindly; and the results are largely inadvertent.¹⁸ Even when there is exceptionally close rapport between parent and child, the latter will, as we have seen, develop covert responses that he cannot express either in words or actions; and he may inadvertently acquire responses that, in view of other acquired responses, he is afraid, ashamed, or otherwise unwilling to reveal. Thus begins the growth of what we have called one's private self, overt evidences of which may be long delayed and therefore incomprehensible to others when they do appear (note 38).

Anthropological evidence indicates that, the more stable the social

¹⁸ Illustrating the difficulty of deliberately controlling the development of covert nonsymbolic responses is the general failure of our public-school system greatly to "improve" American standards of literary and artistic appreciation. For more than two generations, schoolteachers have endeavored to teach school children to enjoy the poetic form and "good" literature. But increasingly the popular taste is for simple, formula type stories (those in the pulps) and no poetry.

system, the more effectively the individual is fitted on covert as well as overt levels for his social roles.¹⁹ Here cultural controls assure a minimum of inadvertent individual experiences, with the result that most of the individual's motivations and emotions are appropriate to the overt behaviors required of him. If he is expected to act humble and subservient toward his father as he grows older, he will probably have learned also to "feel" humble and not "want" to be other than subservient.

But in our disordered society there is, as we shall later see in detail, little consistency in the individual's experiences. Many of them are of conflicting orders, and any single experience may have contrasting elements. As a result the covert behaviors of the individual are likely to lack pattern or consistency and to bear little relation to the typical aspects of his social environment.

Individual Variations. In our society there would in fact seem to be a large margin of error in the transmission from generation to generation, from father to son, of the cultural stock of covert attributes. Thus even when a son does follow occupationally in his father's footsteps, it is often with a manifest lack of the compulsions that made it possible for his father to be a success. It is often said of such cases that the son is lacking in ambition "because he had it too easy," implying that strong motivation arises out of adversity. Certainly the child who has everything brought to him acquires many wants but probably does not acquire the strong motivations that would push him out to get and fight for the things that he wants. And perhaps adversity—relative hardship in early life—may be a factor in the development of intense motives under some circumstances. But obviously it can be only one of many factors. Most of those who grow up in socially submarginal conditions never display any inclination to improve their lot. There are, of course, occasional exceptions; just as some few of those who are born into wealth and ease do somehow acquire intensive motivation of one sort or another, so, too, a few of those born into abject poverty do somehow acquire the ambition to improve their lot.

Perhaps more common in our society than the son who learns, but less intently, to follow in his father's footsteps is the one who acquires somewhat different motivational leanings. In theory, the musical household should foster musical tastes, and that of the successful physician am-

¹⁹ It was a tenet of ancient Confucian theory that the best way to induce feelings of respect, of anguish for the dead, of reverence for the aged, etc., was to provide elaborate ritualization for all human relationships. The theory was that, if a child saw the weeping and wailing that followed the death of a relative, he would come to feel great sorrow, which the weeping and wailing were presumed to indicate, upon the death of a relative.

bitions in medicine. Sometimes, no doubt, this does happen; but often the product of a musical family evidences a marked lack of interest in music and a strong interest in pictorial art, and the son of a physician struggles to avoid a career in medicine and to achieve one in law, business, or, possibly, engineering. Perhaps here as elsewhere it is the intensity of the environmental factor that operates to bring about such seeming contradictions; possibly too much and too obvious parental stress on the virtues of music (or art, churchgoing, the rustic life, life in a penthouse, or anything else) tends to develop feelings of distaste rather than appreciation, and strong encouragement toward a given career tends to direct motivational development into quite different channels. At any event, the placid parent does not necessarily produce a placid child, the ambitious parent an ambitious one, etc. This fact is in turn often one of the bases for the fairly characteristic opposition between the covert attributes of the individual, or private self, and his external world.

CONFLICT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSIONS

When two or more patterns of adjustment are in opposition or when a given pattern is blocked by external circumstances, the conflict produces covert forces that, for lack of a more definitive term, are usually called "tensions." These are the disequilibriums, mentioned earlier, that appear to be involved in long-delayed and inconsistent responses. Their exact nature is, of course, not clear. But their existence and role can be inferred; and many individual and collective phenomena are entirely incomprehensible except in terms of the generation, accumulation, and discharge of tensions. We may therefore think of the tensional concept as a useful working hypothesis.

Psychological tensions can be described as a by-product of conflict. Conflict circumstances and antecedents are of many orders, some of which will be described in Part IV. The more complex sorts of conflict are a consequence of various forms of malpreparation during early life for the circumstances under which one must live in later years. In a multitude of ways the person brought up in luxury will be distressed by enforced poverty; the girl strongly enamored of the ideal of becoming a motion-picture or radio star will be dissatisfied with her life as wife of a truck driver; the man raised under the conditions of democracy will be ill-prepared to live under a dictatorship; etc.

The tensional by-products of conflict seem to be cumulative. Thus it is that the person who lives under conflict conditions—who is "bored" with the monotony of his routine work, who is "irritated" by his wife's constant nagging over petty financial matters, or the like—may suffer increasingly until some incident leads to the expression of his distress in

some startling overt act. It is only thus that we can interpret such facts as unpremeditated murder, suicide, collective fanaticism, and other of the more unusual forms of individual and collective behavior.²⁰

It is to be noted that those covert disequilibriums that we have designated as tensions are not learned as are the disequilibriums previously discussed. They are acquired, but only as a by-product of opposition between previously learned patterns. The tensions are an indirect rather than a direct result of social experience and are wholly covert in character. As a consequence the overt behavior that they provoke is not, strictly speaking, socially determined, although it may at times be socially channeled into such forms of activity as shouting at football games. Because the existence of tensions can be objectively ascertained only as they are later manifest as overt behavior, and since the particular overt expression that will ultimately appear in any specific instance is, with some exceptions, not designated by the society, their appearance and their form may be predicted only in the most general way. We shall consider such behaviors in later chapters as being abnormal in character.

²⁰ For attempts to describe this concept in mathematical terms, see "The standard error of a 'social force'" (S. C. Dodd, 1936) and "A tension theory of societal action" (S. C. Dodd, 1939). See also "A method of measuring tension in written documents" (J. Dollard and O. H. Mowrer, 1947).

PART III

The Human Personality

CHAPTER XI

PERSONALITY

The processes of socialization that have been examined in the preceding chapters might be loosely compared with the procedures by which many men, using many tools and skills, convert iron and other raw materials into automobiles. Many human beings, interacting with the "raw" organism of the human infant, gradually shape the infant into a human being. But the analogy between the making of an automobile and the socializing of a human being is at best a suggestive parallel, and more might perhaps be learned by contrasting the automobile and the human being and the ways in which they are fashioned than by comparing them. For one thing, the raw materials of industry have a degree of uniformity much greater than that of human organisms. Two batches of iron are either chemically and structurally alike or can be made so. But the organic characteristics of human beings vary widely; and while such differences are often camouflaged, they cannot be eliminated by any means yet devised by man. Sex differences in structure cannot be done away with by society; nor can other anatomical and physiological variations, including the major one of innate ability to learn, be wiped out by political fiat or by a simple denial of their existence. As a consequence, the products of socialization differ one from another, if only because the "raw" materials vary.

But even more important is the variation in the human product that results from the fact that the socialization processes do not operate with anything like the mechanical exactitude of modern industrial techniques. Human beings are made, as it were, by handicraft techniques. Although there was a great deal that was systematic and organized in the socialization of individuals in the highly institutionalized societies of the past, no two mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, etc., would ever treat a child in identical manners; nor would any one of them be entirely consistent in his treatment of a given child. Because of this fact alone, no two human beings were ever anything nearly as alike as are two modern automobiles of a given make and model. And in the modern world there is so little that is systematic and organized in the socialization of the individual that each human being is, in a sense, a special make and model. All run, more or less efficiently and continuously, and most

manage to travel along the highway of life until time and usage bring them to that end that is inevitable for both automobiles and human beings. But they are of all shapes and sizes and designs, and they perform in widely varying ways. In the words of the sociologist, modern societies are composed of heterogeneous rather than homogeneous populations.

Personality: Unique Product of Socialization. The term "personality" has come into scientific usage to designate the product of socialization as of any given moment with any given individual. It refers to the "whole" of what the individual has acquired through socialization, and it stresses the fact that this whole is always in some respects and in our own society in many and major respects unique. The term "personality" is therefore used to differentiate the members of society rather than to lump or classify them into common categories. For although, as will be shown shortly, many of the elements of an individual's personality may as elements be common to most of the members of a social group, his personality as a whole will be a unique combination of elements.

Sociopsychological definitions of personality are quite varied, largely because individual personalities are so complex and elusive that abstract conceptualization of the personality per se is exceedingly difficult.¹ Most of this present chapter will be devoted to describing and illustrating that complexity. In a preliminary way it may be said that definitions of personality usually attempt to encompass the following facts: Personality is not overt behavior, which is observable, but is rather the preparations of the individual to behave. (These preparations are variously designated as habits, sets, traits, or attributes or else are described as values, sentiments, motivations, etc.; they are not directly ascertainable by any known means and must, therefore, be inferred from overt behavior.) This behavior, however, is a function of more than personality; it is the product of the interaction of personality with various situational factors and group identifications, the effects of which must somehow be canceled out before the character of personality itself can be inferred from the behavior. Although presumably acquired "bit by bit" and revealed through behavior bit by bit, a personality actually seems to operate in terms of organizations or complexes of "bits," even as the body itself operates as a dynamic whole rather than an aggregation of parts.

Whether the concept of personality is clear at this point or not, it

¹ According to Allport "personality" refers to "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment" (G. Allport, 1937). Or, to phrase the matter in still different words, "personality [is] . . . an inner system of beliefs, expectancies, desires, and values" (R. Stagner, 1948).

should be evident that the sociopsychological understanding of personality has little resemblance to what the layman means when he uses the term. Actually, lay use of the term reflects the general inability of the layman to distinguish conceptually between human beings and such tangible objects as automobiles. He applies to the two much the same way of thinking. Thus he may classify, often at first glance, into make and model what he imagines to be the personality of an individual, *e.g.*, "she's just an old-fashioned girl," or "he's a damned nigger." The layman is also prone to think of his own personality as a simple and tangible entity. So thinking, he may buy a gadget in the expectation that it will improve his personality, even as he may buy accessories to put on his automobile. This is what he does when he takes a course or buys a book that purports to tell him how to become a leader of men, how to make himself charming, or perhaps simply how to acquire the self-confidence that he feels he lacks.

Personality Analysis. In the analysis of personality it is necessary for purposes of clarity to break down the whole into functional categories, just as it was necessary to dissect the total processes of socialization and treat in turn that process responsible for the development of a given kind of behavior. The dichotomization of personality into conscious and unconscious "selves" as made by the Freudians seems only to add mystery to complexity, and the old psychological dissection into numbers of specific "traits" has limitations that will be examined in a subsequent chapter.

For present purposes the whole that is a personality will be conceptually separated into four functional categories of attributes: (a) those which are involved in the individual's defining of situations and, specifically, of the persons to whom he is adjusting (these will be discussed as a special sociopsychological phenomenon to be termed personality stereotyping); (b) those which are specific representations of the characteristics of the group or groups into which he has been socialized (normative attributes); (c) those which are peculiar to the individual (deviant attributes); and (d) those which may lead him to repress or violate other attributes in view of his membership in social groups (these will be considered under the general concept of social control or group identification). The four functional categories are not mutually exclusive and, as will be stressed later in this chapter, behavior invariably involves attributes from more than one and often from all four categories.

The dissection of personality that will be undertaken in the following chapters of this part of the book does violence to the fact that personality is an operational whole, a point that must be kept in mind throughout the entire discussion. It also does violence to the fact that personality never

operates apart from some sort of situational context.) In this chapter the stress will be upon the interdependence of the personality and the situation in the fashioning of behavior and upon the functional wholeness of personality.²

PERSONALITY VERSUS OVERT BEHAVIOR

To begin with, it should be observed that the personality of any individual is evidenced only through his overt behavior, which, as we have said, is always a product of the interaction of his personality and some situation.) (The individual's personality must, therefore, be inferred from his behavior; but since his personality does not *cause* his behavior, no important inferences regarding his personality can be drawn from one or even a small number of behavioral expressions of his personality).

Thus very little if anything about a man's personality can be safely inferred from the fact that he attends the races on a certain day and there watches and places bets on the horses. His behavior does not indicate whether he hates or loves horses, whether he enjoys or detests gambling, or whether he is glad that he is at the race track or wishes he were almost any place else. His presence at the races and all that he does while he is there are a product of many factors, of which his own personality is but one complex one. The many other factors are external to his personality; and although they operate through it, they do so in such ways that any direct inference regarding his personality, such as that he is a "lover of horseflesh," may be far of the mark. Possibly he likes to see the horses running; possibly, however, his behavior in going to the races, etc., expresses personality attributes that have nothing whatever to do with horses, racing, or betting. Perhaps he is engaged in what is for him the painful task of entertaining an out-of-town customer; perhaps his wife is more youthful and energetic than he is, and he is simply trying to keep up with the pace she sets; or perhaps he is down to his last dollar and is making one last desperate attempt to win his way back to prosperity by betting.

Personality and the Situational Variables. (The personality, then, is not directly expressed as overt behavior, but, rather, interacts with a situation or series of situations to produce behavior.) (These situations consist of more or less complex masses of stimuli that together provoke the personality into responding.) Most of the situations in which men operate are social or at least socially mediated; they range in character from such simple circumstances as the casual encounter of a man with

² A much more extensive analysis than that which will be undertaken here is provided in *Personality* (G. Murphy, 1947).

an acquaintance to such variegated and complex circumstances as those that surround a man attending an elaborate church wedding or watching the races at Belmont Park. The nature of social situations will be analyzed in the final part of this book, and an effort will be made to classify them meaningfully. At this point it is necessary only to recognize that during the course of even a single day any person behaves in, and hence in part in terms of, a great variety of situations. Thus a man may have breakfast with his wife, sit with friends on his way to town, walk through crowded streets to his office, work at a desk with letters and other documents representing the views, etc., of a large number of persons, and pause from time to time to converse with his boss or fellow employee. After lunch in a crowded restaurant, he may go to the race track, and thence home, etc., until sleep at last releases him from the necessity of responding to a more or less continuous series of widely varying circumstances.

In nonanalytical terms, we may perhaps say that the behavior of the individual in some of these circumstances is directly expressive of some aspect of his personality. "Automatically" he smiles and says "Good morning" to his fellow worker at the next desk. But most of his behavior is not so easily described. Many of the situations in which he will behave are made up of varied and perhaps opposed factors.^a Thus at breakfast his wife may be talking to him while his morning paper asks to be read; on the street a pretty girl, a honking taxi, and a display in a shop window may compete for his attention; at the race track there are thousands of people, the steady blare of the announcer system, and other things, including the horses, to bombard him with stimuli. Moreover, his responses at any moment may be associated more directly with some past circumstance or some future possibility than with the situation of the moment. Such is the case with the calculated attendance at the race track in order to impress a customer or youthful wife. In view of these facts, which are only suggestive of the great range and complexity of the situational variables that may enter into the making of behavior, it is evident that the attributes of a given personality cannot be ascertained

^a Barker and his colleagues (R. Barker *et al.*, 1946) have made an interesting analysis of what they term "overlapping" situations, of which they distinguish four types: (a) overlapping identical situations, as when a man contributes to charity and thereby avoids paying higher income taxes; (b) overlapping consonant situations, as when a man who is eating his lunch also converses with friends; (c) overlapping interfering situations, as when a man tries to eat his breakfast and read his newspaper at the same time; and (d) overlapping antagonistic situations, as when a man attempts to read a newspaper and carry on a conversation with his wife at the same time.

by direct inference from a few samples of behavior. That a man committed a criminal act may be indisputable; that this act indicates that he has "criminal tendencies" does not, however, follow.

Personality as Derived from Multiple Inferences. The mere fact that a man has committed a crime or that he has gone to the races may mean almost anything so far as his personality is concerned. Only prolonged and detailed study of his behavior through time and in a great variety of circumstances would enable one to say anything about his personality with any assurance, even such comparatively simple things as that the man who stole money dislikes to work for it or that the one who goes to the races likes horses or enjoys gambling. Of course, a man's friends and acquaintances will have rather fixed, if at times opposed, interpretations of him; and strangers may classify him as this or that sort of person on first meeting. And it is possible to ask a man to answer a list of questions about himself, *e.g.*, Are you honest? Do you believe in obeying the law? Do you like horses? Do you enjoy betting on the races? But what is secured thereby is, unfortunately for the scientist, but a fractional indication of the relevant attributes of the man's personality, and it may or may not be indicative of the more salient attributes.⁴ As a consequence, the student of personality has to proceed with caution and examine everything available that indicates the nature of the behavior, past and present, of the individual under consideration before he can make even a tentative inference about the individual's personality.

Personality, Basis for Prediction. One might ask, then, why try to separate situational from personality factors? Why this concern with personality? Why not study the overt behavior of men and let the inferences go? This is, in fact, what the layman usually does, although he may apply subjective terms to what he has observed and fool himself into thinking that he has actually gone deeper into the matter. Thus the layman may believe that he has ascertained the "character" of the man or woman when he has only evaluated that person's behavior in one or a few situations. And because he has in this way fooled himself, he may then make a fool of himself; he may trust a man who proves to be untrustworthy or marry a girl who is only irked by the responsibilities of marriage.

We have observed that the covert behaviors of man are not ascertainable by any direct method and that they can be known, if at all, only through inference from overt actions. It is true that for many purposes the overt actions of an individual in a given situation are all that is important. To the buyer of such standardized things as packaged groceries and train tickets, about all that is important in a clerk is that he be prompt

⁴ See Appendix note 17.

and polite and make change accurately. But to the clerk's employer, who would like to know what the clerk will do over a period of years, and to the scientist, who is interested in even more fundamental problems of prediction, what is important is not the behavior of the clerk in this one sort of situation, but the clerk's personality attributes. (For although situations vary widely and may change rapidly, the personality is a comparatively stable thing; once established, its attributes persist, although of course the personality is always subject to change by the addition of new attributes and, less importantly, by the atrophy of old ones.

It is mainly because he is interested in the prediction of behavior that the social psychologist struggles with the concept and fact of personality. To the extent that he can strip from the actual overt behavior of an individual the effect therein of specific situational variables and get down to the relatively stable bedrock of personality, he can predict with some assurance how an individual will behave in such-and-such a circumstance. The observation that Mr. Jones has attended the races three Saturdays in a row does not in itself enable one to predict what Mr. Jones will do the next Saturday and will not be of the slightest aid in predicting what he may do when the circus, with its horses, comes to town. For unless a great deal more is known about Mr. Jones, nothing at all is known about why he went to the races those three Saturday afternoons. There had to be races, of course, or he could not have gone. That much is obvious. But there is nothing obvious about the nature of the attributes of his personality that were expressed in the going-to-the-races behavior.

Few others than his wife and intimate friends will be much interested in knowing whether Jones really likes going to the races; but in the case of the man who commits a crime, the problem of predicting future behavior becomes one of judicial and general concern. (If it can be ascertained that his act of theft was a "direct" expression of some attribute of his personality—*e.g.*, that he is too lazy to work for a living, that he has an insatiable desire for wealth, or that he is chronically incapable of resisting temptation—then he might well be permanently removed from society.⁶ On the other hand, to condemn him to life imprisonment on the basis of his one crime may actually be to deprive society of one of its more useful members and will certainly be a social expense. Perhaps the circumstances that led the man, in view of his personality, to steal will

⁶ It should be noted that the law does not currently accept the above distinctions. At present, the "unpremeditated" crime is invariably regarded as of less social importance than the "premeditated." Yet the one who commits a long series of "unpremeditated" crimes is far more likely to possess a vicious, antisocial personality than his fellow convict who once in his life found a situation so unbearable that he turned to carefully planned murder.

never again arise; perhaps if he were permitted to go free, he would thereafter reveal only the most socially desirable characteristics.

Before it is possible to make even crude prediction of behavior, it is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the personality of the one regarding whom prediction is to be made. This can be done only through multiple inferences from the prior behavior of that person in many and varied situations, to the end that the situational factors will tend to cancel themselves out and the more durable and persistent personality attributes involved in his behaviors will be to some degree at least revealed. For example, if it were observed that a man attended the races only when a certain customer of his was in town and then only with that customer, it might be inferred that he goes to the races only for "ulterior business" reasons. This might in turn lead, when supplemented with other data, to the crude inference that the man's personality includes an attribute which might be described as exceptional ambition to make money or to get promoted or perhaps even as exceptional desire to please others. Something of the same sort is attempted through the legal rule-of-thumb procedure wherein the penalty for a crime is scaled upward for second- and third-time offenders.

DYNAMICS OF PERSONALITY ORGANIZATION

In the attempt to predict behavior, however, another and related difficulty arises: no matter how diligently and systematically one studies the human personality, knowledge of it comes piecemeal; the "bits and pieces" are revealed through behavior in this and that situation. As was remarked earlier, the personality does grow, experience by experience, bit by bit, even as it is revealed situation by situation and piece by piece. But the personality is not merely the sum of its parts, any more than an organism is just the sum of the cells that compose it; and the behavior of a man in a given situation is no more an expression of this or that "piece" of his personality, than his walking is an action of his legs alone. Just as the motions of a man's legs are a function of his entire body, so those attributes of his personality that are expressed in a situation are a function of much if not all of his personality. It is therefore as impossible to predict the behavior of an individual from a knowledge of the various attributes that constitute his personality as it would be to predict where and how fast he will walk from a knowledge of his legs, arms, trunk, and head. For in both instances, the "parts" are organized; and the character of that organization is as important as are the parts themselves.

Self-roles⁶ and the Dynamic Organization of Personality. The

⁶ The much-quoted Hartshorne-May study of honesty (H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, 1929-1930) revealed that a child might make a high honesty score in one situation and a low score in another. But as Allport has pointed out (G. W. Allport,

man who has distorted the truth in filling out his income-tax return and thus has cheated the government may not, by and large, be a deceitful and dishonest person. But suppose that he is found to be dishonest under a variety of circumstances; for example, he cheats at bridge, he tells his wife that he is going on a business trip and then actually takes his secretary off for a holiday, and he has for years lied to his wife about the size of his income. Having thus somewhat canceled out situational variables, we reach the conclusion that he is in fact possessed of an attribute of deceitfulness. If he has been consistently deceitful with his wife and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, we are fairly safe in predicting that he will lie to her in the future and that he will falsify his income-tax return the next time he makes one out.

But in point of fact people never behave with such consistency. Even a markedly deceitful man may be honest with his wife most of the time and may occasionally report accurately on his income-tax return. Much of this apparent inconsistency may arise from situational variables, which can be slight and important at the same time. Talking at dinner with his wife, a man may be first honest and then deceitful as a shift in the topic of conversation changes the character of the situation. The year he earned a large income he may report dishonestly for income-tax purposes; but the year he loses money he may make out his report with complete honesty. Because situational variables may be important in the determination of behavior, however small they may seem to the observer, it is always difficult to cancel them out.⁷

When, however, differences in the behavior of an individual cannot be traced to situational variables, and this is often the case, the "variable" must be presumed to be the individual's own personality. It is now generally believed that such variability is not a consequence of instability of personality attributes, *i.e.*, that the attributes of a personality do not themselves undergo rapid or profound modification. Variability arises, rather, from the fact that behavior is apparently a situational expression of an "organization" or patterning of attributes. A change, for whatever

1937), honesty scores are the resultants of conflicting self-roles. If a lad who pictures himself both as an honest student and an honor student comes unprepared to a "sprung" examination, the honor-student role may emerge victorious. Yet the boy's personality may be basically an honest one.

⁷ In animal experiments situations can be fairly well standardized. The white rat, for example, can be weighed daily, run on the maze at the same time each day, and fed only after his run and then but a fixed amount of food, the value of which has been previously determined. His learning ability can, therefore, be expressed in terms of quite well-defined situations and can be compared with the learning ability of other rats in similar situations. With human subjects, such an ideal demarkation and limitation of the situation is never possible.

reason, in the organization of personality attributes that comes into operation in a given situation would presumably result in a modification of behavior.

Suppose, for example, that a man who has frequently been deceitful with his wife and has always hidden from her his extramarital affairs suddenly begins to tell her the truth about this particular matter. We should say of him, perhaps, that he has "decided" to tell her the truth for a change. Assuming that there has been no change in external circumstances—that, for example, he has not met someone else whom he wishes to marry—and that experience has not wrought a modification in some of his personality attributes—that he has not, for example, grown weary of extramarital activities—the decision to tell his wife the truth evidently represents a reorganization of his personality. His deceit with her in this matter was based upon one combination of personality attributes; a recombination, perhaps with the addition of some other attribute, results in his now telling her the truth. As he himself might say, he sees the whole matter in a new light.*

Since the particular attribute of personality that is overtly manifest in any situation expresses an organization of a number of attributes, it is not possible to predict behavior in a given situation simply on the basis of knowledge of the sum of an individual's personality attributes. Like words, those attributes can be organized into an almost infinite variety of patterns, for each one of which a given attribute will be the situational expression. So far, no very adequate means has been devised for ascertaining even the more characteristic organizations of an individual's personality attributes. But the realization that there is more to behavior than situation and a single attribute of personality has opened up a new field for sociopsychological exploration and has added greatly to our general understanding of the factors and processes that are involved in human behavior.

Perhaps the clearest way to conceive of the organization of personality attributes is as the individual's definition of what is for him right, proper, expedient, or profitable under the given circumstance. This definition will involve, among other things, his interpretation of the situation and his concern for his status in some or many of the social groups of which he is a member. The organization of personality attributes that is achieved in any situation is not necessarily calculated—*i.e.*, a consequence of covert symbolic trial and error—although it may be. The interpretation of the situation may be no more than a "feeling," such as the feeling of dislike that one may experience upon first encounter with some

* In the words of the clinical psychologist, "there has been a restructuring of the field."

person. And the concern with status in social groupings may be more a sensitivity to than an intellectual awareness of what would happen to his reputation with others should he do so and so.

Nevertheless, we can perhaps best describe in terms of the symbolic involvements what seems to occur when an organization of personality attributes is effected. Involved, it would appear, is the more or less deliberate resort to a "self-role." The self-role is a concept, no doubt largely symbolic, that the individual uses as a guide in the shaping of his behavior in the particular situation. For example, the deceitful man "sees" himself as one who is more clever than most men in handling his wife, or at income-tax time he "sees" himself as an honest and industrious fellow who is being unjustly deprived of the fruits of his labor.

The self-role is a situational counterpart to the model, actual or symbolic, that is often used in the working out of major and long-run problems of adjustment (see Chapters VIII and IX). Although the individual, even the child, ordinarily concentrates on one model at a time and uses it over a considerable period, he usually has a great many self-roles from which he can draw as the circumstance warrants; and he can work out others as occasion seems to require. Often, no doubt, the self-roles are variations on a composite-model theme. Thus the man who is trying to live up to his idea of an "up-and-coming young businessman" may see himself as one sort of person when he is discussing business matters with his employer, another when he has that employer home to dinner, still another when he is dictating to his stenographer, etc. That the difference in self-roles is not entirely a matter of situational variations may be illustrated by the fact that he may "see" himself in one light while he is dictating to his stenographer and in quite a different light a moment later. "All business" while dictating, he may then become in his mind's eye a debonair young man about town and in this self-role ask his stenographer to have dinner with him.

The Dynamics of Role-forming. There would appear to be considerable individual variation in ability to adapt to varying and changing circumstances. Some individuals stick to their tried and true roles, however irrelevant. Adaptability is no doubt in considerable part a function of ability to form self-roles. The personality attributes of the adult are, as we have seen, relatively stable. A man who has the skills, values, motivations, and sentiments of a prosperous, independent businessman cannot discard all his personality attributes when bankruptcy makes it necessary for him to go looking for a job. A woman who has long been a happy wife cannot discard all her wifely characteristics when she is reduced to widowhood. But a change in situational circumstances, whether major or minor, can be met by a "reorganization" of personality attributes.

This involves the discarding of an old self-role and the forming of a new one more appropriate to the changed circumstances. The businessman become job hunter may devise a new self-role that more or less satisfies all the relevant attributes of his personality and the external circumstances. Thus he may now be in his own eyes one who is starting again up the ladder to success, older but far wiser than he was the first time he started out. And the wife become widow may reconcile herself to her new status by seeing herself as one who is living up to her late husband's expectations of her. Even within a given momentary situation a re-forming of the self-role may occur as a means of adjustment. The person who has tried and failed to be the life of the party may, for example, then become in his mind's eye the amused bystander.

Inability to adapt to changing circumstances may stem from the fact that the individual does not possess personality attributes that can be organized into a new relevant pattern, as would probably be the case with a small-town girl who is called upon to play the role of a sophisticate at a big-city party. Lack of adaptability may, on the other hand, reflect too many and too rigidly structured self-roles. A young college instructor is usually a highly adaptable classroom performer, playing a variety of self-roles, the one in operation at any moment depending on the circumstances of the moment. As occasion seems to warrant, he shifts, perhaps, from the man-with-a-message role to the man-with-infinite-patience role and from the stern disciplinarian to the tolerant and good-humored scholar. But after many years in the classroom, he may arrive at one standard and unvarying classroom self-role, which he "plays," whatever the classroom occasion. As a campus elder he may also have come to play equally standardized roles in each of the various recurrent situations of academic life. His behavior has then become exceptionally predictable for those situations.

FUNCTIONAL DISSECTION OF PERSONALITY

Each of the four chapters to follow will analyze in abstraction one of the four functional categories, as they were designated earlier, of personality attributes. Since attributes do not operate as independent units and since the individual himself does not distinguish between the various categories of attributes, it may be well to preface the analysis with a running illustration of the ways in which attributes in the various conceptual categories are actually interdependent in operation. For convenience, we may think of the personality as consisting of four storage bins, each containing a stock of parts which have, from our view, but not from that of the individual himself, something in common. And we may think of the individual as drawing upon the various bins when he meets a situation

for the attributes that he assembles into a functioning personality organization, much as a stock clerk may fill a special order for goods by selectively drawing upon the varied items in the various sections of the stock room. For purposes of illustration, we shall take the commonplace incident of a young man entering a store to purchase a suit of clothes.

Personality Stereotypes. The first "bin" into which the young man would dip would probably be that which contains his stock of stereotypes. This is the sort of thing we do whenever we "take in" a situation at a glance. Thus in passing through a residential section of a strange city, we may judge it to be a slum area and in doing so impute to the district all the physical and social characteristics that are associated in our minds (and feelings) with slums. So we may hurry on, although the area may in fact be in many of its details quite different from what we assume it to be. Any prejudgment of this sort quite clearly influences the behavior of the one who makes that judgment, since he responds not to the situation per se but to his definition or stereotype of it.

When the prejudgment is passed on a person or a number of persons, the process is designated personality stereotyping; and it is this process, and its various ramifications, including the possible effects upon the behavior of the stereotyper and the person stereotyped, that will be discussed in the chapter immediately following.

Personality stereotyping is not, of course, an independent process; it is at once a function of the personality that makes that stereotype and the situational context and, often, of the behavior of the one who is stereotyped as well. Upon entering a clothing store for the first time, the young man who wants to buy a suit will evaluate the establishment in his own terms as the right kind of place or the wrong kind of place in which to purchase a suit. If the latter, he will probably turn away at once; or, if he is shy, he may go through the motions of looking at the available suits with his attention on getting away. But if he does like the appearance of the establishment, he will then evaluate the clerk who offers to serve him. He stereotypes the clerk in terms of one of a number of well-defined and fixed categories, perhaps as a "nice old duffer." The existence in his "mind" of this particular stereotype category permits him to pass this particular judgment; but it is a variety of other factors—attributes of his own personality, the appearance and behavior of the clerk, and the general situational context—that leads him to do so. Thus if he happens to feel in a good mood because, say, of some recent good fortune, he will probably be more generous in his judgment of the clerk than otherwise; and his judgment of the man as a clerk will probably be quite different from what it would be were he to judge the man as a swimmer at the beach.

Personality stereotyping often involves, therefore, a great many factors in addition to the existence of the stereotype category. Moreover, its effects upon the behavior of the one who makes the stereotype are then subject to still other factors, the most important of which is usually the behavior of the one who was stereotyped. As the young man is shown suits, he may revise his judgment of the clerk for better or for worse; and as his judgment of the clerk changes, so too will his responses to what the clerk does and says.

Clearly, then, personality stereotyping should not be thought of as a unitary, independent process. When it occurs, it is one of the factors, and sometimes a very important one, that enter into the organization of personality and, thus, into the making of behavior. But it is never the lone determinant of behavior.

Normative versus Deviant Attributes of Personality. The second and third "bins" from which the young man will draw attributes contain his values, his sentiments, his tastes, etc., some few of which will be relevant to the buying of a suit. Conceivably, the many and various attributes that have accumulated in these bins might be named, described, and catalogued. They might even be listed alphabetically. But there would not be much point to it; for the social psychologist in his capacity as a scientist is not interested in the content of any given personality; he leaves that to wives, husbands, lovers, and all the other persons who would like to know, but never completely do, what another person is "really like."

But the social psychologist does attempt to distinguish between those attributes of a personality which are representative of the society of the individual and those which are not. This distinction is drawn because the representative attributes are what may be called "successes" in the socialization of the individual, while the unrepresentative attributes are the consequence of "failures" in that socialization. Society, it will be recalled, begins the moment an individual is born to establish in him those personality attributes which are appropriate to that society and to the particular roles which this particular individual will subsequently be called upon to play. And to the extent that society succeeds, the individual will fit his assigned roles; *i.e.*, his personality attributes will accord with situational expectations. To the extent that society fails, the individual will be misfit to his situational roles and, possibly, will attempt to shape his own situational roles rather than play them in the culturally prescribed manner.

Since the concern here is not with individuals as such, and most certainly not with any given individual, the analysis of the foregoing distinction is made in terms of what is typical for the society and what is not, what used to be called "human nature" and "individuality" and now is

thought of as "normative" and "deviant" attributes of personality. A chapter will be devoted to each of these categories, and such matters will be brought out as the fact that what is normative for one individual may be deviant for another; *e.g.*, the desire to have sexual intercourse with males is normative for females but deviant for males, and a liking for aged fish is normative for Eskimos but would certainly be odd in an American.

The concept of normative and deviant personality attributes has been derived from the study of the behaviors of many sorts of persons under many sorts of conditions. But when the distinction between the normative and the deviant attribute is carried back and applied to a given individual, there is some danger in thinking that his personality is operationally made up of two distinct kinds of attributes. The distinction is made, however, in terms of external criteria—social norms—rather than in terms of internal psychological qualities. Socially, a taste for ancient fish and a taste for well-aged cheese may have very different meanings, the one being deviant and the other normative for the group, or vice versa; but both are simply food tastes.

In his quest for a new suit of clothes, the young man in our illustration will draw upon many normative personality attributes and only a few that set him apart from other young men of his class. To want a new suit is, under the circumstances, itself probably normative. Only if he already has more suits than he "needs" will this want of another suit be deviant. His ideas of what kind of suit he wants, how much he should pay for it, and even how he should go about selecting and buying it will be largely normative. In fact, the store into which he goes is operated upon the assumption that he and most of the others who enter it will be normative in most respects. As must any mercantile establishment, it caters to a certain kind of clientele—those who want cheap and flashy suits, those who want middle-priced suits of rather conservative cut and material, or perhaps those who want and can pay for a great deal of flattery and a prestige label along with the suit itself.

If, therefore, the young man has gone into the right sort of store for him, he should have little difficulty in buying a suit. If, however, he deviates from the norm in some one or two relevant attributes, he and the clerk and the stock of available suits will come into opposition. Should he, for some reasons of atypical socialization, be inclined to haggle over price, he will arouse antagonism in a clerk accustomed to the modern take-it-or-leave-it procedure. Should he want a pink suit, he will be thought extraordinarily queer and be ushered out as quickly as possible. And should he simply ask for a suit of any size, style, material, and price, he would be considered somewhat crazy. In men's

suits, as in many other things, it is normative for us to have some individual preferences. These are minor deviations that are socially sanctioned and provided for. Most deviant attributes, however, bring the individual into opposition with those around him and are therefore of sociopsychological interest.

The Effect of Group Identification. The kind of suit that the young man will actually buy will be determined not only by his personal preferences, his financial ability to pay, the available supply of suits in his size, and the persuasive efforts of the clerk, but also by some factors that transcend the suit-buying situation itself. A knowledge of these factors, which will later be designated as social controls, might lead us to revise our entire conception of why the man buys a suit and why he buys the kind of suit that he does. Possibly he does not "want" to buy a suit at all; perhaps he is timid and reluctant to go into the store and deal with the clerk; perhaps he would prefer a single-breasted blue serge to the double-breasted brown tweed that he settles on; and it may even be that he would like to buy a suit twice as expensive as or half as expensive as the one he does purchase.

In fact, the buying of the suit may express not his interest in a new suit but concern with what people will "think" of him if he continues to wear his old one or what people will "say" about him if he should buy the one he likes rather than the one he believes others would like him to wear. The fourth "bin" of his personality will be well stocked with "concerns" of this order; and in the particular organization of attributes that is effected in the buying of a suit, an attribute from this "bin" may play a decisive role.

An individual's concern for what people will think and say about him is a consequence of the fact that he is a member of a number of social groups that exercise considerable control over him, even when he is away from the groups themselves, because he values his status in those groups. "People" as used above always refers to some specific group of persons—the members of a family, the neighbors, the men at the office, etc. Such a group has a durability that may be lacking in the personnel of an immediate situation. Although the man buying a suit may be influenced by the clerk and sensitive to the opinions of other customers and other clerks in the store, he may say "No" to the suggestion that he purchase an expensive gray flannel that is more becoming to him than the brown tweed simply because he feels that his family would disapprove of the price or the men at the office of the material of this suit. Moreover, he may in buying a suit violate his own interests and preference in clothing in view of the values and tastes of the members of his family, etc.

Each social group has something of its own norms of conduct, and the

ways in which these norms arise and the means by which they are more or less successfully enforced upon the individual member (thus, perhaps, repressing deviant attributes of his personality) are a very large concern of social psychology. But again it must be observed that the effect of his group identifications upon any given organization of an individual's personality is but one of many factors. Situational factors and other personality attributes may be tempered and one or a number of them may even be nullified by concern over status with various groups; but that concern never operates in isolation. Like any other "kind" of attribute, it operates in conjunction with some and usually many others.

CHAPTER XII

PERSONALITY STEREOTYPING

Of the various factors which enter into the determination of an individual's behavior the least complex and most easily understood is the definition which he makes of the situation in which he finds himself. That definition, which may of course change momentarily, determines in part the particular organization of his personality which comes into operation. If the situation is familiar to him, he will define it in terms of past experience. If it is in whole or in part new to him, he will resort to the procedure, mentioned in the preceding chapter, of stereotyping it.

The stereotyping of physical circumstances, such as the classification of a residential district as a slum on the basis of limited evidence or the decision that a house must be untidy and run down because there is a litter of dried leaves on the doorstep, need not concern us here. Nor shall we attempt to analyze the influence upon an individual of his defining a complex situation, such as a cocktail party, as "tense" or an organization as "living on its reputation" or something of the sort. Such evaluations do no doubt at times affect behavior in significant degree. But much more common and far more significant is the stereotyping of persons. The man who stereotypes a new acquaintance as an interloper will thereby bring into operation a quite different organization of his personality than he would had he judged the new acquaintance to be a "sound fellow." The one who judges a salesman, a chance acquaintance, or the lad his daughter brings home to dinner a "Jew" will certainly thereby determine in part the organization of his personality that will be revealed in action, whether he himself is gentile or Jew and, if the former, whether he is or is not prejudiced against Jews.

The role, however variable, of personality stereotyping in the determination of the behavior of the person who does the stereotyping should be sufficiently clear so that we may now turn our attention to the process of stereotyping itself. Although it is often necessary, particularly in modern society, to rely upon personality stereotyping, the process is always in some degree unrealistic; and the consequence is often some form of injustice to the one who has been stereotyped and frequently anything from embarrassment to failure for the one who does the stereotyping.

The Actuarial Function of Society. Life, it has been said, is a con-

stant gamble. Fate throws the dice, and they unroll our destiny. The stakes are high; on every toss our joys and sorrows are dependent. But the dice are loaded, and the final outcome is certain. It is death.

This may make good reading, but it is scarcely accurate. Human society serves the very function of reducing the risks of life by systematic calculation of the probabilities of success for any given act, by systematic selection of those acts whose probabilities of success are great and by elimination of those whose possibilities of success are small. For the individual, society is an insurance system; it eliminates chance¹ by providing him with those patterns of adjustment to the external world which are most likely, under given circumstances, to result in eventual life satisfaction. The social system cannot, of course, calculate and provide for all the factors that may influence the course of human life; some, such as earthquake and flood—"acts of God"—are quite unpredictable. But chance and disaster go hand in hand, and the integrated social system operates to eliminate chance and to protect the individual from disaster. Man's adjustments to nature are predicated upon the known and recognized "laws" of regularity of occurrences in nature. Given the knowledge that attacks of cholera follow from drinking polluted water, for example, society may eliminate from the individual's life the chance of his contracting cholera.

During the past two hundred years our knowledge of the physical and biological world has increased immeasurably, and we have grown increasingly better able to predict natural phenomena. We have, however, grown steadily less able to predict, and hence anticipate, social phenomena. Every human adjustment to other human beings is formed upon the presumed behavior of those others, for the adjustment value of any specific mode of social behavior is determined not by its specific character but by its fitness in terms of the behavior of other human beings. This fact is summed up in that well-worn phrase: "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." If one does not know what the Romans do, such sage advice is not at all helpful; and even in his own home town the modern man is very much in the position of the stranger in Rome. The population of modern society is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous; the personalities of the persons around the individual, on whom he is dependent both in major and minor ways, vary widely one from another. The modern man cannot predict with certainty how those about him will behave; he must work out many of his adjustments to them by undirected trial and error. The social consequences of his every act are thus to some extent a matter of chance. Life therefore becomes something of a gamble.

¹ "Chance" is here employed as the equivalent of "unpredictability." It should not be taken to mean "uncaused" factors.

The Prediction of Human Behavior. For the individual, the function of the normative aspects of the personalities of others is that of making their behavior predictable. The individual's in-group and out-group classifications, which will be discussed in the following chapter, serve him as a sort of actuarial table. He "knows" that members of his clan will respond pleasantly to such and such a greeting. Thus, when he meets any member, he anticipates this response and proceeds accordingly. Even in the modern world we are constantly predicting individual behavior on the basis of socially provided concepts of normative behavior—when we address a stranger in English, when we give a dinner party, when we put our savings in the bank. We may not consciously calculate the effects of these acts upon others; but the acts imply confidence in the predictability of the behavior of others. We simply take it for granted that the stranger will understand and respond to English, that people will be pleased rather than offended by the invitation to dinner and what we then serve them, and that all the people who constitute the banking organization will behave in ways to ensure the security of our savings. Sometimes these assumptions are fallacious; but in the vast majority of instances our "predictions" are accurate.² Confident that they will respond in kind, we meet our friends with a smile and outstretched hand. Confident that she will be pleased by this untruth, we considerably assure dear Aunt Mary that the hideous Christmas tie is the nicest thing she could possibly have given us. Conversely, convinced that he would have killed us had he seen us first, we greet a member of the enemy with an arrow or a bullet through the head. Sure that he will humbly step from our path, we ignore the presence of an "inferior."

All such prediction of individual action proceeds from knowledge of the general—typical behaviors of the members of the group—to knowledge of the specific behavior of the particular member to which adjustment is being made. To the extent that the individual member of the group behaves in the ways that are typical for that group, *i.e.*, to the extent that his personality is composed of normative attributes, such prediction will be successful. But as we shall see, each personality consists of a more or less unique combination of normative and deviant attributes. As a result, person-to-person relationships that proceed solely on the basis of generalization from knowledge of the typical will invariably be subject to considerable error. For easy and effective relationships, knowledge of the typical must be supplemented by knowledge of specific personalities. Intimate, personal knowledge of specific personalities is a normal out-

² The pooled predictions of many people are more likely to be correct than is any one individual prediction picked at random (D. McGregor, 1938); S. F. Klugman, 1947).

come of life in the small, closely knit social group. Socialization into such a group includes, in addition to training in what in general to expect from people, training in what in specific to expect from particular persons. Thus we may learn that in general gift givers will feel hurt if we fail to express great admiration for the gift, but that Uncle Joe is an exception who delights in teasing his friends and relatives by giving them small gifts that he believes they will not like. To please Uncle Joe, we must indicate—not too crudely—disappointment with the gift, even though it is a desirable object.

Personality in the Modern World. Variety in the personalities of the members of a social group does not preclude social harmony, but it does make necessary intimate acquaintance of each individual with all the others. In a stable society people do get along effectively with the members of their groups, although those members are not as “like as peas in a pod.” In our own social milieu, the pattern of organization is so much disrupted that deviations from the group norms have become an increasingly larger part of the human personality. This fact complicates the matter of person-to-person adjustment and intensifies the difficulties of the social psychologist. As we have already remarked, almost nothing that will have significant universality can be said regarding the character of life in our society. We are, therefore, forced to describe not “the rule” but a complex mass of exceptions to the rule.

Two interrelated factors contribute to the difficulties of social adjustments of a person-to-person order in the modern world. In the first place, the more the human personality is a matter of deviant rather than of normative attributes, the more important it becomes that those making adjustments to one another be intimate in order to predict successfully the outcome of any form of action.⁸ In the second place, the forces that have made for an increase in deviation have also been at work tearing down the conditions that permit long-time intimacy between people. The modern man does not often live in a compact grouping of intimately known people. He tends to live anonymously, adjusting himself to a stream of constantly changing strangers, many of whom are also “foreigners” in that they come from a somewhat different cultural background from his

⁸ From one point of view, all difficulties of person-to-person adjustment are a consequence of the failure of each individual to anticipate the behavior of the other. There has been considerable success in forecasting the degree of happiness to be anticipated in marriage (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1938; E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., 1939). The questionnaire tools so far used contained items that dealt mainly with self-impressions of personality attributes and with data relating to the home background. See Appendix note 56. Moreno has suggested (J. L. Moreno, 1941) that psychodramatic techniques should prove of great value in planning a successful marriage. For a discussion of these techniques, see Chapter XXI.

own. To bridge the gap between his inability to make accurate predictions of the behaviors of others and the necessity for his doing so, the modern individual commonly resorts to stereotyping.⁴

STEREOTYPING (NOTE 49)

Stereotyping as a Substitute for Intimacy. In our society the individual must get along with many people whom he does not "know." His real intimates may be rather few; and his social welfare many depend largely on his adjusting to a series of people whom he meets, to whom he relates himself, and from whom he is then severed. Contrast in this respect the personality knowledge of the old-time country-store merchant, whose customers were mainly old and intimate "friendly enemies," and that of the modern department-store salesman, whose customers may never return a second time. Each makes his living by selling goods to other human beings. The former has a steady and only slowly changing group of customers; the latter, a series of new customers. In all walks of contemporary life and in most phases of human association, we today are in the position of the man who must sell to strangers. Moreover, the personalities of these strangers are, as we have remarked, extremely varied.

It is in an effort to avoid the time and errors involved in the working out of adjustments to strangers on the basis of trial and error that we stereotype them. This consists of putting a person into a simple personality "type" and treating him in terms of the "known" type attributes, rather than attempting to treat him in terms of his actual, but unknown, personality. From one or a number of elements of his behavior, from his physiognomy, from his dress, or from some mannerism, we "type" him and proceed accordingly. Thus, perhaps only because Cousin Jane is short and fat rather than tall and lean, we decide upon first meeting her that she is the sort of old maid who has a sense of humor and likes to be teased. Casting her into this role, we proceed to treat her as a humorous, teasing person until, as may happen, experience with her teaches us that she is literal-minded and sensitive. In much the same way we may "type" the man with a darker skin than ours as a Negro and then treat him in terms of our idea of what a Negro is like, although in point of fact he may not fit this stereotype at all.

Categories of Species and of Variety. The process of personality stereotyping is both simple and uniform. But it takes two more or less

⁴ Although the term "stereotypes" was introduced into social psychology by the journalist Lippmann (W. Lippmann, 1922), it has been sociologists, educators, and psychologists who have demonstrated experimentally some of the characteristics of the stereotyping process.

distinct forms.⁵ In one, the stereotyped person is placed in an out-group category; i.e., he is judged to belong to a different and usually inferior social species than the one who does the stereotyping. Categories such as "damned nigger,"⁶ "poor white trash," "Wop," "hillbilly," and "Jew" are categories of species to many middle-class white Americans. In the other form of stereotyping, a person presumed to be of one's own social species is placed in a category of variety; i.e., he is judged to deviate in some standardized and patterned way from the group norms. Lay terms such as "intellectual type," "motherly type," "athletic type," etc., suggest something of the nature of such categories of variety.⁷ Both forms of stereotyping do violence to fact, but in somewhat different ways.

The primary error in stereotyping into a category of variety lies in the fact that deviant attributes of personality are not necessarily patterned and are never standardized. The "motherly" woman may be so toward her son and rather the opposite toward her daughter; and the fact that she is kind and indulgent with children does not mean that a woman will also be honest with her neighbors and loyal to her husband or anything else. The category of variety, moreover, imputes to the individual on the basis of a few known or surmised attributes an entire complex of attributes.

Categories of species, or group stereotypes, are the product of historical development and, as will be shown in the following chapter, may bear little resemblance to the actual character of the people to whom they are applied. The average Frenchman's ideas of an American are, for example, superficial and in the main fallacious, as any American traveling in France soon discovers.⁸ Conversely, the standard American concept of a Frenchman would seem a weird perversion of the facts to the French

⁵ Stereotyping takes three forms, if one wishes to include the categorizing of one's own in-group. The in-group stereotype is, of course, a necessary prerequisite to the existence of any category of species or variety, since it provides the standard by which groups and individuals are judged.

⁶ For a collection of derogatory terms given to members of out-groups from early times to the present, see *Dictionary of international slurs* (A. A. Roback, 1944).

⁷ The members of every in-group have their own set of categories of variety. For some of those current in Negro society, see "Negro-white relations as reflected in social-types" (S. M. Strong, 1946). They include such categories as "white man's nigger," "smart nigger," "race man," and "sheet lover," a Negro who is enamored of light-colored or white women.

⁸ For a discussion of this general phenomenon, see "Attitudes to the stranger" (J. L. Greifer, 1945). It is interesting to note that approved characteristics tend to be attributed to the citizens of approved countries (I. L. Child and L. W. Doob, 1943). Hence, during World War II, it was to have been expected that the stereotypes of Germans and Japanese would have become more unfavorable and that of Chinese more likable (M. Meenes, 1943).

themselves. It is easy to understand how such national stereotypes can be unrealistic. But they are no more unrealistic than are many of the categories of species used by people who speak the same language, are citizens of the same country, and live in proximity to those whom they so stereotype. The Southern white concept of the American Negro and the gentile concept of the American Jew are probably as wide of the mark as the Frenchman's idea of the American. Stereotyping into a category of species is unrealistic in that the characteristics imputed to the species are more likely to be fictitious⁹ than real. It is also unrealistic in that it involves the assumption that the individual member of the "species" will conform in all respects to the norms of that species. For, in fact, whatever Americans and Frenchmen, Negroes, Jews, hillbillies, or Wops may be like as a group, no member of the group will in all respects represent the group norms.

One of the major discoveries of the modern anthropologists was that even the members of a primitive society are not in any sense "like as peas in a pod." Early students of primitives had, apparently, been in the habit of stereotyping the natives whom they studied rather than observing them as individuals. At any event, they described the life of primitive peoples in all-or-none terms such as the following: "it is the invariable practice to do so and so," "crime is unknown," "husbands and wives never quarrel (or do so continuously)," "men never speak to their mothers-in-law," etc. Subsequent observation, more objective and detailed, showed that there is considerable variation in the behaviors, and presumably in the personalities, of the members of primitive societies, even as there is in the members of modern, civilized societies. The personality differences may not be so great among primitives as among groups of civilized peoples, but they do exist and cannot be ignored.

Conventional Personality Stereotypes. Although two people upon being introduced simultaneously to a new acquaintance may not put him into the same stereotype, their sets of personality stereotypes may be much alike. We have developed more or less fixed, conventional preconceptions of the nature and variety of human personalities. Such stereotypes as that of the Negro, the Jew, the Yankee and his converse the Southern gentleman, and many others have remained fairly constant over

⁹ Several detailed studies have been made of the validity of certain racial stereotypes. In one (R. T. LaPiere, 1936) the Armenian immigrants of California's great central valley were found to have normative behavior quite different from what the stereotype pictured. More recently a study of Mexican-American youths showed that they are actually quite different from what they were depicted to be (N. D. Humphrey, 1945). Another study has shown that the reality of the racial stereotype does not increase as formal knowledge about a racial out-group increases (G. Nettler, 1946).

the years (D. W. Seago, 1947). "Gangster," "communist,"¹⁰ and many other categorical types have gained rather uniform meaning within the past generation or two.

Nowhere, perhaps, is the conventional nature of some personality stereotypes more clearly indicated than in drama and in fiction. The personality types of our grandfathers' day were relatively clear and unvarying; there was the villain, the hero, the heroine, the comic relief, the "dear old" mother or father, and perhaps the well-meaning but misguided fool. With these personalities the world of make-believe was peopled. The moment a character walked onto the stage, our grandfathers knew into which category to put him and could, therefore, promptly make the proper identification with him. In keeping with the times, dramatic stereotypes have changed. The heroine need no longer be the pure and simple maiden of yesterday; she may be smart and slightly soiled. We believe that we are more sophisticated and more realistic than our grandfathers were, and there is much talk about "realism" in the drama today. But actually it is only that the stereotypes have changed; we are just as insistent as were our grandfathers that the dramatic characters run true to type.

Conventional Stereotypes and Behavior. In literature and drama the practice of fitting characters to conventional stereotypes is a labor-saving device that can have few unfortunate consequences. In real life it may, however, cause much more trouble than it saves. The judge who treats all convicted criminals alike, *i.e.*, in terms of the conventional concept of the criminal personality, no doubt saves himself a great deal of thought, indecision, and worry. But since the persons convicted of crime in his court will actually have quite different personalities, his uniform treatment of them will cause them and, in the long run, society at large a great deal of trouble. The businessman who refuses to deal with people of the Jewish faith because he accepts and operates upon the conventional stereotype of the Jew as untrustworthy will not only do many Jews an injustice but may also miss many an opportunity to earn an honest profit. The Southern politician who in Congress and out defends discriminatory legislation and practices and fights against anything that seems to jeopardize the "supremacy" of the white race may do so simply because he believes that this is what his constituents want him

¹⁰ It has been claimed that political stereotypes have four dimensions—definiteness (uniformity or the degree of conformity of persons reacting), direction (affective tone), intensity, and quality (A. L. Edwards, 1940). Some university students agree very well on their Negro, German, and Jewish stereotypes and very poorly on those for Japanese, Chinese, and Turks. The American stereotype is only moderately definite (D. Katz and K. W. Braly, 1933 and 1935).

to do. But he may be acting in good faith—because he accepts the conventional Southern stereotype of the Negro¹¹—although to the long-run disadvantage of both Negro and white.

The resort to conventional stereotypes in first meeting with a stranger will certainly affect all initial relations with him. The idea that he belongs to such-and-such a category may of course be broken down as his behavior demonstrates the contrary.¹² But it is quite as likely that the placing of an individual in a conventional stereotype will preclude the development of intimate association with him and eventual understanding of his actual personality. This is the certain consequence of the placing of a person in a stereotype that itself precludes intimacy, as when a race-proud white man classifies a dark-skinned stranger as a Negro. The development of intimacy may also be precluded by the tendency of all men to see what they are looking for, to ignore what their preconceptions tell them cannot exist, and thus to react to the stereotype of the man rather than to the man himself.

Artificial Control of Stereotyping. This tendency on the part of people in our hurried and disorganized social life to behave in terms of stereotypes rather than in terms of actual personalities has led to the practice of providing people in public life with characteristics that will lead to their being put into desirable stereotypes by the general public. The technique is probably as old as politics and has undoubtedly been in the bag of tricks of every noted courtesan, religious reformer, and political leader. In a society that is noted for lack of uniformity among its members, it has become a remarkably effective means of molding the "public mind." To select an appropriate stereotype and to associate his client's name with it constitute the task of the public relations counsel. Such control of the stereotyping process is attempted for everyone and everything from motion-picture stars to office buildings. A public entertainer, politician, or financier is always in some measure dependent on his "good

¹¹ Quite naturally whites and Negroes will place Negroes into somewhat different stereotypes. Nevertheless, both Negroes and Princeton students were found to regard the Negro as superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, very religious, ostentatious, loud, and musical. But whereas the Princeton students added to the list the adjectives ignorant, stupid, naive, slovenly, and physically dirty, the Negroes listed intelligent, progressive, faithful, and imitative (J. A. Bayton, 1941). As might be anticipated, the Japanese are differently regarded by whites and by Japanese (K. Kusunoki, 1936).

¹² In one factory where additional workers were badly needed there was found to be a well-established stereotype picture of the "older woman"—she was "slow," "she wasted time," and, hence, she should not be hired. After many group discussions, however, a few older women were hired; and the stereotype gradually collapsed (A. J. Marrow and J. R. P. French, Jr., 1945).

name" among the people who make up his public. Unless control is exercised, his "name" would be determined largely by the whims of rumor. In the effort to ensure that a name becomes attached to a desirable stereotype, the public relations counsel feeds the press with appropriate items of "news" and withholds from the press every fact that runs counter to the desired stereotype. Similar control of the stereotyping process is also attempted for impersonal corporations. Since men think and act mainly in terms of human beings, they attribute a personality even to a business enterprise. Uncontrolled, the personality that people impute to an organization might be of the villain type; consequently, every means is used to make Mr. C. and B. Oil, Mr. XYZ Motors, etc., something of heroes, giving them agreeable and charming personalities.¹⁸

The ability to fit a person into a particular personality stereotype by means of proper censorship of the facts and fictions that the public learns about the person is illustrated by the propagandistic stereotyping of Joseph Stalin during World War II. Prior to the war he had been to most Americans the "mystery man of the Kremlin"; but in accordance with the official American wartime policy of collaboration with the Russians, he was cast, through the stories about him fed the public via newspaper, radio, and motion picture, into a new stereotype, that of the folksy great man, a friendly fellow with infinite patience and wisdom and a sly and pleasant sense of humor. He became "Uncle Joe," who spoke Russian, of course, and was the leader of the Russians, but who was in most important respects just like an ordinary American Uncle Joe. With the end of the war and a change in American international policy, a hasty and evidently fairly effective restereotyping of Stalin was made. In the newer postwar version, Stalin was again back in the dark, secret caverns of the Kremlin; but there was no mystery about him now. He was the madman who plotted and endeavored to wreck the peace and extend his evil control over the whole of the world. In terms of his personality—his ambitions, his insatiable cruelty, etc.—he was fitted into the stereotype left vacant by the defeat and reported death of Hitler.

So accustomed are we to thinking and acting in terms of personality stereotypes that newspapers must give to every name that appears in important news items some clue that will help us put the person into his proper category. Mr. Smith is just a name; and, no matter how spectacular the things he does, they have little meaning for us until Mr. Smith acquires a personality. The newswriter, therefore, gives us a clue or

¹⁸ Sororities (L. J. Cronbach, 1944) and colleges are also subject to the stereotyping process. Thus Dartmouth is supposed to harbor out-of-doors, college-loyal, hard-drinking collegiates, whereas Harvard is supposed to have an intellectual, blasé, and snobbish student body (K. Fink and H. Cantril, 1937).

two to help us in selecting the appropriate personality stereotype. The clues, like the stereotypes, are often conventionalized. "Late, great . . ." says *Time*. Banker, potent industrialist, prominent society matron, blonde beauty, café socialite, and radical are a few of the conventional stereotypes into which we are expected to place what would otherwise remain blank, impersonal names in the news.¹⁴

Individual Stereotypes. The conventional stereotypes tend, however, to be somewhat individualized. It is probable, for example, that the pauper will include in the category "banker" quite different personality attributes than will the professor of economics, the average businessman, or the spinster with money in the bank. When the poor man meets a big banker, he may anticipate nothing but ruthless treatment. But the economist, the businessman, and the prosperous spinster may expect the big banker to be something of a gentleman, to be logical but sympathetic, and to be a personal symbol of security and financial integrity.

Furthermore, each person has, in addition to the more or less conventional personality stereotypes, a few private categories of his own into which he can file people when occasion arises. The acute pessimist has his own personal apprehensions about people, a set of personality stereotypes that leads him to expect, at the least, the very worst from those he meets. The extreme optimist, if such a person exists, has a set of stereotypes that leads him to expect the best from everyone. In adjusting to the same man, the pessimist would tend to guard against the worst and the optimist to take the best for granted.

Generalization on the Basis of the Particular. The conventional stereotypes are acquired by the individual in much the same indirect ways as are such other cultural categories as right and wrong and "we" and "they"; i.e., they are normative consequences of socialization. Individual stereotypes, on the other hand, are generalizations from one or a small number of direct and specific experiences. Just as the child may decide from experience with one hot stove that all stoves burn—a generalization from experience with one member of a category to include all members of that category—he may also conclude from an unpleasant experience with one bearded man that all bearded men are to be avoided. The process of generalization may not be logical, but it is psychologically imperative. We cannot forever go around testing whether or not this specific stove will burn us. We must act upon the assumption that, since all the stoves we have so far touched burned us, this particular stove is to be treated with caution.

But men are more complex than stoves; and there is, as we have seen,

¹⁴ For a discussion of stereotypes as they appeared in one important newspaper, see "Emotional stereotypes in the Chicago Tribune" (S. S. Sargent, 1939).

no certainty that any two of them will have a great deal in common or that a given aspect of the personality of one of them can be taken as an indication of the other aspects of his personality. As a consequence, all personality stereotypes are unrealistically simple; and the bases commonly employed for classifying people may be fully as unrealistic as are the stereotypes. The highly trained and experienced clinician would not think of making a guess about the personality of a patient until he had carefully studied all that was available about the background of the patient and had had a number of intimate interviews with him. But the clerk in a store, the teacher in a classroom, and the woman at a tea will often glance at the customer, student, or new acquaintance and promptly file him in some personality stereotype on the basis of some gesture, some quality of voice or mode of speech, some physical attribute, or some element of dress.

ATTEMPTS TO VALIDATE STEREOTYPING

The Rationalization of Stereotyping. Efforts to give scientific validity to the process of personality stereotyping have not been lacking. Just as some scientists and pseudo scientists have endeavored to check on such ideas as that Negroes are inherently inferior to whites, others have attempted to validate such common lay beliefs as that people with receding chins are weak-willed.

The most obvious and easily measured things about a human being are his physical characteristics. That is probably the reason why we commonly "explain" our type casting on some physiognomical basis. We say, perhaps, that we do not trust a man "because he has close-spaced eyes" and that someone else can be trusted "because his eyes are wide apart." Stereotyping a person as hot tempered on the basis of his red hair is so commonplace as to be traditional.

Careful observation will indicate, however, that physiognomical characteristics are often observed after and not before we have classified the individual. What has really been used as a clue for type casting is often not ascertainable. We respond more or less speedily to something in the person's appearance or behavior and make our classification in terms of that response. When called upon to justify the classification, physical characteristics are the straws at which we grasp.

Pseudoscientific Justifications. It is apparently this frequent resort to physical characteristics in rationalizing personality stereotyping that has misled some scientists into trying to predict human behavior on the basis of a study of physical characteristics. They have taken seriously what the man in the street says but may not act upon. As a consequence, an unbelievable number of books have been written under the misappre-

hension that there exists a significant, automatic, and invariable relationship between physical characteristics and behavior.

Physiognomy and Phrenology. One of the best known of the earlier attempts to correlate personality type with objectively measurable physical characteristics was that of Cesare Lombroso, the noted French criminologist, in 1876 (G. Ferrero, 1911). Tarde, it will be recalled, had concluded that criminal behavior was the consequence of imitation, a concept that was of little practical value to those who were engaged in the apprehension of criminals. Lombroso, however, presented the ingenious and intriguing theory that all mankind was divisible into the criminal type and the noncriminal type and that, since nature had fortunately stamped the criminal personality with a criminal physiognomy, all that was necessary to prevent further crime was to round up the people who looked like criminals. After long study, Lombroso provided criminologists with a set of pictures showing the types of physiognomy indicative of personalities typical of people who would commit specific types of crimes. He confessed, somewhat belatedly, that the correlation between face and crime was only .40; but that concession to reality did not dim the ardor of his disciples, the latest of whom, the physical anthropologist E. A. Hooton, has produced amazingly large volumes of remarkably dubious data on the physiognomy of criminals.¹⁵

Lombroso was not the originator of this interesting bit of sociopsychological nonsense. Aristotle had formulated a "scientific" treatise on physiognomy, in which he described the physical signs and symptoms of personality. And late in the eighteenth century the physiognomist J. K. Lavater had listed in detail the relationship between physical traits and personality, giving us one hundred physiognomical rules by which to misjudge our friends. Rule 77, for example, states that "a broad, brown wart on the chin is never found in truly wise, calmly noble persons."¹⁶ A century after that, the world had been made a more convenient place in which to live by the astonishing "discovery" of F. J. Gall and J. K. Spurzheim that the traits that go to make up the human personality have anatomic counterparts in various regions of the brain and that the presence or absence of these traits is revealed by the exterior configuration of the skull. Thus had been founded the "science" of phrenology.¹⁷

¹⁵ See *Crime and the man* (E. A. Hooton, 1939) and Volume I of *The American criminal: an anthropological study* (E. A. Hooton, 1939). Concerning the former, one reviewer comments: "And he [Reuter] likes Mr. Hooton's book. In fact, he considers it the funniest academic performance that has appeared since the invention of movable type." (E. B. Reuter, 1939).

¹⁶ From *Essays on physiognomy* (J. K. Lavater, 1878).

¹⁷ Neurologists of today postulate only a very tentative map of brain areas with

Lombroso's work did, however, revive these prescientific ideas and thus divert attention for some decades from the pursuit of a scientific understanding of the origins of criminal behavior (A. Lindesmith and Y. Levin, 1937).

All the evidence derived from truly scientific study refutes the idea that there is any very important correlation between what a man's face looks like and how he will act under given circumstances (note 50). To the layman, however, all such evidence seems to count for little against the fact that it would be extremely convenient if some such relationship did exist. And thus the modern rehashers of Lavater, Gall, Spurzheim, Lombroso, and other pioneers in misinterpretation find a lucrative field for exploitation. It must be very satisfying, we suppose, to know that "always and everywhere, the normal blond has positive, dynamic, driving . . . and variety-loving characteristics; while the normal brunette has negative, static, conservative . . . characteristics" (K. M. H. Blackford and A. Newcomb, 1915, p. 141).

Pyknic and Asthenic "Types." Equally unfruitful and unscientific have been the efforts to reduce the complexities of personality prediction to matters of body build. Hippocrates, the Greek physician, tried to simplify the practice of medicine by classifying people into physical types on the basis of their differing bodily fluids, which he called humors.¹⁸ Each type was, he thought, predisposed to a certain disease. The idea of neatly classifying people into a few body types has in modern times been revived and made the basis for personality prediction. Most widely known during the late 1920's and the 1930's was the work of E. Kretschmer (note 51) who believed that we can determine the specific temperaments of the persons with whom we live if we subject them to physical measurement in accordance with the indexes he set up. Serving

accompanying "functions." The name of the function is derived either from the sense organ from which the nerve impulses come, such as the visual or the auditory, or from the body region in which there will be a response if the particular brain area is electrically stimulated. Thus, in the pre-Rolandic area is a spot the stimulation of which will effect wiggling of the toes. But one brain area can apparently take on functions formerly associated with other brain areas, and some neurologists believe that the brain acts more or less as a whole. Clearly, the views of modern science are far removed from those of phrenology.

¹⁸ The Hippocratic typology, based on the relative importance of four body fluids, has seen rebirth and modification at the hands of the modern French typologist, Paul Carton. Carton and his followers believe that there are four components to each personality. These, in descending order of their strength in the normal male, are bilious, nervous, sanguine, and lymphatic; in the typical female (presumably French), they are nervous, lymphatic, bilious, and sanguine (personal communication from Professor Alexandre Vexliard, a Carton follower and researcher in typology).

as a basis for his theory was the idea that there are two fundamental classes of personalities, pyknic and asthenic (leptosomic).¹⁹ Upon examination, these terms are found to be little more than substitutes for the older extrovert-introvert classificatory system, which was in turn based upon the time-honored distinction between the "good mixer" and the "dreamer." It is true that in certain psychopathic cases we find the extreme introvert who lives in a world of unreality and is more or less unresponsive to stimuli of external origin. But to generalize from these cases and to conclude that the mass of human beings can be divided into two mutually exclusive categories is not sound logic. Furthermore, even though we were to assume that these two classes of personalities do exist, it would not follow that classification could be made on the basis of anatomic or of anthropometric criteria. The notion brings to mind the ancient superstition that the physically crippled human being is a creature of the Devil and has a mind as crippled as his body.

Somatotypes. In recent years the Kretschmer system of typology has been largely displaced by a more complex if no more valid procedure devised by Sheldon (W. H. Sheldon *et al.*, 1940). This generally goes under the title somatotypology.

In the Sheldon system, body build is classified in terms of three basic "components"—endomorphie (or fatty), mesomorphie (or muscular), and ectomorphie (or linear)—each of which is measured on a seven-point scale.) The body type of a given individual is thus ascertained by "measuring" him with three separate rulers rather than, as in the Kretschmerian system, of forcing him into one of two or three preformed categories. In the Sheldon system of measurement, the individual is given a three-number rating, the numbers representing his rated positions on each of the three scales. Thus Christ, who was pictured by the early religious painters as thin, lightly muscled, and rather delicately boned, would be given a rating on the Sheldonian scales of, perhaps, 2-3-5 (low in the endomorphic component, relatively low in the mesomorphic component, and slightly above average in the ectomorphic component). Superman of the comics, on the other hand, would probably rate 2-7-6 (thin, exceptionally developed muscularly, and relatively small boned).

The Sheldon system of measuring body build might be quite useful to physical anthropologists and anatomists. But Sheldon has contended that there is a significant correlation between each of his body components and personality characteristics²⁰—that endomorphy is correlated with

¹⁹ A third type, the athletic, sometimes appears in Kretschmerian literature. But more often it is considered as a subtype of the asthenic.

²⁰ Sheldon has advanced masses of evidence in support of his theory, but social scientists have generally refused to accept his data at their face value. For one thing,

viscerotonia, mesomorphy with somatotonia, and ectomorphy with cerebrotonia, which is simply a way of saying that fatness and jollity, muscularity and enterprise, and fragility and intellectuality go together. Although Sheldon does avoid setting up pure body types, each with its pure personality type, he nevertheless arrives at the old familiar idea that body and mind are causally related. Thus we see in his viscerotonic, the easily recognized relaxed glutton, which is just the pyknic type renamed; in his somatotonic, the man of vigor and push, which is just Kretchmer's old athletic type (or subtype); and in his cerebrotonic, the one who shrinks from sociability, the well-known introvert or asthenic.²¹

The Unrealistic Character of All Stereotyping. Every so often someone, frequently a medical man, "discovers" that human behavior is simply a matter of glands. "Gland types" will be described; and the effects upon the behavior of abnormal "types" which are produced by supplying them with some hormone or other will lead to the conclusion that all undesirable behavior, from criminality to economic incompetence, can be promptly driven from the world by so many cubic centimeters of this or that. There is just sufficient truth behind such claims to give

in the original Sheldon study those who rated the personalities of the subjects were Sheldon followers and must certainly have been influenced by the physical appearances of their subjects, as well as by their knowledge of their leader's doctrines. Hence, to a considerable degree, the physical and psychological measurements made in this study were not independent but were the same ratings appearing twice under different names.

Attempts to check Sheldon's theory have not so far added much to its stature. One study reported a slight relationship between body build and reaction time (H. C. Smith and S. Boyarsky, 1943); another (D. W. Fiske, 1944) found relationships of only a chance order between body build and personality variables; and still another (T. E. Coffin, 1944) seemed to find some tendency for specific body builds to be associated with certain "life values"—a finding that appears to be somewhat supported by a recent research (C. Morris, 1948) which found low to moderate correlations between Sheldon's variables and a variety of descriptions of the "ideal life." But the correlations that have been found are so small, and in most instances the personality attributes measured are so vague and difficult to measure exactly, that one must have a good deal of faith in the theory of somatotypes before he can place significance on the findings which purport to prove that theory.

²¹ Unrelated to the Sheldon theory are many independent studies, some of which indicate statistically interesting relationships between a specific constitutional factor and personality, but in which the relationships demonstrated are too small to be sociopsychologically impressive. Representative of such studies is one in which a slightly negative correlation was reported between conscientiousness and short-wide body build (R. N. Sanford, 1948); one in which a small positive relationship was reported between duration of menstrual flow and intensity of maternal behavior (D. M. Levy, 1948); and one in which a negative association was claimed between strength of "masculine component" and "sensitive personality structure" (C. C. Seltzer, 1948).

them credence. The complex, interdependent, and little known system of glands of internal secretion is a part of the physiological mechanism that aids men to behave in ways that are human. Disturbance of that system, for whatever reason, may affect behavior. It is no doubt true that the "thyroid type" is likely to be more active than is the normal person (note 52). This knowledge does not, however, help us much in attempting to predict the behavior of the personality involved. Our interest is, of necessity, in the qualitative aspects of personality. What will so-and-so do under such and such circumstances? To say that he will do more of whatever he does than would the average person does not indicate what he is going to do.

All evaluations of the human personality solely in terms of objectively measurable physical criteria, however scientific their pretensions, belong in the same category as "character reading" by means of palmistry, astrology,²² numerology, and the countless other ologies through which the unscrupulous exploit the credulous.

INDIRECT RELATION BETWEEN PHYSIQUE AND PERSONALITY

Personality stereotyping is unrealistic and without verifiable basis. It proceeds upon the assumption that there is a direct and unvarying relationship, often between a certain combination of physical attributes and a certain set of personality attributes. But, as has been indicated, modern people are forced to make many of their person-to-person adjustments at least initially on the basis of stereotyping. Such stereotyping will have its immediate effects upon the behavior of the one who does the stereotyping and probably of the one who is stereotyped. Moreover, being stereotyped may in the long run affect the latter's personality development. In some instances certain deviant attributes of an individual's personality would appear to be indirectly related to some atypical aspect or aspects of physique.

Nature of the Relationship. A given attribute of physique may lead people to stereotype an individual in a certain way and to treat him as though he had the personality attributes that are imputed to this stereotype. Thus, although there certainly is no demonstrated relationship between the color of one's hair and one's covert behaviors, there may be a relationship between one's hair color and the sort of treatment one is accorded by others. If most people rather consistently treat the redhead as though he were "hot tempered," the blonde as though she were "beauti-

²² An analysis of the birth dates of over six thousand musicians and artists has made it clear that possessors of the "artistic temperament" know no particular birth month, in spite of the contentions of the astrologers (P. R. Farnsworth, 1938).

ful but dumb," and the striking brunette as though she were innately flirtatious, the redhead, the blonde, and the brunette might conceivably become so. The redheaded boy who is perpetually plagued by his companions, constantly teased to provoke his "hot temper," frequently accused by adults of being hot tempered, etc., may develop intense covert responses of the hot-tempered order. Indeed, it is possible that in time he will come to pattern himself upon some real or symbolic hot-tempered redhead model. Even so, his red hair was not the direct cause of his hot temper. The relationship between them was indirect: red hair provoked a given sort of response from his fellows, and that response developed the hot temper.

The distinction between the indirect and direct relationship of physique and personality is of considerable significance. The attributes of physique are more or less fixed by nature, but the social stereotypes associated with given physical attributes are subject to change. In our society where there is a tendency to stereotype redheads in the "hot-tempered" category, there may well be some tendency for redheads to develop hot tempers. But the stereotype may change in time, and then the indirect effect of red hair would be quite different from what it now is.²⁸

The Either-or Result of Stereotyping. If all other things were equal, the person who was consistently placed in a given stereotype would develop the personality attributes of that stereotype; the redhead would become hot tempered, the overgrown boy a clumsy and inept man, the undersized boy a meek little adult, the beautiful girl a brainless clothes-horse, etc. But stereotyping is seldom consistent, and all other things are never equal.

Whereas strangers and acquaintances of brief standing tend to stereotype us and may do so in terms of some combination of physical attributes, the people who are most important to our social development will tend to treat us more in terms of our actual personality attributes. Strangers may overestimate the age of the overgrown boy, stereotype him as a fifteen-year-old when he is only twelve, and treat him as a clumsy, inept oaf. But his parents and other intimates know that he is just a little boy, however big he is physically, and they will therefore tend to excuse his stumblings and not expect him to perform on the fifteen-year-old level. The other boys in the neighborhood may stereotype the redheaded new arrival as hot tempered; but before such stereotyping has had time to become effective, they may have become sufficiently intimate with him to know, as do his parents, that he is really of gentle disposition. Whether

²⁸ In Moslem countries red hair means not hot temper but "one who has been to Mecca." The Moslem who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca may dye his beard red and will thereafter be looked upon with respect.

stereotyping on the basis of some physical attribute will be at all significant in the development of the individual's personality attributes will depend in the first instance, then, on the importance to the individual of the people who do the stereotyping. Even a striking physical attribute, such as red-headedness, may have no significant effect upon the growth of personality.

Stereotyping does not operate irrespective of other factors affecting the development of personality; and these other factors will largely determine the way the individual will adjust to the fact that he is rather consistently treated as though he were this or that sort of person. To the extent that he accepts the role accorded him, he tends to fit the stereotype; to the extent that other factors lead him to struggle against acceptance of the role, he tends to develop personality attributes diametrically opposed to those of the stereotype.

The two extreme possibilities can perhaps be most clearly illustrated by the case of the undersized "sweet-looking" little boy. Damning in the eyes of other boys are the golden, curly hair and childlike physiognomy that lead adults to stereotype a small boy as "a sweet child." Boys will promptly label him for persecution as a sissy, a "mamma's boy," or the like. The effect upon him of the treatment they accord him is not, however, predictable in terms of itself. He might, of course, have so little association with other boys that their stereotyping of him would be ineffective. If, however, it is effective, that effect may be one of two extremes. If he has, as a consequence of prior factors, learned to accept as his role that of the small, insignificant person, he may submit humbly to mistreatment at the hands of his playmates and in time gain their acceptance as a useful but distinctly inferior member of the gang. He is then well on the way to becoming the sort of meek adult who is perpetually exploited by others; in making him this way, his physical appearance will have played an indirect part. Undoubtedly the meekness and humbleness of the meek and humble little man are in many instances thus indirectly related to his "littleness."

But the golden-haired little boy may, because of antecedent factors, resent rather than accept the role accorded him by other boys. To overcome the handicap of small stature and sweet appearance and to gain acceptance as a "regular fellow," he may then struggle against the stereotype, endeavoring to prove to his companions that he is by nature anything but a sissy, anything but a mamma's boy. The direction that such struggles will take depends on his own ingenuity. But if he is successful, he will become, so far as his playmates are concerned, some sort of antithesis to the stereotype in which they originally placed him. Perhaps he will discover that fighting words and a fighting manner make fighting unnecessary; perhaps he will learn that by being mentally resourceful and

suggesting gang procedures, he can win the desired respect. In either event he will have acquired some attributes of the so-called "domineering" and "aggressive" personality. Undoubtedly the blustering aggressiveness of the blustering and aggressive little man is often thus indirectly related to his subnormal stature, even as is the shyness of the shy little fellow.

There is, therefore, a degree of truth in the old saying that a man will become what you believe him to be. But the long-run effects of stereotyping upon a person so stereotyped are so complex and so much conditioned by other factors, that treating a crook as an honest man is almost certain to have disappointing results.

CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY NORMS

Diametrically opposed to the process of stereotyping is the procedure by which the social psychologist arrives at the concept of social, or group, personality norms. From the study of the behavior of the members of a group in many circumstances and over considerable time, he may obtain data that indicate that such-and-such an attribute of personality is typical for the members of that social group; *i.e.*, it occurs more often than not. What is found to be typical is now generally designated a "norm" for the group, or, alternatively, a "normative attribute" of personality. When all the more normative attributes for the given group have been ascertained, the result is a concept of the "personality norms" for the members of that group. And with such a concept at hand, it is then possible to distinguish between the normative and deviant attributes of the personality of any individual member of the group.

The normative attributes of a given personality constitute, it will be recalled, one of the four categories of attributes that were discussed in the opening chapter of this part of the book. They represent the successes in his socialization into the group, and they are the respects in which he is like most of the other members of his group. But, contrary to the assumption that underlies all personality stereotyping, the personality of no individual ever entirely fits the described personality norms for the members of his social group; he deviates in some and often in many ways and in varying degrees from those norms.

That there are differences in the modes of conduct, in the ways of thinking, and in the values, sentiments, and motivations of the members of different social groups is not a new discovery. On the contrary, it has probably been known as long as men have lived in distinctive social groups. But the real origins and the actual nature of those differences have long been obscured by group bias and prejudice and social reliance on group stereotypes. As a consequence, the study of group norms has led to almost as much controversy as solid fact, and it is even now impossible to discuss the facts without at the same time contrasting them with the social fictions that surround the subject.

Human Nature. The term "human nature" has often been used to designate the normative attributes of the personalities of the members of

a given social group.¹ The term was borrowed from the folk language, and it initially brought with it the implication that what it designated was natural—i.e., inherent, presumably of biological determination—to human beings. In early sociological writings, where the term most frequently appears, very few of the things that men do were traced to human nature. Most of their actions were considered to be the consequence of social training and hence to differ from society to society and from group to group within each society. But from the undeniable fact that all men everywhere and always live in some sorts of social groupings, it was deduced that there must be some psychological attributes, usually described as social sentiments, which are common to all men. These presumably universal attributes of the human personality were designated human nature.²

Within recent years there has arisen considerable doubt that any of the personality norms of social groups have universality. It is true that all men live in social groups; but the size, character, and structure of the groups vary widely and are subject to change. The things that may be validly said of all men are of the order that they eat, procreate, live together, and eventually die. Such observations are hardly helpful, since they neither distinguish men from many of the lower animals nor add to our understanding of how, when, and why men eat as they do, procreate in the way they do, and live together in the particular kinds of groups to which they adhere. In recent years the term "human nature" has lost its implication of universality and has become redefined to mean the typical personality attributes of the members of a particular group—i.e., what have above been designated the personality norms for the group. This redefinition of "human nature" conforms to our present understanding of the facts, but it is somewhat misleading; for however human, there is nothing "natural" about what the members of any social group do. And since our understandings have changed so radically in the last quarter century or so, it is perhaps well that we abandon the old term "human nature" rather than try to divest it of all its old meaning.

The Basic Personality Type. As was indicated in an early chapter, anthropologists have recently become interested in the study of sociopsychological phenomena and have devised something of their own terminology. One term now frequently encountered in anthropological litera-

¹ It was so used in the preceding editions of this book; but it is herewith being abandoned, for reasons that will appear above, in favor of the less confusing and less tradition-encrusted term "personality norms."

² Perhaps the earliest and certainly the most careful and effective use of the phrase in this way was that by Cooley in his *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1902).

ture is "basic personality type."³ The concept to which it refers differs little from what we here designate as personality norms, although it was derived mainly from the study of primitive peoples. But whether we examine the personality characteristics of primitives and arrive at a concept of their "basic personality type" or the personality characteristics of modern civilized peoples and find that the members of each social group have their own distinctive personality norms, the conclusions are the same: Men differ in their socially acquired characteristics; they differ as individuals one from another; and some of the differences between them are individual in origin and others are group, or social, in origin. It is with the latter that we are for the moment concerned.

IN-GROUPS VERSUS OUT-GROUPS

The fact that personality norms vary from society to society and, in lesser degree, between different groups within the society is the basis for the layman's crude and unrealistic classification of people into fixed categories; and it is this in turn that underlies many social phenomena, *e.g.*, the ridicule of the "country bumpkin," the periodic slaughter of "racial" minorities, the bitterness of class toward class, and the war of one people upon another.

It was once the hope of sociologists that modern means of transportation and communication would so amalgamate the peoples of the entire world that there would emerge one universal way of life and, hence, one universal set of personality norms, with the result that men could live together in peace and understanding. But today, as in the past, the peoples of the world are anything but standardized. The two billion and more inhabitants of the world are broken up into a great variety of groups, each with something of its own norms and each more or less contemptuous of the norms of other groups.

Dichotomization into In-groups and Out-groups. Because the various members of a social group have had much the same set of social experiences, they are more like one another than any of them is like the "typical" member of another group. They can, therefore, predict one another's behavior with much greater accuracy—usually described as ability to "understand"⁴ one another—and, hence, can adjust to one an-

³ See *The psychological frontiers of society* (A. Kardiner *et al.*, 1945).

⁴ An interesting measure of "understanding" is one in which people to be questioned answer in two ways—as they honestly believe and as they believe the members of some other group would answer (R. Stagner and C. E. Osgood, 1941; and H. C. Steinmetz, 1945). This technique has recently been put to test with labor and management groups on the West Coast. Here, what the union members claimed to believe was contrasted with what the management group said labor probably believed, and vice versa (L. M. Libo, 1948).

other with a minimum of friction. This is illustrated by the fact that under almost any circumstances we could get along better with almost any fellow American than we could with a "foreigner" whose language, sentiments, tastes, etc., we did not understand.

Every people has some word or phrase, "we-uns," "unsere Leute," "nous autres," or whatnot, by which they refer to the fact that they belong together and constitute a separate and special segment of mankind—an in-group. The sense of belonging together, in-groupness, is a reflection of the fact that their norms are somewhat peculiar to them, and it constitutes in turn one aspect of those norms.

The counterpart to in-groupness is the belief that those who do not belong are a different *kind* of human being (perhaps not human at all) who must of necessity be accorded treatment quite different from that accorded the members of the in-group. They—as distinct from we—are difficult if not impossible to get along with. Although "we" may have fixed ideas of what these others are like, our ideas do not lead to understanding of them—hence ability to get along with them—if for no other reason than that our ideas of them may have almost no relation to reality. They constitute, therefore, the antithesis of our in-group—an out-group.

Social Determination of Dichotomization. The individual is socialized into a number of groups, each one of which becomes for him an in-group. He is born and brought up in a family (or tribe or village); he and his family live in a neighborhood made up of a number of associated families; the neighborhood is a part of the larger society, or state; etc. The particular structure of the social groupings will depend on the organization of the society. The more integrated the society, the fewer and more clearly defined the number of groups to which the individual will belong. Many of the difficulties of contemporary life stem, as we shall later see, from the fact that we are partly socialized into a large number of vague and overlapping, and often opposed, social groups (U. G. Weatherly, 1934).

Status at birth and, today, accidents of migration and the like determine to which particular groups the individual will belong. Whatever these groups are, the socialization of the individual into the group ways of each group will involve his developing some degree of in-group feeling.⁸ He will be taught that the various members of the group are his friends and

⁸ Because our own social groups are at present notoriously unstable, it is difficult to develop in them any great amount of in-group feeling. There is, therefore, only a very slight positive correlation between length of group membership and homogeneity of opinion among the members (M. Smith, 1940). See "A technique for measuring like-mindedness" (J. Zubin, 1938).

that their ways of behavior are the "right" ways for men to behave. At the same time he will ordinarily be taught that people who do not belong to the group are strangers, foreigners, or outlanders.⁶ If his group is for historical reasons in conflict with some group among the general category of outlanders, he will be trained to beliefs that are appropriate to fighting and destroying that group.

The ways that different peoples act toward their friends and their enemies are extremely varied. But that every human being will put some human beings into the category "friend" and others into the category "enemy" is as near to a universal law of human behavior as the social psychologist is likely to discover. Toward the people whom he classifies as friends, he will exhibit some degree of what may be described as love, loyalty, kindness, consideration, and the like. Toward those whom he classifies as enemies, he will exhibit some degree of hatred, fear, distaste, and the like.⁷ The covert processes that are involved in such in-group and out-group behaviors can best be understood as forms of identification.

Positive Identification.⁸ Although in-group membership does not result in any specific pattern of person-to-person adjustment, all such adjustments appear to reflect in whole or in part the covert process of

⁶ An extreme form of dichotomization into in-groups and out-groups is described in *Patterns of culture* (R. Benedict, 1934). In the particular society in question a person looks upon even his or her spouse as a member of an out-group. When illness comes, the spouse is the most logical person to blame, as he (or she), being in closest contact with the victim, possesses the best opportunity to exert that particular sort of magic which, according to tribal belief, results in illness.

⁷ An interesting illustration of the social origin of in-group and out-group attitudes is to be found in the changed status in Negro society of the light-skinned Negress. A half century ago in the deep South, the "high yellow" was considered socially inferior to the full blood in Negro society. Since that time, the light-skinned girl has attained a great advantage over her darker sister in the South as well as in Harlem. The same is now true of the light-skinned man (C. H. Parrish, 1946).

In the case of small children the darker their skin the more readily they identify themselves as Negroes (K. B. Clark and M. P. Clark, 1940; 1947). See also *Color and human nature* (W. L. Warner, B. H. Junker, and W. A. Adams, 1941) and "The relationship between minority-group membership and group identification in a group of urban middle class Negro girls" (M. Brenman, 1940).

Even as changing social circumstances were leading the Negro to take over the high value whites place on white skin, the Negro was also acquiring some of the white man's group prejudices. See "The Negro merchant: a study of Negro anti-Semitism" (H. L. Sheppard, 1947).

⁸ The term "sympathy" is frequently used to refer to the subjective aspects of positive identification. Cooley, in his *Human nature and the social order* (C. H. Cooley, 1922), and some others have used it in much the same sense as we use the phrase "positive identification."

For a picture of the way in which "sympathy" develops in children of our own culture, see *Social behavior and child personality: an exploratory study of some roots*

positive identification. Positive identification consists of mentally putting oneself into the place of another and reacting more or less intensely to the stimuli that actually impinge upon that other person. Thus, should a person with whom we have closely identified ourselves cut his finger in our presence, we would vicariously "feel" the pain of that hurt. Conversely, should he receive good news, we would "thrill with him." The ability to react positively to the situations affecting another is evidently a consequence of social training and becomes more or less characteristic of our relations with the members of our in-group.

Apparently the positive identification of one person with another is dependent not so much on the ability to understand and to react in the same manner as the other as it is on the ability to react in some way or other to the stimulus that affects that other. The child who is playing in the street may be quite oblivious to danger; but the mother may be afraid for him, since, under the same circumstances, she would be afraid for herself. Similarly, the child need not actually be happy in order that the mother derive pleasure, if the situation of the child is one in which the mother herself would be happy.

Positive identification leads the one who makes the identification to be affected vicariously by the situation that is directly affecting the one with whom identification is made. The person who is positively identified with another is encouraged, therefore, to act in such a way as to contribute, in terms of his own personality, to the welfare of the other and is discouraged from doing anything that will injure it. The extent to which such in-group identification will influence his behavior will depend, of course, on the intensity of that identification.

People who have common reactions to situations and who are closely identified with one another will live together in a considerable degree of harmony. Since to hurt another hurts him vicariously, each member of the group will tend to do only that which contributes to the welfare of all. The process of positive identification is, therefore, the sociopsychological basis for social unity and mutual aid. It is the process underlying the Biblical injunction, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

Negative Identification. But up to the present the members of mankind have not been integrated into one great in-group of men. All men are not brothers; they are broken up into innumerable antagonistic brotherhoods. Their capacity for self-sacrifice, loyalty, kindness, and

of sympathy (L. B. Murphy, 1937). See also "Measurement of sociation" (L. D. Zeleny, 1941).

Identifications and group norms are discussed in considerable detail in *The psychology of ego-involvements* (M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1947).

humility is equaled by their capacity for selfishness, ruthlessness, greed, and cupidity. Although they love their friends, they may also hate some other group of human beings, their enemies. With the former they are, or can become, positively identified. With the latter they are identified in a reverse direction. This form of identification permits a vicarious reaction that is negative; i.e., stimuli that produce "pain" in the other give pleasure to the negatively identified person, and vice versa. Thus we enjoy the suffering of our enemies, whereas their good fortune hurts and angers us. To obtain this response, we are in a sense identifying ourselves with the enemy; for only by doing so can we imagine what hurts him and what constitutes his good fortune. The difference between positive and negative identification is therefore entirely a matter of the direction of the identification. Frequently termed "antipathy,"⁹ negative identification underlies much of man's inhumanity to man.

Attitudinal Aspects. Much of the data that have been secured on verbal attitudes, which were discussed earlier in another connection, consist of symbolic aspects of in-group and out-group identifications. Questioned regarding their views of and willingness to associate with the members of various social groups, people may reveal the symbolic aspects of their identifications, from which group norms may be secured. Thus it has been found at one time or another that it is normative for American whites to identify themselves symbolically with other American whites and, to that extent, against American Negroes,¹⁰ with Americans in general and against Germans or Russians or some other nationals, and with "democrats" of all colors and nationality and against "totalitarians" whatever their color and nationality; that it is normative for those Americans who consider themselves Christians to identify themselves in some respects with Christians everywhere and against Jews and Moslems and heathens, but that it is also normative for American Protestants to identify themselves with Protestants of all colors and sects and against in some degree all Catholics; and that it is normative for Americans, whether white or black, Christian or Jew, or Protestant or Catholic, to identify themselves with the middle class and against symbols of great wealth and power, such as Wall Street.

What such findings mean in terms of nonsymbolic behavior is at present largely unknown, since the relationship between verbal attitudes and the

⁹ See "Is antipathy the antithesis of sympathy?" (C. Alexander, 1946).

¹⁰ In a recent study of the prejudices of high-school children against Negroes it was shown that the attitudes of persons of this age group conform most closely to those of their parents and also but in lesser degree to the attitudes of their teachers and classmates. That is, children identify themselves with the members of these three groups, accepting most completely the attitudinal norms of their parents (M. Katz, 1947).

other components of in- and out-group identifications has not yet been ascertained. But they clearly indicate that modern people do think of themselves as belonging to a great many "we" groups, each with one or several "they" group associations, and that there is always a great deal of overlapping and even conflict between the "we" groups to which a given individual considers himself identified positively and the "they" groups to which he believes himself identified negatively. Thus in some connections he thinks he is opposed to Negroes, Jews, and Germans, while in others he thinks he is allied with them.

Individual and Social Consequences of Identification. By making a positive identification with the hero of a story or play and a negative identification with the villain, it is possible to "live" with these characters, covertly participating in the struggles of the hero and enjoying his eventual success, covertly being relieved and gratified by the ultimate defeat of the villain.¹¹ It is mainly by vicarious participation of this sort in the struggle and in the final resolution of the symbolic drama that the recreational satisfactions derived from the reading of fiction and the witnessing of prize fights, plays, motion pictures, and the like are secured. In real life also, many human satisfactions, as well as dissatisfactions, are secured through vicarious participation in the life of others. A man lives in part through his children, sharing their pleasures and sharing their sorrows. He rejoices at the news that "his" army has won a battle and suffers with it in its defeat. His children, his soldiers, and the like are for him heroes in real-life drama.

Real life has its villains, too. Nature, evil spirits, poisonous food, and the tough boy down the street may be the villains of the little dramas in which his children are involved. The members of other races, other nations, other classes, and the like will be the villains in the complex dramas in which he and his in-groups are involved.

Bias, Prejudice,¹² and Differences in Personality Norms. In a

¹¹ In comedy and tragedy the process is much more complex. The interested student will find a discussion of how varying identifications make possible our laughing at the plight of the comic hero and enjoying the sufferings of the tragic hero in Appendix note 39.

¹² The term "prejudice" is often used to indicate negative reactions to any object, animate or inanimate. Thus we may say of a man that he is prejudiced against popular music, against spinach, or against cats. So used, "prejudice" means only "dislike." As indicative of negative identification of a person-to-person order, however, "prejudice" means something far more complex than simple dislike. See "The usability of the concept of 'prejudice'" (H. S. Dyer, 1945); and "New trends in the investigation of prejudice" (R. Lippitt and M. Radke, 1946). For a study of dislikes as distinct from prejudices, see "Social factors annoying to children" (R. Zeligs, 1945); "A comparative study of annoyances" (E. Bennett, 1946); "A multiple factor analysis of children's annoyances" (H. D. Carter, H. S. Conrad, and M. C. Jones,

fictional drama the hero represents those things which are good and the villain those which are evil. In the dramas of real life we, our in-group, represent for us the forces of good, and they, an out-group, the forces of evil. Ideologically this is expressed by some variant of the idea that "we" are the chosen people, the people of glorious destiny, the saviors of civilization, whereas "they" are the forces of destruction, the inferior peoples, the unworthy. It is to be observed, however, that they consider themselves the truly human and us the less than human.¹³ Since who is which is a matter of group membership, the beliefs concerning the nature of the members of an out-group can have in-group, but not universal, validity.

To the sixteenth-century European, the Oriental was a "strange and wondrous creature, undoubtedly possessed of many human attributes, but yet in no sense truly human." Wrote a scholarly Chinese observer of a meeting with Jesuit priests in the same century:

These "Ocean Men," as they are called, are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beak-like noses. . . . But the strangest thing about them is that, although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men. The most bestial of peasants is far more human, although these Ocean Men go from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of scholarship and are in some respects exceedingly clever. It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being.¹⁴

In the objective study of differences in personality norms it is necessary to transcend the biases of in-group identification and the prejudices against out-group members. The sociopsychological view of these differences will therefore run counter to the particularistic views of the members of any given in-group.

The Social Origin of Differences in Norms. In Chapter I, it was observed that the science of social psychology has grown out of the fairly recent rejection of the Aristotelian view that society is but an expression of the innate nature of man and out of the acceptance of the Platonic thesis that behavior norms are largely a consequence of society.

1935); and "The categorization of an annoyance inventory" (C. M. Harsh, 1938).

¹³ Among the Amerindians a great number of tribal names, such as Zuni, Déné, and Kiowa are, in reality, names by which these groups know themselves and are their only native terms for "human beings" (R. Benedict, 1934).

¹⁴ The quotation is from a letter written to his son by a scholar visiting Yunnanfu. It is pertinent to note at this point that the Confucian school of Chinese social philosophy held that being human is a consequence of social training, mainly through example and by means of rituals. This view was generally accepted by the layman and is reflected in the quotation referred to.

This latter concept does not, of course, ignore the fact that man, the human being, cannot transcend the limitations imposed by nature upon man, the animal. It does not question the importance of heredity. It accepts as true the old adage that you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. But it also recognizes that the silk must be made into a purse; and thus, to attempt an explanation of the character of a silk purse in terms of the nature of silk ignores the fact that the finest Shantung raw silk will not, by its own nature, evolve into a purse and might, as a matter of fact, be made into any one of a number of other silk objects.

It is equally unfruitful to try to explain personality norms in terms of the biological potentialities of the human animal. Biological inadequacy might explain the failure of an individual to attain the attributes of personality normal for his social group; but, as we shall shortly see, it is futile and misleading to attempt to trace the different personality norms of different social groups to variations in their biological heritages. There is, however, a pronounced cultural incentive for doing so.

The Fiction of Biological Origin, a Rationalization. The idea that the members of an out-group are inferior because they were born that way is a useful fiction to the members of any dominant in-group. It is often, as a matter of fact, a basic item in the ideological systems of upper classes, of military conquerors, and of most ethnic, economic, religious, and political majorities.

The relations of different in-groups to one another are seldom equable. Usually one dominates the other or others to some degree. The economic elite of a society rules and perhaps exploits the lower classes. This is clearly the case under slavery; it is less clearly but equally true of a serf system, such as that which was in effect in premodern Europe. Early capitalism was notoriously exploitative of so-called "free" labor, for under that system the rich got richer and the poor remained at the level of bare subsistence. In many times and places, the members of one ethnic group have lived off the labors of another, as the plantation owner of our South lived on the proceeds of Negro slaves and as some of the ethnic-religious castes of contemporary India live parasitically on others. Even in a community of families belonging to a common class, there will be some differences in family position, both economically and in terms of prestige; and the "best" families will in subtle or brazen ways lord it over those less fortunate.

For the members of any dominant in-group the fiction that they are biologically superior to out-group members has a number of functional values. It fortifies the barriers between in-group and out-group members and prevents intermarriage that might bring about a gradual disappearance of in-group out-group distinctions and a reduction of the

status of the dominant in-group to the economic and social level of the out-group. The idea also strengthens the in-group ties, giving a pseudo-logical reason for individual loyalty to the in-group. It therefore helps to preserve the *status quo*. Thus, when Aristotle expounded the doctrine of the biological origin of social differences, he was but expressing the belief of upper class Athenians that they had a permanent and irrevocable claim to the social status of master and that the slaves of Athens (members of an out-group) should keep to their place and refrain from protest if they found it an uncomfortable one.

The fiction that in-group out-group differences are of biological origin also serves the members of a dominant in-group as a salve to whatever conscience they may have. It relieves them of all responsibility for the ways they treat members of the out-group—for beating the slave, massacring primitive natives, paying no more than subsistence wages, and acting snobbishly toward the people who live on the wrong side of the tracks. The idea that subordinated groups are inferior because they were born to be that way is particularly useful in societies, such as those of the contemporary Western world, that profess and in many ways live up to the ideals of democracy. For in the democratic ideal "all men are born free and equal," whereas in crass social fact men in democracies as elsewhere are broken up into in-groups and out-groups of different social, economic, and political status.¹⁵ If the members of dominated out-groups were not honestly believed to be biologically inferior, the members of dominant in-groups would certainly be uneasy about their own position and might feel called upon to treat the members of the out-groups in less distinctive ways, *i.e.*, more as they treat one another. Thus the belief in the inherent inferiority of the physique, mentality, or morals of all members of out-groups serves as a needed rationalization to many an otherwise uneasy conscience.

That there is a certain social value in the belief that the members of an out-group are inferior because they are born that way does not, however, give it any scientific merit. The fact remains that personality norms are not the direct expression of some inherent force; they are a consequence of society. As societies differ from one another, so, too, do the normative personality attributes of the members.

RACIAL NORMS

The Concept of Race. In some societies the concept of race has not existed. The idea that mankind can be divided on the basis of skin

¹⁵ The conflict between the democratic idealism of the American people and the undemocratic treatment of our racial minorities is made much of in *An American dilemma* (G. Myrdal, 1944).

color or characteristic physiognomy into two or more distinct biological groups was apparently rather foreign to the early Egyptians, the Romans, the Chinese, and some other peoples. They had their in-group and out-group concepts; but because of historical accident, these were not founded upon biological criteria. It is only when out-group social divergences happen to coincide with some fairly well-pronounced biological distinctions that the theory of the racial determinism of personality attributes appears. In our own background, this coincidence has occurred; and with us the concept that there is an invariable relationship between physical appearance and personality has served long and well in the perpetuation of animosity between ethnic in-groups and out-groups.¹⁶

Following the decline of the Roman Empire and prior to the twelfth century, there was little movement of peoples in the Western world. Isolation had resulted in the localization of cultural attributes, each small community forming a basic in-group where strangers were looked upon as enemies. With the breakdown of feudal isolation and the growth of world exploration and trade, Europeans came into contact with peoples of divergent cultures and different biological attributes. Cultural and biological attributes became associated; and the idea that the cultural "inferiority" of the peoples of Africa, India, China, and the Americas was caused by natural (biological) inferiority of these "races" provided Europeans with an excellent justification for political and economic exploitation of them.¹⁷

The Aryan Myth. The fact that the peoples of the Western world

¹⁶ The arguments advanced in support of "white supremacy" are critically evaluated in *Caste, class, and race* (O. C. Cox, 1948) and those currently used to justify anti-Semitism in America are discussed and dismissed as fictions in *A mask for privilege* (C. A. McWilliams, 1948). The race ideology does not, of course, freeze in-group and out-group distinctions for all time, but it does give them a greater stability than most social arrangements. There is evidence that attitudes toward the Negro may change with college training (E. R. Bolton, 1937), but only if direct attention is paid to the cultures of other peoples (A. L. Porterfield, 1937). See also "The development of attitude toward the Negro" (E. L. Horowitz, 1936); "The development of children's nationality preferences, concepts, and attitudes" (H. Meltzer, 1941); "The development of stereotypes concerning the Negro" (R. Blake and W. Dennis, 1943); "Psychological investigations and the modification of racial attitudes" (E. L. Hartley, 1944); "Some roots of prejudice" (G. W. Allport and B. M. Kramer, 1946); "Factors associated with attitudes toward Jews" (A. A. Campbell, 1947); and "Class and ethnic attitudes" (P. Hatt, 1948).

For a detailed study of the limited effects that changing circumstances—in this case the wartime evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast—have upon racial antagonisms, see *A controlled attitude-tension survey* (L. Bloom, 1948).

¹⁷ For a brief consideration of the historical factors lying behind modern racial preconceptions, see "The rise of modern race antagonisms" (F. G. Detweiler, 1932).

today possess a more efficient technology than is found elsewhere is frequently taken as indicating that they have a superior biological heritage—an idea known to social psychologists as the Aryan myth. During the last century, the entire problem of group differences was neatly, if inaccurately, disposed of by the French savant de Gobineau. Following his lead, the early physical anthropologists devoted great energy to the measurement of human physical attributes in the attempt to find facts to fit the theory that mankind consists of a number of mutually exclusive racial groupings. As anthropometric techniques improved, the results became less and less convincing. It is true that upon the basis of some single criterion, such as skin color, or upon the basis of the more complex multiple criteria, such as pigmentation, texture of skin and hair, nostrility, and cephalic index, certain group types can be discerned. The typical African primitive is darker than the typical Polynesian; the latter, darker than the Oriental; and the Oriental, in turn, darker than the European. But the variation of color, etc., among the members of any such group is wide; and the distributions of physical attributes of various groups overlap. An individual of southern Europe may come much closer to the norm for the Polynesians than to that for Europeans. Such overlapping makes ridiculous all attempts to classify the human animal on the basis of mutually exclusive biological groups (note 40).

The idea that there is a distinct Aryan race has, however, persisted (note 41). As commonly used, the term means no more than "superior." It is a favorite shibboleth of political demagogues who identify Aryanism with national or religious affiliations to suit their particular purposes. In relatively recent times, we have witnessed an attempt to unite under one political system the various peoples of Europe justified in the name of racial identity and racial "destiny." Furthermore, the idea that civilization is doomed unless Western peoples maintain a high birth rate is invariably founded upon the assumption that the peoples native to Africa and Asia are biologically incapable of carrying on our culture. Much of the alarm expressed over our declining birth rate is thus rationalized, although the objection to birth control probably finds its origin in religious preconceptions. Even were we to assume that the people of western Europe form a distinct Aryan race, it would not follow that they are biologically superior to other "races." Using historical materials and arguing that cultural superiority presupposes biological superiority, almost anything can be claimed. It all depends on the period of world history that is selected for consideration.

The Cultural Nature of Racial Norms. Most if not all the differences commonly thought of as racial are, in fact, cultural (note 42). We

have already agreed that the people of Asia have both a somewhat darker skin and a different mode of social life than do those of Europe. That these correlations are causal does not follow. Vast cultural changes may take place without similar modification of "race"; and personality attributes of "racial" groupings undergo pronounced modifications as the social conditions under which these groupings live change.¹⁸ Many individuals of European origin have become "Chinified," and many Orientals have become culturally indistinguishable from Europeans. All the findings of sociology and of cultural anthropology support the conclusion that the source of personality differences is to be found in historical divergences rather than in biological variations.

Although there may be underlying functional similarities between different social systems, the particular institutions, mores, technical practices, etc., may be very different; and hence the personality norms of the members of one society may contrast sharply with those of another. With us it is probably true that few men will work hard and diligently unless they are spurred on by the prospect of self-gain. Ours is a society in which economic activities are still governed largely by the profit motive. Our personalities being what they are, there is therefore little reason to anticipate that an appeal to altruism will encourage men to work harder and more efficiently. It is also generally true of us that we tend to be preoccupied with tangible property, to evaluate one another in terms of the possession of material wealth, to deem quantitative increase in material goods a sign of progress, and to consider lazy and unworthy those among us who do not continually strive to increase their wealth.

The opposite has been true of some primitives. Our Northwest Indians, to be sure, were intensely competitive and like us measured almost everything in quantitative terms. But in some Indian groups it was definitely contrary to the norm to be competitive, either in work, sport, love, or other human activity.¹⁹ With these groups, to be first was not

¹⁸ See, for example, "The modification of Hawaiian character since the advent of the white man" (A. W. Lind, 1934). See also *Children of bondage: the personality development of Negro youth in the urban South* (A. Davis and J. Dollard, 1940); *Negro youth at the crossways: their personality development in the middle states* (E. F. Frazier, 1940); and *Deep South* (A. Davis, B. B. Gardner, and M. R. Gardner, 1941).

¹⁹ A survey of the literature on competition would force one to conclude that the evidence for a universal competitive urge is not convincing. See, for example, *Patterns of culture* (R. H. Benedict, 1934); *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples* (M. Mead, 1937); "The experimental psychology of competition" (J. Vaughn and C. M. Diserens, 1938); and "Social motives in economic activities" (T. N. Whitehead, 1938).

esteemed. Among some of the American natives, wealth consisted not of material objects but of magic powers socially inherited or else secured as compensation for labor. In those social systems men worked not for individual material profit but for their group.

What is true of economic motives and values is true of all other personality attributes: the norms differ from place to place, depending on the society rather than upon the inherent nature of man. It is generally true that men in Western societies violently resent any amorous affairs that their wives or sweethearts may have. The "unwritten law" is a reflection of the conviction that it is "natural" for men to be jealous of their wives. Actually, it is only normative for them to be so. In some societies men are resentful only when the wife, returning from an amorous adventure, fails to bring from her lover a token payment to the husband for her services. The fact that another looks with favor upon his wife is, in these societies, intensely flattering to the husband. If she reciprocates, the husband does not find in that fact a reason for jealousy.

There are many such contrasts in the norms of personality. The rapid cultural synthesis that has been going on during the past few centuries is, however, reducing them. Should a world society finally emerge, the biological divergences that permit us to think and talk of races will no longer be paralleled with differences in personality norms. The present differences in "racial" personality norms have developed as a result of cultural isolation; as cultural contacts grow, those differences tend to dissipate.

HABITATIONAL NORMS

In addition to the larger cultural differences in the norms of personality, there are many of a habital character, which have never been thought of as racial in origin, but which are frequently believed to result from different natural endowments. These differences are of two orders: regional, such as those between the New England Yankee and the Georgia Cracker; and rural-urban, such as those between the sophisticated city girl and her naive country cousin.

Regional Norms. Regional differences in personality norms originate in sectional isolation. In many countries a conventional but somewhat unrealistic comparison is made between the people of "the north" and those of "the south." The former are supposed to possess the virtues—or, from the southern point of view, vices—of hardihood, persistence, economy, diligence, shrewdness in economic and political dealings, rugged honesty, sharpness of voice, and quickness of manner. The latter, on the other hand, are supposed to be complacent, generous, unambitious, unduly trustful in economic and political matters, rather more concerned

with formalisms than with underlying realities, soft of voice, and slow of movement.²⁰ This north-south dichotomy of the personality attributes of the people within their respective countries is recognized by the Chinese, Italians, Spanish, French, English, Scotch, and Americans. National histories frequently utilize this dichotomy in interpreting the cause of national events. To explain the presumed differences, recourse is invariably made to climate; but either the differences are not so common as many suppose, or some other factor than climate is involved. For northern Italy is south of southern France; the climate of many regions in northern France differs little from that of southern England; northern England is south of southern Scotland.²¹

Although they cannot be correlated with latitude and climate, regional differences in personality do exist. In the United States, some distinctions can, for example, be drawn in rather general terms between the people of the north and the south (C. W. Hunter, 1927) and the east and the west. More apparent, however, are those of a more localized character. Outstanding in the popular mind are the "hillbillies," people born and reared in certain isolated mountain regions of Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Arkansas. Descendants of early Scotch-Irish immigrants who settled in the hill country, the hillbillies, because of isolation, have retained many of the old-country modes of life, modified to suit the new conditions, but otherwise relatively unaffected by the current of American social development. Then there is the "poor white trash" of the southern lowlands—people of diverse origin who have lived generation after generation upon submarginal land, in submarginal occupations, and in ways that are different from those more or less typical of American society. An even more striking group, perhaps the most famous in American literature, is the so-called "Pennsylvania Dutch," whose language, religion, and customs are in some regards so unusual that a visitor to the region feels that he is in a foreign land.

As the result of initial isolation, many personality differences have existed between the "typical" New England farmer and the "typical" Far West rancher. Both, however, are citizens of the United States, have a common national history, speak a common language, and have access

²⁰ In continuing his studies of "goodness" of areas Thorndike found the people of our Southern and Southwestern states to rank low in general welfare. As an hereditarian, he interpreted his data as indicating that the human stock is at fault (E. L. Thorndike, 1944).

²¹ For an attempt to correlate personality differences and nationality, see "National character" (M. Ginsberg, 1942). See also "Themes in Japanese culture" (G. Gorer, 1943); "Observations on the characteristics and distribution of German Nazis" (H. Peak, 1945); *The chrysanthemum and the sword; patterns of Japanese culture* (R. Benedict, 1946); and *The American people* (G. Gorer, 1948).

to a common literature. The differences between them have therefore tended to disappear with the growth of interregional communication. The newspaper, good roads, and the automobile have gone far to level off the regional differences in personality of the people of the United States. At present, the radio is believed by some to be wiping out regional linguistic differences; and it may well become a powerful force in establishing a common mode and manner of speech, based presumably upon the diction of the professional radio announcer.

Rural-urban Norms. The basic aspects of our social heritage are rural. The urban community, creature of trade and industrialism, has been superimposed upon an older, agricultural society. But the personality attributes that are characteristic of the farm and village are in some regards incompatible with the new conditions of life. The rural community is small, unconcentrated, homogeneous, and relatively self-sufficient. By contrast, the urban community is large, compact, heterogeneous, and dependent on relationships with other communities for its maintenance. Thus the modes of conduct that operate under rural-life conditions have been gradually modified among the people of cities. The city man has come to have attributes of personality somewhat distinct from those of his rural brother.²²

Personality differences of the rural-urban order are not peculiar to the modern world, but they have been made especially significant by the rapid rise of cities in western Europe and the United States during the past century. For the last fifty years the political and economic importance of the rural community has been declining, whereas that of the urban community has increased. The normative attributes of the city man have therefore gained prestige, and rural personality characteristics have lost value in the public eye. Reflected until very recently in our literature, art, and drama, this viewpoint led some of the earlier students of human behavior to assume that the city was draining the best "stocks" from the farm. They argued that the more ambitious, more intelligent, and better educated farm boys and girls moved on to the city, which offered greater opportunities and greater rewards. A depletion of the rural "blood" was envisaged, and the time was foreseen when we should have an American

²² The wide gap that exists between the normative personality attributes of the rural and urban person even in contemporary America is reported in the following: "The role of rural socio-cultural factors in the functional psychoses" (N. Blockman and S. G. Klebanoff, 1944); "The broad gap between rural and urban opinion" (P. H. Trescott, 1947); "Rural-urban people" (V. H. Whitney, 1948); "Personality development in farm, small-town, and city children" (L. H. Stott, 1939); "A comparison of the personality test scores of rural and urban college women" (A. E. Robertson and E. L. Stromberg, 1940); and *Mensch und Volk der Grossstadt* (W. Hellpach, 1939).

peasantry of low hereditary capacity.²³ Overlooked, however, was the fact that little concerning innate ability can be deduced from the observation that it is boys and girls with exceptional ambition who leave the farm and strike out for themselves in the city. Moreover, except for personal biases, there is no reason to suppose that ambition is necessarily meritorious.

To say that the farmer is a farmer because he is naturally incapable of becoming anything else is simply to reveal an urban bias. In spite of the elaborate studies that have been made to prove the biological superiority of urban populations, nothing has been proved except the existence of differences in the personality norms of rural and urban people.

CLASS AND CRAFT NORMS

Class. The Industrial Revolution, which has slowly narrowed racial and habitational differences in personality, has at the same time intensified and changed personality differences arising from class position. Until quite recently we here in America have been unaware of or at least unconcerned by the existence of classes in the American population. For one thing, class distinctions are in violation of our concept of democratic government. For another, the expanding character of our economic activities has made for such a great interchange of individuals between the classes²⁴ that there has been comparatively little class consciousness. In England and continental European countries, class distinctions have long been pronounced and the lines between classes relatively rigid. Some sociologists and economists believe that we are approaching something of the same sort in contemporary America.

The origin, nature, and function of social classes is a sociological problem.²⁵ Sociopsychological interest in classes lies in the fact that

²³ If intelligence tests could be taken at their face value as perfect reflections of inherited intelligence, one would be forced to admit from Klineberg's studies that the rural populations of Europe possess less inherited intelligence than do the urban groups (O. Klineberg, 1935). Klineberg's urban groups—from Paris, Hamburg, and Rome—differed but slightly one from another; yet they were markedly superior to his seven rural groups. On the other hand, Klineberg has offered other data that suggest that the differences between urban and rural groups in intelligence-test scores are at least in part a result of environmental differences. With 425 twelve-year-old Negro boys of New Orleans he found an almost perfect correlation between test score and length of city residence (O. Klineberg, 1935).

²⁴ For an amusing attempt to develop a class system among three white rats, see "An experimentally produced 'social problem' in rats" (O. H. Mowrer, 1939). One rat "did all the work" by repeatedly pressing a bar some distance from a food slot, while the others merely waited for their food at the slot.

²⁵ For brief summaries of the historical forces that have made for the breakdown of the old feudal class system and the rise of the three-class system, which is character-

in a class system, each class has something of its own personality norms. Sociopsychological analysis of class differences in personality is, however, made exceedingly difficult by the welter of popular preconceptions concerning the reason why one man belongs to the "lower" class while another belongs to the "upper" class. Unfortunately, more time and effort have gone into the attempt to verify the Aristotelian contention that some men are born to be slaves and some to be masters than into the actual study of class differentiation.

Class distinctions are based upon, and in the first instance arise from, some traditional method of division of labor among the members of a social group. Work differentiation is necessary for efficiency. Even the simpler peoples have occupational groups. Among the plains Indians, the males were divided into guardians (warriors), hunters, and butchers. With fishing peoples the division is necessarily different: boat-makers, boatmen, fishermen, etc. Among many primitives such occupational distinctions have no more than occupational significance. When, however, occupational position is associated with other distinctive social attributes, as it is in modern society, classes result.

The ideal Greek society, expressed most understandingly in the writings of Plato, involved three classes—warriors, workers, and leaders. Feudal society, also, involved three classes, although historians often lump the warriors and workers together as serfs. Class position was hereditary in feudal society, and the differences between the personality norms of classes were pronounced. In the transition from feudalism to our present society the old class barriers were swept away, a bourgeois class arose, and leadership passed from the hands of the old feudal political aristocracy to a new economic one. Because wealth is not exclusively a matter of inheritance under the industrial system, there has always been considerable individual interchange between classes.²⁶ In

istic of contemporary Western society, see A. Meusel's "Middle class" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 407-415); his article on "Proletariat" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 510-518); and *The evolution of social classes* (J. W. McConnell, 1942). That Americans consider themselves a middle-class nation is perhaps shown by the fact that only 21 per cent rate themselves as belonging to the upper or lower classes (*Fortune*, February, 1940). In a similar Gallup poll 12 per cent so rated themselves (*Gallup poll*, April, 1939). The term "middle class" has, however, seemed so unrealistic to many interviewees that in a 1945 national survey a fourth or "working class" was added to the three earlier categories. This latter "bin" attracted many who had previously labeled themselves as middle class as well as some who had considered themselves as belonging to the lower class. The survey's final tabulations gave the following percentages: upper class 3 per cent; middle class 43 per cent; working class 51 per cent; lower class 1 per cent; don't know 1 per cent; don't believe in classes 1 per cent (R. Centers, in press).

²⁶ Even in the "open-class" system, as it is called, only the individual whose per-

western Europe, however, the economic class lines and distinctions have long since become clear; and membership has partly solidified.

In many European countries, class consciousness is a real thing, as is evidenced by the political party line-up in the various national governments. Each class has something of its own conventions, some distinctive traditions, and some special points of view. During this present century the disorder and destruction brought by war, subjugation under ruthless conquerors, and revolutionary upheaval have from time to time affected but not as yet revised the class structure evolved during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.²⁷ In France, for example, we may still distinguish within the general population the agricultural peasantry—the “backbone” of the country—which is exceedingly conservative, intensely nationalistic, thrifty, and solid. In contrast to the peasant stands the industrial laborer, who is radically inclined, contemptuous of the peasantry, comparatively unstable, and, unlike the peasant, inclined to resent the political and industrial leaders. These leaders, although hardly a hereditary class, are cosmopolitan and tend to have their own social life and ways of looking at the world. Between the laborer and the leader stands the petty bourgeois—the small shopkeeper, small-scale manufacturer, and technician. He is conservative like the peasant but has somewhat different interests, something of his own society, and a definitely “middle-class” point of view. Movement does take place among these classes; a peasant may become a merchant and a worker may become a politician or industrialist. But so distinct are the characteristic personality attributes of each class that no one familiar with the French people would have much difficulty in placing a man in his class after a few moments of conversation with him.

In England, class distinctions are also clear. Although a poor boy may rise to wealth and knighthood, such exceptions only “prove” the rule. A man stays in the class to which he has been born. The attributes associated with the various classes include distinctive speech usages, interests, values, modes of dress, manners, etc. Nothing could, for example, be more definitive of the personality attributes of an English servant than to

sonality happens to deviate from the norms of his class has any real chance of rising to a higher class position. Thus the son of a working family must ordinarily be more ambitious, acquisitive, and perhaps ruthless than is normal for members of that class; or he cannot work his way into the middle class. Conversely, should he be less ambitious than normal, he may “sink”—in this case into chronic unemployment.

²⁷ The various European revolutions have no doubt been attempts to destroy the class structure and to establish new ones. So far, however, the general result has been only a change of personnel in the existing class categories. Thus in Germany during the 1930's the Nazis drove Jews from positions of economic leadership, but filled their places promptly with “Aryan” party members (H. Gerth, 1940).

state of him that he is a "gentleman's gentleman." Over the past half century the growth of labor unionism has somewhat reduced the economic gap between the classes in England as elsewhere. But it has at the same time tended to stratify class structure, for union organization enforces a conformity upon the working man that prevents him from rising out of the working class by exceptionally hard and skillful work. The "leveling" process begun by labor unionism has been accelerated in Britain by the rise of a variety of socialistic political devices, such as near-confiscatory taxes on large estates and incomes, by the rationing system instituted during the recent war and continued out of necessity into the peace, and by the nationalization under a Labor government administration of certain industries. Unquestionably these developments have made the traditional upper classes a good deal poorer; but it is not likely that they will eliminate class distinctions, however much they may reduce the economic importance of class position.

Here in America, where class lines are only now beginning to solidify, it is often more suggestive of a man's personality to designate the region where he was born than to state whether he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth or a shovel in his hand. For the personality norms of our various classes are still in the making,²⁸ and it would be foolish to predict the outcome. Perhaps the rapid technological and organizational changes that have prevented a crystallization of our class structure will come to an end and here, as elsewhere, the classes will be clearly defined and class position relatively permanent. Perhaps we may, on the other hand, attain that classless society envisaged by the American Constitution and the theoretical communists. In such a society no class differentiations in personality would exist.

Social Origin of Class Distinctions. It is argued by most sociologists that class differences in personality are based not upon native variations but upon differential training. Those who believe in the aristocracy of birth may argue otherwise; but in a society like ours, where class mobility has been very great, it would seem that the burden of giving evidence should be upon the hereditarian (note 43). The theory that wealth and power in society are a consequence of superior inherited potentialities is, after all, little more than a revision of the ancient and long discredited idea of the divine right of kings. That men differ in their innate potentialities to learn is highly probable; but that a class system represents a division of the better and poorer²⁹ strains in the social pop-

²⁸ But see *Caste and class in a southern town* (J. Dollard, 1937). For an attack on the semipsychoanalytic approach employed in this study, see "Mr. Dollard and scientific method" (L. H. Lanier, 1939).

²⁹ Social competence is obviously much easier to study among the feeble-minded

ulation is not to be proved by the mere fact that the "better" classes are better fed, clothed, and housed, better informed, more skillful at certain activities, and more ambitious and creative than the "lower" classes. There may be a positive correlation between innate potentialities and social position in certain instances, but there is no evidence that it is at all general. Among the things that a man "inherits" at birth is his class position, which in a large measure determines what he will become as a human being.

Craft Norms. In addition to those of class, each occupation within the class has something of its own special set of personality norms.⁸⁰ These invariably include more than special technical knowledge or skills. To be acceptable to craft membership, the vintager must know more than the craft techniques; he must know and accept the particular ideas, sentiments, and values of his craft. He must have a "feel" for wines and interest in those things—weather, for example—that go to make a good vintage year. He may even see history in terms of wine and vintage years, know geography in terms of wine regions, and judge people by their tastes in wine. His personality will therefore be different in many respects from the personality norms of other occupational groupings.

Although the decline of craftsmanship during the last few centuries has tended to level off occupational differences in personality, there remain such distinctions as those between the priest, the scientist, the medical man, the businessman, the politician, and the professional reformer. To illustrate, there is often a considerable conflict between the point of view of the scientist, who is interested primarily in facts, and that of the businessman, who is interested mainly in profits. Should the former examine advertising copy, he is likely to be concerned only with the validity of statements and therefore to be repulsed by its fictional nature; the businessman, on the other hand, will judge it in terms not of truth but of effectiveness. Such occupational differences become particularly apparent whenever representatives from a number of occupations are called upon to give expert advice upon some governmental problem. The fact that committees and commissions of investigation disagree is as likely to be an indication that the membership was drawn from different occupational groups, each with its special point of view, as it is to be an indication that their problem is unsolvable.

than among other portions of the general population. See "Influence of environment and etiology on social competence" (E. A. Doll, 1945).

⁸⁰ For descriptions of the way of life of some commonplace craft groups, see *The schoolma'am* (F. R. Donovan, 1938); and *The railroader* (W. F. Cottrell, 1940). For a technical analysis of occupational role and personality attributes, see "Institutional office and the person" (E. C. Hughes, 1937).

SEX NORMS

The Sex Division of Labor. In the modern world class and craft distinctions are dynamic. There is, however, one occupational distinction that remains at least relatively stable. This is the division of labor on the basis of sex. We frequently think of sex differences in personality as an automatic consequence of sex. It is a traditional belief that men and women differ intellectually and "emotionally" because they differ somewhat physiologically.⁸¹ This idea quite possibly developed out of the patriarchal family system, under which human activities were divided into two general categories: domestic and nondomestic. For reasons related to her sexual functioning, woman was assigned by convention to the former sphere of activities; man, to the latter. Basically nothing more than an expedient division of labor between the sexes, the personality attributes that were associated with each occupation were long interpreted as a natural consequence of the fact that men and women are physiologically different. The idea that woman's "nature" was somehow inferior to that of man developed, probably because under this system descent was calculated along the male line; for in the matriarchal family system, such as that still adhered to by the Basques, this idea does not appear.

The Changing Status of Women. We need not engage here in the interminable controversy over the respective merits of the two sexes.⁸² The old sexual division of labor has broken down under the impact of industrialization. During the past century a great number of formerly domestic activities have shifted from the home to the office, shop, and factory; and women have been "freed" to compete economically with men in many nondomestic occupations. In the process of working out a new equilibrium, there has been a considerable amount of bitter fric-

⁸¹ For an evaluation of the major observations in sex differences, see *The feminine character* (V. Klein, 1946). The bias here is biological.

⁸² Although the makers of mental tests attempt to be fair to both sexes, one type of test may favor the male and another the female. Thus, although girls are slightly better in the main on linguistic items, boys are a trifle better on arithmetic (H. S. Conrad, H. E. Jones, and H. H. Hsiao, 1933). But in total performance no socially significant sex differences in intelligence appear. Witty, for example, found that, contrary to general belief, high schools do not enroll more intelligent boys than girls (P. A. Witty, 1934). His finding was verified a decade later (W. D. Lewis, 1945). In the later study more high-scoring girls than boys were found in the fourth to eighth grades.

For further reading on the topic of sex differences, see "Sex in social psychology" (C. C. Miles, 1935); "Recent research on sex differences" (C. N. Allen, 1935); "Sex differences in intelligence test scores" (G. M. Kuznets and O. McNemar, 1940); and "Psychological sex differences" (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1946).

tion between the "career" woman and the old-fashioned male and quite possibly as much between the "new" man and the old-fashioned female. In the heat of debate almost everything has been claimed for one side or the other. Upon the contention that because of their natural moral superiority they would purge politics of its corruption, women were given the ballot; upon the charge that because of their natural intellectual inferiority they are incompetent, they have been denied any significant place in political life. Men have been called the destroyers, women, the creative force, behind civilization. Women have been termed an insidious force undermining men, the hidden cause of war and social degradation; they have also been acclaimed the foundation of peace and security. All this indicates what every man and woman knows: there are some residual personality differences between men and women.

That the small girl tends to be more interested in dolls than does her brother is not an indication, however, that such an interest is a direct consequence of her sex. In our society, as we have seen, girls and boys are treated differently. Because it is conventional—not because it is natural—the girl may be taught to display more concern over clothes, personal cleanliness, and intimate family affairs than may her brother. Because he is a boy, the latter is allowed and encouraged to develop interests in games, play wagons, footballs, hiking, etc., and in associates outside the immediate family. If we find that the girl and boy in later life differ in their basic interests, capacities, capabilities, and sentiments, we should not be astonished. Although they live in the same society, that society has responded to them quite differently (note 44). Obvious is the fact that men are supposed to be concerned with "manly" things; and since dressmaking, hairdressing, housekeeping, and child tending do not enter into this category, the male is discouraged from such activities. Because it is "proper" for women to be feminine, we discourage the girl from developing interests in blacksmithing, prizefighting, engineering, and other masculine activities. The list of exclusively male and female occupational interests is rapidly dwindling, and the forces that keep men and women in their respective "places" are subsiding; but the belief that the personalities of men and women differ because men and women differ sexually persists.

It is a notable and unquestionable fact that the majority of great scientists, writers, artists, musicians, and statesmen and many of the more successful cooks, dress designers, decorators, etc., have been men.²² This is

²² Two phenomena—the greater frequency of male "geniuses" and the old belief that there are more male than female mental defectives—have led to the theory that man is more variable than woman. No complete survey has ever been made of the feeble-minded population. To know the relative numbers of the two sexes in hospitals

often interpreted as proof of the natural inferiority of the female. The social superiority of men would seem, however, to be a direct consequence of the conventional sexual division of labor, which even today centers the attention of women upon the home and prevents any large proportion of them from acquiring the strong motivations necessary to any considerable success in nondomestic occupational life. The interpretation that it is natural for women to be domestic undoubtedly reflects only the prejudice of the successful male who would defend his social superiority.

We do not, of course, question the social importance of the physiological differences between men and women but simply suggest that the associated personality differences are almost entirely of a social rather than physiological origin. Every social system must certainly take into account the fact that the anatomy and physiology of the sexes are in some respects different. But it is to the particular social system that we must look for an explanation of the quite divergent personality attributes that men and women tend to have. Even the "emotional" distinctions between the sexes can be adequately explained without recourse to physiology, and the presumed difference in sexual responsiveness is probably a consequence of the double standard of morality. Where that standard does not exist, no significant differences of this order can be found. If, as is so often asserted, the women of our society are inclined to be a trifle "colder" than the men, the cause would appear to lie in the fact that some remnants of Puritanism still remain with us. If, as seems likely, women are more interested in and more efficient at domestic activities than are men and are less capable in other directions, the reason is to be found in the fact that, the Industrial Revolution notwithstanding, much of the ancient patriarchal division of labor upon the basis of sex is still retained.

PERSONALITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Throughout the past few hundred years the forces of violent social change have been breaking down the isolation of social groups, mixing and blending the members of various groups, and disorganizing social systems. One of the many consequences has been the blurring of in-group and out-group distinctions and of differences in personality norms. The old in-group ideologies, however, have persisted; and new ones have

for the feeble-minded is of little aid; for feeble-minded men are notoriously more difficult to care for at home than are women. The former, therefore, are probably passed on to the state institutions in far greater numbers.

Although one study (Q. McNemar and L. M. Terman, 1936) indicated that the IQ of boys is slightly more variable than that of girls, more recent studies (A. M. Macmeeken, 1939; M. G. Rigg, 1940) yielded no differences that were statistically significant. Yet in spite of these data some mental testers still hold that boys are more variable than girls (A. M. Macmeeken, 1939; J. A. Fraser Roberts, 1945).

been developed. We still think and often act in terms of race, of nation, of class, etc. We still make positive identifications with those people who happen for the moment to be classified among our friends, and we still make negative identifications with others who seem for the moment to be our enemies. But there is today little functional basis for and still less stability to many of our in-groups and out-groups. The friends of yesterday may be our enemies today, the despised inferiors of yesterday our present companions-in-arms.

With the decline in social stability and the blurring of normative differences in personality, deviant attributes have come to make up an increasingly large part of the personalities of modern men. To put it another way, as the personality differences between groups of people have lessened, the personality differences between the members of each group have increased. These are the differences that we shall consider in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIV

PERSONALITY DEVIATIONS

The normative attributes of personality are, as we have said, to be regarded as the successes of socialization. They make for social efficiency; they permit person-to-person adjustment in terms of group ways. No social system, however, has yet developed that could so completely socialize the individual that all members in the society, or even those of like sex and age, would behave exactly like one another. Accidents and incidents of personal experience and, perhaps, differing aptitudes for learning are perpetually interfering with the development of normative attributes. As a consequence, each member of society, even a member of a small and isolated primitive community, will so differ from his fellows that he is in some respects an individual. All members of a Bantu village will be more like one another than any one of them is like Australian bushmen. They will, however, differ to some extent and in some ways from one another in their personality characteristics, even as they will in height, weight, and other physical attributes.¹

In the dynamic, complex societies of the modern world, where the group norms are often vague and are usually confused and overlapping, the socialization of the individual involves, as we have seen, a high proportion of "errors." He acquires, necessarily, many of the normative personality attributes of his society and of the particular groups of which he is a member. If he did not, he would be, in social terms, less than human. Thus he almost invariably learns to speak the language of those around him. Peculiarities of parental or other treatment may, however, teach him to speak that language in some atypical way—to talk less or more than most of his fellows, to "ponder" his words excessively or to converse with exceptional facility, etc. In such or in any one of a number of other ways attributes of the given individual's personality may differ from the norms of his social groups. Often termed "individuality," these attributes will be designated here by the more descriptive term "deviations" or, alternately, "deviant attributes" of personality.

The Relativity of Deviant Attributes. There is nothing absolute about the distinction between normative and deviant attributes of per-

¹ See "Personality in preliterate societies" (J. Gillin, 1939) for an extensive bibliography on the subject.

sonality. That is deviant which differs from the norm for the society or for the groups therein of which the individual is a member. Since norms differ widely from society to society and from group to group within the society, so too will the social definition of any given personality attribute. The mere fact that so-and-so walks down city streets hatless is not sufficient grounds for considering this behavior an expression of a deviant attribute of personality. In New York City it would be; in Los Angeles such behavior is distinctly normal. The fact that Mr. Smith likes well-aged fish marks him out in this respect as a deviate. Mr. Smith is an American; and in America fish, unlike cheese, rots rather than "improves" with age. In an arctic village, on the other hand, not to like well-aged fish would be a deviation from the norm. In the arctic, fish "improves" with the passage of time and the action of bacteria. What behavior will be an evidence of personality deviation depends, therefore, on the point of reference. Depending on the point of reference, one man's deviation is another man's norm.

Although it is a relative one, the distinction between those personality attributes that are normative and those that are deviant is of considerable sociopsychological significance. The normative attributes of a given personality are to be seen as the successes of the socialization processes, whereas the deviant attributes are evidences that at this and that point the socialization processes broke down or were for some reason unsuccessful. Thus it is that we look into the social system for the origin of the normative attributes of a given personality and elsewhere—broadly speaking, into the effects of social change and disorganization—for the origins of the deviations. Furthermore, we see in the one forces for the perpetuation of the social *status quo* and in the other forces making for disturbance and change thereof.

To the historian, the sociologist, and the political scientist, this latter distinction is particularly important. The study of historical events—social changes, political and economic developments, etc.—is, again broadly speaking, the study of the impact of deviant attributes upon the normal way of life of a people. From a social viewpoint, a deviant attribute of personality is an experiment; if that attribute proves successful, it may be taken over by more and more individuals until it is a new norm for the society. It is then a normative attribute of personality. This is what has happened when a new word, for example, has become so much used that it is formally incorporated into a language.

Deviations in Kind and in Degree. The number of possible respects in which a given personality might deviate from the norms is beyond computation. Every norm of the group is subject to violation, and even the simplest of social groups has innumerable norms. For example, there

will be a normative way to pronounce each of the words used by the members of the group, to say nothing of a variety of other norms related to the ways in which that word may be used. It is impossible, therefore, and it would be futile anyway, to list the various deviations that appear in our or any society. We may, however, indicate something of the nature of deviation *per se*.

The churchman's "sins of omission and commission" become in our terms deviations in kind. On the one hand, a given personality may fail to include one or a number of personality attributes that are normative for the group. Thus the individual may never have acquired some of the filial sentiments normal to sons in his society, or he may have failed to learn to like one of the foods normally served and eaten. On the other hand, the given personality may include attributes that are not normally found in the members of his society. Thus he may have inadvertently learned to be sexually attracted to members of his own rather than, as is normal in all societies, the other sex. Or he may have learned to like as food something, say snails, defined as food by some groups but not by his own.

Deviations in kind are presumably responsible in part for such atypical forms of behavior in our society as those of the inventor (who "wants" to do what no one has previously done) and those of the scientist (who "wants" to know what no one yet knows) and all other forms of creativeness and adventuresomeness, including immoral and criminal acts of unique character. They seem also to be involved in acts of "treason," whether to the nation or to some other of the individual's in-groups. Thus it is in part because he failed to acquire normal loyalty to his native country that the traitor becomes a spy for the enemy, and it is in part because he acquired a desire for higher status than a laboring man that the son of a laborer becomes a racketeer or deserts his parents by marrying into an upper class family.

Personality deviations in degree are probably always linked up operationally with deviations in kind, but they may be distinguished from them conceptually. In a society in which it is normal to believe in God, the atheist would be one who had failed to accept the normal religious beliefs and sentiments of his society. He would differ in this respect *in kind* from those about him. The religious fanatic, on the other hand, would be one who had, as it were, too wholeheartedly embraced religious beliefs and sentiments. He would differ *in degree* from those about him.

Each group norm involves, in addition to the kind of feeling, taste, sentiment, motive, or whatnot, an intensity or degree thereof. Thus normatively an individual may have a scale of food tastes in which he prefers A to B and B to C; and similar scales of preferences may apply

to persons, forms of work, play, etc. In a given society it may, for example, be normative to love one's wife more than one's mother, one's mother more than one's sisters, and one's sister more than any woman outside the family circle. For socialization into the normative patterns involves, not only the establishment of the pattern of response, but the establishment of the intensity of that response.

It often happens, however, that a given individual will acquire a normative personality attribute, but to a markedly less or greater degree than is normal. Thus although he likes both meat and potatoes, as is normal, he likes meat less and potatoes more than normal; as a consequence he tends to eat his potatoes and leave his meat. The same principle is involved on a more complex level when an individual is mistrained in the degree of his attachments to various members of his family or his other social groups. Although it may be normal to put the interests of his wife before those of his mother, he may be so intensely identified with the latter that he puts her interests above those of his wife. Likewise, although it is perhaps normal in our society to put national welfare above personal and family welfare during times of crisis, such as war, a given individual may deviate in that his concern for his family is so very great that it cannot be even temporarily subordinated to his concern for the nation.

Motivational deviations in degree are often in part responsible for individual movement into and out of established social roles. The "ambitious" man who unlike most of his fellows works and schemes his way up in a business organization, a governmental bureaucracy, or the political hierarchy, who makes a big business out of a small one, who struggles to get into college although his parental background does not require it, or who in any other way attempts to rise and perhaps succeeds in rising in the social scale may have normal motivations but in abnormal degree. Conversely, the man who slips, falls, or slides down the social scale may also have the normal motivations but in subnormal degree. Thus the lazy and improvident farmer may "want" to farm for a livelihood, but not quite enough to get out of bed at dawn every day or to keep at work when he does not feel quite up to par. And the son of a middle-class family may be normative in that he "wants" to enter one of the professions, but not quite intensely enough to work hard enough to get the grades necessary to gain admission to medical, law, or some other graduate school.

The distinction between deviation in degree and in kind can perhaps be seen most clearly in the difference between the man who does not get ahead in the world, or even perhaps stay in his assigned place, because he does not want to badly enough and the man who loses his job or his sta-

tion in life because he is preoccupied with some esoteric activity that precludes his doing the things that are normal to that job or life position.

Lay Recognition of Deviations. Since the normative attributes in the personalities of those about us are a commonplace, we take them more or less for granted and tend to be aware only of those attributes that constitute deviations from the norms. Thus in our relations with an acquaintance or friend we can and will take for granted the fact that he speaks English. But we may be acutely aware of and strive to adjust to the fact that he speaks very slowly or rapidly, that he swears ² to excess or never uses profane language, that he has a painfully small vocabulary or a distressingly large one, etc. But note that each of these distinctions implies the existence of some more or less definite norm from which the deviation occurs—a normal rate of speech, a normal use of profanity, a normal size of vocabulary.

In lay usage there are thousands of terms by which we endeavor to suggest at once the character of the norm and the specific nature and extent of the deviation from it.³ Some, such as fastidious, flashy, and arty, refer to peculiarities of taste in food, dress, art, and the like. Some, such as mechanical and clumsy, indicate special manual skills or the absence of normal skills. Some, such as modesty, shyness, boldness, and self-consciousness, are used to indicate deviant covert behaviors that are inferred from overt behaviors. All such attributes of individuality are important to the people who possess them and to those who must get along with these people. The man who likes his steak cooked in just such a fashion will be distressed if he is forced to eat in an ordinary restaurant; the restaurant proprietor who caters to epicures and gourmets must know the individual preferences of his various customers. The girl who is shy will be at a disadvantage when she goes to a dance; and her partner may have considerable difficulty in getting along with her because, as he might express it, "She won't act natural."

The Lay versus the Scientific View of Deviation. The lay idea of a criminal is ordinarily that of a person who is perpetually engaged in stealing everything he can get his hands upon, who is untrustworthy in all regards, who has no consideration for other people, etc. The lay idea of a psychopath is usually that of a person who is constantly strug-

² For a discussion of the normative and deviant aspects of swearing, see "On the physiology and psychology of swearing" (M. F. A. Montagu, 1942).

³ For a list of 17,953 such terms, see "Trait names—a psycho-lexical study" (G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert, 1936). For a criticism thereof, see "Unitary traits of personality and factor theory" (J. P. Guilford, 1936). For a treatment of trait names as adjectival stereotypes, see "A study of personality from the standpoint of social stimulus value" (M. A. Durea, 1939).

gling against restraint, brandishing knives, or doing some extraordinary thing. The layman may, therefore, be astonished and dismayed by the discovery that the pleasant man who lives next door is not a night watchman but is in fact a second-story burglar and may be mortified to learn that the man who has just given him a lucid explanation of the operation of the state hospital is not one of the physicians but is in fact one of the patients.

In our ordinary person-to-person relations we frequently deduce the whole of a given person's personality from evidence of a very few deviant attributes. This is the process of personality stereotyping that was discussed in an earlier chapter. The procedure is "reasonable," however unrealistic. The man we judge to be honest may prove to be honest in all his relations with us. For us he is, then, an honest man. That he may be dishonest in his relations with his wife, deceive his mistress, and cheat on his income-tax report is unimportant to us. What is significant for us as individuals who must somehow adjust to the human beings around us is not the total personalities of those human beings but the relevant parts or phases of them.

But in studying the human personality—as contrasted to trying to adjust to it—we must attempt to examine each element in turn, to see the relation of each to the others, and thus to arrive at an understanding of the whole. This endeavor is vastly complicated by two interrelated circumstances, which were discussed in the opening chapter of this part of the book and should now be recalled.

In the first place, a personality is not a homogeneous entity. It consists, as we have seen, of some attributes that are normative and some that are deviant. The possession of one attribute does not ensure the possession of another,⁴ nor does the possession of one preclude the possession of another. As a result the layman's deduction of the whole from the known part is scientifically not permissible. Until all the "parts" of the personality are known, and the dynamic interrelations thereof determined, the whole remains unknown.

In the second place, the "parts" of a given personality can be known only as they function in some sort of situation; *e.g.*, "honesty" appears only under circumstances in which it is possible to steal, cheat, tell lies, etc. This means that deviant attributes of personality must be observed in operation—as one factor in an interaction. Since the interaction necessarily involves a number of variables, it is difficult to isolate the personality

⁴ This is not to say that certain attributes do not tend to occur together in many people. In fact, attributes rated by laymen as "good" tend to be positively correlated. Some of this association can be explained away, however, as a function of the halo effect (see Appendix note 46).

from the context in which it behaves.⁵ Thus, we are never absolutely certain whether two people are behaving differently because of different factors in their personalities or because of different circumstances in the situation in which they behave. Likewise, we are never completely certain whether changes in a given person's behavior are to be traced to variables within his personality or to variables within the situation in which it operates. These complicating facts and the attempts that have been made to surmount them will concern us for the remainder of this chapter.

MANIFESTATIONS OF DEVIANT ATTRIBUTES

Trait Analysis. The study of deviant attributes initially centered around the concept of personality traits. As used by many laymen and by even a few writers, a "trait" was an all-or-none quality possessed by the individual. Thus, if a man possessed the "trait" of honesty, he would invariably be honest; to put it another way, if he possessed the trait of honesty, he did not possess that of dishonesty. The individual would therefore be either honest or dishonest, stubborn or vacillating, persevering or lazy, aggressive or unaggressive, etc.

But as the study of personality traits progressed, it began to appear that traits are highly specific rather than general. The person who under one test or observational situation proved to be honest and was thus assumed to possess the normative personality trait of honesty, might in a somewhat different test or situation give evidence of possessing the deviant trait of dishonesty.⁶ Such contradictory research data led to the acceptance of the view that a personality trait is a highly specific pattern which will appear in one kind of situation and that kind only. Support for this view was soon found in the common, but generally ignored, fact that people are not necessarily consistent; for example, a man may be aggressive in love-making and yet entirely unaggressive in economic matters; or he may be aggressive in making love to Mary and relatively unaggressive in his courtship of Ann. Such being the case, it is obviously impossible to say of him that he possesses the trait of aggressiveness or of unaggressiveness. He seems, rather, to possess a variety of specific traits, some of aggressiveness and some of unaggressiveness. And the same thing will be true for him and for any individual in regard to honesty, ambitiousness, extroversion, etc.

⁵ So difficult, in fact, is this procedure that at least one social psychologist would abandon the attempt (L. S. Cottrell, Jr., 1942).

⁶ For a description and discussion of the Hartshorne-May studies of honesty—which gave great impetus to the trait-analysis approach to personality—and of subsequent and often qualifying studies, see Appendix note 45.

Trait analysis came, therefore, to conceive of the personality as a collection of highly specific and discrete preparations to behave; and for some years this view dominated social psychologists, particularly those who were primarily interested in the measurement of deviant attributes.

The Covert "Frame of Reference." The limitations of trying to study personality in the same kind of way that one would take inventory of the stock in a grocery store finally became apparent to many social psychologists, and a number of new systems of analysis were devised. Of the earlier systems, perhaps the most simple and in some respects most useful was that which found the explanation for the apparent contradictions in an individual's behavior in the contrast between an observer's view of an individual and the individual's own view of himself.⁷ From the observer's point of view, the behaviors of an individual may seem markedly contradictory and explainable only in terms of the specificity of traits. But to the individual himself, no contradiction may be apparent. The thief who is honest with his fellow thieves may see no contradiction between stealing in some situations and not stealing in others; the man who teaches his children that honesty is the best policy may see no contradiction between this procedure and the grandiose advertising claims he makes for the product of his factory; the man who indulges his own children may see no contradiction between this practice and the fact that as a juvenile court judge he is severe with the children of other men.

The observer of behavior, in this case the constructor of tests or other measurement devices, applies formal—*i.e.*, Aristotelian—logic to the interpretation of what he observes. In formal logic, "honesty" means honesty in general, so that to be honest in one circumstance and dishonest in another is illogical. But the individual who behaves in what the observer sees as contradictory ways may feel and think of himself as "logical"; for the individual's system of logic is personal rather than social. The concept of a personal system of logic was termed the individual's "frame of reference."⁸

⁷ It often happens that the individual's view of himself is in terms of an institutional ideal and is not realistic. Thus, when a group of Roman Catholic students were contacted to learn their attitudes on birth control, they stated that the "typical Catholic" was strongly opposed to contraception. Yet their test scores showed them to be typically neutral (B. R. Sappenfield, 1942).

⁸ The concept of a frame or point of reference has been well described by Sherif in his *The psychology of social norms* (M. Sherif, 1936). Allport has also made use of the frame of reference in his treatment of the Hartshorne-May honesty data. According to him: "The low correlations found between the tests employed prove only that children are not consistent *in the same way*, not that they are inconsistent with *themselves*." (G. W. Allport, 1937, p. 250.) See also "Rationalization in

To the observer it may not "make sense" for the struggling artist to go hungry in order to buy pigment and canvas and to paint pictures that no one will purchase. But in terms of the artist's own frame of reference this behavior may seem reasonable and much more sensible than spending his money for food of which he might say, "It will soon be gone, and then what will I have to show for it?" To the observer it may not "make sense" for a man to be aggressive in dealings with his business associates and yet humble and meek in his relations with his wife. But to the man himself there may seem to be the utmost good sense involved. As he might say, "I must be aggressive to make money in business, but it is easier to let my wife have her way than to run counter to her will. When I am home, I want a little peace and quiet; and the only way to get that is to agree to everything she says."

Thus the individual's frame of reference was believed to serve much the same function for him in his various person-to-person relations as the ideologies of the in-group do for its members in their relations with the members of out-groups. Because of his peculiar frame of reference, the individual can "reasonably" be severe with his son but lenient with his daughter, just as his social ideologies make it possible for him justly to kill enemy soldiers, although he succors those of his own side.

The individual's frame of reference would determine in the first instance the meaning to him of any given situation; thus this system of analysis tried to take into account the fact, discussed above, that behavior is always a function of some sort of situation as well as of the personality. A man may be smiling and talking pleasantly until a new topic is introduced into the conversation, when his speech becomes bitter and violent; in terms of his frame of reference, but not necessarily that of others, the situation has become an entirely different one. The same is true of the man who flirts with the pretty girl at the next table until his wife returns to join him at his, when he becomes once again the model husband, and of the man who is honest with his business associates until there arises what he interprets as a justifiable reason for dishonesty. The individual's frame of reference was itself thought to be determined by his particular scheme of values and beliefs; thus it was not considered to be a trait or attribute of personality, but, rather, the product of many such

recognition as a result of a political frame of reference" (A. L. Edwards, 1941) and "Studies in the principles of judgments and attitudes: III. The functional equivalence of two differently structured references" (M. Hertzman, 1940). For a small sample of the experiments that have been conducted on the frame of reference, see "Anchoring effects in judgment" (W. A. Hunt, 1941); "The relation of personal frames of reference to social judgments" (L. W. Kay, 1943); and "Number judgment of postage stamps: a contribution to the psychology of social norms" (H. Ansbacher, 1938).

traits or attributes, *i.e.*, a system or organization of various elements of personality.

The Organization of Deviant Attributes. The frame-of-reference concept was perhaps overly intellectual in that it made all behavior seem calculated. But the idea of the personality as more than the sum of a number of parts was the starting point for a number of fruitful methods of analysis, including that which was discussed in detail in Chapter XI. In that analytical system, it will be recalled, personality is viewed as composed of a great number of highly varied and rather specific attributes, no one of which, however, comes into operation as an independent entity, as traits both general and specific were believed to do. Personality attributes may be thought of as operating somewhat like the individual words in a language—in systems or organizations—and the character of the particular organization of attributes that comes into operation in a given situation is as important as the nature of the attributes themselves. Even as ten words can be organized into a number of different sentences, each with a special meaning, so a given “set” of personality attributes may be organized in such different ways under varying situational circumstances that resulting behaviors may seem to the observer entirely contradictory.

The effect of situational factors in the making of behavior is taken into account by the idea that the first item that enters into the formation of a given organization of personality attributes is the individual's definition of the situation, which is, of course, expressive of an attribute of his personality. That definition, often a stereotype, may be normative for the members of his group or it may be the expression of a deviant attribute of his personality. If it is a deviant one, the individual's behavior in the situation may then be atypical merely because he defined the situation differently than most people would, not because he was atypically socialized for this particular kind of situation. In simple terms, he “misunderstood” the situation and for that reason alone behaved in an atypical way. This is what happens when a man makes what may be called an “honest” mistake in filling out his income-tax return, when he mistakenly rebuffs the friendly advances of another person, or when he misguidedly invests his fortune in a wildly speculative venture. From the behavior alone, it might be inferred that the individual possesses the deviant attributes of dishonesty, unfriendliness, or cupidity, whereas the deviant attribute that was actually involved was the one that led him to misdefine the situation. The other attributes that entered into the particular organization of his personality may have been normative. Any atypical action will indicate the possession of some deviant attribute, but just what deviant attribute is involved is often difficult to ascertain. The practical importance of this

distinction is seen in the fact that even in law an attempt is made to ascertain the "intent" in a criminal act, which involves the recognition that it is entirely possible to act dishonestly by "honest" conduct in a mistakenly defined situation.

Atypical behavior does not, therefore, of itself demonstrate the kind of deviant attributes of personality possessed by an individual. But neither does typical behavior prove the possession of normative attributes. For included in the organization of attributes which comes into operation in a given situation, there may be a concern with group membership which serves to repress the expression of a deviant attribute. Such concerns, which constitute the fourth category of personality attributes, will be discussed as social control in the following chapter. But it should be observed here that in general social control operates to disguise or conceal the possession of deviant attributes. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the person who is honest in a given situation is necessarily an honest person or that the one who seems to be normally ambitious is not in fact abnormally lazy.

The problem of ascertaining what specific deviant attributes are responsible for atypical behavior and isolating them from situational factors appears in our daily life in many ways. If Jones and his wife finally separate, should it be deduced that they are both poor matrimonial risks? Clearly neither could get along with the other. But it does not follow that Jones will fail to get along with his second wife and the former Mrs. Jones fail to get along with her second husband. If, however, either or both repeat their marital failure, there is cause for suspecting that their personalities include deviant attributes that are incompatible with success in marriage. And after the third or fourth failure, the suspicion justly turns to certainty.

THE PROBLEMS OF DEVIATION ILLUSTRATED: LEADERSHIP (NOTE 46)

Attitudinal questionnaires, vocational and other interest tests, personality rating scales, and many other techniques have been devised in an attempt to measure deviant attributes of personality apart from the organizations and situations in which they function.⁹ In general, it may be said

⁹ A fairly profitable way of studying the marital aptitudes of people like the Jones pair has been to develop a formal test battery of items that forecast success in marriage. Then if Mr. or Mrs. Jones is found to make an extremely low score, we can assume with some certainty that the characteristics are such that success with any marital partner is unlikely.

The same problems are encountered in attempts to distinguish between and to measure such deviations as introversion and extroversion, adequacy and inadequacy, stability and instability, activity and passivity, etc. (note 48). In such attempts de-

that peculiarities of food, dress, housing, and other tastes or preferences are fairly easy to ascertain. Special intellectual and manual skills and lack of normal skills can also be measured with reasonable ease and accuracy. But those attributes that operate in person-to-person situations and are of primary concern to the social psychologist are difficult to conceptualize and all too frequently impossible to measure with any degree of scientific accuracy. The various problems that arise when we attempt to study any of the more complex deviant attributes can be illustrated by a consideration of the phenomenon of leadership.

Leadership Defined. Leadership is behavior that affects the behavior of other people more than their behavior affects that of the leader.¹⁰ Thus, when an army officer gives commands that are obeyed, he is exercising leadership; when the teacher speaks and the students listen, the teacher is providing leadership; when the mother orders her son to wipe his feet and he does so, the mother is exerting leadership. At first reading, the idea of leadership may seem simple enough.

But the first complication arises from the fact that the situation in which leadership appears is always interactional. Soldiers who will respond must be present before the officer can exercise leadership over them; they must be faced forward before he can order them to face about, etc. What they do affects his behavior just as what he does affects theirs, but to a lesser extent. Since there is invariably an interaction occurring between the leader and the led, it is often difficult to determine just who affects whom and to what extent.

Nominal versus Actual Leadership. In many instances leadership is nominal only. In the modern world the few remaining kings exercise little if any leadership in the governments they symbolize. They may go through the motions of signing documents, opening conclaves, and the like; but about the only people whom they actually lead are their personal servants. Many of the functionaries of government, business, and other organizations¹¹ also are leaders in name only. The chairmanship of the board may be a position of actual leadership. But it is just as likely to be the place to which the organization retires its outmoded president,

viations are usually conceived to be in one of two possible directions from a modal point. The opposite of leadership would, in this concept, be subordination. For a survey of the literature on leadership, see "Personal factors associated with leadership" (R. M. Stogdill, 1948).

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of this concept, see "Types of power and status" (H. Goldhamer and E. A. Shils, 1939). See also "Leadership" (I. Knickerbocker, 1948).

¹¹ Many high-school student leaders exercise nominal leadership only. They are officeholders who have achieved their honors by way of seniority rules, social position, or some other institutional procedure (M. K. Remmlein, 1938). See also "Dilemma of leadership" (L. K. Frank, 1939).

a place where he can amuse himself by acting important without interfering with the conduct of the business. Likewise, the office of mayor in American cities may be a position of actual leadership; but it is frequently only a front for the undercover boss of the political machine.

In many person-to-person relationships, even in the more intimate ones of family and community life the apparent leader may not be the actual one. From the fact that a man does most of the talking around his home, it does not follow that he is necessarily leader in the husband-wife relationship. He may talk and she may get her way.¹² And a man may appear to be submitting to his wife's nagging while he is actually ignoring her and reading his newspaper.

The nominal leader has status as leader but does not exercise leadership. Many of the institutional and conventional roles in society give the individual the status of leader, but whether the individual in such a role actually exercises leadership will depend in part upon his own personality. In the old family system the patriarch was accorded the status of leader in certain fields of activity (the matriarch was supposed to rule in domestic matters). But if the patriarch was a weak and indecisive person, or if he was ill and incompetent, one of his sons might take over the task of actual leadership. During the times when we have had an especially weak man in the role of President of the United States, the actual administration of the Federal government has passed from the presidency to other, and largely unofficial, hands.

Personality Attributes Involved in Leadership. Leadership status may be achieved by some socially designated system, such as seniority. But leadership status may also be achieved by the individual's taking over or usurping the role of someone else or by his creating a new leadership role. Leadership may then be in large measure a result of particular attributes of personality.

The attributes of personality that are involved in leadership by those who have acquired their status as leaders by hereditary position, seniority, or the like are normative rather than deviant. It is socially normal for patriarchs to be leaders of their families, for army officers to progress

¹² In many cultures leadership by women must be indirect and subtle. Nominal leadership by men is the accepted rule; leadership and ladylike behavior are considered incompatible (A. H. Maslow, 1937).

Among the chimpanzees the dominant male yields his position of dominance to his mate whenever she is in oestrus. But only during this period is she able to obtain her fill of food until her mate is satisfied. Perhaps her temporary dominance might be termed nominal (M. P. Crawford, 1940). The close relation between dominance and sex in animals is also shown by the fact that many male animals when in the presence of more dominant males will assume the female sexual postures (A. H. Maslow, 1936, and A. H. Maslow and S. Flanzbaum, 1936).

slowly up the ranks, etc. The leadership attributes of such men are not accidental but are a consequence of systematic training. The landed aristocrat, the member of the military caste, the political bureaucrat, the son or daughter of a "best" family, and the economic "royalist" were brought up for their status as leaders. In England before 1940, for example, most of the governmental leaders were prepared for their positions by public (*i.e.*, private) school and then Oxford or Cambridge.

The person who has been socially and systematically trained to a position of leadership usually displays less aggressiveness and more conservatism than does the so-called "self-made" man. He generally shows considerable concern for the welfare of his in-group—the traditional leader class—and depreciates self-advancement.¹³ Such leadership often results in attempting to fight a new war with old weapons and stratagems, to meet new political problems with antiquated solutions, to meet new economic competition with timeworn economic practices, etc. Such leadership has characteristically had as its objective the perpetuation of the *status quo*.

In marked contrast are the conditions that produce the leadership attributes of the man who has literally or figuratively battered his way to power.¹⁴ Different, too, are the personality attributes that are involved in his leadership. As a person, he is almost the antithesis of the leader who has achieved his status by some traditional mechanism. As a problem for sociopsychological analysis, he and the conditions that have produced him are infinitely more complex. The political upstart, the military conqueror, the self-made businessman, the religious crusader, and even the little boy who rules the gang of other little boys or who dominates his parents, pose the question, discussed earlier in this chapter, of whether behavior is largely determined by the attributes of personality or by factors in the situation. To the extent that it is the former, we are clearly dealing with deviant attributes of personality; for it is not socially typical for this one of countless farm boys to rise to the leadership of a great corporation, this one of many ghetto-bred boys to become a noted composer, etc.

The Times versus the Man. The older historians leaned to the view

¹³ See "Ingroup membership and academic selection" (A. B. Hollingshead, 1938); "Climbing the academic ladder" (A. B. Hollingshead, 1940); and *The academic man* (L. Wilson, 1942).

¹⁴ The man who is endeavoring to achieve leadership status is usually described as "aggressive" (note 47), the term suggesting that he meets resistance on the part of those whom he would lead. For a vivid description of the characteristics and stratagems of an aggressive political leader, see *The boss* (D. D. McKean, 1940); for an analysis of the personnel of the Nazi party, see "The Nazi party: its leadership and composition" (H. Gerth, 1940).

that personality—the “man”—was of paramount importance in determining the course of historical events. Thus in the characters of kings, princes, popes, and the like, they found historical causation: Napoleon the man was the determinant of the vast events that constituted the Napoleonic era in western Europe; Washington and his associates “founded” the American Commonwealth; Henry Ford “put” the American people on wheels, etc. Had any great leader been, as a person, other than he was, the course of history would have been different. This is the theory that men make their times. Based upon this theory, our older history books were the stories of a few men rather than the stories of peoples.

But the “new” history, the history as written by Marx, Turner, Beard, and others, is based upon the situational interpretation of behavior.¹⁵ It sees leaders as a product of the times and leadership as a function of the circumstances of the moment.

Two relatively distinct points are involved here. First, the character of the “times” determines the extent to which deviant attributes will be developed in the personalities of the various members of society and the nature of those deviations. This fact is frequently indicated by the phrase “harsh times breed harsh men.” Only during times of social turmoil will any considerable number of men appear who possess the potentialities for dynamic leadership. In the second place, the character of the times determines which among those who possess potentialities for leadership will rise to positions of leadership. During times of technological advances inventors¹⁶ multiply; during times of political chaos political spellbinders are in demand; during times of war military strategists rise to power.¹⁷ The person who will be a leader at any given time is, therefore, the one who happens to have acquired the peculiar personality attributes that constitute leadership under the special conditions of that particular time. The soundness of this view will become evident as we

¹⁵ See “The cultural situation as a condition for the achievement of fame” (J. Schneider, 1937); “Social class, historical circumstances, and fame” (J. Schneider, 1937); “The definition of eminence and the social origins of famous English men of genius” (J. Schneider, 1938); and “Class origin and fame” (J. Schneider, 1940).

¹⁶ See “Bio-social characteristics of American inventors” (S. Winston, 1937) and “A study of the childhood, education, and age of 701 inventors” (J. Rossman, 1935).

¹⁷ For one interpretation of the historical forces that are responsible for the rise of new types of social leadership, see *The ruling class* (G. Mosca, 1939). A recent illustration of the fact that changing social circumstances bring forth different kinds of leaders is the rise in power of the German military and the partial eclipse of the Nazi party politicians in 1939 when Germany progressed from preparations for world conquest to military attempt at conquest, and the “liquidation” of both the generals and the politicians when that attempt failed.

analyze in detail the various aspects of the attributes involved in leadership.

Specific Nature of Leadership. The particular behavior that constitutes leadership depends on the situation in which that leadership occurs. Musical leadership has almost nothing in common with military leadership. Leadership as a trumpet player in a dance band is quite different from leadership as the conductor of a symphony orchestra. The trumpet player could hardly exercise leadership over the symphony orchestra with his trumpet, and the symphony conductor would probably make a fool of himself should he attempt to lead off with a rendition of *St. Louis Blues* with his baton.¹⁸ Neither could apply his musical skills to political, military, or industrial leadership. It is meaningless, therefore, to say of a man that he is a leader. A leader in what? Leadership presupposes some sort of skill, if only the ability to talk louder and faster than others. But there is no single kind of skill that will give an individual leadership in all kinds of circumstances and over all kinds of people. The successful leader of a shipbuilding organization may find all his skills worthless when he endeavors to direct the efforts of his companions in a floundering lifeboat. The skills of a fluent political orator may be "liquidated" by violent rioting or military conquest.

The personalities of various accomplished leaders do, of course, include some common attributes. All leaders are highly motivated, and all possess unusual ability. But the motivation of each is directed toward some specific form of achievement; *i.e.*, the leader in business wants to succeed in business, not in art, music, science, or politics. And the proficiency of each successful leader is often restricted to his special field of endeavor; Henry Ford, for example, was extraordinarily ingenious in working out new industrial production methods but quite inept in a surprisingly large number of other matters.

The achievement of a position of leadership usually involves, therefore, personality deviations in both degree and kind. The leader must have exceptional motivation and skill in a special field of activity that happens to be socially approved at the moment as well as a modicum of "freedom" from the distractions—family responsibilities, consideration for the welfare and happiness of friends and acquaintances, interest in time-and-energy consuming recreational activities, etc.—which make up so much of the life of most individuals. The possession of freedom to concentrate upon one channel of activity seems to mean not only an ex-

¹⁸ For a study of leadership in the modern dance orchestra, see *The professional dance musician: a study of the interrelation between the occupational and non-occupational attributes of the dance musician* (C. L. Lastrucci, 1941).

personal interest in that activity but also a lack of those personality attributes which normally lead the individual to divide his time and effort among a variety of activities. To put it in lay terms, the man who achieves a position of leadership necessarily ignores many duties and obligations and misses many of the "simple" pleasures of life.

Origin of Leadership Attributes. Almost everything has been singled out at one time or another as the reason why one man out of many becomes leader. Some have believed that leaders are people with superior physiques; others have believed that leadership behavior was an overcompensation for inferior physique.¹⁹ Lincoln and certain other notables were taller or larger than the average; therefore their superior size, which made them tower over common men, caused them to be "natural" leaders. Napoleon, Hitler, and other leaders, were men of subnormal stature; therefore they felt physically inferior and as a compensation strove to dominate by "force of personality."

As was indicated in the chapter on stereotyping, physical attributes may have an indirect effect upon the development of personality. But to say that superior physique makes for leadership ignores the fact that many leaders are of subnormal physique, and vice versa. Certainly the large man often has the advantage over the small one in a hand-to-hand fight. But most forms of leadership do not involve sheer physical force. Certainly the small, shrewd man would have the advantage over the large, uncalculating fellow in economic, political, and other negotiations. But smallness does not automatically bestow shrewdness; nor does largeness necessarily presuppose lack of mental adroitness.

A superabundance of physical energy has frequently been cited as the key to successful leadership.²⁰ Presumably this superabundance of energy is a consequence of factors of health, diet, mode of life, and glandular balance. It is true that many kinds of leadership require strenuous and sustained effort. The man who is physically weak will probably be eliminated from command of a military force on the grounds that he is incapable of carrying through a strenuous campaign, etc. But most

¹⁹ Evidence against the overcompensation theory was offered in *The executive and his control of men* (E. B. Gowin, 1915). The leaders Gowin measured were found to be both taller and heavier than the less important men in similar lines of activity. Gowin found, for example, that small-town preachers weighed, on the average, seventeen pounds less and were one and eight-tenths inches shorter than bishops; presidents of universities weighed on the average seventeen and six-tenths pounds more and were one and two-tenths inches taller than presidents of small colleges. Some of the weight differences may be accounted for by better or at least more plentiful food. The height differences cannot be explained so simply.

²⁰ Glorifiers of the human physique, such as Bernarr Macfadden, invariably claim that physical strength is the key to success in business, politics, and life in general.

forms of leadership demand sustained "mental" rather than intense physical effort,²¹ as is evidenced by the fact that many noted men (Robert Louis Stevenson, for example) have suffered ill health throughout their careers. This latter fact has, in turn, led some to the conclusion that sickness rather than health is the determinant of leadership. Sickness, specifically tuberculosis, syphilis, and a few other diseases, are supposed to produce toxins that "irritate the nervous system" and stimulate mental activity.²²

Again all that may be said is that no generalization is possible. Neither the great mass of the sick nor the great mass of the physically fit ever become leaders of importance. Except in those few forms of leadership which presuppose superabundance of physical energy, such superabundance could mean only that the aspirant to leadership would, assuming equal motivation, be capable of more sustained and intense effort than would the normal man. But social achievement is not measured solely by the amount of endeavor. It is not how hard and how long you blow the horn that counts, but the kind of sound you get out of it. It is of course conceivable that in a given instance physical strength has contributed to a sense of self-confidence, which has in turn been a factor involved in the development of leadership attributes. In a given instance, on the other hand, childhood illness may have precluded ordinary childhood activities and fostered intellectual activities, which were the basis upon which the exceptional literary, mathematical, or other symbolic skills were subsequently developed. But there is no one key to success

²¹ Perseverance, the ability to do sustained work, has been studied by a number of investigators. See "Two tests for perseverance" (W. H. Clark, 1935); "The meaning of persistence" (D. G. Ryans, 1938); "The measurement of persistence: an historical review" (D. G. Ryans, 1939); "How general is the factor of 'persistence'? a reexamination and evaluation of Ryans' results" (G. R. Thornton, 1940); and "P-tests and the concept of mental inertia" (K. F. Walker *et al.*, 1943). The relation of perseverance to perseveration is shown in "Perseveration and character" (W. Stephenson, 1935) and in "Studies in perseveration: V. Theoretical significance of the perseveration and repetition of conative activity" (I. Kendig, 1937).

Care should be taken to differentiate perseverance from rigidity, the condition where the task is continued not because of intense motivation but because of inability to shift the manner of behavior (J. S. Kounin, 1943; R. B. Cattell, 1946; A. S. Luchins, 1947).

²² A careful check of the personal histories of fifty of the most eminent men of history showed their childhood health records to be normal—neither better nor worse than those of ordinary children (C. C. Miles and L. Wolfe, 1936). A more recent study of 12,000 "generally acknowledged geniuses" indicates that, contrary to common belief, success is not associated with early death. The life expectancy of "geniuses" is the same as that of ordinary men (R. E. G. Armattee, 1948). See also "The longevity of the eminent" (H. C. Lehman, 1943) and "The longevity of the eminent" (C. A. Mills, 1944).

and therefore no simple way to an understanding of the reasons why one particular man is President of the United States and millions of men are not. The skills and the motives that are involved in a given form of leadership are attributes of personality and, like all such attributes both the normative and the deviant, the result of a multitude of factors.

In part the behavior that constitutes leadership, whether over a class of students, over a business enterprise, or over the national or international political scene, is a manifestation of attributes of personality that have been acquired out of the accidents and incidents of social experience. In part leadership behavior is a function of the social circumstances that make the particular attributes of personality, attributes of leadership. The same holds true in slightly varying degrees for all forms of deviation—subordination, extroversion, instability, etc.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIORS

The fact that there is a complex interrelation between the state of society and deviant attributes of personality should now be evident. Social change disorganizes the socialization processes and opens the way for what we have here called “accidents” and “incidents” of social experience. The highly integrated social system will fail in minor respects with all its members and in vital ways with some few of its members. The disorganized social system makes many major failures in socialization. In most of its members it produces a lower proportion of normative and a higher proportion of deviant attributes.

At the same time, the social significance, indeed the individual significance, of any given deviant attribute will depend in large measure on the social system itself. Some attributes will, because of the nature of the social circumstances, result in adjustment behaviors that directly foster further social changes. Such is the case with those attributes, whatever their specific nature, that are manifest as successful leadership in some realm or other of social life. Other deviant attributes will, however, because of social circumstances, make for friction between the individual and society which—through the generation of psychological tensions—may have profound but only indirect effects upon the course of social events. These friction-producing deviant attributes of personality and the circumstances responsible for them will be discussed in Part IV.

But first let us examine the ways by which society endeavors to force the individual whose personality deviates in some way from the norms to conform outwardly at least to the group norms. It is in these ways, rather than by the dubious process of retraining, that society attempts to correct its errors in original socialization.

CHAPTER XV

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROLS

Utopian blueprints¹ for the perfect society always provide for a system of institutions, customs, and traditions which are perfectly articulated and which together function with complete efficiency to the end that the social population is forever maintained in the manner to which it has become accustomed and that each succeeding generation will be completely socialized into those institutions, customs, and traditions. Even Karl Marx included this latter provision in his plan for the classless society. The revolution would of course involve force, and for a time force would be necessary to maintain the new social order. But as a generation or two of children grew up in the new system of life, they would adhere to it from force of habit; and the force of law and police and prisons would no longer be necessary. Indeed, Marx envisaged the rapid and total disappearance of government.

In our terms, what the utopianists have hoped for is a society in which every individual's personality consists entirely of normative attributes. In such a society every individual would behave in every life circumstance in predictable and socially acceptable ways, and that behavior would be a direct expression of his personality. But in real life, as we have seen, all individuals deviate in many ways and in minor or major degrees from the established norms; indeed, in a society such as our own it is often difficult to ascertain the norms, so many and so varied are the individual deviations from them. The result is that social situations never run off with that smoothness and competence that we associate with a professional enactment of a play. People fumble their lines, miss cues, and otherwise embarrass, confuse, and at times harm one another.

Social Control of Deviant Attributes. But within the membership of any society and of any integrated or partly integrated group within a society social controls operate to correct for errors in the socialization of a member by forcing him outwardly to conform to his designated role. This is accomplished by appealing, in any one of a great many ways, to his pride in and desire for status within the group, which are normative attributes of the personality of practically every member of every group.

¹ For a picture of a recently proposed utopian plan, see *Walden two* (B. F. Skinner, 1948).

Operating through such attributes of his personality, social controls induce the individual to repress deviant attributes which should not be expressed in situational circumstances or to behave overtly in ways which are situationally required but do not stem directly from an established attribute of his personality.

Sensitivities to status within his groups and, thus, responsiveness to social controls constitute the fourth of the various categories of personality attributes that were discussed in the opening chapter of this part of the book. Attributes included in this category often enter, it will be recalled, into the particular organization of personality that operates in a given situation. In an organization of personality, these attributes serve to temper or to repress other attributes, a circumstance which we may describe as "concern for what others will think of him or do to him." Thus, because he does not want his friends to think him the coward that he is, a man may hide his fears and do what he does not actually want to do.

The enforcement of normative behavior upon the individual who in terms of his personality deviates from the norms has been studied mainly by sociologists, who generally designate the phenomenon in its larger aspects as "social control."² When attention is directed to the impact of controls upon personality organization, the phrase "effects of group identification" is perhaps more descriptive.

Distinguished from Momentary Situational Factors. The effects of group identification upon personality generally transcend immediate situational factors and should not be confused with them. The situation in which an individual behaves provides, it will be recalled, the stimuli to which he responds; as the situation changes, so will the organization of his personality which is brought into play and, hence, his overt behavior. But situations are short-lived, whereas social groups are more or less enduring. For example, the family-at-dinner *situation* will seldom last more than an hour, whereas the family as a *social group* has a life span

² One of the more recent psychological contributions to the literature is *The psychology of ego-involvements* (M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1947). The authors of this work do not distinguish clearly, however, between socialization into group norms and the repression of deviant attributes of personality by the group.

There have been relatively few psychological contributions to the literature on social control. Those which have been offered have appeared under the heading of "conformity behavior." And the emphasis has been on the statistical aspects of the problem, particularly on the peculiarities of the form the data take when plotted in terms of teleonomic units of measurement, i.e., in terms of the degree the behavior is normative (see Appendix note 64).

General sociological discussions of social control include the following: *Control in human societies* (J. Dowd, 1936); *Social control in its sociological aspects* (L. L. Bernard, 1939); *Social control* (P. Landis, 1939); and *Social control* (J. S. Roucek, ed., 1947).

of many years. When the personnel of the situations in which an individual behaves is the same as that of one of his social groups, as is the case with the membership of the family at dinner and the family as such, the distinction between the immediate situation and the group is not at this point important. But at least in contemporary society, a very large number of the situations in which the individual participates are peopled in whole or in part by persons who belong to other social groups. At home the individual eats with his family, and here situational factors and group controls are identical; but in a big city restaurant he is surrounded by strangers, and there is a categorical distinction between momentary situational factors and the effects of group identification.

People often behave quite differently away from home, home town, or other enduring social surroundings than they do at home. The housewife who is neat and tidy in her own home may callously leave a picnic ground littered with papers and bottles; the aging legionnaire who is a model of respectability in his home town may conduct himself like a silly old fool at the annual convention; the merchant who is scrupulously honest in his dealings with fellow townspeople may try to cheat the strangers in a neighboring town; and the boy who has been the idol of his parents and relatives may be a troublesome little devil when he enters the relatively impersonal world of military life. Such contrasts in behavior are in part traceable to differences in the situational factors; but the major explanation for them is found in the fact that away from home and his usual social surroundings, the individual is somewhat liberated from social controls.

Situational factors tend to provoke a fairly direct "spontaneous" expression of the relevant attributes of personality, whether they be normative or deviant in character. The effects of group identification, on the other hand, tend to induce a more or less calculated regard for the long-run consequences of action. Thus the effects of the individual's group identifications tend to temper the effects of the immediate situational factors, particularly when deviant attributes of personality are involved. For example, it is entirely normative for young men to be attracted to what they define as a pretty girl; and situational factors permitting, a young man will usually react overtly to the attractiveness of a pretty girl. But it is not normative in terms of identification with his family for an elderly husband and father to be attracted to a pretty girl in similar way. If he feels so attracted, he usually represses any sign of that fact out of consideration for his status as an elderly head of a family; and he may do so even though no member of his family or indeed even an acquaintance is present. As he might say in explanation of his reluctance to turn openly admiring eyes on the pretty girl, "What would my wife think if

she saw me acting like a young squirt?" In general, then, social controls operate to keep the individual from following his immediate inclinations in a situation when those "inclinations" are at variance with the norms of some social group to which he belongs.

Group Tolerances. Since social controls operate mainly to keep the individual behaving in normative ways, whatever the dictates of his particular personality, they serve to repress deviant personality attributes. But no social group is so rigid that it demands of all its members meticulous adherence to all its norms. Every group is tolerant of some degree of deviation from some of its norms, which is just another way of saying that in all human relations there is some flexibility or margin of permissible error. A social group that would ostracize the member who was convicted of robbing his employer might be indulgent with the member who boasted of how cleverly he had padded his expense account. The social group that might be shocked to learn that one of its number had deserted his wife in favor of a night-club singer might be partly reconciled to the fact that another one was carrying on a "secret" affair with his "acceptable" secretary. In all four instances the action might violate group norms; but in two of the instances the violations would come within the group tolerances, and in the other two they would exceed the group tolerances.

The tolerances of social groups vary widely in both degree and kind. The more highly integrated (*i.e.*, organized and interdependent and enduring) the group, the closer in general are the tolerances. A family is usually less tolerant of its members than, say, is a business or a club. The former has a multitude of norms which it upholds with severity; the latter type of group usually has relatively few norms which it upholds, and it upholds those with less rigidity. Thus as the leader of a family, a man may be very strict with his daughters; but as head of a business organization, he may at the same time be quite indifferent regarding the morals of the girls in his office. Group tolerances are, moreover, characteristically greater in times of rapid social change or crisis than during periods of social stability; the modern family, for example, is much less demanding of its members than was its prototype of a few generations ago, and both a family and a business organization relax their standards somewhat during time of war or severe economic depression.

The various norms of a social group are not held in equal esteem or believed to be of equal importance. Some are perhaps mandatory, and violating them means being evicted from the group. Others are at most matters of convenience, and a specific violation may not too greatly inconvenience, and hence irritate, the other members of the group. Moreover, a particular violation of an important norm may, through discus-

sion among the members of the group, be defined as an exception to the rule. In a community that adheres to rigidly moralistic norms, a particular instance of misbehavior by a young member may be excused on the grounds that the young member has always before conducted himself with propriety, that he is exceptionally kind to his invalid mother, and that the girl was more to blame for the incident than he. Finally, the group is characteristically more tolerant of deviations in degree than of deviations in kind. Whereas a staunchly religious community will rebuff the atheist or the one who adheres to some foreign faith, it may be relatively tolerant of the member who attends church only occasionally and then with evident reluctance, and it may actually approve of the member who is something of a religious fanatic. Likewise, his family, his friends, and his work associates may be reasonably tolerant of the man who barely holds on to a conventional job, even as they may be reasonably tolerant of the man who is aggressively ambitious in a conventional way; but they may look with disdain on the one who "dissipates" his time and energy in painting many pictures that no one wants.

Permissible Deviant Roles. Every society and every group within the society has in addition to its many "standard" social roles, in which the "normal" norms apply, one or a number of atypical social roles. To the individual who occupies such a role, a special set of norms apply.

The nature of atypical social roles varies from society to society and from group to group, even as do the "standard" social roles. But the social functions of the permissible deviate seem everywhere much the same—to amuse, often by serving as a butt for jokes; to demonstrate in ways deemed harmless to the group as a whole that sin does not pay, and, incidentally, to provide a constant source for scandalized gossip; and to provide respectable people with vicarious escape from their respectability. In small, highly stable communities one person may fulfill all these functions; and the community may feel that two deviates would be a social extravagance. In our society there tends to be specialization in atypicality, as in everything else. Thus we have the buffoon, who is the comic life of the party (when he is at a party; what he is at home may be quite another matter), the wastrel, the cadger, the dilettante, the roué, the aesthete, etc., each of whom may play his narrow role with singleness of purpose. In old China there was the conventional stereotype of a libertine scholar, Lao-tse, whose scholarly greatness demanded and was encouraged by sexual and other forms of excess. We, too, have had a comparable traditional stereotype, that of the Bohemian, who is, however, an artist or poet, rather than a thinker. With us scholarship does not grant immunity from adherence to the standard norms, except perhaps in the case of the teacher who lives up to the stereotype of the absent-

mind professor—his peculiarities may be excused by his students, if not by his colleagues. Sometimes the atypical role has a more tangible function than that of amusing or scandalizing or giving representation to repressed desires. Some otherwise moralistic communities—*e.g.*, European rural villages and the small mining towns of our West—have tolerated a prostitute for the service she rendered local bachelors and widowers.

Whatever the nature of an atypical role, the individual who has been granted that role must play it and play it well. Social controls here operate to maintain atypicality, to enforce adherence to the special norms, just as they operate to enforce conformity to the standard norms on the part of ordinary individuals. The family that is proud of the fact that one of its children has an unchildlike propensity for “keeping his nose in a book” may encourage him to do so and, perhaps, discourage more normal behavior by failing to reward it through approval. Likewise, the club that numbers among its members a “charming old sot” may see that he does not lack for drink and in other ways discourage him from any inclination he might show to reform his ways. Even publics display a similar tendency to distinguish between normal and atypical public roles and demand conformity to the latter as well as the former. Most journalists, for example, are required by their newspaper publics to write with some responsibility about somewhat important matters. But the columnist who becomes “typed” as an irresponsible gossip about the utterly trivial will be called to task should he venture to write with serious intent about matters of national welfare (as was Walter Winchell during World War II).

The individual who is socially maladjusted because his personality deviates in an unacceptable way from the standard norms may in some instances achieve a reasonable degree of adjustment by fitting himself into one of the atypical roles and thus acquiring social acceptance. In old China, for example, the homosexual male who could become a professional actor would thereby “normalize” his homosexual deviation, since all actors were by social definition homosexual. The same procedure is more simply illustrated by the exceptionally fat boy or girl in our society who becomes at least outwardly reconciled to being grossly overweight and learns to joke about it and otherwise play the role of the fat-and-jolly person. Almost as clear-cut is the case of the woman who, perhaps for reasons of personality, fails to marry but learns to live up to our concept of the spinster as a meticulous, sexless, and self-sufficient person. She may be socially acceptable in her atypical role, whereas the unmarried woman who gives evidence of possessing the interests, values, and motivations that are normal to married women in our society may be re-

garded as "suspect" and possibly a threat to their welfare by normal married women.

In a later chapter we shall consider in detail some of the more characteristic forms of atypicality in our society. The point which is relevant here is that the socially atypical individual is not subject to quite the same set of rules of conduct as is the typical member of the group, but he is nevertheless expected to conform to the somewhat different set of rules which apply to him.

DETERMINANTS OF GROUP NORMS OF CONDUCT

Cultural Factors. Most of the behavior norms that are enforced by any group are cultural in origin, and all are at least based upon cultural elements. The "standard" norms of a primitive tribe, those of a peasant village, and most of those of a contemporary American town are cultural in origin. Many, if not most, of the norms of conduct in a modern city are also culturally derived; thus the practice of not speaking to strangers in elevators, streetcars, etc., and that of a woman's wearing and repairing facial make-up in public have become established elements of urban culture, as have many other and more important nonrural practices.

Most, too, of the strivings, values, and sentiments of special age, occupational, and family groups are of cultural derivation. The "latest" of the ladies' bridge clubs to be formed will play bridge in the same old fashion, discuss pretty much the same old topics, and reflect very much the same old views and values as did their mothers before them. The new-day atomic physicists certainly live in a world that is in part newly discovered, but even among themselves they are for the most part creatures of custom and tradition. Although slovenly and incompetent, the family which lives in a shack across the tracks nevertheless enforces upon its members a great many of the norms of more conventional families, norms which are essentially cultural in origin.

Even what may seem to be new group inventions, such as the odd language of the jazz cultists and the utopian platform of a new political party, are in fact usually but minor variations on old cultural themes. This is not to say that the structure of society does not change, that the organizations of particular groups are fixed for all time, or that new groups with new norms do not arise. In our place and time change is constant and runs through the entire social fabric. But the portion which is new in the norms of any group is always exceedingly small in comparison with the portion which is of cultural origin. The modern woman wears cosmetics, smokes cigarettes (not, it is to be noted, pipes

or cigars), and bares most of her body on the bathing beach. These are new norms for respectable women in our society, and they have come about within the last two generations. But for the most part woman's place is still in the home, and her function is that of wife, mother, and domestic as it has been for untold centuries.

Experiential Factors. Since most norms that will be enforced by any social group are cultural, the study of the origin of group norms is primarily a sociological matter.³ For the most part, the norms are what they are because the society is what it is, and the social psychologist need not go further. They are for him a "given." His problem is to see how the individual is socialized into those norms and, when the individual is not, how the group endeavors to force him outwardly to conform to them. But the enforcement of norms will, under some circumstances, involve also the forming of a new norm or new norms to which conformity is to be demanded. This is always true when a new kind of group is in process of formation, and it is often true when the conditions under which a highly organized group operates are so changed that some of its norms become devaluated and need to be replaced with new ones.

A new group which is in the process of formation and an established one which has met with crisis almost invariably attempt to apply old norms to new circumstances. Thus the association that forms voluntarily to meet some joint problem patterns its charter, formal or informal, as the case may be, on the basis of precedent. But as the old fails to live up to expectations, members of the group may lose their regard for the old and engage in experimentation with other possibilities. When this comes about, it does so quite gradually; one by one members begin to deviate from the norm; and if one member can demonstrate that his deviation is effective, he may gain for the deviation more and more adherents until the majority of the group acts in the new way. What was originally a deviation has become a new norm, and those who persist in following the old norm are the deviant members.

The process is complex and uncertain.⁴ It is, at any event, a form of

³ For an attempt to approach the problem psychologically, see *The psychology of social norms* (M. Sherif, 1936).

⁴ For an attempt to analyze the process in psychological terms, see Chap. 7, "The formation of group standards or norms," in *An outline of social psychology* (M. Sherif, 1948).

Perhaps the most fruitful source of data on the subject will prove to be the various case studies of adjustment in marriage that are being carried out over a considerable period of time. Although the concern in such studies is with the factors which lead to success and failure in marriage, the successful marriage is obviously one in which husband and wife have worked out jointly acceptable and functionally effective norms. Such norms might perhaps be designated "interpersonal" to distinguish them from

experimentation in which all the members of the group participate to some extent or other. As with all experimentation, there are many failures; and sometimes a failure may mean the end of the group itself. Inability to work out effective norms is largely responsible for the high mortality of new friendship cliques, of new business enterprises, and of marriages in contemporary society. Many long-established groups likewise prove incapable of working out new group patterns to meet new circumstances; in fact, it is so characteristic for the forms of organized groups to become fixed and inflexible that this tendency is believed by many sociologists to be one of the "laws" of social life.⁵

Nevertheless, well-established groups do upon occasion adopt or devise new norms. The family that leaves the country to settle in town may come to live in many ways like native townspeople. Here experience with the failure of country modes of conduct, the example of townspeople, and the controls that the town community exercise over the family as a whole and the members individually gradually wear down faith in the old norms and provide training in new norms. Eventually, even the mother may concede that it is proper for the girls to wear lipstick, and the father may give up chewing tobacco in favor of smoking it. The club or association that was formed on precedent may gradually revise its bylaws until it has in effect evolved a new organizational plan. And even the leaders of a military force may eventually discover what the common soldiers have learned one by one—that one cannot successfully fight a new war with old procedures.

GROUP MORALE⁶ AND GROUP IDENTIFICATION

The behavior of an individual is often affected, both qualitatively and quantitatively, by intangibles of group organization that are variously

the norms of many-membered groups. See "The length of time required to achieve adjustment in marriage" (J. T. Landis, 1946) and "Sociologically established family norms and democratic values" (W. L. Klob, 1948).

Some data on the development of group norms and their enforcement are to be found in *Human relations in the restaurant industry* (W. F. Whyte, 1948).

⁵ The most recent general discussion from the sociological viewpoint of the processes by which social groups develop into organizations with fixed forms and thereafter evidence great rigidity is to be found in *Social institutions* (J. O. Hertzler, 1946).

⁶ The following references on morale should prove of interest to the reader: "An analysis of the conception of morale" (P. E. Vernon, 1941); "Morale: a bibliographical review" (I. L. Child, 1941); *Civilian morale* (G. Watson, ed., 1942); "Psychological determinants of morale" (F. H. Sanford and R. R. Holt, 1943); "The meaning of 'morale' in relation to morale building and morale research" (I. Chein, 1943); "Building war morale with news-headlines" (F. H. Allport and M. Lepkin, 1943); and "Minnesota studies in war psychology" (W. K. Estes and K. W. Estes, 1944).

designated as *esprit de corps* or group morale.⁷ The ability of the group to enforce its norms upon individual members depends in considerable part on the importance to the individual of membership in the group. If he places a high value on belonging, he will, other things being equal, strive to satisfy the demands of the group; if he is apathetic regarding his membership, he will be disinclined to subordinate himself to the group norms. The general level of regard that the members of a group have for that group constitutes its morale. If the members generally feel themselves strongly identified with one another, if each feels that all the others are contributing to the best of their abilities to the group activity, and if there is general agreement that the forms of group action are desirable and profitable, then morale is high. (If there is dissension, bickering, and other forms of interpersonal conflict between group members, if there is distrust of the intentions or abilities of group leaders, if there is doubt concerning the validity of the group norms and uncertainty over the future of the group, membership identification is weak and a state of demoralization exists.)

Factors Influencing Morale. The factors that enter into the determination of group morale are many and various and seldom ascertainable.⁸ We can, however, indicate some of the more important of the circumstances which might in a given instance affect morale in ways which are either favorable or unfavorable to individual performance in the group. Ordinarily, success improves and adversity lowers the morale of a group.⁹ Thus of groups as of individuals it might generally be said that nothing succeeds like success. The members of a family which is prospering usually work together better and more cheerfully than the members of one

⁷ We are here concerned with an aspect of social control, not a factor of the momentary situation. In a specific group situation such processes as rivalry and interactional amplification, which will be discussed in a later chapter, may operate to stimulate the individual to more than normally intense effort. This and related situational effects on the behavior of individuals are usually designated by psychologists as "group effects," which should be distinguished from the effects of group identification (see Appendix note 62).

⁸ For a report of one revealing study, however, see the article "Morale in war industries" (D. Katz and H. Hyman, 1947). See also "Factors affecting employee morale" (S. A. Raube, 1947).

⁹ Bateson, the British anthropologist, holds, on the other hand, that because of the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on fair play the British cannot kick the underdog. Hence, they kick, i.e., fight, better when they are "down." For them, Dunkerque was a morale lifter, not a morale depressant (G. Bateson, 1942). For a further discussion of national morale, see "The measurement of national morale" (D. C. Miller, 1941). For data on the effects of bombing during World War II on German morale, see *The effects of strategic bombing on German morale* (U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947).

which is going down the socioeconomic scale. A club or association which is growing and enlarging its sphere of activities usually obtains more willing and energetic cooperation from its members than one which is contracting and has "come on evil days." The army which is winning battles usually enters the next engagement with greater zeal than the army which has been on the losing side.

But although success ordinarily improves morale, high morale and success are not invariably associated; each cannot be considered a function of the other. High morale may lead to success, but success may in turn lead to demoralization. The family that has prospered may become demoralized, each member trying to outdo the others in the dissipation of family resources; and the family that has met with adversity may thereby be unified, each member becoming more sympathetic and helpful toward the others. The army that has lost a battle may gain new resolve and in the next engagement defeat an enemy "grown soft and overconfident" as a result of too much victory.)

Clearly, then, factors other than success and adversity enter into the determination of group morale.¹⁰ Of these other factors the traditions of the group and the character of its leadership are perhaps the most important. A group with a long and noble past, into the traditions of which the current members have been well socialized, has great integrity and is able to maintain high morale in the face of adversity. In fact a group with strong traditions generally gains in morale as it encounters new threats to its existence, thus becoming strengthened as the need for strength increases. Since the leadership of such a group is, as was shown in the preceding chapter, mainly nominal, the personal characteristics of the leaders are of minor importance; the traditions of the group rather than the personalities of its leaders determine its tenacity. The proud old family may become even more proud and unified as its fortunes decline, the Ancient Order of Camel Drivers may only be consolidated and renewed in their resolve to save the camel for posterity by the threat of the automobile, and the battleship admirals may put aside their personal interests and differences in a joint struggle to protect the great old traditions of naval combat, and the battleship, from the advocates of aerial and atomic warfare.

Conversely, any newly formed group is by nature tenuous, and the members rely to a considerable extent upon the initiative, patience, and wisdom of their leaders. A new club, business enterprise, military organi-

¹⁰ A definition that has been accepted by many social psychologists stresses five essentials to "good" group morale. These are a positive goal, a feeling of "togetherness," an awareness of a danger to the group, a conviction that conditions can be improved, and, lastly, a sense of advance toward the group goals (G. Watson, 1942).

zation, or social elite may have high morale as long as it is succeeding, but it will be quickly demoralized by adversity unless it is held together by exceptionally competent leadership. The old, established business firm can usually weather a bad year even under inept leadership, not alone because it has the financial resources to keep going, but because its personnel has a faith in the future of the organization that is not easily shaken. The long and successful past "proves" that it will be successful in the future; one bad year or one incompetent president is no occasion for loss of confidence. But the new enterprise has no past, and its future can be gauged only by the present. If that present is discouraging, so, too, will be the prospects for the future. Similarly, the army which has a long history of battles won can shrug off the loss of the most recent engagement, whereas the army which has fought only one battle and has been defeated tends to become demoralized, since it can judge its future only by its defeat.

Group Morale and Social Control. What this means in individual terms is that the older and more traditionalized the group, the less calculating the membership. It takes much adversity to detach an individual from a group into which he has been born or into which he has come through long social apprenticeship, as would be the case of the man who has made a career of the navy and has finally achieved the status of a battleship admiral or of the man who has worked his way up the ranks of a business and become at last one of its leaders. Membership by birth or apprenticeship gives to the individual a strong vested interest in the group and its maintenance; thus he exerts himself and makes many personal sacrifices to preserve that group. On the other hand, the man who enters into the formation of a new group, such as a club or a new business enterprise, or who is conscripted into a military force tends to evaluate his membership in terms of personal and immediate advantages; and if adherence to the group norms demands more of him than he feels that he gains through membership, as is the case under conditions of adversity, he is tempted to abandon the group and is certain to give to it less than his best effort and attention.

Participation in a group with high morale¹¹ is stimulating, reassuring, and gratifying to the individual; participation in a demoralized group is

¹¹ The question, "Morale for what end?" should always be asked when discussing group morale; for it is quite possible for a group to be well disciplined and unified in terms of one goal but not for some other. Thus during World War I a number of battalions that were rated as having extremely high morale while in training camps disintegrated on the battlefield. Morale is a complex phenomenon in which the type of goal cannot be ignored.

discouraging and disheartening. Under the former conditions the "best" in the individual members is brought out, which is another way of saying that they conform to the group norms with willingness and zeal, responding to group controls and subordinating any deviant tendencies to the requirements of group membership. Under conditions of demoralization most of the members of the group tend to rebel against the authority of the group and its leaders, to measure all things in personal and hence often deviant terms, and thus to violate group norms and sabotage the group effort. The significance of social control in the determination of individual behavior depends, therefore, not only on the nature of the group and of its norms but also on the state of group morale.

MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The means by which groups endeavor to secure and maintain individual conformity to the group norms depend in the first instance on the character of the society of which the group is a part and in the second instance on the nature of the group itself. In a society that sanctions slavery, many of the work groups will be controlled in part through physical coercion; the slave who rebels against his master will be whipped, perhaps by other slaves at the master's direction, into submission. In our society the use of physical coercion is theoretically and in large part actually restricted to government, and the worker is kept at work mainly by the appeal of pecuniary rewards. Modern governments are such vast, impersonal, and chaotic agencies of control that the actual impact of laws, police, courts, and penal institutions upon the individual is seldom ascertainable. We shall here restrict ourselves to an analysis of the various means by which the smaller and more personal groups of our society, such as the residential community, the work association, the recreational club, etc., endeavor to discourage deviation from and to encourage adherence to their norms.

Physical Intimidation. Almost any group may be aroused by persistent and marked violation of important norms to threaten and then to take physical action against the deviant individual, even though such action may in itself constitute a group violation of the normally peaceful relations between the members. When more genteel methods fail to repress the deviant member, those members of the group who feel the most injured or who most highly esteem the reputation of the group may come to the conclusion that any means—even violence—is justifiable. One of them may then take it upon himself to administer physical punishment to the offender, or a number of like-minded members may jointly proceed to do so, or a general consensus of opinion on the matter may

evolve and the responsibility for action may be allocated by the group as a whole to some designated member or members.¹²

Work groups, particularly those composed of lumberjacks, sailors, construction workers, and others whose lives are hard and whose occupations are hazardous are especially inclined toward "taking the law into their own hands." All such groups have, as do all occupational groups, their special norms; and although individual workers may come and go, there is always some continuing informal organization among the men on the job. When a new worker comes to the job, the work group keeps him for a time on trial. If he meets their ideas of a good worker and associate, they take him into the "inner circle," which actually means that they help him in a variety of ways on the job and associate with him off the job. If he proves to be unacceptable, or if he should in time become unacceptable, they apply a variety of progressively more obvious sanctions. The ultimate of these is force.

Many normally peaceful communities, particularly the more stable communities of villages and small towns, may gradually through experience, rumors, and discussion come to the opinion that it will not be possible to rid themselves of an objectionable member by hints, scorn, or threat of the established law and that violence must be done. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the local enforcement of laws, as distinct from the laws themselves, is usually a variable reflecting community sentiment regarding violations of those laws; laws that are not expressions of local norms cannot in the long run be enforced, and the local agencies of the law often enforce local norms rather than formal laws.¹³ The threat that a group of which one is a member may rise in wrath is intimidating to any but the most foolhardy of men. Actual action, necessary with the foolhardy, may take a variety of forms, some of which have been at one time or another traditional with certain groups. On the Western frontier, for example, hanging was the usual group means of disposing of an objectionable man; a somewhat more subtle procedure was to spread the word around that anyone who wanted a bit of target practice could safely work out on so-and-so. In the more effete and settled

¹² Interesting historical illustrations of this process are to be found in *California gold* (R. W. Paul, 1947). The early gold-mining camps of California were without any political or community forms of organization. The miners did, however, evolve a few basic norms that were enforced by joint action. The man who "jumped a claim" or otherwise violated the ideas of the majority of what was permissible would be run out of camp or hanged. Such groups also sanctioned individual "justice." The man who killed another was not deemed a murderer if he killed in order to protect his property.

¹³ For an analysis of this matter, see "The Grand Jury as an agency of social control" (E. M. Lemert, 1945).

regions of the country tarring and feathering and riding the unwanted out of town on a rail was for long a traditional method of disposing of him. It was an effective method, for the person seldom returned. In the work communities of lumberjacks, seamen, etc., the man who will not be intimidated by threats may be waylaid and beaten up; and should that fail, he may then be "accidentally" injured or killed on the job.

Economic Intimidation. The historic growth in the number and functions of governmental agencies has all but eliminated systematic resort to extralegal force in our society. For the most part, work, business, and community groups depend mainly on economic intimidation to bring the obstreperous deviate under control or to eliminate him from group membership.¹⁴ No matter by what means a man secures his livelihood in modern society, he is economically dependent on the "good will" of many people. Even the man who lives on an income from a trust fund must convert his dollars into goods, and the quantity and quality of the goods he gets for his dollars is to some extent subject to group control; if the local merchants heartily dislike him, they can injure him in a variety of little ways, and they will certainly never give him the advantage of a bargain. The dependence of the merchant on the good will of the community in which he has his establishment, the dependence of the clerk or factory worker on his coworkers, and the dependence of the farmer on the other farmers and the merchants in the region is clearly evident.

Economic intimidation by groups is much more subtle and in many instances more effective than the obvious manipulation of pecuniary rewards and punishments by employer, merchant, banker, etc. Attempts to stimulate worker productivity by piece rates and bonuses often fail because the individual worker is afraid to violate the production norm that the work group has settled upon.¹⁵ The merchant who offers lower prices

¹⁴ A notable exception is the use by some labor unions of "goon squads" who beat up a member who persistently violates union regulations. A few decades ago it was a fairly common practice in some industries to use company police for the purpose of intimidating the workers who refused to comply with company regulations. For an example, see *The legend of Henry Ford* (K. Sward, 1948).

¹⁵ Some of the most reliable data on social control have come from the studies of "group factors" in industrial production. Of these researches the most noted perhaps is a seven-months' observational study of a small group of workers in the Bank Wiring Observation Room of Western Electric Company in 1931 and 1932. This study, which showed the existence of production norms which could not be changed by management and the various ways in which the workers discouraged individual deviation from those norms, is reported in *Management and the worker* (F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, 1939). For a discussion of other studies, see Chap. XV, "Informal organizations of workers," in *Industrial relations and the social order* (W. E. Moore, 1946); *The social system of the modern factory* (W. L. Warner and J. O. Low, 1947); *The social problems of an industrial civilization* (E. Mayo, 1945);

than his competitors may do less business, particularly if he is located in a small-town community, than those who charge more but who have made themselves agreeable to the local citizens. Conversely, the worker who is well liked by his associates and the merchant with high standing in his community may be economically rewarded for good behavior.

Many of the activities of modern men that seem devoid of economic motivations are in fact partly if not wholly the result of economic considerations. The worker who is a "good Joe" may actually be a friendly and considerate person; he may, however, be playing up to his fellow workers because doing so pays off in money. The businessman who attends church, belongs to the local Rotary club, and donates money and time to local charities and civic affairs may believe in these things and enjoy doing them. But it is also possible that he is playing the role of the good citizen because he believes it pays in money to do so. The army officer, government or business executive, college professor, lawyer, or physician who plays golf or bridge with his associates and has them and their wives in for dinner occasionally may enjoy these activities; he may, however, do such things only because his occupational status is largely dependent on their good will.

There are many ways by which work and other groups may affect the economic welfare of individual members. In factory or shop the productivity of the individual worker is always tied in with that of others, and those others can aid or hamper him. They can see to it, for example, that he gets an excessive proportion of difficult tasks to do or of substandard parts to assemble. On the other hand, they can to some extent cover up for and carry along the well-liked worker who is for some reason not up to his job. Shop and office workers often protect the job of the man who is ailing or aging by absorbing part of his work, correcting his mistakes, and even by taking upon themselves the blame for mistakes that were not corrected. But if the group dislikes a worker, it may do just the reverse, shift work off onto him, blame him for everybody's mistakes, and otherwise make life miserable for him.¹⁸ With administrators and professionals there is a similar if more subtle group process of control through economic means. The administrator who is in bad with his associates may soon be put in bad with his superior. The physician who is disliked by his fellow physicians may be persecuted in a variety of subtle and ingenious ways: he may have referred to him only troublesome and impoverished patients; his mistakes may not be

"The social factors of the work situation" (D. C. Miller, 1946); and "Group factors in worker productivity" (G. C. Homans, 1947).

¹⁸ A study of this process is reported in "Ethnic behavior in industry; sponsorship and rejection in a New England factory" (O. Collins, 1946).

covered up but instead be made the most of; he may find it difficult to secure the aid of specialists and even of hospital accommodations for his patients; etc. The lawyer who is personally disliked by other lawyers may be given even rougher treatment; he may be publicly labeled "shyster," for lawyers have somewhat less regard for the reputation of their profession as a whole than have physicians for theirs.

The productivity norm and norms of competitive endeavor are jealously guarded in many kinds of occupational groups. Physicians are free, of course, to do their individual bests to heal patients and lawyers to win their cases. Merchants are expected to compete with one another, although there are in addition to the laws regarding business methods ideas as to what and how intensive competition may justly be. Among unskilled and skilled laborers, office workers, bureaucrats, college professors, and many other groups where the productivity norms are low, those norms are rigidly maintained. They operate to provide all the workers with protection from the competition of the exceptionally skilled and ambitious worker, to keep down average productivity so that there will be work enough to go around, and to preserve the traditional rights and prerogatives of the work group. Unionized labor has codified its work norms and enforces them on the individual union member by such overt means as the threat of eviction from the union. But in most work groups, unionized or not, the group itself exercises a fairly effective restraint on the individual who tends to exceed the norms. The bureaucrat who skips the usual midmorning and midafternoon break for coffee, who works overtime simply because there is work to be done, or who finds a more efficient way to do his job may be considered a troublemaker by his fellows and treated accordingly. The policeman who works too hard at his job or who embarrasses the force by solving the crime that everyone agreed was unsolvable may soon find himself walking a beat out in the suburbs where he can no longer jeopardize the norms of the group.

The same tendency for the group to hold the individual down to the group norms of achievement appears also with some frequency in other than occupational groups—in families, residential communities, and even socioeconomic classes. The ambitious son of a farm family may find that his family does everything possible to prevent him from striking out for himself in the city; the family which moves into a better neighborhood may find it difficult to escape the attachments which were made in the poorer one; and the man who marries or works his way up into a higher stratum of society may find his lower class friends and relatives hanging onto his coattails.

The operation of social controls to hold the overly ambitious or skillful

member down to the norms of the group is paralleled in some groups, but by no means all, by pressures to keep the lazy or unskillful member up to the norm of productivity. Any work group that has real pride in its skills and the quality of its product will treat the laggard with contempt and, if that fails to bring him into line, with threats of economic punishment. In a craft labor union, for example, the incompetent or unproductive mechanic may be tried before a board of his peers and, perhaps, evicted from union membership "for the good of the union." And families may, of course, bring pressures of one sort and another, including such economic sanctions as the threat of disinheritance, to bear on the subnormally productive member. But, on the whole, social groups are more threatened by the member who exceeds the norms of production and competition than by the one who falls below them. Whereas the inferior member jeopardizes only his own welfare or, at the most, becomes a parasitic burden on the other members, the ambitious and ingenious member jeopardizes the maintenance of the group norms.

At the same time, every group, occupational, residential, and class, tends to keep its membership somewhat closed, resisting the entrance of new members. The union restrictions on the admission of apprentices in the building trades is one of the more obvious illustrations. By informal and often rather effective means most groups discourage the individual who is trying to improve his personal status by gaining admission to a group of which he is not "rightfully" a member. Thus the occupationally or socially ambitious person is often hampered not only by the norms of the group or groups to which he belongs and would like to escape but also by the norms of the groups into which he would like to obtain acceptance. In sum, social controls operate not only to make the individual conform to the norms of his role but also to keep him from leaving that role for one more to his personal liking.

Social Intimidation. Economic modes of intimidation blend imperceptibly into and are usually intermixed with control devices that rely for their effectiveness upon the individual's sensitivity to the opinion of others. This sensitivity is so characteristic of human beings that it has often been thought to be instinctive. As has already been suggested, it is actually a product, or at least a by-product, of socialization. The human infant and child secure all their physical satisfactions directly through persons and therefore come to associate those satisfactions with the "willingness" of persons to provide them. In time, symbols of willingness—the mother's smile, approving words, etc.—gain satisfaction value; and as this process extends and ramifies, the individual becomes increasingly dependent on a steady flow of signs of social approval. The need for social approval is variously described as the social self, the reflected self,

ego-involvement, the wish for recognition, the need for human companionship, etc.

Whatever it may be called, the need for social approval is always qualified for the individual by approval "from such-and-such persons"; and although all individuals no doubt have the need in some degree, some have it in greater degree than others. Thus some men appear to be more concerned about their status in the eyes of God than in the eyes of their fellow men; some are more interested in being well and favorably known in the local *bistros* than by their neighbors; and some would rather be well known to the general public through the press, etc., than admired by their immediate friends and relatives. Moreover, some individuals are so afraid of anonymity, of being lost in the mob, that they cling like leeches to their friends and relatives and make a career of currying their favor, while others seem actually to enjoy the anonymous and impersonal character of hotel life in a big city. In general, however, we may say that it is normal for the individual to need, and hence to strive for and guard, acceptance by the members of the in-groups to which he belongs.

Social intimidation of the deviate may operate either as a threat or as an actuality. The actuality involves subjecting the irritating deviate to signs of disapproval, to frowns, scowls, brusqueness of manner, reproving words, etc., which together and over time make the individual aware of the fact that his status in the group has fallen. Unless he is peculiarly insensitive or is motivated by some stronger considerations, he then seeks to mend his ways.

The threat of social punishment is in the main a product of the individual's own social sensitivity. In his mind's eye he sees his friends turn their backs on him because they have learned that he has done such and such, and in his mind's ear he hears what they would say about him among themselves. So he resists temptation, not doing what his personality and the momentary situation would otherwise have led him to do. At other times he does things that he is not especially anxious to do because in his mind's ear he can hear the good things that will be said about him. It matters little that his concept of the group may not be entirely in accord with the actualities, although in the long run his satisfaction in membership is in part determined by the extent to which his expectations of approval are actually fulfilled, the extent to which he receives the flattering attention, the election or promotion to higher office, the medals or prizes, etc., which he anticipates. Perhaps the most subtle way in which a group socially rewards or punishes one of its members is by relaying its estimation of him to nonmembers; for in time the group's opinion of him will come back to him, often in the form of rumor stories in which he is involved.

Social Control and Personality Maladjustment. By way of summary it may be said that the particular organization of personality attributes which an individual achieves in a given social situation often includes a concern for his status in some one of the groups of which he is a member. That concern may outweigh and hence lead to the repression of one or more of his personality attributes, of his motivations, tastes, values, or sentiments, which would otherwise appear in a particular situation, with the result that the behavior of the individual is a somewhat calculated submission to social control, rather than a full indication of his real inclinations. The individual who has acquired through misadventures in socialization many personality attributes that conflict with the norms of his various social groups is frequently faced with the difficulty that his "real" inclinations and his regard for group status are at odds. In any given situation the individual may subordinate himself to the group norms at the expense of his inclinations; or he may follow his real inclinations, regardless of the effect upon his group memberships. But whatever he does, he will be in some measure maladjusted, a condition which is rather characteristic of life in modern society and which will concern us in the part of the book which follows.

PART IV

Personality and Social Adjustment

CHAPTER XVI

THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

From an ethnographer's report on the structure of a primitive society one is likely to gain the impression that life must be very dull in such a society, a constant repetition of age-old acts. The student of our own medieval order or of the Chinese social system might likewise be led to conclude that in such a society the individual's life must have been one of deadening monotony. Year after year, century after century, men went on doing the same old things, thinking the same old thoughts, and repeating well-worn phrases.

A social system may be relatively stable, and the pattern of the individual's life may have definite historical continuity; but human behavior is never static. (Life is a process, living is a procedure, and personality is of necessity dynamic.) In this chapter and in subsequent chapters we shall examine the various factors which make life dynamic in any society and the special factors which operate under conditions of social change to make many of the personality "assets" of today "liabilities" of tomorrow.

Dynamics in the Stable Society. The patterns of social behavior are always and everywhere comparatively stable. They change but slowly with time, and the new is always an outgrowth of the old. But however old a thing may be in point of social history, it is entirely new to the newborn child; however traditional a way of life may be, it is novel to the one who must learn to follow it. Thus, from the standpoint of the individual's adjustment to society, life is dynamic even in a relatively stable social system.¹

The human infant starts life without any of those social adjustment techniques which *in toto* we designate the human personality. From birth onward he slowly, laboriously, and in the ways previously described acquires a personality. But it is never a completed structure; it is perpetually being modified—added to and subtracted from. We may romantically say of the youth that, having grown to maturity, he "marries and settles down." But neither at marriage nor at any other point in his life history does he achieve the state of being so much "settled down" that his personality attributes may long remain fixed. For purposes of

¹ See *The individual and his society: the psychodynamics of primitive social organization* (A. Kardiner and R. Linton, 1939) for a detailed discussion of this point.

analysis we may dissect a personality into functional categories of attributes and examine it as of a given moment; but a personality is not something that, once acquired, remains static. Two interrelated sets of factors—the physical life cycle and the social life cycle—make necessary continuous personality change, even for the individual who is born into, lives in, and dies in a relatively stable social system.

THE PHYSICAL LIFE CYCLE

Like all the complex organisms, man has a normal life cycle. He is conceived and born; he grows to maturity; and he then begins his organic decline, which terminates with death. Each event along this cycle will lessen the value of some previous patterns of adjustment and will necessitate some modification of the individual's personality.

Physical Maturation. As we have observed, the human infant has great organic potentialities but slight organic capabilities. His organic machinery is only partly developed. He is physically as well as psychologically incapable of walking, talking, and otherwise engaging in human activities. He learns how to do these things as he gradually gains the physical ability to do them. Thus, when he has matured sufficiently, he begins to learn to walk in a particular fashion.

The acquisition of even such a comparatively simple manual skill as that of walking from place to place is, however, dynamic. To the growing child the physical world is constantly changing. It is at once expanding, in the sense that his sphere of activity is enlarging, and contracting, in the sense that the twenty-step room becomes a nineteen-step room as his legs and his stride grow longer. All the child's adjustments to his physical world must, therefore, undergo constant revision. If growth rate were always slow and consistent, the child would probably have no difficulty in correcting his manual adjustment patterns to the changing relative sizes of rooms, tables, chairs, doors, trees, etc. But children tend to grow by "fits and starts" (H. V. Muhsam, 1947). A period of rapid growth will temporarily maladjust the child to his physical environment, making his former adjustments so out of keeping with his changed relation to his physical environment that he bumps against walls, scrapes against tables, falls over chairs, and overreaches doorknobs, dishes, and all the other things he takes into his hands. Just as he has outgrown his clothing, so he has "outgrown" his home and all the physical objects with which he deals. The outgrown clothing can be replaced with new and larger clothes. But the physical world cannot be enlarged to accommodate him; he must readjust to it.²

² In the case of exceptionally rapid growth, the manual clumsiness of a child may have important consequences other than the inevitable danger to physical welfare.

As he grows in physical size, he also grows in strength. Substances, including people, will in effect grow increasingly fragile, a fact to which he must make readjustment. The door that just barely closed when he pushed it with all his strength when he was five will slam when he pushes it with all his strength at eight. The kick that amused the dog and Father six months ago may hurt them now. Thus the act that secured one result yesterday may secure quite a different one today.

Not a little of the child's baffling experience with the world arises as a consequence of his growth in physical size and strength. His propensity for slamming doors, falling down stairs, smashing precious vases, and hurting the family pets is in large part simply evidence that psychologically he has not caught up with his changing body.

Adolescence. Growth in size and strength are largely matters of quantitative change. The first important qualitative changes are those which occur at puberty, when the sex glands come to maturity. Adolescence begins sometime around the twelfth, thirteenth, or fourteenth year in girls and somewhat later in boys.³ The physiological aspects of adolescence include a sharp intensification of erotic sensitivity and a fairly sudden development of capacity for true sexual experience. The sensitive zones of the skin may tend to become more sensitive; increased erotic satisfaction can be secured by lightly stroking these zones; and the body be-

The abnormally clumsy child or youth may impress those about him as incompetent. This social judgment may in time become a self-judgment and may thus discourage effort on the part of the child to achieve a normal adjustment. The boy who matures late has a period during which his strength is inferior to that of his associates (N. Bayley, 1943). Although height and weight are not correlated with personality scores in group studies, it is obvious that the abnormally tall or short child often has especially difficult adjustment problems (W. C. Middleton, 1941). It is in view of such possibilities that child psychologists urge a sympathetic tolerance of children's ineptitudes.

³ It is frequently held that external factors, such as climate, play some part in the rate of maturation and thus in the age at which puberty occurs. The conventional belief that children "come of age" very young in the tropics because of the climate has not, however, been verified. Indeed, there is some evidence that the reverse is true (C. A. Mills, 1942). Considerable individual variation exists, but the reason why one girl becomes sexually mature at the age of ten and another not until she is seventeen is so far unascertained. That the age at which puberty occurs may have considerable bearing upon the development of personality characteristics is a possibility which should not be ignored. Studies of American girls of the same age showed that those who had reached the menarche (first menstrual flow) displayed greater maturity of interests, more heterosexual interests, more interest in daydreaming and self-adornment, and less interest in strenuous games than did those who had not. There were no significant differences in IQ (C. P. Stone and R. G. Barker, 1937 and 1939). Boys with great male hormone activity were found to have more mature interests than those who were less physiologically mature (R. T. Sollenberger, 1940).

comes capable of achieving a physiological crisis (orgasm) under prolonged stimulation. At the same time, certain secondary sex characteristics begin to make their appearance. The boy's voice changes, in the course of time dropping a full octave or more and, in the process, getting somewhat out of control; hair begins to make its appearance upon the face and other regions, especially those surrounding the sexual organs. The girl's breasts develop, hair makes its appearance beneath the arms and elsewhere, and the periodic menstrual flow begins.

Some of these physiological changes, such as the change of voice and appearance of the beard in boys and the enlargement of the breasts and occurrence of the menstrual flow in girls, impel the individual to learn some new ways of handling his own body. It is by no means clear, however, that the appearance of the capacity for sexual experience makes such experience a biological imperative and thus accounts for the marked adjustment difficulties which have long been thought an inevitable phase of the process of growing up. At any event, the personality changes that we associate with the period of adolescence are so much a consequence of a change in social status, which is only precipitated by sexual maturation, that we cannot discuss the one apart from the other (notes 53 and 55).

Maturity. The human organism normally reaches a period of comparative stability sometime after its twentieth year. During the period of maturity, physiological changes are slight and of little importance to personality. Maturity is for most people in most societies a period of great physical well-being and, hence, of great potential productivity.⁴ The duration of the period varies widely, depending on the inherited constitution of the organism and the uses and abuses to which the organism is subjected. The professional pugilist is old at twenty-five, and the dance-band musician at thirty; chronic malnutrition and extremely arduous labor may exhaust the primitive and the peasant before they reach the age of thirty-five; the hard-driven physician may begin to crack up at forty; whereas a member of the academic profession (the longest lived occupational group in contemporary society)⁵ may so conserve his energies that he is still a sound organism at fifty.

Accidents and Illnesses. The normal life cycle may be interrupted at any point by an accident to the organism. It can be injured from without by a fall, a bullet, or any one of countless other misadventures. It can be injured from within by bacterial infection, food and other poi-

⁴ The most creative years are different for the several occupations (H. C. Lehman, 1944 *et al.*; H. C. Lehman and D. W. Ingerham, 1939; H. C. Lehman and W. S. Gamertsfelder, 1942; C. W. Adams, 1945-1946).

⁵ See *Length of life: a study of the life table* (L. I. Dublin and A. J. Lotka, 1935).

soning, deterioration or malfunctioning of one or more of the organs, etc. Any interruption in the life cycle will necessitate more or less significant changes in the individual's personality. A broken leg and other sources of temporary interruption will ordinarily have but temporary consequences, although the experience of being injured or ill may itself affect the personality.⁶ Permanent injury or chronic illness will necessitate marked and permanent changes in the personality.⁷ Loss of sight not only destroys the value of many attributes of personality but makes necessary the development of new ones. The blinded man, for example, must reconcile himself to the fact that he can no longer be an architect and must somehow learn to make the best of his remaining senses. The man who develops a weak heart must give up tennis and content himself with such intellectual pastimes as bridge.

Senescence. When the human organism has passed its period of maturity, it begins the slow descent toward final death. Somewhere along this descent the individual will begin to feel the effects of declining vigor, declining stamina, declining sexual powers,⁸ deterioration of the sensory mechanism, etc. (note 54). At some point or other he must readjust to loss of teeth, loss and graying of hair, loss of youthful appearance, and, vastly more important although frequently ignored in contemporary society, loss of physical ability to keep going at the pace that was possible during the period of maturity. As we shall see, the nature of the readjustments and the ease with which he makes them are almost wholly dependent on social factors. But that some sorts of readjustment are necessitated by the various factors of aging should be clear. The personality attributes of the gay young blade of twenty-five simply cannot be retained when the organism begins to deteriorate. At fifty the gay young blade is but a middle-aged man pretending to be young.

Old Age and Death. If the human organism lives to complete its life cycle, the later years of that cycle will be a period of more rapid

⁶ There is some evidence that children who have many minor illnesses learn to adjust to reality better than do their sturdier brethren (M. C. Hardy, 1937).

⁷ See *Born that way* (E. R. Carlson, 1941) for a discussion of the adjustment problems of those suffering from spastic paralysis. See also "Discussion on the psychological aspects of deafness" (H. Frey, A. B. Stokes, and I. R. Ewing, 1940-1941); "Personality and chronic illness" (J. Ruesch and K. M. Bowman, 1948); and references on psychosomatic disabilities in Chapter XX.

⁸ There is an interesting and at times socially significant difference between men and women in the senescence of sexual powers. Man's capacity to procreate declines slowly and may not terminate until death. Women's procreative capacity, on the other hand, terminates rather suddenly at the menopause, a period of glandular readjustment that occurs about the forty-fifth year; but, contrary to much lay belief, the capacity to engage in the sex act may not be impaired and may actually increase.

physical deterioration and approaching death. Both factors will force marked changes in the personality. Although some few persons retain their "faculties" more or less intact during their later years and die all at once, in the manner of the one-horse shay, most old people die by degrees. Bit by bit the organic machinery runs down; little by little the various "faculties" are lost. Each such decline, each such loss, forces the old person to make some sort of readjustment. In the main such readjustments are of the order of abandoning former activities; they seldom involve the development of new personality attributes. In a sense, then, the personality of the old person steadily contracts until, as it has been put, he becomes again the helpless infant, like the infant in that he must be cared for but unlike the infant in that he is unable to learn how to care for himself.

Ordinarily, it is only during the later years of the life cycle that the imminence of death becomes an important factor in personality adjustment.⁹ The individual may, of course, anticipate eventual death to the extent of purchasing life insurance, preparing a will, etc. But it is not until old age that the probabilities of surviving tomorrow become so slight that the individual must actually prepare himself—as contrasted to providing for others in the event of unexpected death—for dying. Presumably the lower animals are spared this necessity, since recognition of imminent death probably can come only by means of complex symbolic processes. But society teaches men, among other things, that they will eventually die and that the older they get the sooner (in terms of probabilities) death will come. Although death¹⁰ is an inescapable law of life, the recognition of this law is a social matter; and the mode and ease of adjustment to the eventuality of death are largely determined, as we shall see, by social factors.

Indirect Effects of the Life Cycle. As the individual grows up and old and makes his adjustments to the organic processes, all the people with whom he associates are doing likewise. The social system may remain relatively stable, but the people whose behavior constitutes that system are coming and going in an endless stream. Abstractly, this coming and going may be of no significance. But to the individual it is significant in that his environment of persons is perpetually changing.

⁹ Exceptions include times of physical crisis, such as occur during illness and participation in hazardous activities—engagement in military combat (T. D. Eliot, 1943); work in mines, construction projects, etc.; and travel by dangerous means and into dangerous regions. The real but uncalculable hazards of so-called "natural" catastrophes—earthquake, fire, drought, flood, etc.—are seldom adjusted to in advance.

See *The child's discovery of death* (S. Anthony, 1940).

¹⁰ The Freudians have postulated a death instinct that supposedly clashes with an innate drive toward life (F. S. Caprio, 1946).

As a child his world of people ordinarily includes, among others, a mother, a father, perhaps a small brother and sister,¹¹ and a middle-aged grandmother and grandfather. As the years pass, the latter die, the father and mother become middle-aged, and the brother and sister become mature persons. At the same time, new persons to whom he must make adjustments are born—sons and daughters, nieces and nephews, etc. And all of them are constantly changing. His son becomes mature; his wife becomes middle-aged; etc. The aging of others means that his adjustment techniques of yesterday will need revision for today, and those of today will be inadequate for tomorrow.

THE SOCIAL LIFE CYCLE

As the individual progresses through the physical cycle, he also progresses through a more or less definite social cycle. The two cycles are often concurrent but are not necessarily correlated. The social life cycle consists of a succession of socially designated roles, the exact nature of which will depend on the particular society, the individual's class position therein, and his sex. But whatever its nature, each shift from role to role will necessitate some readjustments of the individual's personality.¹²

The Nature of the Social Role. The role of a child is different from that of a man, the role of a man different from that of a woman, the role of a priest different from that of a soldier. The social role, whatever its specific character, is made up of cultural elements and, as was shown in the preceding chapter, is enforced in much the same way as the role of a character in a play is enforced upon the player. The other members of the cast—of the play or of real-life situations—expect the individual to behave in accordance with the role that age and other factors have assigned to him. Thus, as Johnny grows older, he is told, "You are a big boy now, and big boys don't do this and that." When he reaches maturity, he may be told, "You're on your own now, John." When he marries, his friends and relatives may say, "At last you will settle down and become responsible."

The way people respond to an individual depends in considerable measure on his designated social role. In relations between comparative strangers, stereotyping usually determines their relative roles; perhaps

¹¹ Birth order in the family is one of the variables that determine the sort of adjustment a child is called upon to make. The eldest child of a large family tends to be the most adequately adjusted (E. M. Abernathy, 1940). Throughout childhood sibling rivalries necessitate many readjustments (D. M. Levy, 1937, 1941; and M. B. McFarland, 1938). See also "The relation of birth to behavior" (I. S. Wile and R. Davis, 1948).

¹² For a lively analysis of one phase of this process, see "The ages of man" (R. Bain, 1945).

the shabbier is respectful to the one who is better dressed. In intimate relations, the role of each person has developed through time and depends on factors of age, economic status, educational status, achievements of one sort and another, marital and parental status, and the like. The father may excuse the child, reprove the youth, and disown the man. The law may send the youth to a correctional institution and execute the adult.

Supplementing and at times conflicting¹³ with the response of others to the individual's designated role are his own ideas of what sort of person he is or should be. The processes here involved have already been discussed as learning by example. Just as the young actor may long to play the role of Hamlet, the youth may strive to act like a man (or his idea of a man), the man to act like a responsible husband and father, etc.

Childhood and Youth. The period of childhood is largely a matter of social definition and varies from place to place and from time to time. But the role of the child is everywhere much the same. The child is expected to acquire many of the normative attributes of personality, but he is not expected to use these attributes in contributing to group welfare. Childhood is, therefore, a period of preparation rather than of participation. The child is an economic and social parasite, living off the surpluses produced by those who have progressed through childhood to adult roles.¹⁴

The period of youth frequently begins at adolescence and often involves induction into the new role by some more or less elaborate puberty rite.¹⁵ Youth is a period of social apprenticeship, when the social skills that were learned during childhood are tried out under adult guidance. The social demands upon the youth are much greater than those upon the child. Generally, the youth is expected to "earn his salt" in social as well as economic ways, but he is not expected to be fully self-reliant or to make a contribution to the welfare of the group. In most social systems the demands made on the youth are tempered by his being granted the liberties

¹³ Adolescent girls often suffer severely from the mother-daughter conflict of ideas. Most of the discord is due to differences in thinking regarding manners, personal appearance, attitudes, and goals (V. L. Block, 1937). See also *Fundamental patterns of maladjustment* (L. E. Hewitt and R. L. Jenkins, 1946).

¹⁴ Exceptions are to be noted. In rural societies children are often partly self-supporting as soon as they become capable of doing simple tasks. In early industrial England, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, children were fed into the factories, worn out, and discarded long before they reached their teens.

¹⁵ The functional value of puberty rites as a means of introducing the maturing child to his or her new social responsibilities is clearly shown in *Life in Lesu* (H Powdermaker, 1933).

that he did not possess as a child. Thus the youth, unlike the child, may be permitted to wander afield in search of adventure, amorous and otherwise.

Occupational Maturity. At some point or other in the social life cycle, the individual comes of age economically. The young man "goes to work," not as a part-time and rather casual apprentice, but as a member in good standing in an occupational group. He joins the hunters or the fishers or becomes a soldier; or, as is the case in the modern world, he gets a job in a factory, office, shop, etc. For the young woman occupational maturity frequently means getting married. Her job is then that of wife and daughter-in-law or wife and homemaker, as the case may be.

Whatever the specific characteristics of the occupational role, that role invariably presupposes a considerable degree of self-reliance and a productivity (in both social and economic "goods") which is above that necessary for self-maintenance. It is during maturity that the individual tends to pay off the debts incurred during childhood and to store up for the unproductive period of old age. A man and a woman may do this by raising a family and at the same time providing for their elders or, as is the modern tendency, by paying taxes on the one hand (part of which will go to the maintenance of schools, old-age pensions, poor farms, etc.), and buying annuities and life insurance on the other. The debts incurred and payments made are not, of course, exclusively economic.¹⁶ During childhood we are given much attention that we ordinarily return by giving attention to our own children and to "the old folks." In any event, it is the period of occupational maturity that requires the greatest self-reliance, imposes the greatest burdens, and offers the least immediate returns.

Marriage and Parenthood. Marriage and its frequent consequence, parenthood, are likewise roles that make new demands on the individual. Upon entering marriage both the husband and wife normally renounce certain liberties and assume new responsibilities. In most societies it is at least tacitly assumed that as parents they will provide their children with economic maintenance and social training. The moral and legal responsibilities of husband for wife, and vice versa, and of parent for child vary from society to society. In general, the marital and parental roles are much more restrictive than is the role of youth and grant few new rights. These roles are ordinarily, however, a necessary prelude to rights that will mature in later years.

Old Age. In most social systems the role of the elder is theoretically and often actually one that involves many rights and few onerous re-

¹⁶ In *Growing up in New Guinea*, there is described a system of economic indebtedness that effectively enslaves husband and wife to their elders (M. Mead, 1930).

sponsibilities.¹⁷ In most societies, age has been revered and respected as the period of greatest wisdom. The aged have been granted every possible consideration, including that of the choicest foods the household could provide. The role of the aged has been that of nominal and perhaps actual leader. From the sociopsychological point of view, the granting of such rights and the release from arduous duties have served as a partial if not complete compensation for declining vigor and health.

Shifting Roles and Personality Adaptation. Although the point has not been stressed in the foregoing, it should be evident that, as the individual moves from social role to social role, his personality must undergo some sort of readaptation. As he enters the roles of maturity, he must, for example, reconcile himself to new responsibilities and the loss of former liberties. The nature and magnitude of the changes which must be made in his personality will depend on the extent to which his previous role or roles have fitted him for the new one. And that extent, in turn, will depend largely on the stability of the social system which has trained him and which assigns him his roles.

SOCIAL DYNAMICS

With some notable exceptions, the stable social systems have given continuity to the personality of the individual. Not only were his various social roles well defined and so graduated that each one led rather easily to the next, but his methods of adjusting to the various phases of the physical life cycle were socially provided and were compatible one with another. Under such conditions the individual's personality necessarily acquired new attributes as he grew up and old; but each new attribute was only an elaboration and extension of what he had previously learned. Thus the attributes of personality that he acquired during childhood would both fit him to the child role and partly prepare him for adolescence and the role of youth, etc. In the contemporary world, on the other hand, the individual may arrive at each successive point on the physical life cycle and at each new role on the social life cycle without many of the personality attributes which are necessary and with some which are in the nature of malpreparation.

Social Disorganization. We have remarked from time to time that ours is a disorganized society. Abstractly, this disorganization of our society may be considered as a variable, complex, and continuing disequilibrium between the functional units of the social order.¹⁸ In gen-

¹⁷ For illustrative materials, see *The role of the aged in primitive society* (L. W. Simmons, 1945).

¹⁸ For an attempt to establish objective criteria for the measurement of social disorganization, see *Problems of American society* (J. F. Cuber and R. A. Harper, 1948).

eral terms, it might be said that we have replaced old Dobbin with a high-powered internal-combustion motor and are having difficulty keeping the buggy and the motor together. Now a buggy is an effective conveyance for use with a horse, but it was not designed to house a one-hundred-horsepower motor. A considerable amount of tinkering is going to be necessary to adapt the buggy to this new motive power.

During the past few hundred years vast changes have occurred in our techniques of nature control. The tractor has replaced the old hand plow, the truck the wagon, and the automobile the horse and buggy; the sailing ship has become the fleet steamer; and all our means of transportation have been supplemented by the airplane. The electroturbine has replaced the little water wheel; the lance and sword have become machine gun and atom bomb. Handicraft has moved from the home to the great factory; men have moved from the farm and village to the vast city. And the changes in our techniques of nature control go on incessantly.

Our techniques of social relations, however, have not kept pace. For reasons that need not be considered here, we have clung to the old social ways while avidly accepting new mechanical, industrial, and agricultural devices. But the old ways have been disrupted and disorganized by these new devices.¹⁹ Slowly, by painful experimentation, the old social patterns are being readjusted to them. During this period of readjustment, the social system is functioning so inadequately that many despair of its survival. Others offer easy panaceas—ranging from an abandonment of the new technologies and a return to the “good” life of some distant time to the establishment of a planned social order based upon the new techniques.

The inescapable fact is that, whatever the future holds, the present is one of profound confusion. The disorganization of the preindustrial units of social life and our failure as yet to replace them with new forms of group organization do nothing to decrease the dependence of the individual on society and only tend to set him at odds with society.²⁰ In the

¹⁹ See *Technology and society* (S. M. Rosen and L. Rosen, 1941), especially Part III.

²⁰ There is a vast and ever-growing body of literature on the relation between social disorganization and personality disorganization. The May, 1937, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* and the August, 1940, issue of *The Sociological Review* were devoted to the subject and will provide a general introduction to the problem. Note especially the articles by H. Blumer and P. Schilder in the former and that by L. Wirth in the latter. See also *Social pathology* (S. A. Queen and J. R. Gruener, 1940); “The concepts social disorganization and social participation” (S. A. Queen, 1941); “A study of personal disorganization” (E. R. Mowrer, 1939); and “Maladjustment and social neurosis” (G. Devereux, 1939).

The most thoroughgoing systematic analysis of the problem from the sociopsychological point of view is *Personality and problems of adjustment* (K. Young, 1940).

first place the socialization processes are disordered, and the individual does not receive that systematic social guidance which makes possible his adjusting easily to his successive social roles. He is, as a consequence, often in the position of an actor who is thrust out onto the stage expected to play the part of Hamlet but equipped to play the part of Bottom. In the second place, social change has disorganized the social system and outmoded many time-honored human practices and procedures. Thus the outlines of the play itself are blurred; new plot elements are introduced from time to time; and the cast is constantly perplexed and confused. A story of peace? Of war? Of revolution? A comedy of errors, individual and social? The tragedy of poverty or the equal tragedy of excess wealth? In a dynamic social system it is quite impossible to predict,²¹ and hence prepare for, the social changes of the future and their effects upon the course of an individual's life.

Long-run versus Short-run Adjustment Values. The human infant is plastic and could, presumably, be fitted for almost any sort of life. He could be trained to make adjustment to wealth or poverty, to idleness or slavery, to peace or war, and to long life or early death. But every adjustment that he learns reduces by that much his plasticity, fitting him to one sort of life circumstance and unfitting him for many others. This is not to say that as an individual becomes older he grows incapable of learning new habits, but rather that habits he has already acquired tend to interfere with his learning new ones.²² Thus it is comparatively easy to learn the correct pronunciation of a new word, but it is exceedingly difficult to learn the correct pronunciation of a word that has long been mispronounced. As the personality develops, the original plasticity of the individual diminishes. The personality cannot be melted down and recast to keep it up to date with changing circumstances.

The individual's personality develops largely in terms of short-run adjustment values. Under conditions of social stability these short-run values will more or less coincide with their long-run value—their effective-

²¹ When members of ten different occupational groups were asked to forecast the outcomes of certain military, political, and economic ventures, they offered very similar predictions. No one type of occupational training made for expertness in forecasting (G. Nettler, 1945).

²² Older people are considerably less adept at solving problems where the task to be undertaken conflicts in great degree with what has been already learned. If, for example, older people and adolescent youngsters are both asked to solve problems that contain the peculiar assumptions that three times one equals one, three times four equals two, etc., the former age group will progress in its learning much more slowly than will the latter. On the other hand, if the learning task is of a type in which there is far less conflict with well-established habits, the oldsters will be under a much smaller handicap (F. L. Ruch, 1934).

ness in future life situations. But in the disorganized society, short-run and long-run adjustment values will, as we shall see, often run counter one to the other. Under such conditions, a curious sociopsychological contradiction makes its appearance: the more thoroughly and effectively the individual is trained in terms of short-run adjustment values, the more he is malprepared for later life. In a very important although limited sense, the less the child and youth are socialized, the better they will be fitted for the unpredictable conditions they must adjust to in later life. Beyond a certain point, the best preparation for adjustment to social confusion is no specific preparation at all. In a dynamic society effective adjustment means meeting each new situation in terms of itself rather than in terms of some preestablished attribute of personality.

CHAPTER XVII

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND MALPREPARATION FOR MODERN LIFE

ATYPICALITY OF THE FAMILY MILIEU

The adult in our society spends much of his life in and is continually dependent on such large and impersonal forms of group life as the business corporation, the government bureau, and the city; and he must use and rely on such modern techniques as the automobile and the telephone. But his initial and hence basic preparation for life is usually acquired in the highly personal and intimate child-parent relationship. For the family is still the basic training unit for children in contemporary society, even as it was a century or two ago when both the family and the conditions of adult life were quite different from what they are today.

It is largely in the home, Park Avenue penthouse or crowded automobile trailer, that the child acquires those primary aspects of his personality upon which all subsequent experiences will operate. From the intimate, personal relations with parents and siblings, he would seem to secure many of the overt and most of the covert patterns that become vitally important in his adjustments as an adult. Through these relations he acquires those complex personality attributes which are suggested by such terms as personal values, sentiments, motivations, group identifications, and antipathies, and such qualities of personality as are suggested by terms like selfishness and unselfishness, confidence and lack of confidence, and self-reliance and lack of self-reliance.

But even at its best the modern family unit does not provide the child with a representative sample of the larger society, as the family of a century ago did for its children. At its traditional best, the family is a small, closely knit, and intimate grouping in which the members work together rather unselfishly for the common good. The personality attributes appropriate to such a grouping and which are normally acquired from it by the child are often inappropriate to the larger society, for that society is quite different in size, in structure, and in the values, sentiments, etc., which make for easy adjustment to it. Thus in the family milieu the child may learn that honesty does pay and that good intentions are rewarded; but when he enters the larger society, he may discover that honesty, as defined at home, is not highly valued and that only actual performance, not good intentions, secures a reward.

Consequently, even the family at its best provides a socially atypical world for the small child and tends to develop in him personality attributes which will be atypical, or deviant, in terms of the norms of the society at large—or, more specifically, in terms of those particular norms of the social groups which he will enter as a youth and adult. Moreover, the modern family is seldom “at its best.” It is seldom a closely knit and integrated group, for it is not the family system of a hundred years ago or even that of fifty years ago. It is not, in fact, a system at all.¹ It is no more than the fragments of a system that has been shattered by the forces of social change. As a consequence, the modern family frequently malprepares its children, not only because it is an atypical kind of unit for the modern world, but also because it is a disorganized, unsystematic unit. Both its atypicality (or nonrepresentative character) and its disorganization contribute in various ways to the malpreparation of its children² for the adult social roles that they must subsequently assume. The early socialization of the modern child in the home is inadequate and inappropriate for later life in somewhat the same ways as an apprenticeship in a demoralized blacksmith shop would be poor preparation for a job in a modern aircraft factory.

The actual character of the family in which the modern child is born and in which he receives his early training may vary from a reasonable facsimile of the old-fashioned family (the farm family tends toward this pole) to a child-mother relationship which is almost untempered by the presence of other adults. About the only safe generalization that can be made regarding the modern family is that few families will be very much alike. The infinite variety of ways in which the modern family may malprepare the child for later life will, however, for simplicity of analysis be treated in terms of a few polar types. These are, in effect, the extreme possibilities. The malpreparation of a given child may, of course, fall far short of an extreme and may include aspects of more than one of these types.

¹ See *The family: a dynamic interpretation* (W. Waller, 1938); *Marriage and the family* (R. E. Baber, 1939); *The family* (E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, 1945); *The family and democratic society* (J. K. Folsom, 1943); *Marriage and the family* (M. F. Nimkoff, 1947); and *Family and civilization* (C. C. Zimmerman, 1947).

The May, 1948, issue of the *American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to the American family, with articles that discuss regional and other variations. A popular treatment of the modern family is to be found in “The American family in trouble” (*Life*, July 26, 1948).

² See “Parents as the makers of social deviates” (M. E. Bonney, 1941); “Early home background and personality adjustment” (M. M. Bolles, H. F. Metzger, and M. W. Pitts, 1941); and the case data presented in *Fundamental patterns of maladjustment* (L. E. Hewitt and R. L. Jenkins, 1946).

Overindulgence. All children must be indulged in the sense that they must be taken care of, guided, and protected from the consequences of their own ineptitude. When, however, the child is elevated within the home to the status of petty tyrant, he is likely to acquire attributes of personality that will make for his being maladjusted when he leaves it.

In the modern world many things may foster such overindulgence of the child. The decline in family size, almost universal in Western societies, tends to give to each child a more important role in the family. The parents of five children ordinarily divide their parental time five ways, and the child with four siblings is unlikely to develop an excessive sense of his own importance.* But the parents of only one child can, though they may not, lavish on him the parental attention that might have been divided among five. Such an overindulged child may learn to rule his parents with a childish will.

As the size of families has declined, so too has the function of the home as a domestic workshop. In the old family system women had much more to do than tend their children; they were processors of food, fabricators of textiles, etc. Today most such work has been taken over by the factory. Where the women have not also gone to the factory, they are left at home as unemployed. The housewife's free time may be absorbed by a host of pleasurable and nonproductive activities. But in many instances about all she has left to occupy her time is her children. If, then, she has but one or two children, each will be likely to receive from her far more attention than he or she will ever receive from anyone else during his or her lifetime. To the extent that maternal attention is directed into the provision of nourishing food and a guarding of the child's health, it is all to the good both for the child and for society at large. But overindulgence is more likely to take such forms as permitting the child to eat anything he wants rather than what is good for him, and of encouraging the child to pamper his whims and fancies rather than to do what is indicated by considerations of physical welfare.

An adoring and otherwise unoccupied mother or father or both will constitute an exceedingly bountiful environment, particularly if they can afford to indulge the child with material goods as well as attention. Under such conditions the child will ordinarily learn to want many things, in fact an unending series of things. At the same time he will usually

* It is always possible, of course, for the parents of a number of children to favor one of them above all the others; and it sometimes happens that the presence of numerous siblings fosters, rather than limits, overindulgence. This is especially true of the child who is so much younger than his siblings that they tend to assume the parental role toward him. See "The role of the family in personality development" (M. F. Nimkoff, 1946); and "The social adjustment of the only child" (L. Taylor, 1945).

come to accept these as a sort of natural right, an offering that is normally forthcoming. Because he has only to ask for in order to receive, he will not learn the techniques of "earning" what he wants. He will more likely learn to be a petty tyrant, getting what he wants by insistent demands, temper tantrums, sulking, and other devices which are successful with indulgent parents, if only because of their nuisance value, but which will be of slight avail out in the world of other persons.

The personality attributes of the child who is a petty tyrant are thus the product of an overindulgent⁴ and therefore submissive family environment. As long as he is within the family sphere, he will be a well-adjusted person. But when time and changing circumstances force him out into the larger world, he will be not "mamma's darling boy" but "that damned brat." The boys of the neighborhood, the adults of the community, the teachers at school, and the people who make up his adult economic world will be unlikely to enshrine, pamper, and indulge him. They will expect of him what his adoring parents never did—full repayment in kind for all they give to him. The techniques by which he got his way at home will be a distinct handicap to him in his effort to get recognition outside the home. He will, therefore, come to the outside world not only unprepared but malprepared for it. From the ideal and artificial environment of the home, he will go out into the real world expecting what does not exist and unprepared for what does. He may in time learn reasonably adequate overt adjustments to some or many aspects of the outside world; he may learn to smile and say "Please" when he asks for something, and he may even learn to work for what he gets; but his submission to the demands of adult roles may always be somewhat at odds with his covert feelings and his private evaluation of himself. Rather than adjusting outwardly to his adult roles, he may have his spirit broken by the shock of discovering that he is not so important as his family has led him to think; or he may become defiant and fight against the world that refuses to submit to him.

Overguidance. Coincident with the decline in the number of children per family there was at least for a time a rise in the average age at which parenthood occurred. Many factors were involved in bringing this about: the rising standard of economic life often encouraged postponement of marriage, particularly in the middle classes; the development of birth-control techniques made possible postponement of children after

⁴ Overindulgence is, of course, a relative matter. But care should be taken to differentiate it from cuddling, nursing when the child cries, etc. During the 1920's the prevailing philosophy of child care held that close physical contact between parent and child constituted overindulgence. Later research, however, demonstrated quite clearly that the emotional life of the child reared in an impersonal institution or at the hands of the "scientific parents" of the 1920's was not adequate (M. A. Ribble, 1944).

marriage; etc. In any event there has been until perhaps rather recently a significant long-run tendency toward middle-aged parenthood.

As a general rule people become increasingly cautious as they grow older. Whereas the twenty-year-old parent may trust to luck and take each day as it comes, the thirty- or forty-year-old parent may be overcautious, foreseeing all the hazards in the child's first step, the dangers inherent in the stairway, etc. If the overcautious parent is also an adoring one, the result may be overguidance. The child may thus be trained to conform to his parents' ideas of what is right and expedient and may be given very little opportunity to learn by direct experience. His parents may succeed in teaching him to wear the proper clothes and to behave properly in all those situations which they can anticipate. They may provide him with cautious adjustments to wet feet, dangerous crossings, and all other anticipatable circumstances. But in so doing, they interfere with his learning for and by himself. If all his future adjustment problems could be anticipated—and in the stable social system such tends to be the case—this protection from the hazards of trial and error would be wholly advantageous. But the modern parent cannot possibly anticipate a fraction of the circumstances that the child will in time encounter. As has already been remarked, a sort of psychological agility is necessary for survival under conditions of social change. Ability to work out adjustments in terms of the actual circumstances would seem to be largely a matter of skill at covert trial and error. The adjustment consequences of such skill, which may be specific rather than general, are usually spoken of as self-reliance.

The overguided child will be well adjusted within the ordered sphere of the home. But when he enters the disorder of the outside world, he will find a multitude of situational problems that cannot be solved by any of the parentally provided patterns. He will be unprepared to the extent that he has not been allowed to learn the techniques of solving problems by himself; he will be malprepared to the extent that his training leads him to use established elements of personality in adjusting to unprecedented circumstances. Such, for example, is the case when the gentlemanly little boy tries to resolve an encounter with the neighborhood bully by explaining that it is unmannerly to engage in fisticuffs. Not only will he fail to impress the tough, but he will be defenseless in the rough-and-tumble fight imposed upon him.

It should be observed that the overguided child does not expect the world to bow to his will. Rather, he expects others to conform to the same set of rules to which his parents have taught him to conform. He has what might be called a legalistic view of life; he endeavors to adjust in terms of precedent. If he finds an ordered segment of the world in

which to live, all may go well with him. But under any other circumstances he will be more or less severely maladjusted unless and until he has acquired some degree of self-reliance (M. E. Bonney, 1941). It is possible that many of the more earnest and serious of social reformers are maladjusted conformists who are trying to shape the world into the orderliness necessitated by their own personalities.

Social Isolation. One of the more striking results of contemporary social disorganization is that, although modern people live in great aggregations, they often have few permanent acquaintances and even fewer intimate friends (R. K. Merton, 1938). For the most part their associative life is with passing acquaintances, with coworkers, and with functionaries, such as clerks and elevator boys. In the modern city particularly, associates must be sought out and "impressed." The shy person and the person who has not learned to be agreeable to acquaintances may find his associative life exceedingly restricted. The perennial popularity of lectures and books on how to be charming and win friends suggests that a considerable number of modern people want more associates than they are able because of their personalities to secure.⁵

The solitary child is frequently the product of a home background so much circumscribed that he had no opportunity to learn to get along with other children. Getting along with others cannot be learned from books or by parental guidance. It can be acquired only by practice. The child who is limited, because of the nature of the home and its relation to the outside world, to association with adults will probably learn to get along with adults. But, as we have seen, the child-adult patterns of relationships will be of little value when the child, becoming an adult, must get along with equals. In general, the personality attributes that are necessary to the achievement of associative life under our impersonal urban conditions—social assurance, good sportsmanship, and all the various ways in which sociable people "win" friends—would seem to be most readily acquired through participation in childhood play activities. The decline in the size of the family means that many children will not be able to secure such training within the family itself; and the urban apartment

⁵ For many years the manufacturer of a well-known mouthwash has claimed that social failure is usually caused by bad breath. Body odor, poor grammar, the wrong face powder or lipstick, dingy teeth, and inability to dance are some of the many things that have been blamed by one commercial interest or another as the reason for lack of friends. Such claims demonstrate only that advertisers believe that many people feel the need for more associative life. In this, rather than in their claims, they are no doubt correct. In the following chapter this rather general malpreparation of modern people for life in such highly impersonal aggregates as the modern city will be considered. The discussion here is with one form of malpreparation for modern life, which is exceptional in degree if not in kind.

type of home often precludes their securing it among children outside the home. Nursery schools, public schools, playgrounds, and the various girl and boy organizations may be partial substitutes for the informal associations of family and community. But many modern children grow to maturity without having had the opportunity to learn to get along with their kind⁶ and as adults may therefore be solitary rather than sociable. If the solitary person could, as the title of a popular book recently described it, "live alone and like it," then he would be atypical but not necessarily maladjusted to his friendless state. But usually the child acquires, if only through association with his parents, strong desires for human companionship. If he does not also acquire the currently appropriate devices for securing membership in friendship cliques, he will probably be starved for companionship. For whereas the intimate, delimited communities of an earlier day would not let the individual alone, the large, relatively impersonal groups of today reject the individual who does not make himself agreeable.

Irresponsibility. Too much parental attention is one extreme consequence of the disorganization of the family. Too little is another. The tenement home may be no more than a squalid single room to which working parents return wearily at the close of day and from which they go when morning comes again. The costly apartment may be a place of adult gaiety in which children are in the way. The poor parents will of necessity let their children make out as best they can. Under such circumstances children tend to become street vagabonds, subject only to the intermittent and often injudicious guidance of the cop on the beat and the school authorities. The well-to-do parents will shift responsibility to hired nursemaids, boarding schools, and other commercial agencies. In both cases, the children all too frequently develop into irresponsible adults.

All work and no play undoubtedly make for unsociability, but all play unquestionably makes for irresponsibility. Some few members of our society, as of most societies, are enabled by circumstances to remain irresponsibles throughout their lives. Of these, those who are by right of birth members of one of the leisure classes will presumably have been more or less effectively socialized into a parasitic role and therefore will be content to live the life of expensive self-amusement (the playboys of the upper class) or, conversely, to live with equal irresponsibility in squalid ease on the bounty of a paternalistic governmental agency. But most children face eventual social maturity and the responsibilities, economic and social,

⁶ Certain geniuses appear to have overcompensated for a feeling of social inferiority. They had never learned how to make friends and were thus somewhat solitary characters. Unsociability may not, however, be typical of the genius (W. C. Middleton, 1935).

that are imposed by the role of the adult. Youth, it will be recalled, is ordinarily a period of social apprenticeship during which the individual is more or less gradually introduced to the responsibilities of the adult. The child who is given too little guidance may have a prolonged childhood, skip the period of youth, and then have adult responsibilities thrust forcibly upon him.

Unpreparedness for adult roles is no doubt a general tendency in contemporary society, but it is most striking in the children of many of the very poor and many of the relatively wealthy families. The playboy, poor or rich, who is suddenly thrust into the role of worker, of husband, and of father will find the demands made upon him extremely irksome. Perhaps he can in time accept his responsibilities. More likely he will continue on his irresponsible way, losing job after job, spending as he earns, deserting or divorcing his wives, and ignoring, in so far as he is able, the obligations of social membership. And should he be brought to a full stop, he is likely to stare in bewilderment at the adult world, a world that expects of him things he is unprepared to give.⁷

Instability. The disorganization of family life is most clearly reflected by the constantly rising divorce rate. Today more than one out of every four marriages is terminated by divorce.⁸ Probably another one out of the four is broken by desertion, the poor man's divorce. How many of the remaining are precariously maintained conflict relationships, no one knows.

Not all unsuccessful marriages involve children; but in those that do, the effect on the child is usually pronounced. The child who has been raised in a relatively tranquil domestic atmosphere will figuratively be

⁷ Mead reports that among the Manus of New Guinea, in striking contrast to most primitive peoples, the step from childhood to adult status is so abrupt that the adult forever after looks back upon his childhood as the only happy period of his life. This condition she compares with the consequences in our society of the tendency to prolong childhood. Among the Manus both girls and boys are taught to swim, to handle themselves in boats, and otherwise to take care of themselves. From then on, until puberty in the case of girls and until marriage in the case of boys, they are allowed to run loose. They have no responsibilities and are not required to enter at all into the life of adults; therefore they play. By playing they learn many things, but they do not learn the duties and responsibilities that will be theirs in later years. They pay little attention to adults and do not model themselves to any degree upon adult patterns. At maturity they are little more prepared psychologically for adult life than they were at the age of eight. Suddenly, the lid is clamped down; they must be adults although they have not learned to behave as adults (M. Mead, 1930).

⁸ The ratio of divorces to marriages in the United States has been growing slowly but steadily over the past fifty years. In 1945 the ratio was close to one in three. See *Marriage and divorce in the United States, 1937-1945* (Federal Security Agency, 1946).

torn apart if parental conflict arises—whether or not that conflict resolves in an actual breaking of the home. It will be recalled that intimate association tends to develop positive identification of one person for another, with the result that the one vicariously shares the experiences of the other. In a relatively happy home the child ordinarily develops such identification⁹ with both parents. Opposition between his parents will, then, place the child in a conflict position. He will be positively identified with each of two people who are more or less negatively identified with each other. His positive identification with each necessarily involves negative identification with the other. In lay terminology, he at once loves and hates both his father and his mother. He may frequently be forced to take sides in the marital conflict; but no matter which side he takes, it will be in opposition to his “other interest.”

One of the more characteristic consequences of such divided filial allegiance is instability¹⁰—vacillation from side to side with resulting indecisiveness. This instability toward his parents is likely to be extended into other aspects of the child's behavior by the division and opposition of parental authority, *e.g.*, what the father represents, advises, and orders will be countermanded by the mother, and vice versa. Under such conditions instability may be the only adequate form of adjustment. But in the world outside the home some degree of decisiveness and persistence is normally necessary for success, and the unstable child will be mal-prepared for adult life.

⁹ Ever since the advent of Freudian psychoanalysis the problem of father-son adjustment has been clouded by the Oedipus complex, the notion that the son, jealous of his mother's affections, has a submerged instinctive desire to kill his father. This concept is basic to orthodox psychoanalytic theory (G. Roheim, 1932) and has been regarded by the Freudians as a universal phenomenon. It should be noted, however, that the complex does not appear in some societies. Malinowski, for example, found that in the Trobriand Islands (B. Malinowski, 1927), where family authority is vested not in the father but in the mother's eldest brother, whatever hostility exists is directed toward the uncle, not the father. The Oedipus complex would thus appear to be based on reactions to authority, not on instinct. No doubt Freud was biased by the frequency of the father-son conflicts he encountered in Vienna, where the authority of the father, particularly amongst the orthodox Jews, was very great. In *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (E. Fromm, 1936) conclusions similar to those reached by Malinowski are advanced.

Since American children are normally not under the domination of tyrannical fathers, less “Oedipus response” should be expected of them. In fact one study of 388 children shows that boys tend to prefer their fathers (L. P. Gardner, 1947).

¹⁰ The problem behavior of the children of broken homes cannot as a rule be traced directly to the overt delinquencies of the parents (H. A. Weeks, 1940). It would seem to be more related to subtle emotional relationships within the family (B. Silverman, 1935). See also “The influence of the broken home on adolescent adjustment” (P. Torrance, 1945).

When the home is actually broken, the situation may be further complicated by the fact that the child is, in the eyes of the community and, hence, ultimately in his own eyes, atypical. It is still true that the parents of most children live together. This is the normal, as well as what the child has been taught to consider ideal, parental background. The child who has lost one parent through separation, divorce, or desertion may come to feel intensely the contrast between what is and what should be. Such contrasts between the real and the ideal not infrequently lead to abnormal forms of behavior, a subject that will be considered in a later chapter.

DISORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY MILIEU

Just as the old family system has disintegrated under the impact of industrialism, so too has the community—the neighborhood, the village, or the farm families within easy traveling radius—which was an integral part of the old social order. The community served as a supplement to the family. It was particularly important to the individual during his youth, guiding him through his adolescence into marriage and occupational maturity. From the community he obtained his bride; in the community he secured his adult employment.

In the modern world the "community" of the individual is usually dispersed, composed of heterogeneous elements, and largely beyond the jurisdiction of the family. Thus, when the modern child begins to enter the enlarged world of the youth, his parents can only hope for the best. There is little that they can do to ensure that his associates will be "good" for him or that the collective activities he and his friends engage in will serve as effective training for future marriage and occupational status. There are no integrated and cohesive communities of youths, constantly under adult supervision, for the modern youth to join. He must seek out his associates, and they must together seek out things to do. Most of his activities will be of an order of play which is only a slightly more adult version of the play activities which engrossed him during his childhood. Yet it is largely out of such youthful play that he must somehow find his job and his girl and achieve maturity.

The disorganization of the family, plus the disorganization of the community, leave the development of those personality attributes which will be relevant to occupational and marital life quite largely to fortuitous factors.¹¹ The modern individual is not socially prepared for and guided

¹¹ Of the recent sociological analyses of the disorganization of our society, *Social disorganization* (R. E. L. Faris, 1948) is the most sociopsychological in orientation. In it will be found extended discussions of some of the topics that are treated briefly in this and the following two chapters. See also *Problems of American society: values in conflict* (J. F. Cuber and R. A. Harper, 1948).

into his adult responsibilities. He fumbles and stumbles his way into them, and it is no wonder that he makes many mistakes on the way and often fails in the end.

Sexual Adjustment. Prior to adolescence, sex as such will have played little part in the actual adjustments of the child. But the child cannot have reached adolescence without having become aware of the existence of sex and having acquired some ideas regarding its nature and what he will do when he "comes of age."

In all the integrated societies some provision is made whereby the child is systematically prepared for sexual maturity and then is guided into the culturally predetermined pattern of sexual adaptation.¹² In such societies the period of adolescence is not ordinarily one of "storm and strife," as it so often is with us. The psychological troubles of adolescence in our society are so widespread that, until recently, they were considered a natural and inevitable consequence of sexual development. But it would now appear that the flounderings of the adolescent are caused not by sex but by malpreparation for adjustment to sex. Such malpreparation is a fairly common product of the disorganization of family and community life.

In a wide variety of ways, the growing child, particularly the girl, is taught the ideals of monogamy.¹³ These ideals were appropriate to the system of family life that was in existence a century or two ago, but they are in many respects inappropriate today. They include stress upon the material and spiritual worth of virginity, the idea that there is one perfect mate, and, in its worst expression, faith in that stereotyped ending to all love stories, "They got married and lived happily ever after."

Opposed to our ideals regarding sex life is our overridealization of the desirability of sexual experience. We are, as has frequently been pointed out, a sex-ridden people. Directly and indirectly, sex is emphasized in popular literature, in music, and in drama. It is the primary topic for most *sub rosa* conversation. Sex, therefore, cannot be taken casually as a perfectly normal and to-be-taken-for-granted fact of human life, as it is with many primitives and has been for centuries with the Chinese,

¹² Many so-called "primitive" societies have treated sex as a commonplace and have left the adolescent free to select his life companion through socially approved sexual experimentation. In the patriarchal family—the background for our own ideologies of family life—sex was depreciated; and the individual was taught to consider sex life and marriage as synonymous. He was then guided into marriage by the elders of the family. For fuller discussion of these opposing systems, see Appendix note 55.

¹³ A picture of the readjustments made necessary by the clash of two sex ideals—monogamous and polygamous—can be seen in the behaviors of the polygamous Mormons. The plural wives particularly felt the conflict (J. E. Hulett, Jr., 1940; and K. Young, 1942).

For the modern adolescent, sex is likely to become a focus for preoccupation. Thus sexual experience frequently is something that is prohibited until marriage but is greatly to be desired before marriage.

Absolved from the social restraints that prevent the working out of an adequate outlet to the socially stressed need for sex experience, the maturing boy and girl could, through sheer trial and error, attain some sort of adjustment. On the other hand, much the same end would be accomplished were the desirability of sex experiences to be depreciated during youth, since, as has been said, there is no reason to suppose that sex is a physiological "must," the denial of which inevitably results in weird and disturbing complexes.¹⁴

Not all the uncertain fumbings of the modern adolescent are, however, even indirectly related to sex. Many of the "show-off" activities, much of the semihysterical chatter, and the vacillating preoccupations with this today and that tomorrow are inept attempts to be grown up, to play the social roles of the adult.

Occupational Adjustment. Most young people arrive more or less unprepared at the age when they are expected to take on responsibility for their economic welfare. During childhood they have not been systematically learning economically remunerative skills. The boy simply cannot follow his father into the factory, the shop, or the office, there to acquire bit by bit the techniques of the machinist, the salesman, or the accountant. The girl, who in later life will most probably find herself in the occupation of wife and mother, might possibly learn to run a home, to manage a husband, and to take care of children by participation in the work of her mother; but she seldom does. In general most of the skills that boys and girls learn have significance for recreational rather than occupational life.

The public school, originally presumed to be a substitute for the informal educational functions of family and community, does little to prepare the mass of children in the skills—and still less in the ideals—necessary for occupational adjustment. By and large, our educational system is geared to the production of scholars, scientists, doctors, teachers, and other professionals.¹⁵ For those who enter the professions, the educational system functions reasonably well. But the vast majority of those

¹⁴ For elementary discussions of the problems of adolescence, see *Social psychology of adolescence* (E. DeA. Partridge, 1938); *Development in adolescence* (H. E. Jones et al., 1943); and *The psychology of adolescence* (K. C. Garrison, 1946). See also Appendix note 53.

¹⁵ Our high schools generally make some attempts to provide vocational training, and some cities have special technical high schools where specialized vocational training can be secured. But the vocational-training movement has met with strong resistance on the part of the academicians who control the public-school system and

who go through the primary and secondary schools cannot, in the nature of things, enter the professions. There is a limit to the number of professionals and so-called "white-collar workers" that a society can support. Someone must fabricate and run our machines; someone must cultivate the soil; someone must wash dishes, cook meals, and change diapers.

Most modern youths are not only unprepared to find and hold a job, but are also malprepared. In our society, the ambitions of most young people exceed their reasonable expectations.¹⁶ To the extent that it has effectiveness, the school contributes to this by reinforcing the popular misconception that there is plenty of room at the top. Our economic class lines are not clear, and class position is not entirely determined by status at birth. Poor boys do rise to riches, and many of our economic leaders are self-made men. But the way up is long and hard; the competition is bitter; and except for a few who have "struck it rich," those who have succeeded have displayed great resourcefulness and exceptional diligence and have foregone much in order that they might achieve this one thing.

Most modern boys and girls, having more or less played their way through childhood and early youth, are likely to feel that their high ambitions will be fulfilled effortlessly, much as a matter of course. They are therefore likely to be dismayed by the first impact with harsh reality, and many of them give up the struggle (K. Horney, 1937). They must then either become reconciled to the unspectacular and probably dull routine of the work into which they ultimately drift or remain occupationally maladjusted. Whatever may happen in the individual case, it is clear that a large proportion of modern people find their work life irksome and at times unbearable.

The rather general maladjustment to work life of modern people is often blamed upon the character of work in our society. It is said that under the highly efficient productive techniques of industry work is inherently dull, repetitious, and monotonous. The implication is that in

has secured little encouragement from parents. As a result, adequate vocational training is usually obtainable only from private sources at considerable cost to the student and is often therefore not available to those who need it most.

¹⁶ The difficulty in coordinating ideals with future realities is shown by a poll taken by G. B. Gallup (April, 1939). Only 6 per cent of the general public felt themselves to be members of the lower class. Even more startling is the finding of a 1945 survey in which only 1 per cent considered themselves members of the lower class (R. Centers, in press). Yet many more than a few per cent must be "hewers of wood and drawers of water." Even college students, who have in fact much better than average expectations, seem grossly to overestimate their probable future earnings. A survey of college seniors conducted in 1948 showed that they expected incomes that averaged 50 to 100 per cent above those actually being earned by previous college graduates (*Time*, July 12, 1948).

the preindustrial past work was exciting, varied, and of such a character that it kept the worker interested; but it is to be noted that in the past peoples have resorted to a variety of devices, including slavery, to avoid work. There are, of course, very real differences between work and working conditions in modern and in premodern societies. But aside from the fact that the modern worker tends to do a specialized task which is repetitious and which may seem unrelated to the work of others, the modern work situation is usually far less demanding of the worker than was that of an earlier day. The discontentedness of the modern worker would seem, therefore, to be largely a consequence of the fact that he has been inadequately trained into an acceptance of his occupational role. Thus the trouble with work in the modern world is not the character of that work per se but the character of the worker himself. A society that trains many of its children for a life of leisure and then requires them as adults to assume some responsibility for work is bound to have a somewhat complaining and disgruntled working force.

Marital Adjustment (Note 56). The child who is brought up in one of the more or less disorganized families of contemporary society will in time become the founder of another. His preparation for this event will probably be no more adequate than is his preparation for finding and holding a job. The procedure by which he arrives at marriage is romantically described as "falling in love" but is more validly characterized as trial-and-error mate selection. In this trial and error the bases for judgment are largely irrelevant, and one of the first errors may have to serve as the final solution.

Because the eminently practical aspects of the marital relationship are obscured by romanticism, the "choice" of a wife or husband is far more likely to be made on the basis of appearance, status within the community of youths, manner, and similar irrelevancies, than upon the basis of compatible personality attributes.¹⁷ It is, therefore, largely a matter of chance whether a particular young man and a particular young woman will be able to make a success of their marriage. As has already been said, probably two out of four such unions are such bad errors that they are ultimately broken by divorce or desertion.

We have seen that the unmarried youth, particularly in our society, has limited responsibilities. He is, because he is permitted to be, self-centered. Consideration for the welfare of others is ordinarily restricted

¹⁷ Detailed description and analysis of the courting procedure in modern society is to be found in *The family: a dynamic interpretation* (W. Waller, 1938) and in "Courtship and personality" (M. F. Nimkoff and A. L. Wood, 1948). The efforts that are being made to reduce mate selection to a rational procedure are illustrated by *Marriage for moderns* (H. A. Bowman, 1948) and *Your marriage and family living* (P. H. Landis, 1946).

to passing concern with the parental tendency to worry unnecessarily. At marriage, however, self-concern must, if the marriage is to endure, be extended to include the marital partner. This means, of course, a modification of many established attributes of personality. It can no longer be, "What do I want? What shall I do? What effect will this and that have on me?" Each spouse must make his or her calculations and temper his or her behavior in terms of "we" and "us."

Although there are exceptions, as when one spouse is willingly subservient to the other, the marital adjustment is generally most easily effected between individuals whose personalities happen to involve similar attributes. There is no reason to suppose any inherent advantage in blonds marrying blondes and brunets marrying brunettes; but there is every reason to think that the more comparable the personalities of the bride and groom, the greater is the possibility that each will be able to make the transition from "I" to "we." The heiress and the stable boy may live happily ever after in fiction; in real life they would probably never come to a meeting of minds on much of anything. In the modern world, personalities are so diverse and mate selection is so dependent on irrelevancies that even the most fortunate of matings will demand of each spouse many readjustments if marital harmony is to be achieved (H. V. McLean, 1941).

The articulation of the personalities of the partners to a marriage is, however, but one aspect of marital adjustment. Not only must they learn to get along with each other, but they together must learn to get along with their respective friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Conventionally, the honeymoon is a brief period of social irresponsibility during which the bride and groom are free to begin the solution of their own adjustment problems. The honeymoon over, they are expected to behave like sensible and responsible adults, which means taking a variety of new social roles, both individually and jointly. But marriage in the modern world involves factors that make the satisfactions of social demands difficult.

Ordinarily, marriage means almost a doubling of the number of people to whom each spouse is to some extent obligated—relatives, friends, and acquaintances. When he becomes a husband, the groom also becomes a son-in-law, a brother-in-law, etc., and for many people the "husband of Jane." There may be twice as many family dinners, twice as many relatives and friends ill and in need of comfort, etc., as there were before marriage. At the same time, the married person is less likely than is the unmarried to be excused for not attending the dinner, not calling on poor Aunt Ellen, and not repaying this social obligation and that. A thousand and one responsibilities descend upon the married partners that were

unknown to either before their marriage. One of the more important of the factors determining whether or not they will be able to make their adjustment to the new social status is the compatibility of each with the community of the other and of the two communities of relatives, friends, and acquaintances with each other. The heiress and the stable boy might conceivably work out an adequate adjustment to each other. It is improbable, however, that her community would accept him or that his would accept her. And in the modern world so much is left to chance that marriages not infrequently have something of the stable boy and heiress quality.

THE DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH

Every stable social system has included an organized explanation of final causation. This is a system of verbal abstractions, technically termed an ideology, which is used to explain the otherwise incomprehensible forces making for, among other things, the phenomena of life and death.¹⁸ Around this system of abstractions the society builds a great complex of beliefs and rituals, and over it the society exercises influence through prayers and incantations. Usually, a specialized occupational group—the magic men or priests—serves the system on behalf of the people as a whole. The result is organized religion.

For the group, religion generally functions as a control to keep the individual from deviating too widely from group ways. To the threat of punishment in this life, religion often adds the threat of punishment in the future life; to the promise of earthly rewards for good behavior, religion adds the promise of rewards in the hereafter. Religious control is, thus, supplementary to the social control that was discussed in a preceding chapter.

But religion also serves the individual, and in a number of vital ways. It gives an abstract meaning and continuity to his life, comforting him in his disappointments and explaining away his personal failures and sufferings. It helps him in his adjustment to events for which he is unprepared. It is a sort of over-all preparation for his misadventures. Religion also attempts to reconcile the individual to the certainty of

¹⁸ For books bearing on the psychology of religion, see *Psychology and religious origins* (T. H. Hughes, 1937); *Psychology and the religious quest* (R. B. Cattell, 1938); *Psychology of religion* (P. E. Johnson, 1944); *Personality and religion* (W. Brown, 1946); *Religion: its function in human life* (K. Dunlap, 1946); and the references on the religious aspects of the audience *fanatique* in the last chapter of this text. See also "Scientific method in the study of the psychology of religion" (R. H. Thouless, 1938). A number of articles have been written on the mental-hygiene aspects of religion (K. R. Stolz, 1937; P. Hopkins, 1937; M. E. Kirkpatrick, 1940; E. B. Backus, 1940; S. Hiltner, 1940; F. Kunkel, 1943; T. V. Moore, 1944).

eventual death and to make the infirmities of old age but a prelude to a new life. It has been rather contemptuously referred to as the "opiate of the people," a costless substitute for the material necessities of life. But in the integrated society at least, religion may assist the individual to make adjustment to many of the inevitabilities of life.

No other aspect of our old social system has been so thoroughly shattered by the forces of social change as has organized religion. The modern individual is, consequently, unlikely to be equipped with an integrated and unshakable system of religious beliefs. From time to time he will, however, be forced by circumstances to make adjustments for which some system of beliefs is apparently the only adequate preparation.

Bereavement. However long anticipated, the death of an intimate is never truly prepared for. A husband, anticipating his death, might prepare his wife for that eventuality by insuring his life, establishing a trust fund for her, etc. But he cannot completely prepare her, nor can she completely prepare herself, for the vacancy in her life which his death will bring.

Bereavement makes necessary two kinds of readjustment. In the first place, the loss of an intimate means that all those specific attributes of personality that operated in relations with that person must be allowed to atrophy. Thus the woman who has lost a husband or child will discover to her dismay that a great many things that she has grown accustomed to doing—such as kissing her husband good-by and welcoming him back home—have become either impossible or meaningless. In a sense a portion of her personality has been rendered functionless, and thus she has lost not only a husband or a child but therewith a part of herself. In the second place, the loss of an intimate may necessitate the bereaved's taking over responsibilities for which he or she is entirely unprepared. The widow may be forced to assume responsibility for the financial management of the household (or to endeavor to become the provider); she must decide for herself the countless things that her husband formerly decided for her; etc. The widower may be forced by the death of his wife to assume as fully as possible the mother role for his children, a role for which he will, most certainly, be quite unprepared. The youth may be forced by the death of a parent to shoulder adult responsibilities—to become a substitute father or mother for the family.¹⁹ The death of a more distant relative, of a friend, or of an acquaintance will constitute a crisis only to the extent that such a death liquidates some personality attributes and makes necessary the development of others.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the effects on the child's personality of the loss of a parent through death or divorce, see "Character and personality of children from broken homes" (N. Wallenstein, 1937).

The integrated social system did not prevent bereavement from being a crisis, but it did cushion the shock and facilitate the process of readjustment. In most systems, the community (family, village, tribe, or the like) descended upon the bereaved; he was swept up into a flurry of ritualistic activity and kept so much engaged that he did not have time to think of his loss for a while. By the time he could think, he was too weary to do so; and by the time he had recovered from the prolonged funeral ritual, he had to some degree become accustomed to the absence of the deceased. In some societies, moreover, the funeral rites served for the bereaved as a period of actual retraining. The widow, for example, might be required to prepare the body for burial and for a day or two stay beside the coffin, there becoming at least a little bit accustomed to the fact that the husband who had so recently been alive was now a static, unresponsive object. Furthermore, living as the bereaved did in a large and integrated social grouping, the necessary "practical" readjustments were not so severe as they usually are today. The widow had her brothers and brothers-in-law who would fill to some extent the role of her late husband, and the large family would provide for her and make unnecessary her taking over the responsibilities that had been her husband's.

More than this, the bereaved was prepared by religion to consider the crisis as something temporary. The deceased was only gone from this life, not just gone. In some believed-in tomorrow and some believed-in hereafter, the wife would join her husband, the husband his wife, the parent his child, etc. Some religions, indeed, have had the spirit of the deceased still living around the house, a situation that might not always have been conducive to the peace of mind of the bereaved.

The consolation value of religious faith should not be underestimated. Its importance to individual welfare is revealed by the extremes to which people who have no established faith may go in erecting a belief in a benevolent deity and a life hereafter. The tenacity with which so many moderns cling to such patently absurd pseudoscientific faiths as magic cure-alls for human ills, mental telepathy, palmistry, spiritualism, etc., simply demonstrates how much in need they are of assurance that all will come out right in the end.²⁰

Old Age and Death. One of the most commonplace, most intense, and certainly most futile endeavors of modern people is their attempt to perpetuate their youth. The legend of the fount of eternal youth is old, but the frantic struggle to stay young is a relatively recent phenomenon. It takes a thousand ever-changing forms, each no more real-

²⁰ The extent to which various death rites actually constitute a means of reconciling the living to the fact that they will eventually die is ably indicated in "Death customs" (A. M. Hocart, 1932).

istic than the others, *e.g.*, hair restorers, skin tighteners, eye brighteners, bust lifters, stomach restrainers, slimming and fattening procedures, pep producers, gland improvers, and so on *ad nauseam*. This struggle to stay young would be amusing were it not so pathetic. Pathetic it is, since it indicates an unwillingness to grow old, an unpreparedness to adjust to the physical and social changes that come with the passage of years.

A number of factors have contributed to the worshiping of modern society at the shrine of youth. Under conditions of social change the younger members, being more adaptable, are likely to be successful in competition with the less adventurous and less pliant elders. Thus older men tend to be displaced from positions of leadership, a fact that puts a premium on youth. Furthermore, the rapid growth of populations that has occurred in Western countries has meant until very recently a more than normal proportion of young people. The young have been numerically as well as effectively superior to those in the old-age group. Finally, the disintegration of the family and community organizations has displaced the elders from their former roles as nominal if not actual leaders. As a result, age no longer brings compensations in the way of increasing status. It brings, in many instances, a hard bed in the old people's home and an occasional begrudging call from son and daughter, or perhaps the spare bedroom, a place at the family table, and a plea not to be more of a nuisance than necessary; at best, it brings a cottage in the country and the company of other and equally cantankerous "retired" people.²¹

These factors have all helped to lower the status of the aged and thus to make the status something to be avoided just as long as possible. But the factor that perhaps more than any other makes so many modern people reluctant to grow old is that old age is a preface to death, for which they have not been prepared by indoctrination into some system of religious beliefs. In isolated instances, the individual may find death preferable to continued life; but by and large modern people show a reluctance to grow old and die which was not so commonly found in those societies which provided the individual with a firm conviction that death was but a transition to a new and better life.

²¹ See "The study of senescence: psychiatric and sociological aspects" (G. Lawton, 1938); *Adult abilities* (H. Sorenson, 1938); *Problems of ageing* (G. V. Hamilton, 1939); "Psychotherapy in the practice of geriatrics" (L. F. Barker, 1942); "Age differences in personality during adult years" (R. G. Kuhlén, 1945); *The care of the aged (geriatrics)* (M. W. Thewlis, 1946); *Aging successfully* (G. Lawton, 1946); "The army of the aged: a sociomedical problem" (B. B. Beard, 1946); and Appendix note 54.

There are now two journals devoted to the problems of the aged: *Journal of Gerontology* and *Geriatrics*.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIAL CHANGE AND MALADJUSTMENT

In the preceding chapter, attention was focused on some of the more crucial ways in which the disorganization of our social system may lead to the malpreparation of the individual for his progress through life. The counterpart to social disorganization is continuous social change. In this chapter we shall examine some of the more significant consequences to personality of such social change.¹

Functional Relativity of Personality Attributes. The individual who is socialized into and lives out his life in an integrated, relatively stable society leads a dynamic life because he shifts from social role to social role as he grows up and old. But throughout that life most of his basic normative personality attributes will possess a consistently high adjustment value; for although his place in the society changes through time, the society itself remains comparatively constant. Thus the language he learns in childhood will serve him, with additions in vocabulary, throughout his life; the food and other tastes acquired in childhood will be more or less good for life; and the motives, values, and sentiments developed in his early years will still be largely appropriate to his declining years. For him, then, the adjustment values of personality attributes are quite absolute; this is "good," and that is "bad." In sociopsychological terms, what is normative is functionally effective, while what is deviant is not.

But in a changing and disordered society there can be no absolutes, either of personality or anything else. The norm of today may be the deviation of tomorrow; that personality attribute which is functionally adequate for a given individual today may, therefore, be rendered obsolete tomorrow. Conversely, that attribute which is "bad" today may

¹ For a listing of forty-four hypotheses to account for social change, see "Some hypotheses concerning social change" (G. Watson, 1941). Some of the more important theories that have been advanced are discussed with great insight in *The problem of social change* (N. L. Sims, 1939). Attempts to predict the social effects of future technological developments are made in the following: "The influence of invention on American social institutions in the future" (W. F. Ogburn, 1937) and "Technological trends and national policy, including the social implications of new inventions" (Subcommittee on Technology of U.S. National Resources Committee, 1937). See also "Causation in social change" (Q. B. Gibson, 1945).

possibly turn out to be "good" tomorrow. Thus in a disordered, changing society such as our own, the adjustment value of any given attribute of personality is always relative to time and place as well as person. The physician who is well adjusted to and highly successful in private medical practice would for those very facts be in some degree maladjusted should medical care be socialized, as it was recently in Britain; and the man who has always enjoyed life on the Western plains would find many of his values, sentiments, tastes, and modes of overt conduct inappropriate were circumstances to force him to live in a big city.

Some of the changes that are constantly occurring in our society are of little moment; the rise and fall in popular dance tunes, the ebb and flow of clothing fashions, and the like are directly significant only to those who make their livelihood by catering to the whims of public taste. Some of the changes are of considerable ultimate significance but occur so slowly that people can keep up with them without much difficulty; this is in general true of the continuing developments in automobile design and production, in housing, in food techniques, and the like. Many of the changes are, however, both so rapid and so significant that they inevitably maladjust a great many people, no matter how well adjusted those people were to the circumstances of life prior to the changes.

Change and the Devaluation of Personality Attributes. In the modern world personality, like machinery, is subject to continual and at times very rapid devaluation. Just as changing fashions and changing techniques often destroy the use value of a dress or a mechanical device long before it has been worn out, so the changes that time brings to our social relationships continually reduce the adjustment value of some attributes of personality. All members of our society are so affected, although the incidence and the rates of such devaluation through time vary widely between individuals. In general, we may say that in our society the individual's personality or some aspects of it grow old-fashioned as he grows older.

The continual devaluation of personality attributes in modern society is most markedly revealed in the conflict between age groups. As we have seen, age-group roles vary in all societies; and no doubt in most societies, as in ours, the elders have always wondered what the younger generation was coming to. But under conditions of social stability the age-group roles have been functionally articulated; and although in such a social system the youth might be inept, he was nevertheless in the process of becoming an adult. Today, however, there are contradictions as well as differences between the generations, contradictions produced by social changes to which the young adjust more rapidly and fully than do their elders. Since this process goes on more or less continu-

ously, each age group tends to represent a somewhat distinctive period in the cultural history of our society and tends thus to have something of its own values, sentiments, motivations, etc., which set it apart from and perhaps at odds with the age groups above and below it. Thus the middle-aged man is not only middle-aged and socially mature but is also likely to be "in the middle" in terms of many of his personality attributes. He will tend to be at odds in some respects with both his elderly father and his young son. To the former he may seem somewhat of a radical; to the latter he will probably appear to be a reactionary. His father may seem to him overly conservative about many matters, and his son may seem to be recklessly radical about most.²

This is not to imply that the social population can be categorically broken up into age groups, each with its own distinctive set of norms. It is only to indicate by a simplification of the actual process that, as the individual grows older in our ever-changing society, he also tends to grow old-fashioned. Many of the interpersonal conflicts in our society can be traced in whole or in part to the fact that each of several individuals may represent somewhat different periods in our cultural history. Thus a family squabble over such a matter as Junior's plan to go dancing may simply reflect changing social norms; his grandfather may staunchly insist that all dancing is sinful, as it was in his youth; his father may concede that dancing as such is quite all right, but dancing in that "highway joint" is not; whereas Junior, in accordance with a recently developed norm, can see no harm whatever in drinking a "Coke" and dancing to the music of a juke box in a roadside rendezvous. In his father's youth the highway places were usually bootleg gin mills, and his father will probably find it difficult to believe that today many a highway establishment caters to the respectable younger set.

In somewhat the same way, but with more profoundly maladjusting consequences, the changes that have been occurring in our economic and political ideas and practices have been making "reactionaries" of people as they grow older. There is not an invariable relationship between age and the liberalism or conservatism of economic and political beliefs; many elderly men are rabid radicals, many young men are staunchly conservative. But on the whole, each generation is better adjusted than the preceding one to the new economic and political practices of its day. Few Americans, young or old, now consider public regulation of the railroads a sinful violation of natural law and the rights of the individual; but fifty years ago, when public regulation of the railroads was being instituted, a great many men considered it just that; and until they died off and were

² Pollak has found that older people are more conservative than their younger compatriots (O. Pollak, 1943).

replaced by men who had grown up in the tradition of such regulation, there was constant protest and much resentment against it. Few Americans today will deny the social validity of the principle of income taxation, as many of those who were subjected to such taxation did back in the early 1920's when this form of taxation was still new; but a great many present-day Americans are unreconciled to the still newer practice of progressively higher surtaxes. Irrespective of whether or not they hurt the individual personally, these high rates may violate his now old-fashioned ideas of social justice and social expediency. "What incentive is there left for a man to work hard?" he may ask. "How can we now expect to get that individual initiative which is the basis of social progress and the foundation of our greatness?"

In individual terms, the continual devaluation of personality attributes means either constant "relearning" to keep up with the times, which is seldom possible where motives, feelings, and values are involved, or else an increasing maladjustment to many of the conditions of life. As he grows older, the working man characteristically finds more and more reasons for being discontented with his job; "they" no longer do things in the good, old-fashioned way, new-fangled machines have appeared, new and to him inferior materials are being used, etc. As he grows older, the businessman also finds himself growing old-fashioned, although he will probably see it in quite another light. From his point of view, what is happening is that increasing governmental regulations, rising corporation taxes, and the growing arrogance of unionized labor are taking all the fun and profit out of business.

On other levels, too, the worker and the businessman, as well as many others, may find occasion for disgruntlement. Thus through the course of time the nice, friendly small town may grow into what the old residents consider a deplorably large industrial community; smoke blankets out the lovely distant hills, the streets are crowded with unwashed working men, and the downtown parking problem has become so acute that what was once a pleasant shopping expedition is now a nerve-racking ordeal. To an earlier generation the same town was just as badly spoiled by the coming of noisy streetcars, the displacement of "safe" roads and the horse and buggy by pavements and automobiles, the erection of apartment houses, etc.

Social Change and Individual Movement. As the various aspects of our society undergo change, the relevant normative personality attributes of the members of society lose some of their functional value, with maladjusting consequences. These changes are, of course, produced by deviant attributes of other members of society; and in theory more people resolve prior maladjustments by a change in a social norm

than become maladjusted by that change. Thus presumably more people gain from the governmental services that are supported by high income surtaxes than are hurt by those taxes, and the people who move into and industrialize a small town gain more than the older residents lose. But although all social changes come about through persons and are to that extent expressions of personality, they actually stem in many instances from impersonal circumstances of which the individual is only a reluctant agent. The late Henry Ford did as much as any man to universalize the automobile, but he detested many of the things that the automobile did to American life. The physicists who discovered a way to release the power of the atom were among the first to deplore their handiwork. Whatever it may mean in the long run, then, a social change may maladjust far more people than it "adjusts."

Moreover, many social changes make for personality maladjustment not only by putting many people at odds with the new but also by shifting some people from one place in the society to another, from one occupation to another, or from one class position to a higher or lower position. It is therefore characteristic of our society that people as well as social norms are continually in motion. That movement is in itself usually maladjusting, since it often involves a shift, as distinct from a change through time, in the norms to which the individual must conform.

SPATIAL MOBILITY

During the past hundred years and more great shifts in population have taken place. Here in the United States the effects of this migration were most profound. Year by year native Americans were uprooted by one circumstance or another from the relatively settled life of their home communities to move westward and enter the rough, harsh, and unsettled life of the frontier. Their difficulties in making adjustments to the requirements of the new community and their frequent failures to do so have been the theme of many novels, plays, and motion pictures.³ This phase of our history would now seem to be over; the West is conquered, and today a Bostonian can migrate to the Pacific Coast without feeling that he leaves civilization and enters a barbaric world.

But there is still much spatial movement, and spatial movement is always disturbing to some degree; for the migrant leaves some sort of community of people behind and has to adjust himself to some sort of community in the place in which he settles.⁴ Only professional migrants

³ For a scientific appraisal of the adjustment problems with which these pioneers were faced, see *Pioneering in the prairie provinces* (C. A. Dawson and E. R. Younge, 1940).

⁴ Even such comparatively minor shifts as that from family and home town to college may produce severe if temporary maladjustments. An interesting account

are prepared for migration; all others are to some degree and for some period unprepared for life in the place to which they migrate. Anyone who as a child was moved from one neighborhood to another knows how difficult it is to relinquish the status that has been achieved in the old community and to secure a comparable status in the new.

Immigration. At the same time that Americans by the tens of thousands were moving out over the continent, Europeans by the millions were entering the United States. They were largely people of peasant background and entered mainly into urban, industrial communities here in America. The flow has not entirely ceased, although of late years we have called the immigrants refugees,⁵ and most have come from a different stratum—urban and professional—of European society.

In general, the older immigrants failed to make the transition from the Old World ways of life to the new. They tended to cluster into immigrant colonies and to form little Old World societies within the larger American community. Within their colonies they preserved in so far as they could their traditional ways of life.⁶ Indeed many of our European immigrants found it unnecessary to learn even the language of Americans. This is not to say that all or even a majority of immigrants have not been severely maladjusted by being transplanted from the land of their birth to this new one. The fact that a large number of them have cherished the hope of someday returning to their native country suggests that they have seldom become fully reconciled to their life here.

The "Marginal Man." Even more adversely affected by migration than the immigrants are their children. Although they do not necessarily move in the spatial sense, the children of immigrants are nevertheless born into one world and later drawn into another. The general result is that neither in terms of social acceptance nor of personality are they fully members of either group. Such people are "marginal" in the sense

of such home-college shifts can be seen in a study of Bennington College women. From wealthy and conservative families these students were plunged into an atmosphere much farther to the political left (T. M. Newcomb, 1943; 1946).

⁵ For a consideration of the adjustment problems of the refugee, see "The psychology of the refugee" (G. Saenger, 1940); "Refugees" (F. J. Brown, ed., 1939); *Post-war problems of migration* (I. B. Taeuber, 1947); and *Refugees in America* (M. R. Davie, 1947).

⁶ The classic study of the sociopsychological processes and consequences of immigration is *The Polish peasant in Europe and America* (W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, 1918-1920). See also "Emigrant-immigrant neuroses" (E. Harms, 1937) and "Acculturation and personality" (J. Gillin and V. Raimy, 1940). Typical studies of specific immigrant groups in America are *The Puerto Rican migrant in New York City* (L. R. Chenault, 1938) and *The Negro immigrant* (I. D. Reid, 1939).

that they are partial participants of two or more distinctive cultural groups.¹ Marginality takes many forms, but that of the second-generation immigrant is most striking.

During their childhood within the Old World environment of the home and the surrounding foreign colony, the children of immigrants develop their basic personality attributes. In later childhood and youth, they venture out into the larger society and discover that all that they represent as persons is inferior in the eyes of this richer, more rewarding world. Thus, perhaps for the first time when he first goes to school, the son of the immigrant discovers that he is a "Kike," a "Wop," a "Hunky," or something equally regrettable. In some instances he withdraws, in so far as circumstances permit, and endeavors to live out his life in the psychological security of the colony.

In general, it would appear that the second-generation immigrant usually takes over only the more superficial aspects of American life. To him the use of slang, the wearing of modish clothes, the possession of an automobile, and the like constitute being an American. He struggles to achieve these items of distinction and, when he gets them, is baffled by the fact that he is not accepted as an equal within the American community. In the struggle to get them, he is unprepared by past training and at a grave disadvantage because of subnormal opportunities. That his endeavors frequently lead to activities which bring him not into the larger society but into conflict with it is not surprising.

Urbanward Migration. The movement of peoples from one country to another is one result of the commercial and industrial revolutions and will no doubt continue in one form or another—implemented by agricultural and technological changes, by wars of conquest, by large-scale forced displacements of people, and by the chaos of revolutions—until a balance of peoples and cultures has been reached. Any such migration will inevitably maladjust the migrant and will have repercussions for a generation or two thereafter.

Another form of spatial movement, also traceable to the Industrial Revolution, is at times equally disturbing to those who move. This is urbanward migration, the importance of which is indicated by the tremendous growth of cities in the past hundred years. Only a small part

¹ For an analysis of this phenomenon, see *The marginal man: a study in personality and culture conflict* (E. V. Stonequist, 1937). See also "Personality in a white-Indian-Negro community" (G. B. Johnson, 1939).

In some instances the marginal status of the second-generation immigrant would seem to be an important factor in the development of criminal behavior. See, for example, *Brothers in crime* (C. R. Shaw, et al., 1938) for the case histories of five brothers who were born into a maladjusted immigrant family and who became professional criminals.

of that growth can be accounted for by natural increase within the city itself. The city is a "consumer" of people who are born in the small town, the village, and the open country.

Although, as we have seen, the cultural differences between country and city are being leveled off by highway, motorcar, newspaper, radio, and, perhaps most significantly, the gathering of rural children into consolidated schools, the country youth is certain to be somewhat malprepared for urban life. This is not to say that he necessarily arrives in the great city in the manner of the old dramatic stereotype—as a country bumpkin, awkward, gawking, and so naive that he promptly makes a down payment on the Brooklyn Bridge—although he might be outwardly the country boy. It is more probable, however, that he is sufficiently urbanized to be indistinguishable at first glance from those born and reared in the city. But, as was indicated in a previous chapter, there are still some remaining significant differences between rural and urban personality norms. Thus, however much he may be attracted to the city by its promise of greater economic opportunity, by its excitements, etc.,⁸ the country-bred person is certain to be maladjusted to some if not many of the aspects of urban life.⁹ For example, it is generally true that rural people still have relatively large families and retain the beliefs, values, and practices appropriate thereto. Since urban circumstances are much less conducive than are rural to large families, the rural youth who migrates to the city psychologically prepared to have a large family will be maladjusted to the extent that the conditions of the city life virtually preclude his doing so.

There is reason to think that on the covert levels at least, many modern people are maladjusted to urban life. Although the city dominates the contemporary scene, it has, as we have said, been superimposed upon a rural heritage. The nostalgia for the "peace and integrity" of rural society that is expressed—mainly by people born to the city—in literature, poetry, music, and art suggests a considerable discontent with the urban way of life. The preservation of rural mementos—such as Henry Ford's Greenfield Village in Michigan—indicates a sentimental, however impractical, longing for the farm and village.¹⁰ The sanguine plans of scientists and quasi scientists for the garden city, for the decentralization of

⁸ See "Intelligence as a selective factor in rural-urban migrations" (N. P. Gist and C. D. Clark, 1938); "Selective migration from small towns" (W. P. Mauldin, 1940); "Selective migration in a rural Alabama community" (G. A. Sanford, 1940); "Selective factors in migration and occupation" (N. P. Gist *et al.*, 1943); "Rural-urban migration and the marriage rate—an hypothesis" (P. H. Landis, 1946); and "Internal migrations in peace and war" (H. S. Shryock and H. T. Eldridge, 1947).

⁹ See "Urbanism as a way of life" (L. Wirth, 1938).

¹⁰ See *Henry Ford and Greenfield Village* (W. A. Simonds, 1938).

industry, etc., reveal how serious is the problem of maladjustment to present urban forms.¹¹ Finally, the persistent effort of urban peoples to "get back to the soil," although they may have lived all their lives surrounded by pavements, would seem to suggest that the growth of cities has come about as a matter of material necessity rather than of fundamental desire for the urban way of life.

SOCIOECONOMIC MOBILITY

Spatial movement usually takes the individual from one kind of cultural setting into another kind. It does not necessarily imply a significant change in class position. The rural worker, for example, may move to the city to work in industry and remain a member of the laboring class. Socioeconomic movement, on the other hand, is a change in class status; it need not involve any significant change in the place of residence—other than, perhaps, movement from the wrong to the right side of the tracks, or vice versa. As was indicated in a previous chapter, ours is an "open" class system; and social changes constantly make possible the rise and fall of individuals within the class structure and periodically modify the status of many or all the members of a given class.

Individual Mobility. It is always possible in our society for the individual who is born into poverty to die, years later, a person of great wealth, of political eminence, or of scientific attainment. It is equally possible for the individual who is born into wealth and family prominence to die poor and unknown. As a people we are rather proud of the fact that a great many of our financial, political, social, and artistic leaders have been self-made men. We tend to overlook the fact that what can rise can also fall; that, although many strive to rise, most are thwarted in this endeavor; and that any shift in social status, whether up or down the class hierarchy, maladjusts the individual to some degree (A. Davis, 1941).

The phenomenon of individual mobility and its personal consequences is most strikingly illustrated by the exceptionally rapid rise and fall of motion-picture stars. Because it is always possible for the possessor of a reasonably pretty face to be "discovered," and because the rewards of stardom are apparently great, thousands of reasonably pretty-faced girls flock to Hollywood each year. Of these ambitious girls, the vast ma-

¹¹ There is, one may suspect, a good deal of romanticizing about the virtues of the old rural way of life—a pronounced tendency to dwell on the beauty of lush, green fields, the joys of neighborhood gatherings, etc. Generally ignored, perhaps because unknown, are the inadequacies of rural plumbing, the hardships of farming as an occupation, etc. It is quite possible that any concerted ruralward migration would prove just as maladjusting to the people involved as the urbanward movement has been.

majority suffer disappointment. They return home, embarrassed and brokenhearted, or perhaps stay on in Hollywood, to settle down to the lowly career of extra, waitress, or prostitute. Of the very few who are "discovered," the majority are eliminated after a brief period of synthetic glory by their own incompetence or by the whims of producers and the public. They are then forced to make the best they can of the fact that they were "starlets" but never stars. The ones who do achieve great success find their positions exceedingly precarious: they have displaced someone else in public favor, and there are many striving to displace them (L. C. Rosten, 1941). With some notable exceptions, the life of a star is at best brief. Hardly has she adjusted herself to the new role—having acquired a husband, an estate, the proper number of motorcars, etc.—than she finds herself on the way down. Hollywood is, as a consequence, filled with pathetic "has-beens," people who may have made an adequate adjustment to stardom but have been unable to make any adequate adjustment to the role of ex-star.

The personnel turnover in other fields of achievement is slower and less dramatic; but the underlying processes are much the same. The farm boy who becomes the captain of industry because he has acquired a strong ambition and some sorts of skills that make possible success under the conditions of his times will probably not be so severely maladjusted as will the boy or girl who has "shot" to stardom in the motion pictures. But when the son or the grandson of the captain of industry loses his inheritance because he has not been taught how to maintain it against competition of more energetic, skillful, and calculating men, he will probably be even less prepared for lowly status than will the motion-picture star who has fallen from stardom.

The Nouveau Riche. Movement up the socioeconomic scale is in general less disturbing than is movement down. For one thing, upward movement is socially approved. It is the achievement of socially sanctioned personal ambitions. For another thing, it usually means a lessening of physical hardships and an increase in the goods and services ministering to physical comfort, *i.e.*, better housing, food, clothing, etc. Not all those who move rapidly up the socioeconomic scale, however, are prepared to make adequate adjustments to their new roles. To be accepted, the *nouveau riche* may need to learn what amounts to a distinctly new way of life. This will involve the abandonment of many old habits—including, perhaps, such practices of the "lower" classes as eating with noisy gusto—and the acquisition of those modes of conduct which are considered appropriate to the man of wealth and position. Any considerable movement up the socioeconomic scale is quite certain to open an almost unbridgeable gap between what the person is and what he is now

supposed to be. The poor boy who becomes the rich man cannot, after all, retrace his steps and acquire those personality attributes which are the product of life in one of our "best" families, Groton, and Harvard. Lacking these personality attributes, he is likely, therefore, to be maladjusted in association with those who once were but no longer are his economic superiors.

Success often goes to people's heads; and the person who has become successful without long and serious endeavor on his part (the lucky holder of oil lands, for example) is particularly likely to be disorganized by the opportunities that the new status affords. Such is the case with the newly rich man who proceeds to throw his money around so recklessly that it is soon gone. Such, too, is the case with the man who, quickly successful in one field of endeavor, gets inflated ideas of his own importance and enters fields for which he is in no way fitted.

This latter phenomenon frequently takes the direction of social climbing. The new rich and the new near-rich are perpetually clamoring for social status equal to, if not in excess of, their economic status. The endeavor takes forms that are, from the point of view of the socially elite, gauche. The established elite resent the inroads of the new rich and set up many barriers. What the socially elite would like to have the socially ambitious new rich believe is that gentlemen and ladies are "born" to their station.¹² Money does, of course, often make up for lack of "proper" family connections. But financial success not infrequently leads to maladjustment in that it gives the new rich social aspirations which they are unable to achieve.¹³

The Nouveau Pauvre. The woman with too many diamonds, too many airs, and a great ambition to crash society may make an amusing character in fiction, if not in real life. But even in fiction those who have recently descended the socioeconomic scale are hardly amusing.

The *nouveau pauvre* is in his own eyes and in those of his former associates a failure.¹⁴ His course has run counter to the established values. It is unlikely that he will, as the *nouveau riche* may, find in the new status compensations for the things that he is now forced to relinquish. Whereas the formerly poor man may not greatly mind abandoning the

¹² For a discussion of the ideological barriers erected against the *nouveau riche*, see "The assumptions of aristocracy" (C. E. Merriam, 1938).

¹³ For a history of social climbing in America, see *The saga of American society* (D. Wecter, 1937).

¹⁴ In our culture responsibility for failure, economic and otherwise, tends to be attributed to the individual (D. Gandine-Stanton, 1938). But in some primitive cultures, responsibility is attributed to forces outside the individual. Under such circumstances the adjustment is relatively easy, and little or no sense of personal failure appears (L. M. Hanks, 1941).

comfortable practice of eating his meals in the kitchen, the formerly rich man certainly will not be gratified by the fact that he now has to follow it. His loss of status means a contraction of his world; and the people in this smaller world and the things that he must do to survive in it have always been, in his eyes, humble and humiliating.

In order to make an adequate adjustment to this smaller and inferior world, the new poor must not only acquire the appropriate personality attributes but, as it were, unlearn those inappropriate attributes that he will have brought with him into the new status. Thus, if he was a rich man's son and is now a truck driver, he must learn both to eat hamburgers and to get along without squab, to get along in the company of shopgirls and to do without the company of debutantes, and to get up when the alarm clock rings and to forego the pleasure of lying abed.

A significant distinction between getting richer and getting poorer is that the former does not impel readjustments, whereas the latter does. The man who has risen in economic status could probably go on living much the same sort of life as that to which he was originally accustomed. Psychological rather than economic factors are usually responsible for the endeavor to achieve a social role appropriate to the new economic status. But the new poor is forced by economic circumstances to reduce his scale of living and otherwise adjust, however unwillingly, to his new estate.

The Liquidated Class. In the modern world, there is always some individual movement up and down the social scale. It results in a gradual change in the personnel of each class grouping. Some social changes, however, have their effect not upon isolated members of a class but upon the entire group. War and revolution invariably liquidate one or more classes in the population. The people of Britain, for example, experienced a sharp decline of the national income both during and following World War II, and by a variety of political devices the burden of that decline was shifted as much as possible to the upper and middle classes. An economic crisis, such as that which followed the stock-market crash of 1929, will either reduce the membership in the upper economic groups, lower the status of the entire group, or both. Monetary inflation, whether caused by war, revolution, or an economic boom, invariably depresses the status of all those who have fixed incomes.

The maladjusting consequences of the lowering of the status of an entire class of people are the same as those which accompany the fall of a single individual, except that the distress of the individuals involved in the former is somewhat tempered by the fact that their friends, relatives, and acquaintances are facing the same adjustment problems. Misery

does seem to gain some comfort from company, particularly if the company is "respectable." Furthermore, if all the members of a class are going down, the individual member is freed from self-responsibility. He is not a failure; rather, "evil days have fallen on the land." And when an entire population is suffering adversity—as is the case when a nation is engaged in war—all the indexes of status are temporarily reversed. One can then be proud of his rags, joke with his guests at the inadequacy of the food he serves them, etc.

Any permanent lowering of socioeconomic status is, however, inevitably distressing. It can hardly be consoling to the dispossessed aristocrat, the dispossessed peasant, the disfranchised Jew, etc., to know that many others accompany him into permanent and abject poverty. Time after time whole classes in a population have been so suddenly and markedly depressed that they were unable to build a new way of life compatible with their new economic status.¹⁵ Liquidated aristocracies, for example, have generally given up and become parasitic.

The New Elite. Generally, the same events that liquidate one class elevate another. In revolution and conquest a new class of leaders dispossesses the old. The aristocrats, priests, and professionals of czarist Russia, for example, were displaced by the bolsheviks in the years immediately following 1920. Likewise, during 1939–1942, as Germany conquered various European countries, the native economic and political leaders were either replaced by or subordinated to German military, economic, and political masters. In other instances, the new elite do not usurp the position of the old but rise, as it were, to fill the position that other forces have made vacant. Thus when the great economic crisis of 1929 discredited the former economic and political leaders, the so-called New Dealers simply moved into the leadership position. The Eighteenth Amendment (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages) liquidated by governmental fiat the producers and distributors of alcoholic beverages. Into the vacuum thus created, countless petty criminals (and not a few formerly honest men) swarmed to become a new economic elite—the bootleggers, who were soon organized into vast gangs that ruled the multitudinous vice interests of the United States for a decade or more.

Whatever the circumstances that cause its rise, the new elite is composed of the more ambitious, energetic, and ingenious members of the "lower" classes. During any period of really violent turmoil within the

¹⁵ *After freedom: a cultural study in the deep south* (H. Powdermaker, 1939) gives an indirect but vivid picture of the decadence of the upper classes of the South after the Civil War.

class structure, it is always the vigorous, no-hold-barred type of individual who rises to a position of leadership. And for this reason if no other, the members of the new elite no sooner establish themselves as a class than they turn to internecine conflict. They are, in other words, extreme "individualists" and are malprepared for membership in a ruling clique. The personality attributes that brought them up the social scale preclude their subordinating themselves to group welfare. Each must be boss; and in the ensuing struggle one may survive and, dispensing with his competitors, fill the ranks with men of less personal ambition and more loyalty. This is what happened after the Russian Revolution and the death of Lenin; it accounts for the "purge" of the Nazi party after its rise to power; it explains the rapid dispersal of most of the original New Dealers after 1933. Sometimes, however, the struggle within a new elite leads not to the emergence of a single boss but to the breaking up of the new elite into a number of cliques that fight among themselves for leadership. The railroad wars of the 1870's and the 1880's were the result of the fact that competition for leadership within the elite was too intense for the welfare of the group as a whole.

It is perhaps inevitable that the belligerent and calculating men who rise to the top during periods of social turmoil should be maladjusted when, the new elite established, the time for fighting has passed and the time for coordinated activity has come. Furthermore, each member of the new elite is faced with much the same problems of adjusting to his new status as is the solitary *nouveau riche*—problems that are tempered only by the fact that his peers are also unprepared for their new roles.

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

We have seen how difficult adjustment to occupational life can be in the modern world. There is, however, no assurance that, when an adjustment has been effected, it can be maintained. Social changes frequently liquidate an occupational group, just as they do a socioeconomic class, thereby destroying the economic value of specialized skills and the occupational status that may have taken years to achieve. The invention of a new machine, the development of a substitute for an old product, changes in the demand for goods and services, and wars, revolutions, and depressions make most occupations insecure. The economists, arguing in favor of technological progress, contend that the new machine opens up more jobs than it closes. In the long run this may be true; but it is slight consolation to those who are dispossessed from their occupational niches to know that somewhere, sometime there will be some kinds of jobs open to them. Some inventions (*e.g.*, mechanization of glass blowing) have displaced thousands of workers in a single year; some events

(e.g., the economic collapse of most European countries after World War II) have displaced millions.¹⁶

Economic Insecurity. Economic security is a matter of food, clothing, shelter, and the like. A dynamic society gives much to some, little to many, and assurance of continued income to none. In the modern world no man's livelihood is truly secure. However competent and conscientious a worker he may be, society may deny him profitable employment. Disequilibrium is an inherent characteristic of our economic system; even the rate of total production of goods and services is normally either rising or falling.

One aspect of this perpetual change in our economic life was discussed in terms of individual and class mobility. Another aspect is the fact that every occupational group—working men, professional men, or entrepreneurs—faces the possibility of being liquidated. Moreover, the instability of the economic processes means that many specific jobs (as distinct from trades and crafts) are of short duration. This is most evident in seasonal occupations, such as agricultural harvesting, canning and packing of agricultural produce, and building of houses and other structures, where climatic factors prevent spreading the work throughout the year. The same short-time conditions obtain in such industries as automobile, furniture, clothing, shoe, and many other kinds of manufacturing. Finally, the high mortality of business enterprises means that jobs are constantly being closed because of the inability of the specific organization to continue operations at a profit. Every displacement from an occupation, every drying up of a job, means that a worker and his family have for the moment lost their economic security.¹⁷

The Occupational Way of Life. Fairly self-evident are the maladjusting consequences of loss of economic security. Not so apparent, but quite as vital to the individual involved, are the psychological consequences of being displaced from one occupation and forced to seek employment in another one. A man has more than an economic interest in his occupation. He has presumably spent some years learning the skills required by the occupation (even the day laborer has learned to do his heavy but simple tasks); but he has also adjusted himself to the occupational way of life. To shift into another occupation, then, means more

¹⁶ A study of the occupational mobility of the citizens of San Jose, California, is described in *Occupational mobility in an American community* (P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, 1937). See also the second book in this series, *Occupational trends in the United States* (H. D. Anderson and P. E. Davidson, 1940).

¹⁷ Many and varied are the adjustment problems of the unemployed and his dependents. See *The unemployed worker* (E. W. Bakke, 1940); *Citizens without work* (E. W. Bakke, 1940); and "Morale during unemployment" (G. Watson, 1942).

than learning the necessary manual or intellectual skills. It means adjusting to another occupational way of life.

As was observed in a previous chapter, each occupation has something of its own peculiar culture. This involves a more or less highly specialized language (the mechanic has his jargon, just as do the physician and the lawyer), a complex of values which are specific to the occupational group, and a code of conduct by which the relations of the members of the group with one another and the relations of the group with outsiders are more or less effectively governed.

For example, skill in playing an instrument is but the minimum requirement for employment in a dance band. The professional dance-band musician must have certain personality attributes. He must know his history—the history of the notables of jazz. He must believe that true jazz is the ultimate in human achievement and that the “commercial” music he plays for the public is no more than a means to an end. He must be willing to endure almost anything—including constant insecurity—for the sake of his “art.” He must be rootless, generous with his associates, indifferent to family ties, etc. Unless he is all these and countless other rather specific and socially atypical things, he will not be accepted by the established members of the occupation. And he might be an exceptionally skilled instrumentalist; but unless he belongs, he will not for long play his instrument in a dance band (C. Lastrucci, 1941).

The individual who has made an occupational adjustment has, as we have seen, acquired the normative personality attributes of the members of that occupational group and is, therefore, somewhat atypical in terms of society as a whole. When such a man is displaced from his occupation, he is then maladjusted; many of his personality attributes as well as his skills have been liquidated. Under conditions of social change it is inevitable that a significant proportion of the population will be continuously maladjusted by occupational displacement and that from time to time large segments of the population will be so affected.¹⁸

¹⁸ One of the more striking mass displacements occurred with the introduction of talking pictures, circa 1930. This revolutionary development displaced a large part of the silent-picture technicians and most of the more important actors and actresses.

Less spectacular but more important was the displacement of the soft-coal miners, which began with the introduction of oil as a household and industrial fuel. Theoretically, the coal miners should have gone over to the work of oil-well drilling and operating. Actually, few could make any adjustment to the new conditions, and a generation later the majority were still to be found huddled around the disintegrating collieries.

The story of the mass displacement of farmers by a complex of social and climatic factors and the difficulties they encountered in becoming migratory agricultural laborers in California is told in *The grapes of wrath* (J. Steinbeck, 1939). For a more

WAR AND REVOLUTION

From time to time during the course of human history the normal, however disordered, processes of life have been disrupted by cataclysmic events. In the older societies these events were mainly of natural origin: flood, fire, crop failure, plague, earthquake, and the like. Modern society has developed techniques that can eliminate many natural catastrophes and can prepare people for effective adjustment to others. At the same time modern society itself precipitates from time to time cataclysmic events more widespread and more disturbing than any that originate in nature. Modern war, whether of offense or defense, is one such event. Modern revolution is another.

Total War and Total Revolution. Wars¹⁹ and revolutions have apparently plagued men since the beginning of human history. But the wars of the relatively stable societies have been clashes of professional soldiers, men trained to conflict and more distressed by prolonged peace than by war. The civilian populations of the past have been affected only indirectly by such wars—except, of course, when their homelands served as battlefields. In the modern world, however, war is increasingly a phenomenon engulfing and disturbing, if not destroying, the entire population. The total population and its total energies are thrown or forced into the conflict.²⁰ All peacetime activities are disrupted; every man, woman, and child is affected. This is true even when the population is not subjected to the violence of bombing, of mass slaughter, or of being driven from place to place. Because modern war involves an ever-increasing use of machines, a society at war will necessarily shift its industrial resources to produce destruction instead of consumption goods. There was a time when a country could send an army off to war and then quietly await results. Today it must root every citizen out of his peacetime rut and make him a participant.²¹

scientific discussion, see *The people of the drought states* (C. Taeuber, I. Taeuber, and C. C. Taylor, 1937).

¹⁹ For several rather diverse views of the causes of war, see *Personal aggressiveness and war* (E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bowlby, 1939); "The causes of war" (M. Ginsberg, 1939); "The causes and the prevention of war" (K. Dunlap, 1940); "Psychological causes of war" (R. Stagner, 1941); *Drives toward war* (E. C. Tolman, 1942); *A social psychology of war and peace* (M. A. May, 1943); "Violence between nations" (G. M. Stratton, 1944); *Human nature and enduring peace* (G. Murphy, ed., 1945); *Approaches to world peace: a symposium* (L. Bryson et al., eds., 1944).

²⁰ For a definition of total war, see "Class structure and 'total war'" (H. Speier, 1939).

²¹ The January, 1941, issue of *The American Journal of Sociology* is devoted to articles by sociologists, anthropologists, and others on the subject of war and its

Much the same thing can be said of modern revolutions. The relatively stable societies had, perhaps, their "revolutions." But these were at most "palace" revolts, shifts in the personnel of the established leadership clique. The mass of the people were largely undisturbed by such events. Modern revolutions, on the other hand, are a phenomenon of social disorganization. They are an explosion of the tensions generated by the maladjustments of a large number of individuals in the population.²² In one sense, they are collective attempts to change the conditions that have made for widespread discontent; but they will surely cause, in the short run at least, more maladjustments than they can possibly eliminate.

Limited revolutions, usually spoken of as social movements, do not involve armed conflict and affect only a limited part of the population. The Townsend movement (for old-age pensions), for example, gives false hope only to impoverished oldsters. The majority of the American people are not significantly disturbed by it. Violent revolutions involving armed conflict, on the other hand, are, like international wars, now "total."

Effects of Total War and Revolution. War and revolution intensify all the forms of malpreparation that were discussed in the previous chapter and all the forms of maladjustment that have been discussed in this. Thus, the bereavement rate is increased manifold; there are more widows, widowers, parentless children, etc. Economic insecurity and occupational mobility are increased; the problems of adolescent adjustment are intensified; the aged become even more of a burden than usual, etc. But in addition to intensifying the normal forms of malpreparation and maladjustment, such conflict imposes some special forms of its own. Only the professional soldier has been trained to warfare; only the pro-

social effects. Although none of the articles is focused on the sociopsychological aspects of war, they will provide useful background reading.

Some indication of the vast and varied consequences of war to the individual can be secured from *War in the twentieth century* (W. Waller, ed., 1940). The effect of war on the family is described in *War and the family* (W. Waller, 1940); "War and the family" (J. H. S. Bossard, 1941); "Air raids and the child" (W. E. R. Mons, 1941); "The child in war" (I. J. Wolman, 1943); "The war and family life" (D. M. Levy, 1945); "The psychological effects of war on the family and its individual members" (E. Dukes, 1946); and "Some observations on the reaction of children to wartime conditions as seen in a child guidance clinic" (D. M. Odium, 1947). See also *The psychology of fear and courage* (E. Glover, 1940); *A psychologist's wartime diary* (A. Weymouth, 1940); and *Psychological aspects of war and peace* (R. Waelder, 1939). A survey of German efforts at inducing wartime morale is given in *German psychological warfare: survey and bibliography* (L. Farago and L. F. Gittler, eds., 1941).

²² The conditions making for and the processes involved in revolutionary upheaval will be discussed in Chapter XXV.

fessional revolutionary has been brought up in the tradition of internal chaos. All the rest of the population have been more or less effectively prepared to live out their lives under the sufficiently eventful conditions of peace.

The immediate special effects upon a people of a war or revolution are fairly evident, however varied and complex. They range from unprecedented danger of violent death to the lesser irritation of food and other rationing, and from exhausting demands upon time and energy to the distasteful presence of victorious conquerors in the streets. The long-run effects are equally varied and complex but may be somewhat less apparent. They arise from the disruption of the individual's normal (*i.e.*, anticipated) life history.²³ How such disruption causes prolonged and multifarious maladjustment may be suggested by the effect of war upon the career of the person who is conscripted into the military service.

Whereas the professional soldier makes a career of military life, the conscript is torn out of his social context. All his normal expectations are interrupted; and, if he survives, he is returned to a "different" society and as a different sort of person. As war becomes increasingly "total," everyone is torn thereby from his normal social role and returned, if ever, to find himself and his role considerably altered.

Man is, however, an exceedingly tenacious creature. He may at a given moment despair of finding continued life tolerable; but he usually recovers to go on and meet successive and equally discouraging moments. This tenacity of the individual is reflected in the fact that no social system, however disorganized, however battered by war or by revolution, actually collapses. Greek civilization, for example, did not "die" from internal disintegration and external assault, as a man may die when his heart is punctured. Rather, it declined, as a man does toward the end of his life span. During periods of acute crisis people are prone to forecast the end of civilization, the imminent collapse of society, etc. But in point of historical fact the processes of social change are relatively slow and are always continuous.

²³ For studies of wartime psychopathies, see "Psychoneuroses and other mental conditions arising out of the war" (R. D. Gillespie, 1941); "Psychoneuroses in wartime" (E. G. Zabriskie and A. L. Brush, 1941); "The psychoneuroses of war" (F. P. Moersch, 1943); "The psychoneuroses of war" (J. L. Henderson and M. Moore, 1944); *War stress and neurotic illness* (A. Kardiner and H. Spiegel, 1947); "The adjustment of veterans to civilian life" (W. B. Brookover, 1945); and "The personality of inmates of concentration camps" (H. A. Bloch, 1947).

CHAPTER XIX

SOCIALLY ATYPICAL PATTERNS OF ADJUSTMENT

Life does not run smoothly in the disorganized and ever-changing modern world. But not yet can it be said that most marriages are failures, that most men are occupational misfits, or that most people give up the endeavor to adjust to social reality and escape into insanity. Most "spoiled brats" become reasonably well subdued in the course of time; most adolescents settle down to marriage and a job; and most *nouveaux riches* and *nouveaux pauvres* live out their normal life spans. The processes of adjustment are always painful, and complete adjustment is seldom achieved. Nevertheless, these processes do tend to result in the achievement by most individuals of fairly typical patterns of life adjustment. What is typical for our society is, of course, vague and shifting. But it is more or less typical for the modern youth to arrive eventually at a heterosexual form of adjustment to sex, to stabilize his relations with members of the other sex through marriage, and to secure his livelihood by participation in some socially sanctioned occupation.

Atypical Adjustments. Marked peculiarities of individual experience may, however, result in adjustments that deviate so far from the typical that the individual stands out in striking contrast to his fellows. Those who fail to make a heterosexual adjustment to the problems of sex life, those who are so much malprepared for marital adjustment that they never succeed in marrying, those who have been prepared to make their livelihood only in antilegal ways, those who have failed to make any occupational adjustment and have turned to the life of the open road, etc., are persons who have made atypical¹ adjustments. Each has as a consequence of peculiar life experiences, arrived at a mode of adjustment that is at such wide variance with the cultural standard that he is treated in some exceptional manner by society. Atypicality is of many orders and degrees, but all atypical individuals can be divided into those who have been socially trained for atypicality and those who have been

¹ A wide variety of terms are in use as synonyms for "atypical." American sociologists now often use the term "sociopath" to refer to those individuals who are socially atypical but not necessarily psychologically abnormal. For a theoretical analysis of the concept and its application to a variety of persons and groups in our society, see *Social pathology* (E. M. Lemert, in press).

socially prepared for a normal life adjustment and have become atypical because of subsequent events.

The Atypical and the Maladjusted. It will be recalled that analysis of the personality attributes of an individual is always complicated by the fact that any action is a product of two complex variables: the individual's personality and the situation in which it operates. The question arises, then, whether the personality or the situation is primarily responsible for any specific act. As we have seen, one cannot, for example, tell from the fact that Jones is surly at breakfast with Mrs. Jones whether Jones is characteristically surly or whether it is Mrs. Jones who has made him surly.

In analyzing atypical modes of adjustment, we must constantly keep in mind the distinction between the atypical act which is a direct and consistent expression of the personality attributes of the individual and the atypical act which is provoked by a peculiar and perhaps unprecedented combination of external circumstances. This is, in brief, the distinction between the man who regularly steals to make his livelihood and the man who one day steals because his children are starving. When the atypical act is a consequence of prolonged and consistent atypical training and atypicality is therefore embedded in the personality of the individual, we are dealing with a truly atypical personality. The atypicality of such an individual may be described as habitual or inveterate, and the individual is often referred to as a professional—a professional criminal, a professional bachelor, a professional tramp, etc.

When the atypical act is mainly a consequence of peculiar circumstances, it is not a normal expression of the personality. Thus the man who steals only in an attempt to resolve an unprecedented predicament is inadequately prepared for stealing and its consequences. He is, as it were, "choosing" the lesser of what seem to him two evils. Theft makes him, by social definition and thus probably in his own eyes, a criminal. By acquiring, if only in his own eyes, the status of a criminal, he becomes maladjusted. He is not only at odds with society but at odds with himself.

The distinction between the atypical and the maladjusted personality is a vital but seldom categorical one. An atypical adjustment, although inadequate in terms of society, may be almost the only one that is possible in terms of the personality of the individual plus his social circumstances. The atypical person is a round peg in a square hole, but atypicality is normal for him. His life has had such continuity and the things that he has learned from social experience are so compatible that, although his personality deviates markedly from the social norms, it is reasonably symmetrical. The maladjusted person, on the other hand, is one

who has violated his prior training. Whereas the professional thief is completely complacent about his atypical behavior, the amateur thief is not; and whereas the former may end up in jail, the latter may eventually find himself in a psychopathic institution.

Although it is an oversimplification of reality to speak of types of atypical personalities, we can, for convenience, focalize attention upon some of the more characteristic forms of atypical behavior manifest in contemporary society.² There is perhaps no such thing as a typical criminal, although both the police and the mystery-story writers resort to the stereotyping process in speaking of the typical racketeer, the "big shot," the killer, the confidence man, etc. But it is true that, however divergent, all criminals, professional and amateur, are alike in that their behavior brings them into conflict with our social ideas of personal and property rights.

THE CRIMINAL

The criminal has at various times been looked upon as one possessed of an evil spirit, as one who consciously and willfully sins against the laws of God, and as one who is a victim of natural forces. Historical contrast can be seen in the fact that the Chinese blamed the wrongdoings of a man upon his parents, that the people of the Middle Ages blamed them upon Satan, and that Lombroso and other physiognomists tried to find a correlation between the antisocial behavior of a man and the contours of his face or the bumps on his head. Efforts have also been made to relate the frequency of crime to such natural variables as climate and seasonal changes in the weather. The fact that crimes against persons are more frequent in Mediterranean countries, whereas crimes against property predominate in northern European countries has, for example, been explained as a consequence of climatic variation. The relation of this idea to Montesquieu's theory of climatic determination of social behavior is obvious.

Origin of the Criminal Personality. At present, there are two extreme views of the criminal and of the treatment that should be accorded him. Many of those who deal with criminals—police, judiciary, and institutional personnel—take the attitude that criminals cause crime and that it is, therefore, only by exterminating or permanently incarcerating criminals that crime can be stamped out. Those who hold this view

²It should be observed that the standard for typical adjustment (previously described as normative) is set by society and is subject to change. As a result, that complex of personality attributes which today is an atypical adjustment might be typical under other social conditions. See "Psychopathic trends in culture" (B. W. Aginsky, 1939); and *The people of Alor* (C. Du Bois, 1944).

usually assume that the behavior of the criminal is an automatic consequence of some innate attribute, such as subnormal intelligence³ or an "instinct" for crime. Holding the opposite view are the sentimentalists, who see the criminal as a victim of circumstances—one who means well, but who has been forced by society to do wrong. They would appeal to his better nature, show him the error of his ways, and then send him out to sin again.

Between these extreme views is one which has gradually come to be accepted as valid by the more careful students of criminology and which would appear to follow from our present sociopsychological concept of the origins of human behavior. Although based upon a mistaken idea of cause, the hard-boiled view of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of modifying the criminal personality is valid in so far as the professional criminal is concerned. With our present training methods, there would seem to be little possibility of reforming him; and if society finds his behavior dangerous or expensive, he had best be disposed of. It does not follow, however, that if all the criminals in the United States were apprehended and promptly removed from action, crime would cease. There is partial validity in the sentimental view; criminals are, in every sense, victims of social circumstances. Until the circumstances that breed criminal behavior are wiped out, disposing of criminals is much like killing mosquitoes. New ones come to take the place of those who have been removed from action.

The Sociopsychological Definition. By legal definition, a criminal is one who has been convicted of committing a felony. Frequently, however, a man who breaks vital laws, such as those against murder, is not apprehended; or, if he is caught, he may escape conviction. Furthermore, by legal fiat, a whole new class of criminals may be created; thus the legal definition of the criminal has none but legal significance.

For our purposes, a criminal⁴ is an antisocial parasite, one who behaves in ways which are so contrary to those mores of his society which

³ Intelligence as measured by group tests of the Army Alpha type has been found to vary considerably among various sorts of criminals. Inmates of work-houses and county jails usually make the lowest scores, and those in the state and Federal prisons the highest. In several instances, the average intelligence of a prison population has been found to be higher than that of the guards. Apparently there is some correlation between the intelligence of the criminal and the type of crime he commits; but that crime is caused by low intelligence does not follow. See *Intelligence and crime* (S. H. Tulchin, 1939); and "Levels of intelligence of prison inmates" (D. G. Schmidt, 1946).

⁴ For case studies and discussions of the adult criminal personality, see *Criminal behavior* (W. C. Reckless, 1940); *Criminal careers in retrospect* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1943); *Crime and the human mind* (D. Abrahamson, 1944); *Why crime?* (C. Mullins, 1945); and *Crime: causes and conditions* (H. von Hentig, 1947).

have to do with rights of persons or of property that he is a hazard to the welfare of the community, whether or not his behavior is known to the members of the community. The fact that he does not get caught does not keep the thief from being a criminal in the sociopsychological sense. On the other hand, the fact that a man suddenly becomes a criminal by legal fiat does not make him a criminal in the sociopsychological sense. In a changing society such as ours the line between the criminal and noncriminal is a vague and shifting one. In the stabler societies the distinction was reasonably clear.

The Inveterate or Habitual Criminal. Perhaps since time immemorial, there have been certain minority groups who have lived parasitically upon the larger community through resort to force. These are the brigands of history—not to be confused with those members of the majority group who, although living parasitically, do so in accordance with the conventions of the community. The brigands have been recognized as enemies and ordinarily have not lived within the community, but have stayed perhaps in the inaccessible hills, venturing forth only for an occasional raid. Their way of securing a livelihood has been typical for their in-group but atypical in terms of the larger community. They have considered all except the members of their in-group natural prey. To the larger community they have appeared as habitual criminals.

There is no essential distinction between the brigands of old and the professional criminals of today, except that the latter breed in the slum regions within the larger community instead of the distant hills and are less easily identified as enemies of society. Like the brigands, our professional or habitual criminals are men and women who have been trained into modes of behavior which are in marked contrast to the ways of the larger community and which make them antisocial parasites. They do not lack socially determined principles of conduct, although it has frequently been claimed that they do. But their attitudes, values, interests, conventions, mannerisms, and morals⁵ take a form of expression that is at sharp variance with the ways of the majority of the members of the society.

The criminal personality is shaped by the same kinds of forces and processes which develop that of the noncriminal. The boy whose parents, parental associates, or play gang are antisocial simply takes over the patterns of their behavior, becomes a member of their in-group, and, in so doing, achieves the status of a criminal within the larger community.⁶

⁵ See *The professional thief: by a professional thief* (E. H. Sutherland, ed., 1937).

⁶ There is no single road to crime. It is true that many criminals have as children lived in cramped quarters in an unsavory location, lacked proper playground facilities, had quarrelsome or foreign-born parents or a broken home, gone nightly to the

Members of the so-called "underworld" are of course divided into classes—fully as class conscious as those of the larger community—and into specialized work groups. In some respects, the underworld of our modern cities is more thoroughly organized than is the rest of the city population.

The habitual criminal may have no sense of wrongdoing so far as society is concerned, for his acceptance of the philosophy of the underworld is a normative attribute of his personality. He considers honest labor repulsive—something for fools to do. He has special technical skills and knowledge, peculiar in-group loyalties and codes of conduct, and his own argot, superstitions, beliefs, etc. But the criminal is also an individual, and there is probably as much deviation among criminals as among the noncriminal members of society. Some are leaders, others followers. Some are skillful, others crude. Some are parsimonious, others spend-thrifts. Some are ambitious, and others content just to "get by." It is, in fact, frequently because of some individual idiosyncrasy that a criminal is apprehended.⁷

The Incidental or Fortuitous Criminal. Not all crimes are committed by habitual criminals. The man who steals a loaf of bread may do so because he is hungry. Finding no other means of getting food, he steals in spite of his early training. He is a criminal, not because of the character of his personality, but because unusual social circumstances in a sense force him to act in this antisocial way. We usually refer to action arising under such conditions as the result of temptation. It would appear that there is some truth in the contention that every man has his price. Although a man has been trained into the mores of his community, pronounced changes in his status may lead him to commit anti-social acts in a trial-and-error attempt to reestablish himself at his old social level. Such is the case with the man who, having lost his job and being unable to secure another, resorts to theft or even murder (R. S. Banay, 1943) in order to obtain the necessities of life.

Changes in external conditions do not, however, of themselves induce

movies, had bad associates, etc. But no one of these or any other factor by itself is guaranteed to induce delinquency. Only when the individual is subjected to a pattern of antisocial influences will any single factor, such as bad parental example, be of significance. It is for this reason that only a small percentage of slum children become delinquent or criminal, and the vast majority of the second generation become respectable citizens.

⁷ The police, for example, generally know all the apartment-house burglars—a specialized group—in the community. When an apartment is robbed, the problem, assuming it is a professional job, is to find out which one of the specialists did it and then to secure his conviction. Not infrequently such a man follows his own individual pattern in doing the job and can be identified by the clues he leaves behind. Apprehending the man is seldom difficult; securing a conviction is usually the major problem.

criminal behavior; that behavior is a consequence of the interaction of a personality and a social circumstance. Some men would starve rather than steal; others are not so well prepared to resist temptation. The person who has been defeated in an intense and lifelong ambition to achieve financial or social success by honest labor may in desperation resort to antisocial methods. More complex, and perhaps more frequent, is the case of the person who is faced with the alternative of committing a crime or of losing something he values above his social integrity.⁸ Embezzlement is commonly a consequence of this sort of life predicament. Then there are the typical crimes of person against person—rape, assault, and murder. The jealous husband may in a moment of rage kill his wife. Except in the case of rape, there is a tendency to make a judicial distinction between those crimes of violence which are a means to an end—such as murder with the object of securing money—and those which are, in a manner of speaking, an end in themselves—such as killing the seducer of a wife.

Other than separating the old from the young and the first-timers from the recidivists, there is little effort in the United States or elsewhere to segregate and administer differential treatment to habitual and to non-habitual criminals. The more enlightened judges attempt to mete out punishment fitting to the criminal rather than to the crime; some effort has been made to establish a legal method of recognizing and permanently removing the professional criminal from society; and it is probably true that local police forces, when they are not involved with the underworld, frequently resort to extralegal methods of solving the professional crime problem. But the amateur criminal, when caught, is ordinarily forced by the way he is treated to drift into the professional class. The man who has stolen as a result of necessity is in a much worse position to secure an honest livelihood after discharge from prison than he was before he committed the theft. Moreover, except in so far as juveniles are concerned, there is little concerted effort on the part of society to change the conditions that breed professional criminals.

The Juvenile Delinquent as a Potential Criminal. In the past, youthful offenders have often been treated exactly like adult criminals; but in recent years there has developed, particularly in the United States, the practice of treating the juvenile violator of the law as a potential rather than an actual criminal. He is designated a delinquent, rather than a criminal, to be dealt with as a person requiring social care rather than as one upon whom society should wreak its vengeance. In keeping with this concept, separate courts, social agencies, and reformatories have been established for juvenile delinquents. Since experience with reforma-

⁸ See "White-collar criminality" (E. H. Sutherland, 1940).

tories has not always been encouraging, some communities make an effort to change the physical and social environment of the delinquent by placing him in a socially adequate foster home. In the large cities some attempts are being made to break up antisocial boy gangs by providing facilities for socially desirable gang play under adequate adult supervision. The establishment of public playgrounds, gymnasiums, boys' clubs, etc., is based upon the realization that the formation of antisocial gangs can be discouraged only by provision of more attractive substitutes.

The boy delinquent is a potential adult criminal of the professional type (note 57). If he can be uprooted from the social conditions that are molding him into an antisocial pattern and be transplanted to more normal surroundings, he can often be brought into line with the larger community. The girl delinquent, on the other hand, frequently presents a far more difficult problem. Whereas the boy delinquent can often be detected and removed from antisocial influences long before he becomes habitually atypical, the girl delinquent is not usually recognized as a delinquent before it is too late, for her early antisocial behavior is seldom traceable to some such obvious factor as membership in a gang. The delinquency of girls frequently takes the form of breaking our sex mores, and the girl delinquent is often apprehended only because of pregnancy. No matter how intelligently and sympathetically she is treated as an unmarried mother, she usually feels that reestablishment upon a normal level cannot be achieved and frequently drifts into prostitution or joins the underworld as a criminal's "moll."

THE PROSTITUTE

Sex promiscuity is in some societies entirely normal for the members of both sexes before marriage and therefore cannot of itself be considered as a form of atypical behavior. But in any society where men are permitted a degree of sexual freedom that is not allowed women—where the so-called "double standard" of morality exists—there is inevitably present a class of women who are sexually atypical. Theirs is the occupation of prostitution,⁹ which at times has been economically and

⁹ Forced prostitution, so-called "white slavery," probably plays a small part in the recruiting of prostitutes. In contrast to such popular but unrealistic approaches to the problem of prostitution as are found in the treatise *The oldest profession in the world* (W. J. Robinson, 1929) should be set such undramatic but realistic examinations of the subject as G. May's article "Prostitution" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 553-559); *Prostitutes: their early lives* (League of Nations Advisory Committee on Social Questions, 1938); *Designs in scarlet* (C. R. Cooper, 1939); "Digging at the roots of prostitution" (E. J. Lukas, 1944); *The psycho-pathology of prostitution* (E. Glover, 1945); "Some psychological aspects of prostitutes" (T. Agoston, 1945, 1946); and *A case work approach to sex delinquents* (R. Wessel, ed., 1947).

even socially recognized, at other times subjected to economic and political exploitation.

In certain periods of history and under certain conditions the beautiful and clever prostitute has had an enviable social and economic position, and her occupation has had a status at least equivalent to that of motion-picture actresses and other professional entertainers in our society. In Greece, the occupation was surrounded with an aura of religious mysticism; and the prostitute had certain prerogatives denied all others. In later Rome, she often had considerable prestige and political power. In the early days of such cosmopolitan American cities as New Orleans and San Francisco, she plied her trade openly and occasionally rose to a position of prominence in the life of the city. Practically all the romantic poetry of old China was written to and about prostitutes. They were considered intellectual and social as well as sexual companions. In the exceptional case where filiality did not determine marriage, a wealthy Chinese might even select his wife from among the prostitutes of a large city. Although the occupation is no longer idealized in China, it is socially recognized and sanctioned. In China, in France, and in many other places, prostitutes are socially atypical only in the sense that their occupation excludes them from normal participation in social life. It does not make them *déclassée*.

In the United States, Britain, and most parts of northern Europe, on the other hand, the prostitute is the object of social disapproval, a member of a *sub rosa* out-group. Under these conditions she is tolerated and used, only to be discarded in contempt when her function as a prostitute is over. Society may feel some sense of social responsibility for the welfare of the aged and feeble scullery maid, but it will probably force the ex-prostitute to shift for herself.¹⁰ The ignominious status of the prostitute in America is seen in the fact that, although ordinarily a man publicly recognizes and treats with consideration a shopgirl in his employ, his relations with a prostitute seldom exceed those of a sexual-economic order.

The fact that, in any society, prostitutes form a sort of society within a society and have, like the criminal class with whom they are frequently associated, something of their own customs, conventions, and mores has led to their being spoken of as a profession—the “oldest” profession in

¹⁰ Although commonly condoned by local government, the existence of prostitution is, like the trade of housebreaking, ignored by the U.S. Census Bureau in its Census of Occupations. Prostitutes are not, furthermore, covered by the Social Security Act; nor has there been any attempt to bring this occupational group into the protection provided by this act.

history. The young novice is put through a period of training, during which she acquires not only the techniques of her occupation but also the personality attributes of this minority group.¹¹

The Professional versus the Amateur. Some prostitutes have fallen into the occupation because it seemed to offer them the only means of securing a livelihood. In times of economic stress, the number of girls and women who resort to this means of earning a living always increases. The economic stresses and the social dislocations of a period of war or revolution invariably cause many girls who would otherwise marry or else earn their living in socially sanctioned occupations to enter prostitution. At such times the established prostitutes complain bitterly that their business is being ruined by the amateurs

The true professional enters the occupation as a normal consequence of her early training; she has been brought up into a pattern of behavior that fits her for the life. Such atypical training may be a consequence of the inferior character of her family situation. More often, perhaps, the home has been respectable but inadequate; and influences outside it have molded her into that pattern. It has been said that many enter the occupation without any feeling of regret but with the ambition to be successful, and this is no doubt possible wherever, as in France, prostitution is a fairly respectable as well as profitable occupation. The amateur prostitute, on the other hand, is psychologically ill-fitted for the occupation. Prostitution is for her a desperate last resort and may be in such contrast to her life preparation that she eventually becomes psychopathic. It is probable that where prostitution is looked upon as a disreputable activity, as it is in America, relatively few women are entirely reconciled to the status that their occupation imposes upon them, however well they may have been trained into the occupation itself.

The use of sex as an economic commodity is not of itself extremely unusual, for the numerous women who marry for money really sell their sex services. Neither is sexual promiscuity necessarily evidence of atypicality. In some societies all unmarried women are somewhat promiscuous, and in others some few women are entirely promiscuous. Whether sex promiscuity and the sale of sexual services, both of which are characteristic of the prostitute, will constitute social atypicality depends, therefore, on the particular forms they take and on the reaction of society to those forms. The professional prostitute in our present so-

¹¹ From the fact that they have no argot of their own, Maurer concludes in "Prostitutes and criminal argots" (D. W. Maurer, 1939) that prostitutes do not constitute an occupational in-group. If so, they are the only class of professional atypicals who do not.

ciety is atypical, and probably also to some degree psychologically maladjusted, in that her occupation involves social disapproval and invokes persecution from agencies of the larger society.

THE SEX PERVERT ¹³

In a sense, the professional prostitute is sexually perverted; for she generally receives her gratification for the sex act indirectly, through the medium of money.¹³ But if sexual action devoid of sexual gratification were to be classified as sex perversion, this category would be expanded far beyond its conventional limits. In our society at least, a considerable number of otherwise normal women submit but do not respond to the sexual advances of their husbands. The sexually cold woman or man is, of course, atypical, since the normal is that of sex responsiveness of a heterosexual order. We need not analyze here the social antecedents or individual consequences of sexual coldness. Undoubtedly it is very common in our society, particularly among women.¹⁴ Occasionally, no doubt, a normally adjusted person may become unresponsive to sexual stimulation as the result of a single unfortunate experience with sexual activity. Both the unfortunate victim of circumstances and the extreme puritan who never feels deprived of desirable sex gratification are sexually abnormal, but it is not conventional to speak of them as perverts. As with other forms of atypical behavior, it is the society that defines the sexually atypical personality; and the term "sex pervert" is usually reserved for those who are sexually responsive but are so in an unconventional manner or to unconventional objects.¹⁵ The sex pervert is one who prefers to find sexual gratification through autosexual practices, the homosexual relationship, or some such extraordinary method as zoerasty.

The Autosexual. Masturbation,¹⁶ although practically unknown

¹³ For an authoritative account of perversion, see the two volumes entitled *Sex variants* (G. W. Henry, 1941).

¹⁴ The professional prostitute is often attached to a pimp, who serves as her business manager and lover; and it is possible that she may have sexually gratifying experience with him.

¹⁵ In our culture approximately one woman in three fails to achieve orgasm. This ratio seems to have held constant for many years. See *Psychological factors in marital happiness* (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1938) and "Correlates of woman's orgasm" (L. W. Ferguson, 1938).

¹⁶ According to the best selling and widely debated "Kinsey report," all sex practices are so common among American men that we should not class any of them as perversions (A. C. Kinsey *et al.*, 1948). But even if further and more careful research confirms the Kinsey findings, it will still be true that by current social definition any sex practice other than the heterosexual, however common, is a perversion.

¹⁷ Masturbation has sometimes been termed self-love and included under the

among those primitives who allow adolescents sexual freedom, is generally recognized as prevalent among both boys and girls in our society. It appears most often as a temporary adjustment to sex maturity; it is also resorted to when no other kind of adjustment is permitted or possible. Often this practice is arrived at by socially undirected trial and error. Traditionally it has been believed to be morally and physically degrading, and discovery usually involves social disapprobation. Certainly the heterosexual outlet is the biologically normal one; but even many lower animals sometimes indulge in autosexual practices when long denied sexual mates. There is no evidence to show that such practices necessarily dull sexual capacity, as medical men once believed, or invariably preclude attainment of a normal heterosexual adjustment.

The Homosexual. The homosexual, or invert, is one who finds sexual gratification through association with members of his or her own sex. In later Greece and Rome, the practice was so common that homosexual prostitution existed openly; effeminate men were available for men, masculine women for women. The practice of homosexuality was considered more exotic than aberrant. Although with us it is strongly disapproved, the number of homosexuals is considerable. Once thought to be inevitably a consequence of some physiological abnormality, it is now believed by many to be largely an outcome either of unconventional sexual training or of social necessity.¹⁷ The former circumstances produce the orthodox homosexual; the latter, the lay or fortuitous homosexual.

Social Backgrounds of Homosexuality. Although there may at times be anatomical or physiological reasons for homosexual behavior, at least a significant part is socially determined. In old China, for ex-

broader heading "narcissism," which also embraces love of one's own personality. Quite obviously much masturbation is not self-love at all but is, rather, lust for some absent person. See *A study of masturbation and the psychosexual life* (J. F. Meagher, 1936); "Masturbation as a mental hygiene problem" (E. V. Pullias, 1937); and "The problem of masturbation" (E. Berne, 1944).

¹⁷ The body build of the male homosexual is sometimes normally masculine (J. Wortis, 1937) and sometimes of an intersexual type (H. S. Barahal, 1939). Some believe that endocrinological factors play a large role in all homosexuality (S. Kahn, 1937; C. A. Wright, 1939; A. Myerson and R. Neustadt, 1942-1943) even though endocrine medication appears to be of no value (S. Rosensweig and R. G. Hoskins, 1941). Others believe that it is not at all an organic condition (H. S. Barahal, 1939; and T. V. Moore, 1945). At any event, it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as widespread homosexuality in prisons in any but social terms. See also "Homosexual trends in children" (L. Bender and S. Paster, 1941); "Homosexuality" (E. W. Green and L. G. Johnson, 1944); "The homosexual as a personality type" (H. Greenspan and J. D. Campbell, 1945); "The homosexual woman" (J. MacKinnon, 1947) and volume 217 of *Medical Practice*. For an alleged statistical proof that the homosexual is a genetic type, see "Zur Genealogie der Homosexualität" (K. Jensch, 1941).

ample, small boys were deliberately trained to take the part and place of women in the theater and in sex life. In our society, the social circumstances that make for such a personality development are largely accidental. Certain types of early life conditions may encourage a boy to develop personality attributes usually associated with girls. He may find at adolescence that his group identification is so largely with girls that, rather than feeling sexually attracted to them, he is attracted to those of his own sex. His adjustment to sex therefore takes the homosexual pattern; since it is not superimposed upon the heterosexual pattern, he is an orthodox homosexual.

The personality of the orthodox homosexual, particularly the male homosexual, is often quite distinctive. Oscar Wilde is likely to be his patron saint; and his interests are likely to run to clothes, art (notably terpsichorean), and other things usually associated with the personality of a female. The man who in the sex act takes the part of the female may go so far in assuming the role of a woman as to dress like one (A. Masson, 1935). Within any community, orthodox homosexuals tend to form their own social clique and are often quite indifferent to or even proud of the social disapprobation that they incur.

The background of the incidental or amateur homosexual is quite different from that of the orthodox. Under duress, the man or woman who once was accustomed to normal sex life but has long been denied heterosexual relationship may, in spite of a feeling of aversion to it, resort to behavior of a homosexual order. Homosexuality of this origin is very common in prisons and in other places where men and women are segregated. In those prisons where homosexual prostitution has developed, orthodox homosexuals serve as prostitutes for other inmates. If no money is in circulation, flattery, choice morsels of food, clothes, and other things are used to secure the services of the "woman" or, in the women's wards, of the "man."¹⁸

THE CELIBATE

Social Antecedents of Sexual Abstinence. In medieval Europe, as in some other times and places, certain men and women entered religious groups in which the vows of celibacy and chastity were taken. Theo-

¹⁸ Gradually we are seeing the folly of suppressing all normal sex outlets among prisoners; and, in certain countries, attempts are being made to direct the prisoner's sex behavior into adequate channels (J. F. Fishman, 1934). Nelson contends (V. F. Nelson, 1933) that practically all men, even those who were normally adjusted in regard to sex when they entered prison, eventually resort to either masturbation or homosexual practices. See also "The mind of the prisoner" (J. S. Roucek, 1937); and "Sex life in prison" (B. Karpman, 1948).

retically at least, they went through life without experiencing normal sexual behavior. Some, no doubt, entered this life as refugees, finding in its security a compensation for the things they had renounced; others were trained by their parents for the priesthood or brotherhood. The members of such religious orders are orthodox celibates.¹⁹ But the individual who throughout life remains unmarried without securing adequate social compensations is a celibate of an amateur order and is quite likely to be maladjusted to the role. Society does not often disapprove of such a person; but he is living in society only to a restricted degree, since full membership involves marriage.

The Celibate and Sexual Abstinence. Although in rare instances sexual abstinence may be a consequence of physical or physiological incapacity, it would appear to result more often from unusual or limited social experience (E. Podolsky, 1946). In a society such as ours, where sex life and romantic love are commonly identified, a bitter failure in the latter may condition the individual to an avoidance of the former. Fear of—or distaste for—premarital relationships combined with economic inability to enter into matrimony may postpone sex participation until the physiological drive for it has waned. An adolescent resort to autosexual techniques may result in adequate adjustment to sex on this level; thus relieved of the impelling need for a heterosexual relationship, the individual may be disinclined to take the risks of clandestine affairs or assume the troubles of marriage.

Although the term "spinster" implies sexual abstinence, that of "bachelor" does not.²⁰ As a part of the liberation-of-women movement of a few decades ago, the phrase "bachelor girl" was coined to indicate the unmarried woman who was not, or did not want to be known as, sexually abstinent. It is highly probable, however, that even under present conditions far more women than men go through life without experiencing normal sexual behavior; for the unmarried man is less likely to be sexually abstinent than is the unmarried woman. Moreover, in European countries, the differential death rate, male emigration, periodic

¹⁹ For an excellent description of the normative personality attributes of the members of various priesthoods, both primitive and modern, see A. Bertholet's article "Priesthood" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 388-395). Not all priesthoods require celibacy and chastity of their members, and it may well be doubted that the medieval priests who took vows of lifelong chastity always lived up to them. But where celibacy and chastity are required and generally adhered to, they cannot socially be considered a form of atypicality.

²⁰ For a consideration of the unmarried, see "The emotionality of spinsters" (R. R. Willoughby, 1937); *Sex in development* (C. Landis et al., 1940); *The single woman* (R. Reed, 1942); and "The sex lives of unmarried men" (L. B. Hohman and B. Schaffner, 1947).

decimation of the younger males by war and revolutionary violence, and other factors have long resulted in there being a greater proportion of females than males in the total population. A considerable number of women must, therefore, remain unmarried; and if they are prohibited extramarital relationships, they must also remain sexually abstinent.

The factors that may lead or force a person to remain unmarried after reaching maturity are many and often complex. As was previously indicated, the social pattern is undergoing rapid change; and there is much malpreparation of the individual for such critical transitions in his life history as that of marriage. We can, however, make a rough distinction between those who want to marry and cannot, and those whose early training has led them to an avoidance of the status and responsibilities of married life. Probably many of the middle-aged bachelors who explain their status as the tragic consequence of a broken heart are merely rationalizing an early developed distaste for marriage. The financial, moral, and emotional responsibilities that marriage incurs are more than they can face. Occasionally we find a man who is so woman-shy that he never really becomes acquainted with members of the other sex. Although most women probably remain unmarried from necessity, some spinsters are no doubt orthodox old maids; in these cases malpreparation for marriage often consists of maintaining standards for the marriage partner and for marital relationships that are beyond all possibility of achievement.

THE UNSOCIABLE

Although people who are considered normal may vary greatly in their ability and willingness to adjust to the presence of others, those who definitely withdraw from the world of others are distinctly atypical. When a person deliberately cuts off or steadily neglects the lines of communication between himself and others, he does so either because he has never learned the normal and conventional person-to-person adjustments or because, having learned them, he finds his treatment by society—in terms of his personality—intolerable. The former source of atypicality is illustrated by the shepherd who often becomes more accustomed to the presence of sheep than to that of human beings. He is an inveterate unsociable; his entire personality is one that makes sociability undesirable. He is self-sufficient and content to be let alone.

More interesting but far less important is the hermit, a person who has retired from participation in normal social life, often because of unfortunate experiences with it. Although we usually think of the hermit as a man who lives in a cave and looks like a wild animal, the hermit may be a rich and cultured woman who lives in dignified seclusion on River-

side Drive because she is afraid or intolerant of the world outside her door. Such withdrawal borders upon, if it does not achieve, the abnormal.

THE VAGRANT

Professional Migratory Parasites. Except among a pastoral people, who must follow the grass with changing seasons, it is normal for the individual to have a settled if not permanent abode and some occupation. His home may be a hut in the wilderness or an apartment in the city to which he returns from periodic trips, and his occupation may be anything from hunting wild game to selling life insurance. But the person who does not have "roots," either in terms of residence or of occupation, is definitely atypical.

The gypsies of central Europe were a group of people who had adapted their migratory habits to economic conditions. Professional migratory parasites, they lived on the road and on the people. They had something of their own culture and brought their children up into the practices and traditions of the group (M. Block, 1939). Overidealized in literature, the gypsy seems to have been tolerated merely because his visits were infrequent and colorful. Until recent years "tribes" of them came annually to America to spend the summer months living on their wits and on the credulity of the American farmer and small townsman.

In contemporary America the nearest counterparts to the gypsies are the "auto tramps." Like the gypsies, they have no fixed abodes. Some live parasitically; others are migratory part-time workers. Ultimately we may develop a new type of "gypsy," one geared to the life of our present age. In the meantime, the auto tramps are likely to remain social outcasts who are ill prepared for the form of life that circumstances have thrust upon them.

But it is the hobo, the tramp, and the bum who most clearly exemplify the sort of person who has no roots in contemporary society. The terms are often used indiscriminately.²¹

The Hobo as an Urban Product. The hobos form a loosely knit and informal grouping throughout the United States. They have their jungles, camps where they gather to eat, sleep, and gossip. But they have no specific place to call home; home is on the road. They have little property and keep nothing that they cannot carry in their pockets. They have even developed something of their own language, customs, and group

²¹ The definitions of Jeff Davis, the self-styled "king of the hobos," show, however, the distinctions which this surprisingly class-conscious group of people make among themselves. "A hobo," he said in opening one of their annual conventions, "is a migratory worker; a tramp is a migratory nonworker; while a bum is a nonmigratory nonworker."

mores. Like all true itinerants, the hobos are afflicted with wanderlust. Although they work when necessary and for brief periods, they are not true migratory workers. The true migratory worker, such as the fruit picker of the Western states who follows the crops, is one who migrates because his occupation demands it; with him, migration is incidental to occupation. But for the hobo, migration is primary; work, incidental.²³ Give him an easy and remunerative job, and he soon becomes restless, finding some fault in the work to justify resumption of his interrupted travels.

The Tramp as a Rural Product. Within the jungles a distinction is drawn between the hobo and the tramp, for the vagrant is often as snobbish as are his settled compatriots. Apparently the real difference between the tramp and the hobo is that the former is more rural and frequents the small towns, whereas the latter is essentially an urban product. The hobos travel "on the rods" and hang out on the edges of cities and in camps near railroad terminals. Perhaps because they are accustomed to spending many hours together in freight cars as they go from place to place, the hobos of America are better acquainted and far more of a fraternity than are the few remaining true tramps.

A half century ago, many tramps had some definite occupation. They were itinerant camp cooks, barbers, printers, etc. With the declining economic value of craft skills, their avocation, traveling, got the upper hand; and thus they worked only that they might move on in search of some other place to work.

With the coming of the automobile, a new class of tramps developed. These are essentially beggars on wheels; they beg rides from passing motorists and a coin or two at the end of the journey. Such people may travel tens of thousands of miles a year in any direction and to a constantly shifting objective. In the Western states there is a type of tramp relatively unknown in the East. Because he plods down the highways with a bedding roll upon his back, he is called a "bundle stiff." Disdained by his fleeter fellows, he is a perpetual and rather complacent vagrant, who works a week or two on one ranch before moving hopefully on to some other and temporarily better place across the hills.

Another type known only to the West is the "desert rat." He combines the personality attributes of the bundle stiff with those of the hermit. By avocation he is a searcher after lost mines, of which there are legendary thousands. He secures his annual stake—sufficient to buy a burro, some food, etc.—from some kindhearted or credulous person and spends eight

²³ See *Men on the move* (N. Anderson, 1940). C. Goodrich in his article on "Migratory labor" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 441-445) has drawn a clear distinction between the migratory worker as a normal person and the professional migrant as an atypical person.

or ten months in solitary wanderings over mountains and desert. If he should strike a paying vein, he would probably squander the proceeds as quickly as possible and then set out again on the perpetual quest.

Professional Vagrants. Until recently the vast majority of hobos and tramps were male. Such material as we have upon them seems to indicate that most of them are professional vagrants; *i.e.*, they have broken from home and community ties at an early age and have "gone on the road." Because they are orphans, because their parents are loath to take care of them, or because their parents or guardians mistreat them, boys occasionally run away from home. Unless they quickly find a means of self-support, they may learn while wandering in search of work to prefer wandering to working. Gradually they acquire the special skills, knowledge, and other attributes of the professional hobo or tramp. The effect of the tradition that the life "on the road" is relatively easy and adventurous should not, however, be overlooked. No doubt, some boys with reasonably adequate home backgrounds have secured from literature and other indirect sources an idealization of the life of the vagrant and have been encouraged by this to break home ties.

In contrast to the professional vagrants are those men who as adults have become itinerant in the effort to escape some unsatisfactory condition in their home community. Many of these are, in fact, criminals who have become itinerant to avoid the social consequences of crime. Some wanderers are, of course, actually moving about in search of work. But if they remain unemployed too long, they become habituated to unemployment and make wandering their vocation or else sink to the level of the bum.

The Bum. The hobo and the tramp are atypical in that they have made no occupational adjustment. They are men who have remained permanently in the temporary status of the adolescent, economically and socially irresponsible. In a manner of speaking, they have weighed the advantages of occupational maturity against the disadvantages and have decided not to grow up. They are a poor counterpart to the rich playboy. The bum, on the other hand, is one who has attempted to achieve an occupational adjustment but has been repeatedly defeated in this endeavor. As a young man he may have been a reasonably competent and diligent worker; but he has secured and lost so many jobs that, like the dog who is beaten too often and too severely, his "spirit" is broken.

As we have seen, fluctuations in the demand for labor, changes in industrial techniques, and other factors mean economic insecurity for the individual worker. Even during periods of high national production, there has always been a labor reserve. The men who are too frequently and for too much prolonged intervals members of this reserve gradually

become its dregs, deteriorating from unemployed to unemployable. Unless these men are taken over by some agency of society and rehabilitated or else given a dole, they become bums.

The bum is, thus, the human wreckage of our economic system. Whatever he was at the outset, repeated failures have made him despondent, unenterprising, and irresponsible. He lives, or maintains life, by foraging in garbage cans or by desultory panhandling.²⁸ He sleeps, when he can find the necessary money, in the flophouses that abound in the poorer sections of our cities. As hardship and privation beat him down, the bum usually becomes mentally abnormal.

Atypical Times and Atypical Patterns of Adjustment. The criminal, the prostitute, the sex pervert, the celibate, etc., are "normal" atypicalities of our disorganized and continuously changing society. Out of any violent economic, social, or political upheaval in this disorganized society comes, however, some form of atypicality more or less peculiar to that upheaval. The recent war, for example, created a large number of orphaned children who became, particularly in defeated and demoralized Germany, juvenile criminal gangs that ran in vicious packs and lived parasitically upon the larger society.

As we have seen, whole classes of people may be liquidated by severe economic crisis, revolution, and military conquest. These may gradually work out an atypical adjustment to the new status. Such was the case with the dust-bowl refugees—the so-called "Oakies" and "Arkies" of California—who became semiparasitic, migratory agricultural workers. Refugees from war or revolutionary violence may, when peace comes, return to take up their old ways of life. Often, however, the period of their enforced idleness is so long and there is so little to return to that they never are rehabilitated. Few of the displaced peoples of postwar Germany, Poland, and the former Baltic states can ever hope to return to the lands and life from which they were uprooted by war and political conquest. Some of them will no doubt reestablish themselves elsewhere; most will no doubt become permanent wards of the world, as did many of the people who were dispossessed by World War I and its economic and political upheavals.

SUMMARY

The disorganized continuously changing society produces a great many individuals who have resolved one or many of the major problems of

²⁸ Although the bum may occasionally beg, he is not a professional mendicant and cannot maintain himself in this way. The professional mendicant is well adjusted occupationally and has at times been accorded a fairly high social status. See *The beggar* (H. W. Gilmore, 1940).

social adjustment in markedly atypical ways. This atypicality sets them apart from the normal social membership and is, from the group point of view, a major failure of the socialization processes. The criminal, the prostitute, the sex pervert, the spinster, the economic parasite, and all the other socially atypical people are society's "problem children."

It does not follow, however, that the socially atypical person is always badly adjusted from the individual point of view. If his atypical behavior is a normal outcome of atypical personality development, he may be reasonably well adjusted within himself, however badly adjusted he is in terms of the social norms. But if his atypical behavior is a consequence of peculiar external factors, it may lead to marked disorganization of his personality, setting him not only in opposition to society but in opposition to himself, with the result that he is psychologically maladjusted.

The socially maladjusted person may in time work out a socially typical form of adjustment, or he may become habituated to atypicality. But it often happens that, in endeavoring to resolve his maladjustment, he resorts to some psychologically abnormal device. Psychologically abnormal adjustments are sometimes an individual, sometimes a collective, phenomenon. In the following chapter those which are individual in character and the nature of the social circumstances which impel their use will be discussed.

CHAPTER XX

PSYCHOLOGICALLY ABNORMAL MODES OF ADJUSTMENT

As a consequence of a number of the various circumstances that have been discussed in the two preceding chapters, the individual may be slightly maladjusted to most of his social roles. He may be somewhat uncomfortable in his occupation, a bit less successful than he would like to be, somewhat dissatisfied with his family, etc. The tensional by-products of all his varied but mild maladjustments may express themselves in occasional "unreasonable" irritability and a variety of mysterious physical ailments but may never lead to actions that significantly distinguish him from his fellows. The individual may, on the other hand, be so markedly at odds with some one or a number of aspects of his society that he can neither endure that conflict nor resolve his predicament in "realistic" terms. The tensional by-products of his maladjustment may then accumulate until he is impelled to make a forced or abnormal adjustment to the unresolvable. This is what has happened when the widow, unreconciled to her bereavement, begins to "hear" the voice of her deceased husband; when the formerly rich man becomes convinced that he is the victim of an evil conspiracy; when the unhappy husband, instead of divorcing or murdering his wife, forgets that he has one; when the spinster begins to live in but not of this world. Such behavior is a form of adjustment; but in that it denies "reality," it is psychologically abnormal.¹

The layman is inclined to divide the people of his in-group into a fixed dichotomy: sane and insane. The fact that members of out-groups behave in ways different from his own he can explain on the assumption that they are a different kind of people—they are Negroes, Germans, primitives, criminals, or lower class—and are for this reason different. But when one of his in-group members—a friend, relative, acquaintance, or fellow citizen—behaves in a way that he does not understand, he com-

¹ The following would appear to be a workable definition of the abnormal: "If, therefore, behavior anomalies which are at bottom constitutionally or pathologically conditioned be excluded or subsumed as a different group under the category of the non-normal, we could state the quintessence of abnormality as *the tendency to choose a type of reaction which represents an escape from a conflict-producing situation instead of a facing of the problem.*" (H. J. Wegrocki, 1948, p. 560).

monly falls back upon the concept of insanity. This is vaguely recognized as a sort of mental sickness and is generally assumed to be a definite and specific thing, which some few people develop and the majority escape.

The common practice of dividing people into those who are sane and those who are insane is a form of personality stereotyping and involves all the misunderstanding and oversimplification characteristic of this process. The problem of making a scientific distinction between the mentally sound and the psychopathic is fully as complex as that of differentiating between the physiologically sound and the pathological.

The Normal Personality. The idea of a psychologically "sound" personality is like the concept of a physically sound body, a pure abstraction. From a tallying of many observations, the normal health of human beings may be derived; but sound body functioning should presumably be perfect and not just normal. The physiologist, however, has little idea of what a perfectly functioning body would be. He observes that some bodies work better than others and that some break down and cease to operate. In the same way, we can determine the normally adjusted personality by tallying the personalities of a social group. Since, however, this normality is socially determined, the normal personality may or may not be a psychologically sound one. Thus, although we may abstractly conceive of the psychologically perfect man, in practice we can only observe that some men function more effectively than others and that a certain number break down so completely that they cease to make normal adjustments to the external world.

Abnormality Socially Defined. In so far as biological nature prescribes few specific reactions to sensory stimuli, it is impossible to define the abnormal personality in terms of reactions alone; the cultural setting must also be considered. Nature provides man with a mechanism by which he can communicate with the world external to his body and with the various parts of his body. But the response that he will make to any combination of stimuli, such as those which come from an apple, is socially determined and is therefore not of itself an adequate criterion of psychological "normality." The mere fact that a man believes that an apple is poisonous, that it harbors an evil spirit, or that "an apple a day keeps the doctor away" is no evidence that he is psychologically abnormal. In actuality, apples may be neither poisonous nor a magic cure-all for human ills. But what they are psychologically depends on experience, which may be derived rather than direct. In some communities, the apple may be regarded as evil, in others as an object of quasi-religious reverence. For the members of such groups unrealistic beliefs concerning apples are entirely normal. For the educated American of today the idea that a tomato is a poisonous fruit may be an evidence

of some mental disturbance. But this idea was perfectly normal for the Americans of a century or so ago. In other words, the distinction between a true belief and a delusion or false belief must be social. Is the belief in keeping with the cultural ideas of the group?² If it is in agreement, it is a "true" belief; if not, it is a delusion. True beliefs of today may become delusions of tomorrow, and vice versa.

The "reality" to which the individual makes or fails to make adjustment is, therefore, socially defined. Only when an individual denies what is socially defined as "real" is his behavior abnormal. It is not the reaction per se that determines the normality or abnormality of a person but that reaction in terms of the established social reality. If a man who has been taught to recognize an apple as an edible fruit subsequently develops a strong and "unreasoned" aversion, responding to apples as he has been trained to respond to snakes, we should say that he is suffering from a delusion. If, on partly awakening from a dream, a man perceives an ordinary apple as a cannon ball and treats it accordingly, he is said to be in the throes of an illusion. Finally, should a man perceive an apple when none is present, we should say that his internal stimuli are calling forth an hallucination.

The Psychopathic Personality.³ The term "psychopathic" may be used to designate those individuals whose behavior is markedly abnormal. Various technical terms are used by psychiatrists to distinguish different degrees and forms of abnormality, more because they are a convenient descriptive short cut than because psychopathic personalities can be clearly classified into definite types. With the attempts of psychopathologists to define and to distinguish among mental diseases, we need not concern ourselves. It is important, however, that we realize that there are many, perhaps innumerable, manifestations of mental abnormality, that an individual may be psychopathic in one regard and reasonably normal in all others, and that an individual may be mentally normal at one time and psychopathic at another. Finally, we should realize that there are infinite graduations of abnormality. All this means that it is impossible to say that one man is entirely sane or that another is entirely psychopathic.

For legal purposes, a distinction is made between the sane and the insane; but much more than mental abnormality enters into the legal classi-

² The scientist may, because of information not yet imparted to the lay public, have beliefs not held by the latter. Such beliefs are not usually considered delusions; they are a part of the scientist's culture and have been verified in accordance with a science-sanctioned procedure.

³ For discussions of psychopathy from the standpoint of the psychopath, see *A mind that found itself* (C. W. Beers, 1923); *A mind mislaid* (H. C. Brown, 1937); and *If a man be mad* (H. Maine, 1947).

fication. It is, after all, one of social convenience. Some kinds and degrees of mental abnormality are deemed socially undesirable, some tolerable, and some even desirable.⁴ Many men who from the psychological viewpoint are abnormal—many kings, prophets, and wizards of finance, industry, and science—have been revered as great men. The legally insane are simply those whose behaviors are recognized by the courts as actually or potentially dangerous to themselves or to others.

Throughout the later Middle Ages and down close to the present day, those psychopaths who came into conflict with society were assumed to be "possessed of the Devil" and were treated in the most cruel and barbaric way.⁵ Only in recent years has it been realized that the psychopath is not a victim of some evil eye or necessarily of some organic disorder but may be a victim of society itself.

Organic versus Functional Bases for Abnormality. Certain drugs, diseases, and a few disorders of a physiological order affect the organism and break down normal communication within the organism and between it and the external world. Narcotics dull the sensibilities. Some drugs distort perceptions and call forth hallucinations. Syphilis can cause neural deterioration and may thus disrupt the machinery of communication. Encephalitis, brain tumor, and many other disorders may leave permanent effects upon the organism and its ability to adjust to the environment. Senility involves an impairment of mental efficiency; the senile regresses psychologically, losing his ability to make and retain new habits and falling back upon those acquired in early life. Psychological disorders that arise from these and comparable sources have been called "organic." Their causes are in large part reasonably clear and distinct.

There are, however, a large number of psychological abnormalities that do not parallel known pathological changes in the structure of the organism. These are usually designated as "functional" disorders.⁶ The distinction between the functional and the organic disorder is a common-

⁴ The fighting courage and ability of the "psychological cases" of World War I were as good as, and quite possibly better than, those of more stable soldiers (E. Miller, ed., 1940).

⁵ The social treatment of psychopaths has always been a reflection of the current social concept of the origin and nature of abnormal behavior. At times, the mentally disordered have been revered as possessing superhuman qualities; at other times, they have been brutalized on the grounds that they were subhuman. It is only within the past century that we have come to consider and to treat the psychopathic person as mentally sick and as one who might perhaps be cured. For a brief description of historic views and methods of treatment of mental aberration, see H. S. Sullivan, "Mental disorders" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 313-318).

⁶ For an attempt to measure the beginnings of psychological abnormality—emotional instability—see Appendix note 58 and "The psychotic and the prepsychotic personality" (T. V. Moore, 1938).

place in medical practice. When he can find no physiological cause for a patient's headaches, chronic indigestion, insomnia, pain in the neck, or whatnot, the physician will conclude that the disorder is not organic but functional or psychological.⁷

Social Disorganization, Social Change, and the Conflict Situation.

It is mental abnormality of the functional type that particularly concerns the social psychologist, since the occurrence and character of functional disorders are intimately related to the social milieu. In an earlier chapter it was observed that certain of the covert responses of the individual appear to be a tensional by-product of unresolved or conflict situations and that these tensions may ultimately become manifest in some apparently inexplicable form of overt action. It was then observed that some startling overt responses can be explained in no other way. The sudden outburst of "temper," the seemingly unprovoked murder, the "impulsive" suicide, and the like are made much more comprehensible when viewed as a long-delayed overt expression of the culmination of many conflict situations, each of which left its tensional residue.

Presumably tensions are subject to continuous and periodic release. Many of the recreational activities of men would appear to serve something of this function; and we shall later see in detail how certain forms of collective action, *e.g.*, evangelical meetings, permit and foster periodic release of tensions. But when the psychologically permissible outlets are inadequate or when participation in conflict situations is too frequent, tensions may be resolvable only by resort to abnormal forms of behavior.⁸

In the four preceding chapters we have been discussing what may now be described as the social backgrounds of the conflict situation. Even in the most stable and highly integrated social systems conflict situations will arise as a result of failures in the socialization process or of deterioration in the external conditions of life, such as famine or plague. Under conditions of social disorganization and social change still other conflict situations appear.⁹ Many individuals will be malprepared for the circumstances to which they must adjust as they grow up and old and

⁷ Even when there is evident organic disorder present, the abnormal behavior may be mainly functional in character. But this does not mean that it will not improve with the use of physical therapy—insulin injections, brain surgery, and electric shock being the favorite techniques at the present moment. For a discussion of the interdependence of glands and mental stability, see Appendix note 59.

⁸ Abnormal forms of behavior cannot be attributed to the presence of a single trait of neurotic tendency. See "A factor analysis of certain neurotic tendencies" (C. I. Mosier, 1937).

⁹ The structure of the many types of conflict situations that may be set up by a disorganized and changing society has been variously analyzed. The system devised by Lewin is, perhaps, as adequate as any. See Appendix note 60.

shift from social role to social role. Many of the circumstances to which they have been prepared to adjust will be modified. Functional disorders of personality are, thus, to be considered as individual attempts to resolve the tensions resulting from conflict situations.¹⁰

A Classification on the Basis of Social Antecedents. The psychiatrist distinguishes a great many more or less typical functional disorders. His interest is in the diagnosis and treatment of patients. Ours lies in the social antecedents of psychopathic adjustments rather than in the type of adjustment itself. We may therefore somewhat simplify our analysis and classify the various functional psychopathic adjustments under three concepts: compensatory devices, dissociational techniques, and escape mechanisms. It is assumed that these categories either include or are more basic than those usually designated as suppression, rationalization, resistance, transference, regression,¹¹ identification, projection, sublimation, etc.

COMPENSATORY ADJUSTMENTS

The Conflicts of "Wants" with Actualities. A compensatory device is a symbolic substitute for something that the individual wants but cannot secure.¹² In psychoanalytic theory this is a substitute for the natural outlet of inherent drives. Normally the libido is diverted by social forces into unnatural but partly adequate channels. When these channels are completely inadequate, conflicts arise. Stripped of its mystic terminology, the core of psychoanalytic theory is that there is an inevitable opposition between the individual's wishes and the restraints of social life.

But many neo-Freudians recognize by implication and some few state explicitly that the vast majority of the individual's wants, needs, or wishes are of social derivation rather than of biological origin. If a child desires candy, if an orphan wants parents, if a man wants a car as impressive as his neighbor's, if a spinster wants a husband, and if a hesitant person is desirous of being a fluent speaker, they want these things be-

¹⁰ Some students of abnormal behavior believe that there is no direct relation between the character of the society and the frequency of psychoses. They contend that such breakdown is traceable to hereditary "predispositions," that various peoples have much the same proportion of such inherent weaknesses, and that the predispositions toward abnormal behavior will become manifest, whatever the society. For a discussion of the evidence pro and con, see Appendix note 61.

¹¹ "Regression" refers either to a return to earlier habits or to behaving on a simpler and more primitive level. For research having to do with the latter, see "Frustration and regression: an experiment with young children" (R. Barker, T. Dembo, and K. Lewin, 1941).

¹² Certain of the devices included here under the term "compensatory" are sometimes designated "substitute responses."

cause they have been taught by social experience to want them. Unless they have been taught to want them, they will not miss having them and will not find it necessary to compensate for not having them.

The fact that people cannot miss what they have never had or been taught to want is most clearly seen in the congenitally crippled child. It is a common experience of orthopedic hospitals that straightening twisted legs may be far less difficult than adjusting the child to the possession of legs that have been straightened. Because a child has never had two strong legs upon which to run and play, he has never really missed them. His personality has not been that of a physically normal child.¹⁸ When surgery gives him the sound legs he did not formerly have, he may become badly adjusted; for his personality may remain that of a cripple although his body is now normal.

Let us stress again that what a person will want to have, be, or become is dependent on his social experience. He may be quite contented with the status of a slave or extremely discontented even with that of a prince. Under conditions of contemporary life, many factors contribute to the development of adjustment demands that are later denied satisfaction and of ambitions far beyond the possibilities of attainment. When the gap between what the individual has been taught to be and what society permits him to be has become excessive, he tends to fill in social reality by resorting to compensatory devices.

Daydreaming as a Compensatory Device. There are many ways by which the individual can provide symbolic substitutes for social realities. They range all the way from the commonplace practice of daydreaming to that of shutting out the external world and living completely in one of make-believe (a type of schizophrenia). The child who has been accustomed to playmates and is subsequently deprived of them may substitute imaginary children with whom he talks and plays, sometimes taking alternately the parts of himself and the others and seeing and hearing the others only in imagination. A daydream playmate may become so vivid that the child orders his life in terms of that playmate; he may wait for the playmate to dress, demand that it be fed at the family table, and express puzzlement when others do not know about it.

Although children frequently do their daydreaming out loud and act out the incidents of their daydream life, social disapproval and inconvenience, combined with increased skill in the use of covert symbols as a substitute for nonsymbolic actions, lead the relatively normal adult to

¹⁸ The physically handicapped child simply cannot be treated as a physically normal one. But the character of the atypical treatment that he is accorded depends less on the nature of his physical handicap than on the view that people take of that handicap. See "Attitudes toward cripples" (P. H. Mussen and R. G. Barker, 1944).

do his daydreaming in silence and outward passivity. But the function remains the same. Because his actual role in society is not adequate in terms of his personality, the daydreamer finds satisfaction in telling himself a story in which he is the central figure. Daydreams frequently have, as all those who indulge in this pastime will recognize, a definite plausibility. In view of what is known by the individual, they might become true, however small the probability. "Normal" reveries or fantasies, on the other hand, may be no more than a sort of self-amusement and may have little if any relation to reality.

Fiction as a Compensatory Device. Written fiction, the drama, the motion picture, and such spectacles as a football game, an elaborate wedding, and an impressive military review often provide the individual with a ready-made daydream. By identifying himself with the hero or heroine of a story, he can secure vicariously something of the excitement, romance, wealth, and social recognition that he wants but is denied in actuality. All reading of novels and attendance of motion-picture shows, games, and spectacles cannot be so interpreted, however; such activities are often but time killers and do not serve as substitutes for felt lacks in life experience. The individual may, moreover, use written and other fiction as a source from which to draw certain elements of his personality.

There is, however, reason to believe that extreme dependence by an individual on the moving picture, the novel, and other fiction is a consequence of the inadequacy of his social reality. One of the most interesting developments in the field of radio broadcasting has been the growth and persistence of "radio-family" serials, in which family and neighborhood incidents are dramatized. The tremendous popularity of such serials came as a surprise to broadcasting agencies. That so many people could become intensely interested in the commonplace and, to any but themselves, trivial doings of an entirely fictitious group of people, known only through the medium of radio broadcasting, was not suspected. But, when we reflect upon the number of people who have been brought up under the intimate social relationships of the old-fashioned neighborhood and large family and who now find themselves living in comparative social anonymity, this interest in the intimate affairs of fictitious persons is not so astonishing; it can be seen as a way of supplementing real friends, relatives, and acquaintances.

Only when dependence on make-believe comes to exclude acceptance of and response to reality, do we consider the individual actually psychopathic. There may, however, be no more than a difference in degree between the person who is lost in the action of a book and the psychopath who is ruling his imaginary subjects in a nearby institution for the insane.

Romanticizing. Few men entirely avoid occasional verbal exag-

generation of their social roles. For the fisherman to inflate the size of his catch in telling of it is recognized as a normal and permissible part of the art of fishing; and at basis psychopathic romanticizing is nothing more than an extension of the braggart's trick of making verbal victory from actual defeat, verbal pounds from actual ounces, or verbal feet from actual inches.

Unlike daydreaming, such romanticizing is an effort to change the external world. By exaggerating, misinterpreting, and twisting past events, the individual endeavors to impress others with his own importance. Unless he feels that he is less important in their eyes than he should be, he will not need to make any attempt to pull himself up by verbal bootstraps. All bragging in which the braggart is elevated (and even boasting about one's relatives, country, or civilization is subject to this interpretation) is an indication that, at least in this specific situation, the individual feels a distinct inadequacy in social reality. It is, therefore, a compensatory device. If one cannot "be somebody," he can at least "talk quality."

Much lying, which is sometimes considered an evidence of abnormal adjustment, is of this order. The man who talks among his friends as though he were master in his home may be thereby compensating for the fact that he is not, although he would like to be, the master. Unless, however, his tales of prowess become too insistent and too obviously untrue, we do not think of him as psychopathic. Too great intensification of conditions that have led a man to innocuous bragging may push him over the vague border between the relatively normal and the psychopathic. In the extreme case, the individual is usually described as suffering from delusions of grandeur.

We must distinguish, however, between the person who exaggerates for some specific and recognized object of self-interest, such as the salesman who makes extravagant claims for the goods he wishes to sell, and the one who exaggerates because his social position is inadequate in terms of his earlier experience. The former does not usually fool himself; but the latter may easily do so, in which case the distortion of reality that he makes through exaggeration is for him entirely real. Again, we must remember that the line between the two is never clear. It is not, for example, uncommon for the salesman by his extravagant claims to "sell" not only his customer but himself as well.

DISSOCIATION AS A MODE OF ADJUSTMENT

Logic-tight Compartments. The substitution of symbolic realities for inadequacies in social reality takes many forms and has many degrees

of expression. Somewhat distinct in terms of social antecedents is the abnormal technique of segregating aspects of social experience into logic-tight compartments. This, too, takes many forms but may be considered under the general concept of dissociation.

Principles of logic, morality, and the like are by definition generalizations and are therefore applicable to all of a common category. If it is true that to kill any man is against the will of God, it cannot also be true that to kill some men is the divine wish. Yet it often happens, particularly in contemporary society, that an individual's social experience teaches him first one and then the other of such mutually exclusive principles of behavior. When, as is common, segregation into unrelated elements is characteristic of his social group, no mentally abnormal consequences follow. No pressure is brought upon the individual to relate them; he does not have to reject forcibly the fact that they conflict with each other.

But when opposition between attributes of personality springs from the fact that the individual has lived and been influenced first by one social grouping and then by another and antagonistic one, elements making for a psychopathic adjustment are present. The man who has been brought up into acceptance of religious fundamentalism and who is subsequently inducted into the concepts of modern biology is faced with a conflict situation. Since both fundamentalists and scientists recognize the mutual exclusiveness of their viewpoints, the individual who has been trained to accept both of them is, by this fact, forced either to reject one or the other, to try to reconcile them, or, retaining both unmodified, to keep them artificially segregated. If, because of factors in his social experience, he cannot reject either one, he may attempt to reconcile them and may thus be "torn between two antagonistic truths," in the end resorting to some psychopathic escape from the unsolvable dilemma. Or he may make an equally unrealistic adjustment to this conflict by refusing to recognize that the two viewpoints are in any way related, thus applying one "truth" in some situations, the other in different situations.

The conflicting forces of contemporary life impel most of us to resort to the dissociational technique in some respect or other. We are, however, practically incapable of recognizing our own utilization of it. One of the greatest dangers to science is the inability of even the scientist, however conscientious his efforts, to perceive his own blind spots. He may recognize the cultural dissociations of the primitive, the irreconcilables accepted by the medieval theologian, and the adherence to sets of mutually exclusive principles by those around him. But his own

may be forever kept secret from himself. The value of a dissociational adjustment lies in its making unnecessary any effort at reconciling the irreconcilable.

The "Split Personality." Dissociations have been found to underlie some of the most puzzling phenomena of contemporary life. The child psychologist whose children are notoriously "spoiled brats," the economist who puts all his savings in the wildest stock, the scientist who consults a spiritualist before undertaking any important act, and the domestic-science authority whose home is unkempt may not be hypocrites but only extremely mild psychopaths. They have two or more distinct personalities; in some situations one will function, and in other situations another becomes operative. The so-called "split personality"¹⁴ is but an extreme manifestation of this exceedingly commonplace technique by which the individual can avoid the tensions that are caused by conflicting personality attributes. Most of us to some degree play the dual role of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.

ESCAPE MECHANISMS AS MODES OF ADJUSTMENT

As Distinguished from Compensatory Adjustments. It is as impossible to classify the social antecedents of psychopathic adjustments rigidly as it is to classify those adjustments themselves. But it is one thing for a child to use daydreaming as a means of filling in the gap caused by the death of a parent; and it is another for him to avoid by some abnormal technique the fact that his stepfather, unlike the ideal father, is cruel and harsh. For convenience we may distinguish between the psychological filling in of a felt inadequacy in social reality and the evasion of some reality that the individual cannot tolerate. Adjustments of the former order we have termed compensatory devices; those of the latter may well be designated as escape mechanisms.

One of the simplest forms of escape is that of fainting under the tension imposed by extreme physical pain. A person may also faint as the means of escaping from some situation that is psychologically too painful to bear. As is true of all such mechanisms, fainting must be a psychologically permissible means of escape; otherwise some other device will be utilized. To the person who has been taught that fainting is a sign of undesirable weakness, the "pain" of fainting may be less acceptable than is the "pain" of an unpleasant situation.

What an individual will find intolerable and therefore necessary to escape is a matter of personal definition. Whereas one man finds poverty a "natural" state, another may see it as a living hell; whereas one

¹⁴ For an interestingly described example, see *Persons One and Three* (S. I. Franz, 1933). See also "Multiple personality" (W. S. Taylor and M. F. Martin, 1944).

may take financial bankruptcy as a bit of bad luck, another may feel it an irreparable disgrace; and although the professional criminal looks upon criminal indictment merely as a business matter, most of us would consider it a personal tragedy. Unless one has been taught by social experience that some situation is intolerable, no need to escape that situation by resort to psychopathic devices will be felt. The boy who has never known any but a harsh, cruel stepfather may adjust to the latter's presence and not find it psychologically necessary to make an escape.

Under conditions necessitating some escape adjustment, the particular technique that the individual will utilize is, as has been indicated, determined by his personality. There are many escape techniques; the possibilities range from the temporary expedient of fainting to the permanent resolution of life's difficulties by self-destruction.¹⁵ The technique which is utilized will be the one which is least incompatible with the personality of the user.

Psychosomatic Disabilities. Somewhat more complex than psychological fainting but still clearly escape devices are the marked overconcern with physical health which an individual uses to avoid many of the normal responsibilities of life (hypochondria¹⁶) and the hysterical paralysis, blindness, or comparable physical disability which affords him a socially and personally justifiable way out of some intolerable predicament.

In our society at least, sickness generally releases the individual from a considerable degree of social responsibility and at the same time intensifies the responsiveness of others toward him. Whenever a person finds his responsibilities intolerable or his problems unsolvable, he may use sickness as a means of escape. Although such sickness may be almost entirely of psychological origin and may not deceive the doctor or others, the "sick" person is not consciously making believe. To him the "pains" are as real as are those of physiological origin. The efficacy of sugar

¹⁵ Perhaps the most remarkable fact about suicides is that the people whom we might a priori assume to be most anxious to enjoy the luxury of death—the poverty stricken, the socially exploited, the dregs of humanity—resort to suicide less frequently than do those who are financially and socially more prosperous.

For studies of the social factors affecting the incidence of suicide, see "Suicide as wish-fulfillment" (I. Hendrick, 1940); "Suicide and its prevention" (E. H. Derrick, 1941); "Suicides that fail" (Anon., 1941); "The psychiatric problem of suicide" (J. H. Wall, 1944); "Postwar increase in suicide" (Anon., 1946); "A study in attempted suicide" (J. D. Teicher, 1947); and "Suicides in France, 1910-43" (W. A. Lunden, 1947).

¹⁶ Hypochondria may also be a compensatory device—the person who has an inadequate social role may find an absorbing interest in pampering an otherwise normal digestive tract or heart. Compensatory, too, is the use of functional aches and pains as a means of securing desired attention not otherwise forthcoming.

pills, patent nostrums, and quasi-religious methods of faith healing arises in part from the fact that those cured by these things have been suffering from only psychological pains. In the ritualism of these curatives they find a better escape from conflict tensions than they have in their functional ills.

The person who is perpetually concerned with his physical health may be chronically ill, in which case his concern is entirely normal. But continual apprehension over the possibility of becoming ill (*e.g.*, bundling up even on warm days for fear of catching cold) is definitely abnormal. In our society and probably in most societies, the normal person displays a surprising disregard for the long-run physical consequences of daily actions. Thus food is usually chosen, wherever choice is possible, on the basis of taste rather than of dietary considerations; drugs, including alcohol, are often taken for their immediate effects and with slight thought of ultimate consequences; promiscuous sexual relations are often engaged in for the pleasure of the moment and so with little regard for the diseases that may be an incidental yet enduring consequence; etc.

It is clearly not normal for the individual continually to temper his adjustment to momentary circumstances with an exaggerated regard for his future health. The one who does so apparently finds in this over-concern a means by which he can qualify his participation in some or many of his social roles. Thus because he has a "weak constitution" he cannot assume full responsibility for a job or for a wife and family or whatever. The fact probably is that he cannot assume that full responsibility because he is psychologically a weakling; but since it is neither socially nor personally permissible to be a psychological weakling, he invents for his own convenience a weak physical constitution.

Hysterical disabilities usually operate to much the same end; but they offer a present rather than a future reason for failure to live up to social and, presumably, self expectations. Hysterical symptoms are, moreover, undeniably disabling. They may consist of such obvious loss of normal physical powers as the paralysis of an arm or leg, blindness, temporary loss of ability to speak, etc. Hysterical symptoms are, therefore, excellent psychological devices for escaping from conflict situations. The person who retches at the sight of an accident victim is thereupon relieved from rendering aid to the victim. The soldier who becomes paralyzed in arm or leg just before a battle, as many did during World War I, is of necessity relieved from participating in the engagement. The woman who "loses her ability" to stand upright can take to her bed and let her family shift for itself. In all these and comparable cases, the hysterical symptom not only provides an escape from something in-

tolerable, but it also has the great value of relieving the individual from all responsibility for his failure. To the hysteric and sometimes to his friends and family, if not to his physician, the disability is caused by some failure of nature.

The adjustment value of any hysterical symptom depends on its social definition as a natural disability. When any given symptom becomes widely recognized for what it is—a “self-induced” failure of the body—it loses its value as an escape mechanism because neither the hysteric nor others are any longer fooled by it. During World War I, hysterical paralysis and blindness were common symptoms by which the timid, the overly sensitive, and the overly exposed soldier found permissible escape from further combat. Because the onslaught of the symptoms frequently occurred during the preattack period of heavy shelling, the symptoms came for a time to be designated as “shell shock.” In the years following this war, the subject was much discussed, with the result that it became widely known that paralysis, blindness, etc., could be and in war-time often were psychologically induced. The combatants of World War II were, therefore, largely prevented from resorting to any such obvious devices when escape from the monotony or dangers of war became a psychological imperative. As a consequence, they tended to work out more devious means of escape, though they were usually quite unaware of what they were doing. Some of these, such as duodenal ulcers, involved actual destruction of body tissues (G. Draper, 1942).

The term “psychosomatic” is now given to all physical disabilities in which there is presumed to be a large psychological involvement. Psychosomatic medicine is rapidly becoming a major field, both in medical science and practice. More and more of the common human ailments are becoming suspect, and many disabilities that had long been considered purely physical in origin are now believed to be largely if not entirely caused by psychological disturbances. Specialists in this field of medicine are increasingly inclined to seek the “cause” of the disorder in the social backgrounds of the patient rather than in the patient himself.

It is often difficult for the physician to distinguish in individual cases between symptoms whose prior cause is largely psychosocial and symptoms which, although having psychological manifestations, are at basis of physiological origin. He can clearly differentiate the imaginary from the actual cancer; but many disorders, such as indigestion (S. P. Jewett, 1942), constipation, and some heart afflictions, often defy diagnosis. There is, to illustrate, a considerable interaction between “mental states” and digestive functions. Abnormal mental states may be a consequence of digestive disorders; but, on the other hand, digestive disorders may be a

reflection of mental disturbances, and those disturbances may lead in time to inflammation and finally ulceration of parts of the involved tissue.¹⁷

The adjustment function of psychologically induced ulcers, high blood pressure, irregularity of heart action, or any other of the psychosomatic disabilities that were euphemistically covered by the blanket term "battle fatigue" during World War II is fairly clear. The "sick" soldier might be relieved of active duty by his medical officer and thus escape without loss of self or social esteem from circumstances that had become intolerable for him. But in many cases the adjustment function of psychosomatic disorders is not so clearly evident. The civilian with ulcers seldom seems to avoid much of anything thereby, the man with migraine headaches usually goes on about his business in spite of the pain, the victim of high blood pressure frequently continues his high-pressure mode of life until death provides him with the ultimate and final escape. The woman who is asthmatic (P. L. Goitein, 1942) or rheumatic (E. W. Boland, 1948), or who suffers from a variety of vague complaints may thereby be relieved of some of her household tasks or be able to turn away the inopportune advances of an overly ardent husband. At the same time she may find satisfying attention in the ministrations of her fashionable physician and some occupational therapy in the elaborate treatment rituals that he may prescribe for her. But very often her psychosomatic disorders, like those of her husband, secure for her no evident escape from her responsibilities nor an evident addition to her psychological "income." The question thus arises, are such disabilities then merely a by-product of conflict, adding to rather than easing the psychological burden of the individual?

A tenable hypothesis is that, when a psychosomatic disability does not provide the individual with an escape from any external circumstance, it at least eases his conscience by relieving him of responsibility for failure to live up to his ideals, to achieve his goals, or to keep going at some progressive standard that he has set for himself. It is fairly clear that, in general, those individuals most subject to psychosomatic disorders are the highly motivated and the ones with exceptionally high moral or other standards. In our society the general norm of motivation to achieve is comparatively high; and, as we have seen, hypermotivation is a fairly common deviant attribute. Our scale of values, moreover, places a premium on success defined as personal movement up the occupational and

¹⁷ There are few symptoms of physiological disturbance that have not in some instance or other been traced to psychosocial origins. For a summary of the medical data on this subject, see "Psychosomatics" (B. Mittlemann, 1946) and *Psychosocial medicine* (J. L. Halliday, 1948).

socioeconomic ranks. Finally, the dynamic character of our society means that almost any fixed ideal is more or less beyond achievement and is in this sense "high." Many members of modern society are, therefore, overly motivated in terms of probable achievement and afflicted with ideals or standards that they cannot for the most part live up to. With any such person, life is certain to be more or less frustrating and accomplishment always short of self-set requirements.

A psychosomatic disability may not relieve such a person from continuing to try to live up to his ideals of self or from striving to improve himself—to gain further promotion, to make the business even more profitable, to achieve another rise in the standard of living, to secure a more beautiful wife or a more handsome and wealthy husband, or to do whatever it is that the "driven" individual is driven to do and achieve. But the psychosomatic disorder may release him from the feeling that he himself is responsible for his failure to live up to his ideals or to achieve more than he has achieved. It shifts the blame for failure (failure in his own eyes, of course, for in social terms he may be highly successful) to a faulty body mechanism and away from "himself." Thus he escapes from the doubt that he may be less capable than those who have outdone him, and he may thereby preserve his faith in the superiority of his abilities, his endurance, and his personal integrity. Just as the athlete whose heart gives out during the course of competition is socially relieved of responsibility for failure to win—"he died trying"—so the businessman who is not making his desired million, the ambitious physician who is not at the "top" of his profession, the motion-picture actress who will never be a star of the first magnitude, and the preacher or social reformer who is all too clearly losing in the battle with evil may find consolation of a sort in the idea that the blame is not theirs but lies with a faulty stomach, heart, or other organ. To that extent the psychosomatic disorder is an abnormal mode of adjustment, rather than just a functionless by-product of maladjustment.

Dipsomania. One of the most common, perhaps because most socially permissible, escapes is temporary release from a conflict situation by excessive indulgence in alcohol (dipsomania). A depressant, alcohol seems to effect an escape by "wiping out" recently acquired associations—those which must be escaped—and by permitting earlier and more fundamental ones to become operative. Thus, by drinking, a man can often secure temporary release from the effects of a nagging wife, from the fact that he is a business failure, from his feeling of shyness or insignificance in the presence of his associates, or from whatever it is in his present life circumstances that conflicts with his earlier experience. Should the

necessity for such escape become persistent and his indulgence in alcohol become excessive and periodic, he is considered definitely psychopathic.¹⁸ In terms of social antecedents the distinction between the occasional drinker and the true alcoholic may be one of degree only.

Rationalizing. The man who is actually poor but is convinced that he should be rich may adjust himself to this conflict by romanticizing—imagining that his rags are fine clothes, that the stones he picks up in the roadway are diamonds, and that scraps of paper are bank notes. A person who has such delusions of grandeur is immediately recognized as psychotic. A more subtle method of securing the same self-grandiosity, one more likely to avoid detection, is rationalizing—accepting the actualities of social status but distorting the reasons why this status is not what it should be. Often this is accomplished by imputing evil motives to someone. The individual who does this believes that his status is a consequence of systematic persecution. The man who has been taught to believe that wealth is his by right of birth or worth but who is actually poor may reconcile these contrasts to his own satisfaction by imagining that he is poor because some enemy, perhaps an impersonal one, is defeating all his efforts to secure his normal rights. In this way, he shifts all blame for his actual status from himself to others. The elaborate and quasi-logical rationalization that is involved sometimes excels the plots constructed by professional fiction writers. Not infrequently, such psychopaths have fooled others besides themselves; even police, courts, and psychiatrists have been caught in the mesh of their verbal fabrications.

The egotistical but unsuccessful artist or writer who blames his failure upon the "stupidity" of the public or upon the "monopolistic efforts" of art dealers or publishers is resorting to this sort of device. By thrusting the blame for his lack of recognition upon others,¹⁹ he is saved from admitting to himself and others that he is incompetent and that the fault lies in his books or his pictures. Similarly the businessman, struggling impotently against the painful realities of a business depression, may

¹⁸ See "Alcohol: a critical review of the literature, 1929-1940" (H. Marshall, 1941); *Attitudes and experiences of American-Jewish and American-Irish male youths as related to differences in adult inebriety rates* (D. D. Glad, 1946); "Alcoholism" (H. M. Tiebout, 1947); *A study of the personality of alcoholic males* (H. Marshall, 1947); and *Alcohol, science, and society* (E. M. Jellinek, 1945).

¹⁹ Under the title of "scapegoating," the mechanism of blaming others when things go wrong has been given much consideration by social scientists. Phenomena as different as the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis and the teasing of the family cat have been subsumed under this category. For rather popular accounts of the social importance of scapegoating, see *They got the blame* (K. Gould, 1942); *ABC's of scapegoating* (G. W. Allport, 1944); "The scapegoat in modern Europe" (Anon., 1945); and "Limitations of the scapegoat theory of prejudice" (B. Zawadzki, 1948). See also "How G. S. became a scapegoater" (R. H. Bixler, 1948).

blame his troubles, not upon "business," of which he is a part, but upon "the radicals," who, as he may firmly believe, have willfully and maliciously undermined the economic system.

As is the case with psychosomatic escape from self-responsibility, the "logical" shifting of blame from self to others takes many forms and is resorted to in some degree by most of us. It is a means of escaping the fact that we are in some respects less competent than we have been taught that we ought to be, and of thereby preserving confidence in ourselves. Many of our individual rationalizations are but escapes from less severe conflicts than those which lead a psychopath to believe himself the hero of a cosmic tragedy.

Amnesia. Amnesia, or loss of memory, is commonly an escape mechanism.²⁰ The individual may block off the psychological consequences of conflicting experiences and thus forget what is too "painful" to remember. Some of the psychoanalysts contend that whenever we forget a past event, even the name of a new acquaintance, we do so because that event is incompatible with other experiences. Forgetting is, to their minds, always an escape technique. Although this extreme view is hardly tenable, it is no doubt true that forgetting often serves as a means by which the individual may resolve the tensions engendered by conflicting experiences. When large areas of past experience are blotted out, the person may forget his identity, his occupation, his home, etc., but may be in other regards entirely normal. Since concussion of the brain may cause quite similar symptoms, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the man who has lost his memory because of an automobile crash and the one who is suffering from a business or matrimonial smashup.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR

That the psychopathic are often socially incompetent and must therefore be cared for by social agencies is an obvious social consequence of mental abnormality. A less apparent but no doubt equally important social consequence results from the fact that psychopaths occasionally provide social leadership of one form or another. Religious sects have frequently received their initial momentum from the psychopathic delusions of individuals who found in such sects an escape from intolerable conflicts in social reality. The issue is of course debatable; but there is reason to believe that much that passes for political, economic, artistic, and literary genius is actually a manifestation of psychopathic adjustment. This is not to imply that the social leadership provided by a psychopath is necessarily disadvantageous to society. Although it is impossible to con-

²⁰ For an unusual view of amnesia, that from the standpoint of the patient, see *I lost my memory: the case as the patient saw it* (Anon., 1932).

cur with such an extremist as Adler, who would interpret all exceptional individual activity as a compensation for inferiorities of some sort, it is probably true that excessive concentration upon a single phase of social life, such as business, politics, science, or art, is often a method by which the individual endeavors to compensate for inadequacies or failures in other aspects of his life. And such concentration is commonly the secret of success.

The "Mass Movement." Often merely an individual reflection of social disorganization, the psychopathic personality may, however, play a considerable part both in furthering social disintegration and in inventing and disseminating new elements of organization. As the unit through which social organization is manifest, the individual is both an expression of that organization and a contribution to it. If society forces the individual to work out a psychopathic adjustment in an attempt to reconcile conflicting elements of social experience, this mode of individual adjustment may be taken over, or at least provide leadership for, others who are equally in need of some means of reconciling irreconcilables. The result is a collective, as distinct from individual, phenomenon and is usually described as a mass movement. In the succeeding and final part of this book we shall discuss first the "normal" and then the "abnormal" forms of collective interaction.

PART V

Social Interaction

CHAPTER XXI

THE INTERACTIONAL SITUATION

Throughout the preceding chapters we have kept our attention focused upon the individual, endeavoring to discern the various ways through which his participation in social life prepares him or malprepares him for adjustment to subsequent circumstances. We have examined the processes by which the human infant is socialized and have observed that under contemporary conditions there is a marked lack of continuity and consistency in his socialization. We have discussed the consequence of the social experiences of the individual, his personality, and have seen that the personalities of modern men are often in some or many regards incompatible with the social demands made upon them. Throughout all this discussion we have taken the fact of social interaction more or less for granted. From this point on we shall take the individual more or less for granted and shall examine into the nature of the social interactions from which he has acquired his personality attributes and in which he participates. Heretofore we have been, as it were, studying the characters in the play—their training, their qualifications for their respective roles, and the effects of their being promoted to better parts and being demoted to inferior parts. Hereafter, we shall examine the enactment of the scenes that make the play.

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

All behavior is the response of an organism to stimuli. The stimuli may be either of internal origin or of external origin. The act of food seeking as a response to the hunger pang is of the former order, whereas picking up a food object from the ground belongs to the latter. In analyzing the behavior of human beings, we may for convenience distinguish three levels or forms of behavior—levels that are not, however, to be thought of as in any sense separate. Each of these levels of behavior has something of its own laws, although, as we shall see, the second is built upon the first, and the third upon the second.

Nonsocial and Social Behavior. First to appear in point of time and first in degree of simplicity is what may be termed nonsocial behavior. This includes all unlearned reactions, sometimes spoken of as nonsocial drives. The infant wail is at first presumably of this order—a general-

ized natural reaction to certain body states or to stimuli of external origin. Also included in the category nonsocial are all individually acquired responses, *i.e.*, all responses acquired out of trial-and-error experience that is not directed by other human beings. The distaste and aversion reactions to a bitter fruit acquired by a man from his random picking and eating of such fruit would come into this category.

Only an exceedingly small part of the behavior of men is, however, nonsocial. Social forces direct most of the learning process; and generalized natural reactions to stimuli are quickly refined into a large number of specific reactions, each one of which can be evoked only by a specific and socially designated stimulus situation. Thus the infant wail soon becomes a cry for something, not just a cry. The specific reactions that have been learned through social direction belong to the second category, which, for simplicity, is termed social behavior. Most of the behavior of a man who is strolling down a quiet path in the woods is, for example, social behavior, since he responds to natural objects mainly in terms of his social training. If he finds the sounds made by a bird enjoyable, he does so at least in part because he has been taught by other human beings to consider such sounds enjoyable. If he jumps in fright when a harmless snake slithers across his path, he does so because he has been taught to consider all snakes as objects to be feared.

Social Interaction and Collective Behavior. The third level of behavior is that which arises when two or more human beings respond in socially acquired ways to one another. The process that then appears is interactional, and the consequence of that process is collective behavior.

The distinction between social behavior and collective behavior arises from the fact that in the former we are dealing with what is essentially a series of one-way cause-and-effect relationships, whereas in the latter each effect serves in turn as a cause.¹ The behavior of the man strolling through the woods is a series of reactions (effects) to a sequence of relatively constant stimuli (causes). His behavior is largely a result of the effect of the stimuli (visual stimuli from the path, trees, shrubs, and flowers; auditory stimuli from the birds, wind, and the sound of his feet on the path; olfactory stimuli from the soil, plants, and decaying organic matter; kinesthetic and tactual stimuli from the ground underfoot, the

¹ As was indicated in Chapter I, much of the early social psychology was developed around the one-way cause-and-effect concept, as was, for example, the "stimulus-response" approach (F. Allport, 1924). Of recent years the trend in social psychology, as in other sciences, has been constantly toward multiple-variable or interactional analysis. Phrased in terms of Kantor's interbehavioral system, it can be said that social psychology has passed through the substance-property and the statistical-correlation stages and is now entering the integrated-field stage (J. R. Kantor, 1946).

air, contact with branches, etc.) upon his socially developed personality. His behavior affects these stimuli sources but little. The tree may fall under the blows of his ax; the snake may die under his foot; and to this extent his behavior modifies nature and thus in turn his reaction to it. But, in the main, the reaction is of a one-way order: he reacts to nature, not nature to him. Much of the land surface, many of the animals, and not a little of the internal area of our globe have, of course, been modified by the activities of men. But the point is that nature responds to man's efforts very slowly, whereas man must adjust himself to his surroundings rapidly and constantly.

The interaction that occurs when a man walks into the presence of another person or a group of persons differs so much in degree from the former that we may conveniently consider it a difference in kind. In the presence of other persons, a man not only reacts to them as stimuli sources, but with rare exceptions is reacted to by them. His reactions are, therefore, at once the effect of their behavior on him and the cause of (the stimuli for) reactions on their part.² And thus, whereas in the previous circumstances we have but one variable to consider—the personality of the man walking in the woods—in this case we have as many variables as there are individuals. Each of them will respond in terms of his particular personality to the behavior of all the others. The behavior of any one is, therefore, a consequence, not of a simple one-way cause and effect, but of an interaction. The product of an interaction, collective behavior, is perhaps the most complex, baffling, and yet most interesting phenomenon with which the scientist has to deal.

Collective Behavior as More than the Sum of Individual Behaviors. Although the behaving units are individuals, collective behavior cannot be described as the sum of the separate behaviors of a number of individuals, any more than water can be considered as the sum of two free atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. The interaction of the parts in combination produces a new phenomenon, and thus the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Like one of the parts of a machine, a single

² The behaviorist Weiss has stressed the point that in an interaction the distinction between stimulus and response practically vanishes. Whenever two persons, *A* and *B*, hold a conversation, the speech of *A* can be classified as *A*'s response; yet it constitutes the stimuli for his listener, *B*, as well. Weiss has also suggested that stimuli (or responses) might well be classified two ways—as biophysical and as biosocial. Two stimuli are biophysically equivalent whenever they are similar physically (alike in wave form, weight, height, width, etc.). To be alike biosocially, they must call forth equivalent responses in others. Thus, "Gut' Tag" and "Good day" will be biosocially equivalent although, since their sound pictures are quite dissimilar, they are not biophysically equivalent (A. P. Weiss, 1929). See also "The study of personality and the method of equivalent and non-equivalent stimuli" (H. Klüver, 1936).

personality is but one of the factors that contribute in small or large measure to the interaction that in totality constitutes collective behavior. It is in part because of this fact that so much difficulty is encountered in analyzing attributes of personality. Those attributes, it will be recalled, are usually made manifest in situations; and it is often impossible to distinguish between actions which are mainly a function of the personality and those which are mainly a function of the situation.

THE SOCIAL OR INTERACTIONAL SITUATION

In the study of collective behavior the unit of observation is the social, or interactional, situation.^{*} A situation has its inception, duration, and termination. As a unit of study it is the real-life counterpart to one of the scenes of a play. Sociologists and certain other social scientists study the "plot"—the social organization, the processes of social change, etc. The social psychologist, on the other hand, studies the many specific situations out of which and through time the "plot" emerges.

A social situation has its inception whenever two or more persons come into interaction; it is terminated when they separate or when a distinctly new form of interaction is set off by the introduction of a new factor. The meeting of friends on a street corner is, thus, the inception of a situation. That situation continues until they separate to go their independent ways or until an explosion in a nearby building, the coming of a person they dislike, or something else, changes the friendly conversation into a dash for safety, a forced rather than friendly conversation, or whatnot.

In the succeeding chapters we shall be principally concerned with the processes that occur within the limits of situations as so defined. In some instances, however, situations build so much one upon another that we can trace certain phenomena only through a sequence of situations. Such a procedure is necessary, for example, in the study of such phenomena as rumors, lynchings, and mass movements.

Factors Facilitating Interaction. The proximity of individuals to one another does not of itself constitute an interactional situation (note

^{*} For a time the concept of the social, or interactional, situation seemed to be developing mainly in sociology. Of recent years, however, psychologists have been interesting themselves in the concept, *e.g.*, Allport with his event-system theory (F. H. Allport, 1940) and Lewin and others with field theory (K. Lewin, 1939). The psychiatrists, too, have been helping to develop the concept, Moreno with his techniques of sociometry (J. L. Moreno, 1937) and sociodrama (J. L. Moreno, 1944), and H. S. Sullivan with his theory of interpersonal relationships (E. Beaglehole, 1940).

For other discussions of the concept, see "Personality traits and the situation" (J. M. Reinhardt, 1937); "Social interaction: the problem of the individual and the group" (L. Wirth, 1939); "The dialectic of the situation" (P. Meadows, 1945).

62). Unless those individuals are adjusting themselves to one another, they remain socially isolated and do not in the sense of interaction merge into a unit. Necessary for effective interaction is some degree of similarity or some interlocking dissimilarities between the personalities of the individuals involved. They must be able to communicate with one another; their individual personalities must be such as to permit at least a start toward the working out by trial and error of an adjustment; and they must have or be capable of formulating a common objective.

Although people who speak different languages may to some extent communicate with one another on the basis of simple gestures and thus interact, commonness of language greatly facilitates interaction. A North American and a Latin American may adjust to the presence of each other in the smoking room of a ship on the basis of visual stimuli, each judging what the other intends to do and shaping his behavior accordingly, to the end that they at least do not try to sit down on the same chair. And it is possible, of course, for two men to interact with each other solely by pushing, pulling, and punching. Such behavior is conceivably collective. Ordinarily, however, the means of communication involved in interactional situations are of more complex orders and presume some degree of individual preparation for interaction in the specific kind of situation.

Ability to communicate through a common language facilitates but does not ensure effective interaction. The fact that the members of a situation are capable of communicating indicates a degree of similarity in their symbolic training.⁴ But symbolic behavior is often only the means to adjustment; and unless the members of a given situation have been prepared not only for communication but also for interlocking or parallel patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment, they may be forced to resort to trial and error in attempting to interact. For effective interaction it is not enough, therefore, that people want to get along together and can communicate with one another. They must also have, or be capable of learning, patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment. Probably most individuals entering marriage want to get along with the marriage partner, and certainly most husbands and wives speak the same language. Nevertheless, as the records show, marital discord—lack of adequate adjustment—is a commonplace. The value of parallel patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment is readily seen in the uniform response of a company of soldiers to an officer's command; for example, each member of the company will turn left at

⁴ When such variables as age, race, occupation, social background, and place of conversations are held fairly constant, even sex differences in conversational interests are rather small. People with interlocking patterns of nonsymbolic adjustment tend to have similar conversational interests (S. M. Stoke and E. D. West, 1931).

the command "Left face!" The value of divergent but interlocking modes of behavior may most clearly be seen in the artificial actions of actors on the stage. The members of the cast do not behave alike, but each responds at a given cue in a way that facilitates the behavior of all the others and contributes to the organization of the whole situation.

Further facilitating effective interaction is commonness of objective, which may exist at the inception of the situation or may be developed as a function of the situation itself. The extent to which predetermined unity in objective facilitates a situation can be simply illustrated by what may happen when acquaintances meet casually on the street. If they have as a common objective that of arriving some place, perhaps one to his office and the other to the bank, they can resolve the situation easily. This will also be true should they both feel in the mood for a bit of idle conversation. But should one be in a hurry to continue on his way and the other want to pause to chat, the situation may be awkward and tense, the behavior of the two at cross purposes, and the interaction consequently ineffective. Under these conditions, a common objective may, however, arise as a function of the situation. The conversationally inclined person may introduce an interesting subject for discussion. On the other hand, the one who is disinclined to tarry may lead the talkative one with him down the street or organize the situation for immediate dissolution.

In addition to the foregoing, there are a number of other factors, the presence or absence of which may facilitate effective interaction in a specific situation. Among the most important of these is the physical environment or setting of the situation. Lecturers know the importance of an adequate and comfortable auditorium. Actors are keenly aware of the extent to which audience reception of their program may be influenced by the theater in which they are playing, and stage directors know that the "atmosphere" of a stage setting influences not only the audience but the players as well. Business and other executives recognize the fact that elaborate offices may facilitate conferences with their subordinates and customers. The physiological states of the individuals who make up the situation are also significant. The sober man who finds himself in the midst of a drunken brawl is not likely to merge with the group. Thus one sober member may dampen the enthusiasm of a group of inebriates who are "all set" to act in a given way. On the other hand, one intoxicated person may, because of the nature of his reactions, break up the interaction existing among the members of a sober group. Fatigue, like alcohol and some drugs, may facilitate interaction in some situations and inhibit it in others. In some sorts of situations, as we shall later see, effective interaction is dependent on the development of strong

covert responses on the part of the participants during the course of the interaction itself.

ASPECTS OF SITUATIONAL INTERACTION

For purposes of scientific analysis we may break down the interactional situation into a number of aspects. This is of course somewhat artificial; collective behavior is the consequence of all aspects of the situation, just as the behavior of the individual is the result of a total personality rather than of some special element thereof. But, even as we may dissect the personality for analytical purposes, so may we also dissect the interactional situation.

Origin and Membership. The inception and personnel of interactional situations vary considerably. In terms of the antecedent forces or events that have led certain people to come together at a given place and time, situations range in type all the way from those which are culturally established to those which are fortuitous or accidental. The presence of a man, his wife, and his children at the dinner table is the outgrowth of a multitude of prior situations that can be described only in abstraction and as a social plan or institution of family organization. The situation is traditional, conventional, or normal for the given society. Not only is the time and place a customary thing, but the membership has been determined by a customary procedure.

In extreme contrast to such a situation is the meeting on Fifth and Broadway of three strangers waiting for the "go" signal. So unascertainable are the events that have led to this particular situation that we can describe it only as accidental. The meeting was not prearranged in accordance either with some system of social organization or with individual design. It just happened, and its membership is unselected. Almost anyone can encounter almost anyone else at Fifth and Broadway. But only members of a family can sit down to dinner with their family; and family membership is a highly controlled and sharply defined thing.

Leadership. The role of the individual must not be overlooked in the study of the interactional situation. He is the element from which situations are formed; and without individuals to behave, there could be no collective behavior. This would seem an obvious enough fact; but it can easily be lost sight of when large numbers of individuals are included within an interaction, and the role of most of them is, consequently, relatively small.

Situations vary in the degree and extent to which they are dominated by one member of the group. Such domination is usually spoken of as leadership. On one extreme are those situations in which one individual is steadily and persistently dominant. His leadership is, of course,

a function of the situation, since without the presence of the other members he could not be domineering.⁵ As we shall see, the leader is led, in that he must direct his course of action in terms of the personalities of those whom he leads. As an individual, however, the leader reacts much less to any other individual in the situation than any one of the others reacts to him. This point was made, it will be recalled, in the analysis of attributes of leadership in the chapter on personality deviations.

Situations in which there is one dominating personality may be further distinguished in terms of the nature and antecedents of that leadership. The lecturer in the classroom leads because it is conventional for him to do so. Behind his leadership is a long and complex process of selection, and his position as leader depends less on his particular personality than on factors that may have nothing to do with his immediate fitness for leadership. In contrast to such situations are those in which leadership is arrived at by competitive struggle among the members of the group. Here deviant attributes may be the determinants of the person of the leader, as is the case when the most talkative member of a group comes to dominate the conversation or when the most qualified man rises to the position of leader in an emergency.

In contrast to situations in which there is a specific and continuous leader are those in which leadership is reduced to a minimum and shifts from member to member. Such situations may also be divided into those in which the shifts in leadership follow a predetermined pattern or process and those in which they are a consequence of person-to-person give and take. The former are exemplified by the leadership process in a game of bridge. In accordance with a fairly definite formula (we are speaking of bridge played in a systematic fashion) leadership shifts around the table and is limited in degree to the player's becoming the leader when he has secured the bid. In a conversational interchange, on the other hand, there is a shifting of leadership arrived at in considerable measure by trial and error. Although we may have a sense of what is appropriate, there are no definite rules; and the leadership of such a situation is both loose and subject to moments of instability, as is the case when two leaders emerge simultaneously.

TYPES OF INTERACTIONAL SITUATIONS

Analytical versus Descriptive Approaches. In succeeding chapters we shall analyze in some detail the origin, membership, and leader-

⁵ In recent years more attention has been paid to the role of the situation in leadership training. Leaders are now being trained with a view to the situations that they will probably meet. Thus in the "stress interview" (G. L. Freeman *et al.*, 1942) the trainee is put into real-life situations, not just into the artificial conditions of the laboratory.

ship processes found in typical interactional situations. It is obviously impossible to describe the multitudinous forms of human action that fall into the concept of collective behavior. History, anthropology, ethnology, political science, economics, and sociology make such descriptions and endeavor to find some pattern of recurrences in the phenomena so described. Just as social psychology does not attempt to describe all the various norms of personality manifest in societies of the past or present, it does not attempt to describe all the forms of the behavior of men in interactional situations. To do so would be to repeat, perhaps in slightly different terms, what scientists in other fields are doing.

Our task, then, is not so much that of describing forms of collective behavior as of analyzing the ways in which interactional situations arise, the processes of leadership involved, the factors conditioning the course of interaction, and the methods by which the situations are resolved. The forms of collective behavior may be in marked contrast to one another; but from the sociopsychological viewpoint the situations in which these contrasting forms of behavior evolve may be very much alike. In old China a man ordinarily preceded his wife through a doorway, whereas in modern America a man generally gives his wife precedence. The behavior is quite dissimilar; but in terms of the interactional processes the situations are of the same order.

Multiplicity of Situational Types. From analysis of various situations and comparison of those which occur among primitives with those which occur among civilized peoples and those which have occurred among the peoples of history with those which occur in the present, the concept of situational types arises. In the rather brief analysis that follows, the various types of interactional situations will be classified mainly in terms of the leadership involved. On this basis four general categories, each with a number of subclasses, emerge: cultural situations, in which leadership is designated by tradition; interpersonal situations, in which leadership is determined by individual initiative and operates on the basis of direct contact; publics, in which leadership is determined by individual initiative and operates through distant-contact means of communication; and abnormal situations, in which leadership is determined mainly by fortuitous factors.⁶

In the past, students of collective behavior have been prone to focalize attention largely upon those situations in which the behavior is abnormal—particularly those involving the mob and the crowd and those involved in the boom, the craze, the mass movement, and other phenomena in which there is a rapid swing away from the norms of social action. Significant

⁶ A more detailed and inclusive classification than that presented here is to be found in *Collective behavior* (R. T. LaPiere, 1938).

though they may be, the stressing of situations of this type to the exclusion of all others is comparable with the recounting of the history of social life in terms of wars. Wars have been frequent and recurrent during the last few centuries; they are spectacular and impressive. But the history of wars is only a small part of the history of a society. To consider only the unusual types of interactional situations is to give a biased picture of the processes of collective behavior, much as the history of wars gives us a biased idea of the past—or as the newspaper with its stress upon individual and social catastrophe provides the reader with a severely distorted picture of his times. To avoid such distortion in social psychology, we must study the commonplace as well as the unusual and must not assume that we comprehend a thing simply because it is commonplace.

This caution is felt necessary because of the general tendency to assume that the key to social behavior has been found once it is explained why a man, normally peaceful, suddenly becomes a raving member of a mad-dened mob. The fact is that we have still to discover why this same man may kiss his wife upon one occasion, beat her the next, and “make up” a few moments later; why he gives good money for useless goods at one time and refuses to take advantage of a real bargain at another time; why he will sing in church but will blush and stammer if asked to sing at home. These latter and countless other typical situations are quite as important quantitatively and qualitatively as that in which the man becomes a member of a mob.

Metaphysical Concepts. As was pointed out in Chapter III, it is dangerous as well as misleading to speak or think of society as an entity. Likewise, to speak of a social mind, of the spirit of a people, or even of such a commonplace as the public is to run the danger of being taken or of taking oneself literally. Such “entities” exist only as unrealistic concepts of the observer, comparable with such imputed personifications as Satan and Destiny. Since all we know about them is what we believe—and anyone’s belief is as good as another’s—it is impossible to extend our knowledge of them by any method science has to offer.

The behavior of men in various interactional situations has some continuity and forms something of a pattern, much as the separate tones of a musical instrument may form a musical series or pattern. No one would extend the observation that music is a pattern to the conclusion that tones as such have no existence or that they are but manifestations of the spirit, soul, mind, or anything else of the piece of music. Likewise the fact that collective behavior, as appearing in a long series of situations, may be seen to form a pattern or system is no reason for imputing to this behavior any sort of collective mentality, group soul, or other metaphysical entity. Yet this is what is done by those who think

and speak of collective behavior as though it were an expression of some collective entity. To do this is to deny the reality of the individual, to disregard the fact that all collective behavior arises through the mechanism of individuals, and to close the field of collective behavior to scientific investigation. Thus in imputing to collective behavior some abstract cause, one reduces the student of such behavior to the method of falling into a quasi-religious spell, from which he will emerge with a final and absolute "truth," derived from the substance of his own preconceptions. As scientists we must realize that society is a perceived abstraction, that the study of collective behavior is susceptible to objective methods, and that truth arises from factual analysis rather than from some inner feeling. There is much that is still unknown; but there is no reason to assume that what remains to be revealed is of a different order from what has already been uncovered.

CHAPTER XXII

CULTURAL SITUATIONS

CONVENTIONAL SITUATIONS

The exceeding complexity of even the simplest interactional situation makes analysis difficult and makes the effort to compare and classify various situations somewhat baffling. As a starting point for our analysis it might be well, therefore, to consider the hypothetical situation of two men meeting on a very narrow path. To pursue their individual objectives, they must somehow contrive to pass each other. This means that they must inevitably interact, since the behavior of each is significant only in terms of the behavior of the other. From our own casual observation, we know that such a situation can be resolved in one or another of many possible ways. One man may step aside to give the right of way to the other; they may both step aside halfway; they may argue which one is to have the right of way; they may fight the matter out, the stronger securing the right of way; they may even resolve the situation by one man's turning around and preceding the other down the path.

Our problem, however, is not what they do, but how they come to do whatever it is that is done. In this respect we may distinguish three basic and in a sense mutually exclusive types of adjustment: first, if they have never faced such a problem before, they may be forced to the trial-and-error devising of an adequate pattern of interaction; second, if they have met on this or on another path before, they may now utilize the adjustment technique that they previously devised; finally, they may employ a conventional method of adjustment that has been handed down to them as a part of their social heritage.

Conventional Patterns of Interaction. It is with situations involving an adjustment of the last order that we are here concerned. Whenever an adjustment problem is immediate, has no long-run implications, and concerns only those directly involved, a conventional pattern of interaction may be utilized by the members of the situation. The character of the collective behavior that will emerge from the situation is, of course, dependent on the conventional forms of the people involved.

Even for the meeting of two people on a narrow path there is no single, universal, conventional pattern of interaction. It was conventional in old China for the peasant to step aside to give his social superior the

right of way. Furthermore, that this might be effective, it was conventional for the superior to take the right of way. Each, as it were, knew his place and took it. The eventuality of social equals meeting on a narrow path, in a doorway, or in any situation of like order was also provided for in convention. Here the elder took precedence, the younger stepping aside. And should they be of similar age, it was conventional to go through a preliminary giving-precedence-to-the-other ritual, which led ultimately to the more impatient member's actually taking the lead.

Conventional Patterns in Modern Life. To modern people all this may seem an unnecessarily complex and time-consuming method of resolving a trivial adjustment problem. We are apt to pride ourselves on our freedom from the dictates of convention and to think of ourselves as "unconventional." We frequently poke fun, in the motion pictures and elsewhere, at the conventional patterns of times past.¹ It is true that many of the conventional patterns of an earlier day would be time-wasting and meaningless today; in fact, many of them simply could not be utilized in the modern world. In the age of the automobile, the conventions that surrounded the use of the horse and buggy are of little adjustment value, and the young man who actually "assists" his girl into a modern low-slung automobile may not be regarded as gallant but as rather silly.

Nevertheless, even we of today utilize a great many conventional patterns of interaction, all more or less appropriate to the physical and social circumstances of modern life. The modern man may not give up his seat in a crowded streetcar to a woman; and should he speak to a strange woman in public, she will not go through the conventional signs of distress and alarm that all respectable women were supposed to display a half century ago when accosted by strangers in public. But the ways in which modern people jointly use public facilities—streetcars, walks, elevators, washrooms, etc.—are all more or less effectively governed by convention; and so, too, are at least the initial interactions of friends and acquaintances. Our conventional patterns, particularly those

¹ The popularity of "period" motion pictures, not to be confused with the romance laid in a highly idealized historical setting, would appear to stem in part from the fact that the conventions of the past, especially those of the upper classes, now seem amusingly stuffy. Such motion pictures may give contemporary mass audiences a sense of superiority over their former peers or superiors. But at the same time the popularity of Emily Post's many books and her syndicated newspaper column on etiquette indicates that many middle-class Americans place a high value on what they imagine constitutes proper behavior in higher class circles. And that the highly literate and presumably sophisticated may also at times feel impelled to honor ancient conventions is indicated by the fact that Webster's *New International Dictionary* contains a section on such matters as how one should address a baron, a baroness, and a baron's daughter.

for use between friends, relatives, and acquaintances, vary widely from class to class and from region to region. But the point is that we do have such patterns and do rely on them to simplify the innumerable problems of interpersonal relations that arise time after time in the course of a single day. For although conventional patterns are time-consuming, few are time-wasting. In comparison with the difficulties that might arise were there no conventional formula to apply to a given adjustment problem, the conventional pattern is often highly effective. What happens when such a simple convention as that of passing on the right breaks down and two people spend a number of moments in embarrassing trial and error in order to pass on the widest of streets indicates the social value of conventional forms.

Like all other cultural situations, conventional situations involve a minimum of trial and error, little dependence is placed on any individual member as leader or organizer, and highly effective interaction is attained because each individual member of the situation has learned a customary mode of response which fits into the responses of the other members. This does not mean that the members are necessarily like each other in the sense that they have identical modes of reaction, but rather that each knows his special part—he is either the one to step aside or the one to take the right of way. But should they have been trained into different conventional patterns, they will conflict and thus be forced to resort to trial and error in working out an adjustment to the situation.

Conventional patterns of interaction are a matter of momentary convenience only and serve the interests only of the persons involved in the immediate situations in which these patterns appear. Many culturally determined patterns, on the other hand, have a function that transcends the specific situations in which they appear and serves the interests of the entire social group rather than just the members of the immediate situation. The situations in which such patterns emerge are always related to many prior situations and lead to many subsequent situations, the entire sequence of which constitutes an institutional constellation.

INSTITUTIONAL SITUATIONS

The Institutional Basis of Behavior. The sociologist often speaks of systems of human relationship—*e.g.*, the family, feudal, clan, tribal, and village systems—as social institutions.² Specific methods of eco-

² The term "institution" suffers from a multiplicity of meanings; as a consequence it frequently means nothing at all. The concept that we wish to symbolize by the term "institution" will no doubt become apparent to the reader, especially as we distinguish between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized behavior. For an extended and rigorous analysis of the concept from the sociological point of view, see

nomic or governmental procedure—banking, private property, public education, democratic government, etc.—are also termed institutions. Institutions are, thus, the perceived patterns of social organization. Each institution has some special function or functions but is of course coordinated with and dependent on the other institutions of the society (note 63).

Institutions and the Institutional Situation. The sociologist, economist, political scientist, and social historian are concerned primarily with the development, characteristics, changes, functional relationships, etc., of institutional patterns. Thus they may trace the historic emergence of the patriarchal family as a social institution, plot the changes that historically have occurred in that institution, and describe its disintegration under the impact of modern industrialism. All this, it will be recognized, is study of the system of human relationships that comprises the institution of the patriarchal family rather than of the behavior of the individual men and women adjusting themselves in specific situations to the presence of one another.

The social psychologist, on the other hand, is concerned with the behavior of the individual men and women and with why it arises on the situational level. Once it is well established with the individual, such behavior involves an order of person-to-person interaction in which trial and error plays little part, as is indicated by the fact that the pattern of that interaction appears over and over and has a history which transcends the life of the members of any situation in which it appears. The social psychologist must, consequently, go beyond the immediate interactional situation and seek in the institution an explanation of how the members came to behave in the way that they do. How, in other words, does it happen that the pattern of interaction in some situations is not only recurrent but is of such a character that it can be seen to be merely a part of a large constellation of situations?

The collective behavior emerging from institutional situations may range from that of ritualistic human sacrifice upon the altar of the sun god to nothing more startling or impressive than a man and his wife climbing into the same bed. But all institutional situations have in common the fact that their inception, function, membership, and the person of their nominal leader are determined by the social heritage.

Institutionalization in Modern Society. When attention is directed to contemporary society, however, analysis becomes complicated by the fact that, although many of the situations which arise between mod-

Social institutions (J. O. Hertzler, 1946). In W. H. Hamilton's article, "Institutions" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 8, 84-89) the term is used more broadly to include any stable element of culture.

ern people are in some respect or other and to some degree or other institutionalized, few are truly institutional. The sweeping and fundamental social changes that were discussed in the preceding chapters have disorganized and largely wiped out our old institutions. In their places we have a great variety of new and still-evolving forms of social organization, such as modern marriage, corporate business, and governmental bureaucracy. All of these, for reasons we need not examine here,^a tend to acquire through time the characteristics of an institution; but none are as yet institutions in an absolute sense, and a great many of them are hardly beyond the embryonic stage of development. As of the present, therefore, our fundamental social organizations range from those which are just in the process of formation, such as a newly established business enterprise or governmental agency, to those which have reached a condition of considerable but not complete institutionalization.

As a consequence, it can only be said of the interactions that occur between the members of a modern family, between the members of the administrative staff of a business, between the employees of a municipal government, between the members of a military force or governmental bureau, etc., that to some degree some characteristics of institutionalization will be involved. In the following discussion we shall, therefore, center attention upon the characteristics of the truly institutional situation, with the general caution that in the only partly institutionalized situations which arise between members of contemporary social organizations there will always be some and often much opportunity for the expression of individual initiative and other deviant attributes of personality.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION

Origin. Since the origin of social institutions lies in the history of a people, the origin of any specific situation of institutional order is to be found in some special circumstances of the social training of the members of that situation. All cultural situations have their antecedents; but a clear distinction can be drawn between the unplanned encounter of two men on a narrow path and the prearranged meeting of a man and a woman at an altar, there to enter into a marriage contract. The former situation may be resolved in accordance with a customary formula; but in its origin there is little of the systematic social preparation of the in-

^a As was indicated in an earlier chapter, the tendency for organizations to become fixed in form, hence institutionalized, is so general that sociologists are inclined to consider it a "law" of organizational development. See Chap. XIII in *Social institutions* (J. O. Hertzler, 1946) for a discussion of the phenomenon in general and Chap. XIV of *Sociology* (R. T. LaPiere, 1946) for an analysis of the process of institutionalization.

dividuals involved, the cultural anticipation, and the social significance which have led to the latter.

Although each of the men who meet on the path may have been prepared by prior experience to adjust in the conventional way to anyone he so meets, he has not been prepared to adjust to this specific man at this specific time and place. The origin of the situation is therefore in a sense fortuitous. The lives of these two men have not been so organized as to make this specific encounter one of a series of related situations. What they do when they meet may be culturally determined, but the meeting itself is a consequence of individual factors and thus of antecedent behavior that is only in slight degree related to the situation itself. One man may have been on his way to town to sell produce grown in his garden; the other may have left the town simply to take a stroll in the hills.

Constellations of Situations. An institutional situation, however, originates in closely related antecedent situations. The meeting of a young man and woman, their parents, and others, with a priest or minister in a church at high noon is not a chance encounter. It is the culmination of a multitude of correlated activities on the part of the individuals concerned. Under the highly institutionalized conditions of times past, a marriage was arranged with little if any initiative on the part of the bride and groom. They came together in accordance with the plan of their parents and were little more than pawns in the operation of the family system. To understand their meeting, we must therefore look first to that system. Only then does any one of the series of events, such as the decision that Son John was to be married to the daughter of such and such a family, become meaningful.

The cultural origin of institutional situations makes for an elimination of individual trial and error.⁴ This fact can, perhaps, best be seen by contrast. Although with us marriage is normal, it can hardly be termed fully institutional. Today the presence of a man and woman at an altar may be a consequence of much individual initiative and of considerable individual trial and error. But in the old family systems, both Occidental and Oriental, a marriage was but one of a large constellation of situations, each related to all the others. The origins of all these situations lay in the institutional patterns.

Under social conditions more stable than those we know today, a con-

⁴ There is a measure of trial and error involved in the formation of even the most highly institutional situation, since it is human initiative that puts into operation the plan resulting in any meeting of people. The decision, for illustration, that Son John would marry a specified girl was probably arrived at in family council. But that he would marry and that his wife would be selected for him in accordance with a systematic procedure were all predetermined by his social heritage.

siderable proportion of the situations in which the individual participated were institutional. Neither he nor any of his contemporaries had devised the situations, nor were the situations in any sense fortuitous. They were but elements of a larger social plan, devised in the past and handed down generation after generation more or less intact. The monks assembled for the evening benediction, a gathering of the village elders in a primitive community, the king presiding at his court, and the family sitting at the dinner table were groupings that had their origin in institutional constellations.

Even in these days of social change, there is little that is fortuitous in the meeting of a number of persons at High Mass in a Roman Catholic Church. Nor is there any longer much that is fortuitous about the coming together of the members of our Supreme Court to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of some law, the gathering of people at a stated place and time to nominate a candidate for the presidency, or the convening of the Electoral College to "elect" the president who has been chosen by popular vote. In each instance, those who have come together have done so in accordance with a complex social plan. Their individual actions have been socially directed, coordinated, and systematized, to the end that they should meet at this given place at this specific time. Even a funeral, itself a series of connected but distinct situations, cannot be said to have originated in the accident of death. Death is but the sign or signal for predetermined social forms to come into operation. It is obvious that religious or other ceremonial situations are formulated in accordance with some definite institutional law. Less obvious, perhaps, is the institutional origin of such situations as that in which a woman and a number of children sit at table with bowed heads while a man, the husband and father, expresses their collective thanks for the food spread before them. Such a situation may be as fully institutional as that in which a minister says, extending a bit of bread to his parishioners, "Take and eat this in remembrance that Christ died for thee. . . ."

Ideological versus Actual Function. Since it is but a part of a system of situations, no institutional situation can be understood in terms of itself alone. The function of any institution is the guidance of the individual into modes of behavior that assist in one way or another in the maintenance of group life. The interaction that occurs in an institutional situation is therefore but a single step toward a distant social goal.

Seldom, however, is there any conscious recognition by the members of an institutional situation that their behavior has a long-run institutional or group objective. The rules and regulations for individual conduct incorporated in early Christianity were those developed in part at least from the experiences of the Hebrew peoples. The "good life" was

one that appeared to contribute under this particular system to long-run and collective welfare. Each element was a mode of conduct that men had found reasonably effective and adequate in terms of the given social order. But the explanation for adherence to the specific institutional patterns was supernaturalistic, *i.e.*, based upon the idea of divine law. The Jewish avoidance of pork had its utilitarian basis in the danger of trichinosis or other infection. The Chinese avoidance of unboiled water was a sanitary measure. Yet both these practices were "explained" on the basis of supernatural forces.⁵ Even in present-day theology utilitarian arguments are seldom used. It is not claimed that one should love his neighbor because this is essential to the social system and because the effective functioning of the system is necessary to the welfare of the individual. Rather, the principle is justified in terms of divine command.

When, as frequently happens, the long-run social significance of a situation is camouflaged beneath ritualistic and symbolic action, a distinction arises between the purported function and the true function of that situation. The purported function is an ideological justification, a humanly satisfying "explanation," for actions that are really significant not in themselves but only in terms of a larger pattern. The distinction between ideological justification and true function can be clearly seen in the behavior of a Chinese woman boiling water to "drive off the evil water spirits." She does not know it, but in boiling the water she is actually doing her part to prevent an epidemic of cholera.

The actual function of any institutional situation can be seen only upon study of the entire institution of which it is a part. The ideological justification, on the other hand, usually makes the situation appear to be of some immediate and personal value to the members. The primitive initiation rites serve to mark the individual's transition from childhood to maturity. Only as a part of the system of social education, therefore, do such rites function. But the boy who is just reaching sexual maturity cannot be expected to understand the sociological and sociopsychological significance to him and to his group of transition from one group member-

⁵ Even in the field of the arts, practices that have quite obviously grown out of human trial and error have often been explained in terms of divine or magical forces. Both the ancient Greeks and Chinese explained their failure to use in their music any but the simplest musical ratios (1: 2, octave; 2: 3, fifth; and a few others) on the grounds that more complex ratios would offend the gods. The Greeks would not use ratios in which the numbers six and seven appeared because six and seven were magical numbers (*e.g.*, there were six directions—north, south, east, west, up, and down). The Chinese would not use ratios in which the number five appears because five was the number of life fundamentals (*e.g.*, there were five directions—north, south, east, west, and center; five human relationships—between king and subjects, father and son, brothers, husband and wife, and friends).

ship to another. Thus the initiation rites, like other institutional situations, are related to spirit-world concepts and are thereby given personal significance and interest. As we have already indicated, religion provides the individual with an effective pattern of adjustment to the fact of ultimate death and gives him an abstract and unfailing life goal. But the primitive with his bag of ancestral bones, the Oriental with his ancestral shrine, and the Christian with his altar, cross, and prayer book seldom see this ultimate function in the rituals through which they go. The purported function of a church service may be to secure for the participants a desirable status in life after death or, perhaps, to control through divine supplication the course of natural events. But the actual individual and group functions of that situation can be discerned only in terms of the entire system of institutionalized religion and are seldom, perhaps never, understood by the participants at a religious ceremony.

Flags, banners, robes, uniforms, thrones, altars, titles, etc., are the material accouterments used in the more ritualistic of institutional situations. They, like the rituals themselves, are highly symbolic. But beneath the symbolic behavior of a ceremonial situation, as with the more commonplace and less colorful behavior of other institutional situations, there is usually some definite, utilitarian social function.⁶

The Exclusiveness of Institutional Situations. Inasmuch as institutional situations are but units of a larger constellation, membership in them has continuity. The men on the path may never meet again, but the members of an institutional situation will come together time after time. In order that they will interact in the predesignated mode, it is essential that the individuals entering into any specific situation be prepared not only for it but for all others of its constellation. This means, in turn, that the situational membership must be controlled. Only those who are prepared to play their specific roles, not only in it but in all related situations, can be permitted to participate in an institutional situation. The mechanisms by which a social system ensures that the members of any institutional situation will be adequately trained to that situation and to others of the same constellation are an intimate part of the total social pattern and are exceedingly complex.

Exclusiveness is, perhaps, the first characteristic of institutionalization to appear in the development of organizations. Certainly it is one of the more striking attributes of bureaucratic, military, and business organiza-

⁶ The functional place of ritual in a social system is primarily the concern of the sociologist and the anthropologist. Yet it is imperative that the social psychologist recognize the fact that rituals, however incomprehensible in themselves, may be of great significance when examined in their social context. See R. Benedict's article "Ritual" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 396-397) for a more detailed expression of the point.

tions in contemporary society. The complex and elaborate procedures through which civil servants are selected tend to ensure that only "sound" applicants for admission to governmental bureaus are accepted, and civil service regulations everywhere operate to protect the established bureaucrat from competition with "outsiders" who, however energetic and competent, must ordinarily start at the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy and work their way up in accordance with the rules of the system. The arguments that were advanced, particularly by naval men, against the merging of our armed forces shortly after World War II were largely based upon the idea that, since there had always been an independent Navy, there must always be one. Such an idea illustrates the strong feeling of exclusiveness that is to be found in the membership of any military organization. A more recent proposal to eliminate West Point and Annapolis as agencies for officer training in order to reduce the evils of the so-called "military caste" system⁷ was considered a threat to the very existence of our military establishments, since it would open the ranks of the officer class to "unqualified" men—*i.e.*, to men who had not been adequately indoctrinated into the values and practices of the officer class. Many of the craft unions show a similarly marked exclusiveness; in some instances they go so far as to apprentice only enough young men to maintain a constant supply of skilled workers, even when the social demand for craftsmen is expanding.

Training for Membership. The processes of socialization, which were discussed at some length in Part II, are directed toward preparing the individual for social membership. Not all such training, of course, is directed toward fitting the individual for membership in institutional situations. But in a relatively stable social system, much of it consists largely of shaping the individual's personality in such a way that he will react in accordance with his socially designated roles in situations of an institutional order.

We have had occasion to observe, from time to time, some of the ways in which, and the extent to which, children are socially prepared for situations long before those situations actually arise. In particular, we have noted the manner in which society guides the psychological growth of the individual, preparing him for the dynamic adjustments necessitated by factors of physical and social maturation. A contrast was shown between the lack of system in our present milieu and the exceedingly systematic preparation in stable societies for such critical life transitions as sexual maturity, attainment of occupational, marital, and parental status, and the coming of middle and old age.

The importance to individual psychological welfare of adequate and

⁷ The functional reasons for the proposal are to be found in "The Maginot line of America" (R. W. Johnson, 1948).

appropriate preparation for future events is apparent. Moreover, it is as important for the group as for the individual that the latter be adequately prepared for situational adjustment. Thus, in the old order, it was necessary for family welfare that a son or daughter be so brought up that he would behave in the ways prescribed by the family system. The failure of a parent to train a child properly not only reflected discredit upon the parent but meant that the parent would suffer discomfort in those institutional situations of which the child was a member. Presumably because it worked most effectively, the socialization of prospective institutional members—*i.e.*, children—for a particular situation was largely the responsibility of the members of that situation. Since they would bear the most immediate and apparent consequences of educational failure, they could be depended on to do their best in directing the personality development of the child into institutional patterns.

As a result, membership in institutional situations has in the past been largely a matter of birth. It must not, however, be supposed that blood kinship is the cause of effective person-to-person adjustments in institutional situations. Biological relationship can make for more effective person-to-person adjustments only when it facilitates educational efficiency. As a matter of fact, in some social systems blood kinship has not been significant in personality development.

Selection of Members. Birth, then, is not the sole basis for membership in institutional situations. The monks in a monastery were not necessarily related by birth; obviously, recruiting of new members had to be in the main from other than blood-kin sources. Under certain of the older family systems, the women were recruited from sources outside the family; they were nevertheless members of many institutional situations in which the others had been born to membership. It is apparent that, if the monks were to adjust to one another in an institutional fashion and if the wives of a family were to interact in a predesignated mode with other members of the family, some selective process must have operated to ensure that each individual of outside origin would know and behave in accordance with his specified social role. To this end, every functioning social institution has involved some systematic procedure for selecting new adult members from all the persons available.

It is perhaps with the process by which families of the old type selected the wives for their sons that we can most clearly perceive the working of the total institutional pattern to the end that each situation would resolve with the least possible resort to individual trial and error. Under present conditions the selection of spouses is, as was previously remarked, a relatively uncontrolled and haphazard affair. Marriage, the establishment of a presumably permanent relationship between a man and a

woman, is not now the integral part of a larger constellation of family situations that it once was. Like some of the primitives to whom we have already referred, we today permit and depend on a considerable degree of trial and error in the individual selection of marriage partners.

In the old patriarchal family system, however, it was imperative that a wife be satisfactory not only to her husband but to his father, mother, brothers, their wives, and to all the others who lived under a common roof. Many of the situations in which they would behave were highly institutional. Unless a girl was properly prepared to play her role as a wife, daughter-in-law, and sister-in-law before she came to the family of her husband, that family would have to educate her. By selecting her in accordance with a traditional system, they assured themselves that such education would be unnecessary. Contractual marriage may strike us as contrary to the "laws of God or of nature." But upon close examination it appears that this method on the average ensured that a wife would fit the family of her husband; and there is no reason to suppose that the absence of what we term "romance" necessarily made the relationship between husband and wife any less satisfactory. Although they may not have met previously, the bride and groom were, after all, prepared to accept each other.

Membership in the only partly institutionalized situations of modern society is by no means as rigidly controlled as it was in the fully institutionalized situations of family, clan, etc., in societies of the past, and the members are not so systematically trained. But the tendency toward exclusiveness, including some procedure for the selecting and training of members, is to be found in most contemporary organizations. Professional bureaucrats consider themselves and are a somewhat special breed of men; they have been selected, through civil service examinations^a and their abilities to survive under bureaucratic organization, for their

^a In the political system of premodern China bureaucrats were selected through a complex examination procedure on the basis of their knowledge of the Confucian Classics, their ability to write (i.e., draw characters) artistically, and their skill at composing poems in one of the traditional forms. The criteria that modern governments use in selecting civil servants often are hardly more relevant. Applicants are rated mainly on the basis of paper-and-pencil tests of formal knowledge, although the positions for which they apply may require manual skills or pleasing personality attributes.

A recent comparison of the methods used in the American and British armies to select leaders indicated that in general the various paper-and-pencil tests were less valid than personal ratings by people who knew the individual under consideration. See "Experiments in testing for leadership" (J. W. Eaton, 1947); see also "The regular-service myth" (H. Mullan, 1948).

The British government has instituted on an experimental basis a "houseparty" method of examining candidates for the higher civil service positions in England in

passive subordination to systematic routine and have been trained on the job in that routine and all the complex interpersonal relationships which go with it. Likewise, regular army and navy officers have been selected in accordance with traditional procedures and in terms of traditional values and then have been trained into the values, sentiments, and modes of conduct that have become traditional for officers and gentlemen. The tendency toward exclusiveness is evident in all contemporary professions and in most occupational groups and rapidly develops wherever numbers of people are recurrently associated over periods of time, as in residential communities.

Individual Initiative in Institutional Situations. The character and extent of leadership is one of the most indicative attributes of an interactional situation and provides us with a significant key to its situational type. An outstanding aspect of institutional situations is the subordination of the individual to the institutional pattern. Each individual member acts in the main according to a designated institutional role. The presence of the members and the pattern of their interaction are not determined by the personality of any single member, and there is scant opportunity for the display of individual initiative or the appearance of trial and error.

Although institutional behavior involves little trial and error and is guided by the system rather than by individual initiative, we can discern in every such situation some one individual who is designated as leader, even though his leadership is no more than nominal. He neither selects nor devises the pattern of interaction but is simply the focal point of interaction and the one who provides cues that guide the other members in the enactment of their separate roles. The designated leader of an institutional situation is therefore somewhat analogous to the conductor of an orchestra, who does not devise the music but who guides its rendition.

The institutional mechanisms by which the person of the designated leader of institutional situations is determined are comparable with those mechanisms by which members are selected and trained. The most common bases for selection are heredity, age, and sex. Thus in the old patriarchal family system the nominal leadership of all situations involving members of a family and members of some other family devolved upon the eldest son of the eldest son of that family. In the absence of the patriarch, his eldest son or, when the latter was too young to act the part, the eldest of the patriarch's brothers was the designated leader. Under the feudal system the same sort of mechanism was operative and

which an attempt is made to study the candidate "in action" (*Time*, Aug. 16, 1948, p. 54).

became the basis for the hereditary position of kings, princes, and the petty nobility.

Seniority, which makes the length of service to an organization the determinant of the individual's worth to the organization, is the characteristic modern parallel to the old institutional devices. Seniority is a major basis for promotion under civil service rules in all our Federal and many of our state governmental agencies. The military forces also place considerable reliance on the length of time that a man has been in the service; and corporate business often evaluates its workers in terms of the time that they have spent on the job. Although there has been and still is much discussion of the desirability of making all promotions in business, military, governmental, and other "working" types of organizations on the basis of merit rather than seniority (L. W. Ferguson, 1948), there are strong tendencies within every organization toward elevating to positions of leadership those members who have served longest and most faithfully and have thereby demonstrated their loyalty to the group and their indoctrination into the established organizational procedures, *i.e.*, their fitness to be nominal rather than actual leaders.

Limitations of Institutional Situations. It must not be concluded from the foregoing that the interaction of two or more persons in a situation of the institutional type is automatic (note 64). Even the more fundamental and persistent of institutional forms are little more than a framework for social life. In a sense they are a social generalization from past group experience, which is handed down in a systematic fashion from generation to generation. Elaborate, complicated, interlocking forms of person-to-person adjustment, they are rule-of-thumb procedures for accomplishing social ends with the least possible resort to trial and error and with the least possible dependence on the organizing ability and foresight of individual leadership. At best, institutional forms are more the pattern than the substance of human relationships. Within the pattern, there is invariably some noninstitutional interplay of the deviant attributes of the members of the situation. It is this interplay which gives the "tone," the human qualities, to institutional behavior, just as it is subtle variations in the rendition of a musical classic which make each performance somewhat distinctive.

In the only partly institutionalized relations of modern husbands and wives, physicians, lawyers, politicians, bureaucrats, unionized craftsmen, etc., the interplay of the deviant attributes of the members may become at times the dominant motif in an interaction, with the result that the institutionalized aspects are momentarily lost. Often that interplay takes on the character of interpersonal conflict, where interests, values, sentiments, or the like are opposed and come into opposition. Often, how-

ever, it is through just such interplay that individual members of institutionalized organizations are enabled to display individual initiative and break some strand of organizational red tape before it has become fully institutional.

Social Disorganization and the Institutional Situation. Since situations of the truly institutional type are preorganized in terms of long-run social objectives and each situation is significant only to the extent that it fits into a pattern of prior and subsequent situations, social changes inevitably disturb the functional nature of institutional situations. The institutional situations (as distinct from those which are only somewhat institutionalized) in which we find ourselves today and for which we have been adequately prepared in past experience are few, and the functional value of even these is open to question. In a changing order much dependence, individual and collective, must be placed on trial and error in the working out of situational adjustments. As the reliability of old social forms declines, the role of the individual as a dominating factor becomes peculiarly significant; there is an increase in the importance of individual initiative, of inventiveness, and of those personality qualities that make for leadership under competitive conditions. The rise of political demagogues, of spellbinders, and of great "salesmen" is an offset to hereditary rulers, traditional priests, and a communal form of economic life in which human behavior followed a socially designated form.

FORMAL SITUATIONS

Although the institutions of preindustrial Western society have all become disorganized and their functions largely destroyed by the revolutionary developments that have taken place in our means and methods of making a livelihood, we cling to the remains of some of the old institutions with a sort of despairing unwillingness to be cast loose into the stream of social change. They have lost most if not all their original individual and group functions and now have only sentimental value. Much political, legal, economic, and dramatic symbolism is an appeal to values derived from practices that were appropriate to forms of institutional life no longer possible. Many of the interactions in which we participate follow institutional forms but are devoid of institutional significance.⁹ They are, as it were, but a fragment of the skeleton of a

⁹ Thus the church service, which once functioned as a part of the institution of religion, may now provide the members of a congregation with anything from recreation to social prestige. For example, the lower class Negro church provides its members with revelous outlets for sex conflicts; the middle-class Negro church is mainly a social center; and the upper class Negro church, the members of which are relatively light skinned, serves primarily as a prestige source (R. A. Billings, 1934).

body long since dead. Such situations may, for convenience, be designated as formal.

Social Decadence. There is a pronounced tendency for the members of a disintegrating social system, especially for those of the so-called "upper classes," to become increasingly concerned with outward form in social relationships. This includes great emphasis upon the symbols of status—precedence in introductions, order of seating at formal dinners, and the like; fastidious regard for details of dress, speech, and the like; and preoccupation with ritualistic observances. In general, these formalities are elaborated fragments of old institutional patterns. But they are empty of institutional meaning and are used only for purposes of display.

Preoccupation with formalities to the exclusion of functional effectiveness is evidence of social decadence. Political, economic, and military aristocracies tend to become decadent in time. They cease to fulfill their function as leadership sources and come to devote the major part of their time and energies to going through the motions of being important. This decadence would seem to be a part of the process by which an established elite deteriorates and is finally dispossessed by members of a more virile and earthy "lower class."

Social decadence may, furthermore, affect the entire social system, lowering the functional efficiency of the members of the society to the point where the system disintegrates at the slightest attack from within or without.¹⁰ Undoubtedly it was in part the preoccupation with formal observances which made the ancient Greek city-states easy prey for conquering armies, which made the Roman Empire subject to slave revolts and the inroads of the barbarians, and which more recently made easy the initial conquest of France by the German military machine and the capture of the British stronghold of Singapore by the Japanese.¹¹

Contemporary American society is much too young in the historical sense, much too dynamic, and much too vulgar to be described as decadent.¹² There is, however, some tendency to preserve as formalities

¹⁰ Thus it was probably not the Spanish conquistadors but their own incredible ritualism that destroyed the Aztecs of Mexico. By the time the Spanish arrived, the major energies of the Aztec population were being devoted to the worship of the Sun God and a significant number of the population were being killed as sacrificial offerings. See *Aztecs of Mexico* (G. C. Vaillant, 1941).

¹¹ In *The Stilwell papers* (T. H. White, ed., 1948) an American general who was unimpressed by formalities places much of the blame for the failure during World War II of the campaign in Burma on the preoccupation of both British and Chinese officialdom with ancient but empty ceremonial practices.

¹² But for a careful analysis of an entire system of formalized human relationships in America, see *The etiquette of race relations in the South* (B. W. Doyle, 1937). A

fragments from the old institutions that we inherited from Europe. The Easter service, debutante parties, socialite weddings, and elaborate funerals are but a few of the more striking formalities of contemporary American life. Each of these forms has its old institutional background, but it has lost its institutional significance.¹³

Self-interest of Participants. The truly institutional situation operates toward the furtherance of group and long-run ends. But when an institutional pattern becomes no more than formal, it then serves only individual and short-run interests. Thus, many of the people who go to church on Easter Sunday do so because they wish to be seen by and to see the "right" people, to display their new hats and suits, etc.¹⁴ Many of the people who hold fashionable weddings do so because marriage can be made an occasion for the display of wealth, an opportunity to gain the attention of the socially important, or the like. Many of those asked to attend such a wedding, a formal dinner, a debutante party, or even an ostentatious funeral will have been invited for what they can contribute to the occasion. Many of them will attend only if they feel that to do so will be profitable in some way for them individually.

The Formal versus the Actual. In the formal situation there is usually a distinction between what happens on the surface and what is occurring behind the scenes. The institutional form is in fact often merely a means of making the true purpose of the situation less obvious. Thus the formal dinner may be but a screen for the fact that the host is repaying unpleasant social debts, trying to ingratiate himself with his employer, or endeavoring to bring together men who should be brought together for some business or political purpose. The elaborate wedding may be

less important and more amusing example of a system of formal relationships will be found in *The proper Bostonians* (C. Amory, 1947).

¹³ An interesting illustration of the use of old institutional rites as the basis for grievous exploitation is the "racket" that commercial interests have made of death. One might think that of all human events, death would be least likely to be used as means of securing large and excessive profits. But see J. C. Gebhart's article "Funerals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 527-529) and *Burial reform and funeral costs* (A. Wilson and H. Levy, 1938).

¹⁴ Private attitudes often differ markedly from publicly expressed or implied attitudes. When a group of Methodists were asked in church to state their views on baptism, 90 per cent held that sprinkling was the only proper way. But when asked in private for their views, a mere 16 per cent held out for sprinkling. Of a group of Baptists similarly queried, 67 per cent of the public attitudes favored immersion as the only proper form of baptism. This figure fell to 17 per cent when the private attitudes were tapped (R. L. Schanck, 1932).

Public rather than private attitudes are likely to be tapped when questions on racial matters are asked by pollers. Here the "race" of the poller may affect the answers (F. Williams and H. Cantril, 1945; D. Robinson and S. Rohde, 1946).

but a polite way for the bride's mother to celebrate her successful disposal of her daughter, to gloat publicly over the quality of the "catch," or to make a bid for acceptance into the "best" social circles.

Within the framework of the formal situation, almost anything can happen. Personal leadership is, therefore, a significant factor in such interactions. The formal situation may, in fact, best be described as a competition between a number of individuals for leadership under the camouflage of an institutional procedure. The principal immediate difference between such situations and those which will be discussed in the succeeding chapter is that the former profess to be what they are not, whereas the latter are pretty much what they seem to be.

CHAPTER XXIII

INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS

In the more stable social systems at least, the most important human needs are satisfied through institutional mechanisms. As we have indicated, these mechanisms subordinate momentary considerations to long-run aims. Individual needs of an immediate character are, therefore, generally satisfied in interactional situations of other than the institutional type—in what may be termed “interpersonal” situations. The individual needs from which interpersonal situations arise and through which they are organized are often incidental outcomes of institutional membership and are seldom in antagonism to institutional membership. But the pattern of situational interaction is primarily a function of the particular personalities involved in the situation. Our approach to situations of this order must, therefore, be the reverse of that which was utilized in the preceding chapter.

CONGENIAL SITUATIONS

Basis in Recreational Needs. Those interpersonal situations which function largely in terms of the recreational needs of the members constitute a special type, which can best be described as congenial. All those groupings which occur within the larger social membership in terms of mutuality of special recreational interests belong to this type. Thus, although a church service of a generation or two ago was institutional, the small groupings that formed outside the church after the service were of a congenial order. The younger boys formed one interactive group, the young girls another, adolescent boys and girls still another; and the adults sorted themselves out into still other groups. The subdividing of the larger membership was based upon mutuality of interests in activities that were primarily of recreational value.

The various interests of the members of the groupings were, of course, in some measure a reflection of institutional factors. Even in modern society the character of any neighborhood is a consequence of somewhat institutionalized patterns—family, economic, political, and religious. Thus the similarities of interests on which the congenial gatherings of the neighborhood are based are indirectly institutional in origin. Furthermore, since the members of congenial situations have been trained

into specific institutionalized practices, the fulfillment of their mutual recreational interests cannot take forms of behavior that are definitely anti-institutional. This limitation upon behavior in congenial situations is, however, negative rather than positive. The institutionalized personalities of the members operate only to prevent certain modes of interaction from arising.

Shifting Leadership. The interaction that does arise in congenial situations is primarily the result of individual initiative. This interaction is mainly verbal; and the function is, as we have pointed out, recreational. Neighborhood women sitting on the porch on a summer's evening, farmers gathered around the stove at the country store on a wintry day, and laborers refreshing themselves at the corner pub¹ on their way home from work form recreational groupings. Such groupings arise out of individual needs. Unless those needs are satisfied in the situation, the members will soon drift away.

The tendency of the individual members to drift away unless they find the situation valuable to them means that no single individual can long dominate a congenial situation. The member of any congenial situation who likes to talk but is given little chance to do so will soon seek more congenial companions. Some individuals, of course, are quite content to be submissive; for them a situation is congenial in which strong and persistent leadership is present. But in the main the leadership of congenial situations shifts in rather unpredictable fashion. More specifically, it shifts in accordance with the competitive strivings of the individuals who are involved in it. Such strivings are, however, limited first by the fact that the rewards for success are small and secondly because too much success, *i.e.*, dominance, will disrupt the situation. The function of a congenial situation thus places an automatic check upon the leadership of it.

The "Bull Session." The "bull sessions" common to any American campus furnish excellent illustrations of the congenial type of situation. Proximity and similarity of interests, together with lack of anything more pressing to do, may bring two or more students together to discuss the coming examination, next Saturday's football game, last night's dance, or whatever it is that they are mutually interested in. Such groupings are a modern version of the gatherings of the young people of a generation or more ago after church, when they talked over the things that then in-

¹ The way in which the needs of the British working man are satisfied by the public house is described in *The pub and the people* (Mass-observation, 1943).

The difficulty that modern urban people often have in trying to converse pleasantly with one another is suggested by "A study of urban conversation" (J. Watson *et al.*, 1948).

terested young people, while their mothers dwelt upon domestic affairs and their fathers discussed business, crops, or the state of the nation.

Modern Separation of Work and Play. Under some conditions congenial situations have served a function in addition to that of satisfying recreational needs. The old-time husking bee and the various forms of mutual aid which were given at harvest time resulted in congenial situations from which there arose, by virtue of the effects of rivalry and of the division of labor, a very practical gain in work efficiency. Many communal work situations belong in this category and combine in a most effective way the allegedly irreconcilable business and pleasure aspects of life. Under an older production system, even mowing a field or buying a pound of meat from the corner store was likely to have its sociable aspects.

One of the great disadvantages of modern productive techniques is that they force many workers to do their work in psychological isolation and thereby make for a clear distinction between work and play. The old-time craftsman played and conversed as he worked, but the modern man at the machine has little time to engage in friendly intercourse with the man working next to him.² The imperative need for leisure time and leisure-time activities in the modern world is a direct consequence of the fact that modern industrial methods take much of the fun out of work. The commercialization of recreation which has come about in recent years can be traced to this fact and to the disappearance of the other congenial situations which formed so much and such a satisfying part of the life of the individual in the older order.

FUGITIVE PATTERNS

Rumor. It is in the congenial more than in any other type of situation that there occur those processes which make for the rise of rumors and for the preservation of legends. A rumor is simply a story attached to some actual rather than fictitious person or to some actual rather than

² Efficiency engineers are finally seeing the dangers associated with the psychological isolation that too often surrounds the modern workman. It has gradually become apparent that improvements in the physical surroundings of the worker do not necessarily result in increases in his output and that the quality of the relationships which exist between workman and employers is of paramount importance. Employees who are encouraged to report grievances, who feel that their efforts are appreciated, and who think that the plant officials are genuinely anxious to improve working conditions (even though the company's actions actually make the conditions physically poorer) are the best workers. For a systematic analysis of the worker in modern industry, see *Industrial relations and the social order* (W. E. Moore, 1946). The effects of recent discoveries in this field upon the philosophy of one industrial leader are presented in *Or forfeit freedom* (R. W. Johnson, 1947).

imaginary event (note 65). Rumors appear and spread as the consequence of the initiative of so many individuals that they are for all practical purposes unpredictable. They are, furthermore, transitory and of momentary rather than long-run significance. We may therefore designate the rumor—as distinct from the many situations in which it develops and spreads—as a fugitive pattern.

Sociopsychologically, there is nothing in the processes involved in their rise and spread that justifies distinguishing true³ from invalid rumors. Although the term “rumor” is often used as a synonym for “scandal,” the latter is really but one aspect of rumor. Rumors can enhance as well as degrade the reputation of the central character of the story. The scandalous are perhaps more characteristic, but complimentary rumors are by no means rare. In terms of the effect upon the persons concerned in the story, it may matter greatly whether a rumor is true or untrue, complimentary or scandalous. But the process by which it spreads from person to person is the same whether the rumor is fact or fiction, laudatory or disparaging.

Drama and Authenticity in Rumor. In spreading, the rumor tends to undergo certain characteristic changes,⁴ so that even those stories which originate in actual incidents become distorted. Like every good story, the rumor must acquire dramatic appeal; or it will soon pass out of circulation (N. G. Hanawalt and K. F. Ruttiger, 1944). As was indicated in another connection, the typical dramatic form, consisting of conflict between hero and villain, suspense regarding outcome, and the resolution of this conflict, seems to have universal human appeal. We cast most of our life experiences into this form, and we view the experiences of others in terms of this plot formula. Thus, whether it be an incident in which a man slips on a banana peel or one in which a baby chick pecks its way through its shell, a story becomes humanly interesting only as it is made dramatic. The chief difference between the raconteur and the club bore is not in the stories they tell but in the way in which they tell them. A good storyteller can dramatize the most trivial events, real or fictitious. Significant, therefore, is the fact that the rumor soon takes on attributes of the dramatic form.

In addition to dramatic form, the rumor-story comes to have an air of authenticity. However unreliable the original source, a rumor soon acquires an “authentic” origin, which in some measure compensates for

³ A rumor may tell a true story. But to be termed a rumor the story must be without official verification (R. H. Knapp, 1944).

⁴ In the most complete study so far made of rumor Allport and Postman find as essential principles “tendencies to level, to sharpen, and to assimilate to personal and cultural contexts” (G. W. Allport and L. Postman, 1947).

any lack of factual evidence. Thus the story that may have started as "I overheard someone say . . ." will in passage become attributed to some impeccable person who is believed to be in a position to know whatever there is to know about the persons involved in the rumor.

The crystallization of the dramatic elements, including the addition of supplementary detail, and the acquisition of source authority are characteristic of all rumors. These elements constitute what might be called a "mass invention" to which each of those who hear the story and then retell it in slightly different form make a small contribution. The factual basis for a rumor may be no more than a suspicious action on the part of an unidentified person or a sound that might have been made by the explosion of a boiler; but should a story develop, it will soon be a neat little melodrama, tragedy, or comedy, with all the trappings of authenticity.

Conversational Rivalry and the Spread of Rumor. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the rumor is the rapidity with which it may spread. Upon leaving Washington, a man may hear a rumor concerning an event said to have occurred there that day and upon arriving in San Francisco find that, although it has not supposedly appeared in the press, the story is common knowledge. Such phenomena have led some students to impute quasi-supernatural attributes to the rumor process.

But the fact is that rumors spread in a perfectly comprehensible, if unpredictable, way and gain their characteristic attributes through the mechanism of their spreading. This mechanism is in part the competition for conversational leadership among the members of congenial situations. In congenial situations, as has been said, conversation is the principal activity; and rivalry stimulates each individual to do his best, which means doing such things as introducing a topic which is of general interest to the members of the group, telling a better story than the one just told, or adding details to that story. Under such competitive bidding for conversational leadership, a rumor-story is likely to be "stepped up" in the retelling. The stepped-up story then becomes a part of the conversational stock in trade of the situational members, any one of whom may later use it in his bid for conversational leadership. When he tells the story, he, like the one from whom he heard it, is likely to sharpen it, adding some details of his own and, if the tale is doubted, using as a source the name of someone with local prestige. In retelling it, no two people will, however, step up the story in quite the same way; thus a rumor may turn up in many forms and with great variation in detail and authority. In time those elements which have survived in crossings of the various versions may be synthesized, and the rumor may become highly stereotyped.

Conditions Making for Rumors. In an intimate, settled community people know one another so well that a story concerning one of them will not be accepted and will not therefore spread as a rumor unless it is at least possible in view of the personality concerned. When the life of such a community follows its normal pattern, rumors concerning events will be comparatively accurate and comparatively few. There will be much gossip and endless discussion of persons and things, but the intimate character of the relations between the members of the community will preclude much rumor building.

On the other hand, the less people actually know and, hence, the more insecure they feel (F. K. Kelly and M. Rossman, 1944), the more they will depend on story inventions to satisfy their desires to know.⁵ A story of conduct, scandalous or otherwise, is therefore far more likely to be accepted at its face value when it is attached to the name of a comparative stranger in the community than when it is imputed to a man known to love his wife and to spend every night at home. Thus it is generally the person about whom little is known who is the one to become the hero of many rumors. The rumors serve to fill in the gaps of public knowledge. The little-known man must, of course, be interesting; and he must be a person known at least by name or by reputation to the members of a congenial situation. Otherwise a story about him will be of slight value in the bid for leadership and, if told, will soon be forgotten.

A university or college campus provides an excellent laboratory for the study of rumor. In the larger institutions particularly, students know rather little about the private lives of faculty members. For information they must depend in the main on unverifiable rumors. Since a story about some faculty man who is unknown by name to the students will have little conversational appeal among them, it is with faculty "personages" that most rumors are concerned. A rumor originating on the basis of an incident involving an uninteresting man may become attached to such a personage. The latter is likely, therefore, to become a local stereotype, reputed to lead more lives than ten ordinary men. The sort of story that will be imputed to him will depend on general student opinion of his character. If they like him, they will believe only the best of him, that best being, of course, their own interpretation of what is de-

⁵ The remarkable extent to which people devise and rely upon rumor during times of crisis and particularly when they have come to doubt the reliability of their normal sources of information is illustrated by the spate of rumors which circulated through European populations in the months just preceding the outbreak of World War II. For a detailed report on these rumors, see *Myths of war* (M. Bonaparte, 1947).

For a description of the type of rumor heard among the crew of a ship, see "The scuttlebutt afloat" (A. J. Roos, 1943). See also "The psychological analysis of war-time rumor patterns in Canada" (J. A. Irving, 1943).

sirable in a faculty hero. Should they dislike him, his name will become associated with a multitude of disparaging stories.

The rumor process is not, therefore, unrestricted. To succeed in gaining attention, the rumor-story must be believable and in addition must be in accord with the general opinion concerning the central figure.⁶ It is no doubt true that rumor is one of the most potentially tragic forces in social life. It can help to make a hero out of a cheap charlatan or can bring ruin to the honest and sincere.⁷ Yet it is fairly safe to judge from the character of the rumors told about a person, not what he is, but what his standing in the community is. We may all enjoy the scandalous story, but we will not believe scandal of those we hold in esteem.

Rumor as a Substitute for Knowledge. As has been suggested, rumor is a substitute for knowledge and thrives in ignorance. Thus, in times of social crisis, when no one really knows what has happened, is happening, and is about to happen, the human desire to know makes any story concerning aspects of that crisis good conversation. At such times rumors generate, spread, and dissipate with astounding rapidity.

It has been said that an army lives on its stomach. It is equally true that an army lives on rumor. Under crisis conditions and with little actual knowledge of what is happening, soldiers on campaign figuratively live on rumor. During wartimes the conversation of soldiers is necessarily restricted to matters of current life. Their congenial groups are more a consequence of proximity than of actual commonness of interest and similarity of background. Mechanic, farmer, laborer; men from east, west, north, and south; educated and uneducated men—they will have in common the fact that they do not know where they will be the next day, what they will eat, or any of the things that under normal conditions can be taken for granted. Consequently, the man who knows a man who has heard the captain say . . . can always get a hearing. In fact, one of the principal recreational activities of the more ingenious soldier is to start a rumor and hear it grow and grow, until at last it loses all recognizable form. Indeed, under these crisis conditions, many a

⁶ A rumor which fits into the pattern of beliefs of the listener will be recalled longer than one which runs counter to belief (J. M. Levine and G. Murphy, 1943; W. Johnson and C. B. Wood, 1944).

⁷ The setting off of rumors for the purpose of discrediting political opponents has frequently been resorted to, particularly in presidential campaigns (J. T. Adams, 1932). It is doubtful, however, whether this mode of propaganda has any significant effect upon the outcome of an election. In the first place, the rumor process is entirely uncontrollable. A story intended to discredit an opponent often rebounds to his credit. In the second place, the type of rumor that concerns the personal life of a candidate and gets general circulation reflects his status among his constituents far more than it affects that status.

man may be duped by his own rumor, so dramatic, detailed, and authenticated can it become in passage.

Civilians,⁸ too, become dependent during wartimes on rumor for their "knowledge" of the momentous events that are happening all around them. Even when the communication system does not break down, they soon become skeptical of the official news and eagerly listen to and pass on the latest rumor. This fact was cunningly made use of in World War II first by the Germans and later by the Allies in the so-called "war of nerves," during which every effort was made to undermine enemy morale.

Legend. A legend is a rumor that has become an established part of the verbal heritage of a social group.⁹ As a story it may explain the existence of a vacant house, the reason for a specific social practice, or anything that has long-time interest. Legends have leadership value in the presence of strangers to the community and of children to whom they have not yet been told. Obviously, few of the rumors in circulation at any time will have sufficient survival value to become legends. Ordinarily a story soon becomes tiresome, or events make it archaic.

The constant turnover in the student population of a university or college, however, forces the individual to depend to a considerable degree on local legends for his knowledge of even recent events. This fact speeds up the legend-making process. As each freshman class comes in, a few of the rumors of last year gain new value. The freshmen will listen to a story that is new to them but old to the rest of the students. Thus, because of the shifting population of a university, legends quickly develop around the personalities of the more outstanding students and members of the faculty. Once established, a legend—even a complimentary one—may persist, regardless of public denial by the person with whom it is associated.

Other Fugitive Patterns. The competitive bid for leadership in congenial situations, particularly in those of the modern world, may take other than conversational forms. To the individual who is striving

⁸ During World War II there were numerous attempts to learn which of the many current rumors were largely believed (F. H. Allport and M. Lepkin, 1945). Through the establishment of radio and newspaper rumor clinics, efforts were directed toward combatting the more vicious of the rumors. It is perhaps too soon to evaluate these efforts. However, the verdict of many who examined the clinics is to the effect that the rumor clinic, particularly when it makes use of the radio, spreads more rumors than it kills.

⁹ The terms "myth" and "legend" are often used synonymously. But the true legend deals with mundane affairs, whereas the term "myth" should be reserved for stories or moralistic tales of the supernatural (R. Benedict, "Myth," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 178-181). See also "Myth, culture and personality" (A. I. Hallowell, 1947).

for leadership, there is frequently a significant advantage in being distinctive. This distinctiveness may consist of following the very latest fad or fashion. It may involve use of a new slang word or catch phrase, knowledge of and interest in the latest game, ability to do the latest parlor trick—whether that be standing on one's head or talking glibly about the current best seller—or wearing clothes divergent in some way from those characteristic of the group. Although fads frequently involve action of a nonverbal sort, they spread in much the same way that rumors do—through the competition for leadership which occurs in congenial situations. Other rapid and more vital shifts from the conventional in human behavior, such as the boom or the craze, also are diffused mainly through congenial situations. We shall, therefore, have occasion to refer to the congenial type of situation when we consider such widespread deviations in behavior as those involved in fads, fashions, booms, crazes, etc. A fashion may originate in Hollywood; but if Mrs. Jones in Middletown takes it up, she does so because it will give her prestige among her friends and acquaintances. If they in turn follow her lead, their reason for doing so is to bring them up to the level of Mrs. Jones and, perhaps more important, to give them prestige among those who have not yet adopted the new fashion.

ARRANGED CONGENIAL SITUATIONS

Recreational Clubs. Americans have been called a nation of joiners, and the number of clubs and associations in most American communities gives factual support to this taunt. Such joining is actually an effort to secure satisfactions that were once to be had from membership in informal congenial groupings. The so-often-remarked fact that modern people have varied personalities makes it difficult for people of common interests, tastes, etc., to find one another without deliberate effort. No longer can a man expect to have much in common with his next-door neighbor, or a woman to find much satisfaction in talking with the women who live nearby. As a consequence, those individuals who most keenly feel the lack of congenial companions establish or join clubs of one sort or another. In a sense, we have by necessity come to cultivate that which once arose spontaneously. The character of the congenial situations that result from such efforts is suggested by the term "arranged."

The inadequacy of efforts to cultivate congeniality is attested by the high fatality rate of recreational clubs and associations. In most American communities, there are always a number of informal clubs in the process of organization, and a number of others in the process of disintegration because the members were not actually congenial or, if congenial, simply were unable to find a time and place convenient to assem-

ble. Most clubs are therefore rather short-lived. In a highly dynamic society it could hardly be otherwise.

Some organizations, of course, have become so well established that the prestige value of belonging may offset the fact that the members are not particularly congenial. We have then what might be termed a "prestige club." In this case the satisfaction derived from belonging comes not so much from companionship with club members as from the prestige that membership in the club gives in the eyes of more congenial companions.

Games. In many arranged congenial situations some device or other is utilized to offset the fact that the members are not completely congenial. The device operates to ensure each member an opportunity to enjoy some form of leadership. The maintenance of a large and wholly irrational number of officers, committee members, and other officials by a club organization is one such device. Games are another. In the game interaction, athletic or otherwise, leadership shifts either in rotation or in accordance with competitive merit as determined by a set of arbitrary rules. Either procedure tends to prevent any one member from dominating indefinitely and therefore ensures each member opportunity to assume leadership.

Those situations in which games of a more passive order appear are the most closely related to the truly congenial. A game of bridge is often little more than a substitute for conversation. People commonly fall back upon such games when conversation drags. In view of the great diversity among modern people, it is not remarkable that the members of many arranged congenial situations should find difficulty in keeping up a stimulating and interesting conversation. Their interests, fields of knowledge, and points of view are often so diverse that they must resort to some mechanized procedure for shifting leadership from member to member; or they will find themselves listening to a lecture on a topic interesting only to the speaker. When they have no more in common than the fact that they can play bridge or some other game, they may resort to this pastime as an acceptable substitute for monologic conversation. Such games are stimulating in that they are competitive, in that they bring into play elements of skill, and in that they subordinate the other and possibly diverse personality traits of the members. In addition, they effectively limit the competition for leadership, which shifts in accordance with a fairly definite procedure—one which does not, however, eliminate the appearance of rivalry.

In contrast are such active games as baseball, basketball, etc. These games do not limit competitive leadership to an effective degree, but, rather, secure congeniality by specifying the role of each member, a role

for which he must be prepared by training. Unless the members of a team are almost equally competent, one member may secure and retain leadership, thus subordinating and discouraging the others. When this happens, we have what is disapprovingly known as a "grandstander," a player who subordinates the welfare of the team to his own interests. Only when there is rotation of leadership can there be for long effective teamwork among the members of a game situation. The strife for leadership among teammates must be subordinated to the welfare of the team itself.

A game of this order actually involves two interlocking situational interactions, the interaction of the members of each team and the interaction of the teams; and competition for leadership takes two somewhat distinct forms. Each member of a team endeavors to outdo his teammates without stepping from his assigned role and thereby destroying the pattern of cooperative action; and the team as a whole competes with the other team. In addition to the satisfaction derived from acting as leader of his own team (whoever has the ball is for the moment leader) each individual derives satisfactions from rivalry with the other team and from the possibility of being a member of the winning team.

CONFERENCE AND COMMITTEE SITUATIONS

Formal Objectives of the Conference. In apparent contrast to the situational subtypes so far discussed in this chapter are the conference situation and the committee situation, the latter being a variant of the former and usually a consequence thereof (note 66). The members of situations of this sort have come together for the professed purpose of solving a specific adjustment problem or of putting a plan into action. They have in some manner been selected in terms of their fitness for the task and are supposed to achieve a synthesized leadership in which no one member has a predominant part.

The conference technique is relied on to a considerable degree in government, business, and scientific affairs. The department heads of a corporation confer concerning a matter of general policy; scientists gather for a conference on their field of study; student representatives have a conference on a matter of general campus interest. Whatever the specific problem is and however the membership is selected, there is a presumed gain in efficiency from the synthesizing of the inventive abilities of a number of individuals by the conference method.

There can be no doubt that at times two heads are better than one. It is also highly probable that the sum of the knowledge of ten men is greater than the knowledge of any one of them. But it does not follow, as certain conference-technique enthusiasts believe, that a policy of action

that will be reached by ten men is certain to be more expedient than that designed by one. Still valid to a degree is the old adage that "too many cooks spoil the broth." In many problems that demand initiative, ingenuity, and unity of purpose for their effective solution, some one person will be best fitted to provide leadership. A conference of those who include that one person might conceivably serve the function of giving him an opportunity to display his powers.

The conference technique is probably most effective when the problem to be solved is not how to do something in particular but how, in view of a conflict of irresolvable interests, to do anything at all. Through a conference, for example, there may finally be found the one course of action which does not run counter to the interests of any of the diverse groups which are represented. Such a "finding" is a compromise, not an invention of a new and more efficient way to do something. When the clash of interests that are represented in a conference of this sort is all-embracing, as is usually the case with international conferences, the "finding" often turns out to be an agreement on some trivial and irrelevant matter and a complete evasion of the real issue.

Recreational Functions of the Conference. Whatever its potentialities, the conference in actual operation is often nothing but an arranged congenial situation that is well disguised.¹⁰ Even the conference of scientists may be more recreational than scientific. Like most persons, the scientist likes to talk; but the specialized nature of his knowledge and interests makes it difficult for him to find congenial friends with whom he can talk shop. Periodic conferences give scientists in a specific field an excuse to get together. The recreational function of most business conferences is even more evident. Because conference members talk much and accomplish little, it has been ironically said that conferences and committees keep minutes and waste hours.

Politic Function. When there is a real problem to be solved, the leader—business, political, or otherwise—may use the conference as a means of making his subordinates believe themselves responsible for the solution at which he has already arrived. To this end, he may outline the problem which is before the conference or committee and then sit back to listen to the random suggestions offered, until some member makes one which fits or can be twisted to fit his own plan. He then asks all the members to consider Mr. So-and-so's suggestion. In the discussion

¹⁰ From the sociopsychological point of view the convention is but a sort of three-ring-circus conference, whether it be a political convention in which a party platform and candidates are decided upon, a business convention upon which the good of the industry depends, or a Legion or Shriners convention at which little pretense is made of deciding anything.

which follows, someone else may make a contribution to that suggestion. By the process of selecting those acceptable elements which arise through the give and take among the members, he may be able to formulate a solution to the problem in a way which makes each member feel in some measure responsible for that solution. As a consequence, the members of the group will individually and collectively take a "fatherly" interest in seeing that the solution is put into effective action. Although this procedure requires a good deal of time and patience on the part of the leader, it may secure from subordinates much more willing cooperation than the short-cut method of simply issuing orders in a military, *i.e.*, regimental, manner.

Conversional and Morale Functions. In other ways, too, the conference may be used as a device for maintaining the forms, if not always the realities, of democratic procedures. Through the conference the leader may succeed in selling to his subordinates the desirability or necessity of doing so and so. The personal give and take of the conference permits much more effective conversion of members than does the more impersonal relationship of speaker and members in an audience. In the conference, members may in some measure "talk themselves" into the acceptance of a proposal toward which they were initially antagonistic.

More often, perhaps, the conference is used with the specific hope of developing or maintaining morale among a group of workers or administrators. Executives of the larger business organizations often hold conferences for the purpose of giving their subordinates an opportunity to become acquainted with one another and to develop a sense of unity of purpose. The conference is in addition an effective safety valve, since it permits disgruntled subordinates to air their grievances and in so doing to indicate to the executive how far and in what direction he can assert himself without losing the good will of those upon whom he is dependent; *i.e.*, the conference is used as a device for maintaining group morale.

EXCHANGE SITUATIONS

In the more commonplace congenial situations the members have come together because of similar interests and similar needs. Although the interests may be anything from babies to political platforms, these situations function mainly to satisfy a need for recreational activities. This need is satisfied, as we have seen, principally through the relatively rapid shifting of leadership from member to member.

In contrast to congenial situations are those interpersonal situations which arise out of similarity of interests but divergency of needs. The merchant and his customer are interested in a common commodity; but

the one wants to sell, the other to buy. Their interaction is directed toward the making of an exchange, in which a thing of one order, money, is given for one of another, the commodity. Although we commonly speak of conversation as an exchange, it is more accurately styled an interchange; the things exchanged—words, ideas, attention—are of a similar order. The distinction between those interpersonal situations in which the needs are similar and in which an interchange takes place and those in which the needs of the members differ and in which an exchange occurs can best be seen when viewed in terms of leadership processes.

The Sales Situation. As we have seen, the function of congenial situations places a mechanical check upon the tendency of one person to dominate the others; no one person can be leader for long. In situations that grow out of similar interests but divergent needs, on the other hand, it is often entirely normal for the members to accept passively the leadership of one person. This is most apparent in the typical buyer-seller relationship in American contemporary society. We today do not consider it quite proper for the customer to haggle with a merchant. The former must take the role of subordinate and listen patiently to the most asinine of sales arguments,¹¹ even when the salesman has sought him out. It is conventionally permissible to say "No," but to express doubt concerning the quality of the goods or to attempt to beat down the price at which a commodity is offered is generally considered bad manners. Only the uncouth or the eccentric will struggle against the leadership of the seller, who, in his bid for dominance over the buyer, is restrained less by convention than by law. This characteristic of the buyer-seller relationship is a reflection of the nature of our present economic system.

Barter. Seller domination has not existed at all times and in all places. In precapitalistic societies exchange of goods and services was effected through the medium of barter. The barter situation is one in which a buyer and seller compete on fairly equal terms for leadership; and, since their skills are comparable, they come at length to something of a compromise. Under such conditions the phrase "Let the buyer beware!" signified that he should look out for his own interests. A housewife and a merchant who haggled over the price of a piece of meat were struggling for leadership each over the other.

Under present circumstances, however, the typical buyer-seller situation is one in which conventional factors give leadership preference to the seller and reduce the buyer to passive resistance. To typify that situation, we might say that it is one in which the operating principle is "Let the

¹¹ For books on the psychology of salesmanship, see *Psychology of advertising* (H. E. Burt, 1938); *Psychological aspects of business* (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1938); and *Principles of applied psychology* (A. T. Poffenberger, 1942).

buyer get caught." We have only to observe that, although many books have been written and courses offered on the art of salesmanship, the art of sales resistance¹² has received relatively little attention and the art of getting the best of the seller—"buyermanship," it might be called—has received none at all. Consumer education has been at a minimum; seller education has received considerable and energetic attention.

Varieties of Sales Situations. Contemporary buyer-seller situations may be roughly classified as those in which seller leadership is impersonal (advertising) and those in which it is personal. The situation is of the former order when the buyer goes to a store or shop prepared by advertising to purchase a specific article. In this instance the role of the seller may be no more than that of providing service—that of a clerk.¹³ According to present standards, however, a good store clerk is one who can sell the customer either more than he has come to purchase or possibly a substitute for the article he seeks. When the buyer has been inadequately prepared by advertising, as is the case when he comes to the seller wanting a suit but having no specific suit in mind, the role of the clerk or salesman as a leader is of course self-evident. In the next chapter we shall see how advertising is an attempt so to dominate the buyer that he becomes resistant to the persuasions of the clerk who would sell other than the advertised article.

The seller who seeks out a buyer is in a less favorable position than is the store clerk. The peddler, whether he be a seller of books, insurance, or household gadgets, must secure and maintain active domination to be successful. Since the situation originates in his own interests rather than in mutuality of interests, he must convince his prospect that what he offers is desirable. In attempting to do this he may lack the support of convention or of advertising. He must therefore first create the need for his sales leadership and then proceed to provide that leadership. His position is consequently a difficult one; for success ordinarily depends on

¹² In a business-controlled society it is inevitable that any effort to enlighten consumers will be strongly resisted. But, in recent years, there has developed a considerable literature directed toward consumer education. In the main it takes the form of an endeavor to build up consumer sales resistance, not in the effort to get the best of the seller, but simply to protect the buyer's economic and physical welfare. Following the publication of *Your money's worth* (S. Chase and F. J. Schlink, 1927), there were organized two agencies for the collection and dissemination of information on "best buys." One of these, *Consumers' Research*, now appears to be well established. The rise of the consumer movement was also expressed in a number of books on consumer problems, of which *Good health and bad medicine* (H. Aaron, 1940) is representative.

¹³ The distinction between the role of the salesman and that of the store clerk is elaborated in "Salesmanship" (L. Galloway, *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 519-521).

skillful appeal to interests of the customer—such as that of seeing worthy young men go through college—which are extraneous to the thing he would sell. The ultimate in sales leadership is, of course, to sell something intrinsically worthless to a person who would have no use for the article if it had the virtues claimed for it and to obtain in return a sum far greater than the purchaser could afford to pay if the article were useful and if he had a need for it.

AUDIENCE SITUATIONS

The term "audience" is commonly applied to a great variety of situations.¹⁴ We shall restrict its use to those situations in which the person of the leader is designated and is to a high degree unshifting. The audience situation is in some respects, therefore, not unlike the modern type of sales situation. In the audience, however, the article "sold" is ordinarily intangible; and the buyers far outnumber the sellers.

Some audience situations are highly institutionalized and would be so classified were it not for the fact that the character of the leadership is not rigidly controlled by custom. When a minister turns from institutional ritual, which is designated for him, to his sermon, in the construction of which he may within limits use his own initiative, the members of his congregation become members of an audience. He now becomes a true leader. The members of his audience are, however, so well prepared to accept his leadership that little effort is required to dominate them. Among other things, they have come to church prepared to hear a sermon and trained to accept the leadership of the minister in this situation. Under such conditions, maintaining leadership is comparatively simple. The leader need not be particularly ingenious, forceful, or fluent, and his dramatic techniques can be stereotyped; for his audience is, at least for a time, easily satisfied.

Theater Audiences. In some contrast to such relatively institutionalized audiences are those of the contemporary theater. Modern theatergoers are "sophisticated"—they have heard and seen almost everything—or so they are inclined to think. The Chinese may be content to see an ancient drama unfold in accordance with an age-old pattern; the backwoodsmen may be satisfied with an antiquated melodrama; but the members of a modern theater audience have come as buyers who must be sold satisfaction. Since they have paid for the privilege, they are highly critical. The leadership of a theater audience is, therefore, relatively difficult.

The play, revue, motion picture, or musical program must not offend

¹⁴ For an extensive but largely theoretical treatment of the audience, see *The psychology of the audience* (H. L. Hollingworth, 1935).

the sensibilities of any considerable number of the audience members. It must operate within the limits of a relatively conventional pattern, and yet it must be made to seem new and different. How much trial and error—and what a large proportion of error—is involved in the formation of theater-audience leadership is indicated by the uncertainties of the legitimate play and by the conservatism of the motion-picture industry. In the effort to achieve something new, playwrights, actors, and producers often produce unsuccessful plays. In the effort to avoid failures, motion-picture producers, actors, and script writers often deviate so little from the last box-office success that a new picture is quite obviously but an old one in new clothes.

Although there may be some fairly universal dramatic principles, it does not follow that there is a single and universal method of theater-audience leadership. The dramatic theme must be one which is appropriate to the specific audience, and the appropriate theme must be communicated through symbols to which the members of the particular audience can respond in the appropriate way. Thus, what will be enthusiastically received on Broadway may be a failure in Middletown.¹⁵ It is also true that a play which is successful with an audience at one time may be quite inappropriate, in terms of theme or symbols or both, for the same audience at another time. This is particularly true of the timely theme. Some plays, however, do seem to have a remarkable degree of universality; and of course all plays—modern, ancient Greek, or the stylized classical plays of the Chinese—are built upon common dramatic elements.

Some of the other aspects of theater-audience leadership need only brief mention. Fully as important as the play and its symbolization is the skill of the players. A good cast can satisfy an audience with a bad play, whereas a poor cast may ruin what might otherwise be a good play. Also important is the physical setting, perhaps more so in the theater than in any other audience situation. Finally, extraneous factors, such as the weather, the condition of local and national affairs, and the physical condition of the audience (coughing and sniffing may distract members of the audience), all play their parts in determining the effectiveness of audience leadership.

Audience satisfaction would seem to come from vicarious participa-

¹⁵ Producers of motion pictures have long known that their products cannot appeal equally well to all elements of the population. They have, therefore, issued some pictures with two types of endings—a good or unrealistic one for the Middle West and a bad or realistic one for the coasts. The sophisticated coast dwellers and the sea-board immigrants have been trained to accept less sugar-coated and more realistic action.

tion in the action of a story. This is ordinarily secured by what can best be described as audience identification with the person of hero or heroine. The primary task of theater-audience leadership is thus to provide for the members of the audience some person or persons with whom they can identify themselves not only for the moment but throughout the performance.

Lecture Audiences. The lecture-audience situation is a more strictly limited one than is that of the theater. It may be of the order of the church sermon already referred to, or it may be far less institutionalized. But it is normally one in which a number of people have come together for the purpose of listening to a designated person speak upon some announced subject. The members of a lecture audience tend, therefore, to be selected and thus prepared to submit to leadership of a specific type. There is, however, a vast difference between a lecture audience that is composed of individuals who have paid their money to hear a popular speaker on some such subject as "Mankind at the Crossroads," an audience that has assembled to hear what a political candidate has to say for himself, and an audience that comprises a class in the history of economics. In all three, the person of the leader is at the outset designated; and the leadership range is limited to the extent that the announced topic, the conditions of admission, etc., have led to a selection of the audience members. In all other regards, however, the three subtypes of the lecture audience, as illustrated above, are quite dissimilar.

The Popular-lecture Audience. The popular lecturer who speaks on some topic of general interest is supposed to offer something of cultural or educational value to the audience. This formal purpose of the meeting is, however, unlikely to tell the whole story; for the lecturer who wants a return engagement must do far more toward entertaining than informing his audience. His skill as a dramatist is of at least equal importance with his ability as an interpreter of social forces, a political analyst, or a philosopher.

The Conversion Audience. In some contrast to the popular-lecture audience is that which has assembled to hear a would-be political, economic, or social reformer expound the virtues of his special doctrines or his personal worth. The leader of such an audience must convert as well as entertain; and unless the audience has been packed with members who already accept his leadership, a stratagem that is frequently used for purposes of outside publicity, his leadership over the audience must be forcibly maintained.

The ultimate aim of the leader of situations of this sort is so to convert the audience members that they themselves become conversion leaders in subsequent situations. If the audience leader has "sold" them his

point of view, the members of that audience may later sell it in turn to their friends. This, the so-called "word-of-mouth advertising," is the goal of every conversion-audience leader and, as we shall see, of every propagandist. If his audience is willing to believe, the political aspirant need, of course, only avoid saying or doing anything that will antagonize it. A few jokes, a few harmless platitudes, some not-too-obvious compliments, and an air of warm friendship (or in some instances of impeccable dignity and authoritativeness) will then be adequate. But if he or what he stands for is unpopular, he must resort to demagogic tricks to be effective; argument will be of little avail. If he is a candidate up for reelection, he must present his audience with a cosmic drama in which he is the heroine, representing all that the audience considers desirable, and his opponent is the villain, representing all that the audience fears or considers repugnant, and in which the audience itself is the noble hero whose actions will save the heroine from the villain and itself from disaster. If he is a candidate campaigning for election or for support for some new reformistic or other project, he must assume the role of savior, casting himself into the role of hero and his audience into that of heroine.¹⁶

The Educational Audience. Distinct from both the foregoing is that lecture-audience situation which is typical of the classroom. Here membership is to a considerable extent forced—attendance is necessary for the attainment of some distant goal. The person of the lecturer in this situation is not determined by the audience members, and in many cases he need not be entertaining or even interesting. Not perhaps without reason has it long been assumed that the acquisition of knowledge is at best a laborious process. With much less justification it has also been assumed that the average college or university student is sufficiently motivated to make the effort to acquire the knowledge to which he is exposed. Because these assumptions have long been basic to our educational program, there is a tendency to associate effective pedagogy with pedantism. As a consequence, classroom leadership is often little more than nominal. The bird chirping on the ledge outside the classroom window may have more effect upon the audience than does the lecturer.

The classroom lecturer generally secures his position on the basis of qualifications that have little to do with his ability to dominate student audiences. His status as a scholar or researcher is usually deemed more

¹⁶ Whatever its historic antecedents, the modern trial by jury has degenerated into a sort of competition between two conversion-audience leaders. The jury is the audience, and the law and the judge provide the restraints within which action takes place; but the outcome is often more likely to reflect the respective dramatizing abilities of the prosecuting and the defending attorneys than to reflect the weight of factual evidence.

important than his skill at expressing what he knows or believes in a convincing and stimulating manner. For those students who have a sincere interest in a subject, accuracy of viewpoint and of presentation is of primary importance; but with other students, establishment of interest is the first pedagogical problem.¹⁷ So far, however, convention has prevented any concerted facing of this fact; and many professional educators are inclined to think of teaching in terms of formal teaching methods rather than in terms of audience leadership. The familiar pedagogical excuse for ineffectiveness—that education is an appeal, not to the “emotions,” as are the propagandistic efforts of the forceful publicist, but to “reason”—runs hard afoul the fact that man is rarely a “rational” animal, whether he be a student in the classroom or a voter at a political rally.

Audience Size and the Hypothetical Listener. The members of an audience are individuals, and up to a point each member reacts to the audience leader according to his particular personality. To the extent that the personalities of the members of the audience vary, the responses that the leader secures will be varied. It is his object, therefore, so to conduct himself that he will amuse, please, convert, or inform as many as possible of his audience members.

In any audience situation the leader—actor or lecturer—addresses a hypothetical listener. This member of the audience is not the average member; *i.e.*, his personality is not the average of the personality attributes of all the audience members. The average responsiveness of an audience may remain constant as the number of members increases; for example, the addition of a person who is incapable of understanding the words to which the average member responds will be offset by the addition of another person who can understand more complex words than can the average. But what the leader endeavors to provide is an appeal that will be effective for all the members, not for a nonexistent average member. As audience members increase, the words, gestures,

¹⁷ The importance of the lecturer as a stimulator of student interest is demonstrable. Years ago it was reported that the best school grades tend to be received by those in the front center of each classroom (C. R. Griffith, 1921); and, if given a choice of seats, students prefer this particular classroom area (P. R. Farnsworth, 1933). Although not all the later studies agree as to what is the region of best grades (F. N. Jones and J. B. Cooper, 1938), sufficient evidence has been gathered to indicate that most classrooms have regions where consistently higher than average grades obtain (M. M. Magoon, 1932; and S. W. Calhoun, 1934). Teachers' observations (M. M. Magoon, 1932), students' reports, and data on abnormally arranged classrooms (P. R. Farnsworth, 1933) show that the optimum position in a classroom tends to be that area toward which the lecturer most often devotes his attentions. This focusing of attention on a speaker or segment of an audience has been termed “polarization.”

themes, ideas, etc., that will be effective with all, or nearly all of them, become fewer and simpler. Thus, the hypothetical listener toward whom the audience leader directs his efforts becomes, in effect, duller, more stupid, more prejudiced, and less reasonable as the audience increases in size.

With all other factors remaining constant, change in audience size may therefore completely change the problem of audience leadership. The leadership technique that is effective for an audience of ten will not often work when the audience is increased to one hundred; lecturing satisfactorily to an informal group of ten clubwomen is a quite different problem from lecturing effectively to one hundred of the same type of clubwoman. The lecture or speech that will hold the attention of a large audience may seem quite stupid to a small one; the play that is successful in the little theater may be a failure on Broadway merely because the audience is larger.

Every professional lecturer must speak in terms of a hypothetical listener, and almost the only things that he can be confident will have a positive appeal to the hypothetical listener in an audience of five hundred people are "mother love" and similar stereotypes. Thus, because his hypothetical listener becomes intellectually dwarfed as the audience increases in size, the politician who speaks intelligently and conservatively to a small group may become a blatant demagogue when he faces a large auditorium.

Interaction of Leader and Audience. If he is to be effective, the audience leader must adjust himself to the audience in the effort to get it to adjust to him. The fact that a play or lecture may be written and practiced before the audience situation arises does not remove the audience from the category of interactional situations. Some interaction always takes place between even the relatively passive audience and its leader. To be successful in actually acting out the play or in delivering the speech, the performer must adjust himself to the behavior of the particular audience.¹⁸ Popular lecturers commonly avoid in part the

¹⁸ The function of the motion-picture preview is, of course, to obtain advance information concerning the behavior of subsequent audiences. The action must be so timed that nothing of importance will occur during bursts of applause or laughter. Although stage actors can vary their behavior to fit each audience, motion-picture actors must time their behavior once for all.

There are several ways of measuring audience responses in objective fashion. The number and length of the laughter periods can be counted (J. Morrison, 1940). Ballots may be collected from the audience. Or some sort of "program analyzer" may be used. By the employment of the latter, those portions of a program that are preferred and those that are disliked may be recorded by the audience via push-button controls (J. N. Peterman, 1940; T. Hallonquist and E. A. Suchman, 1944).

difficulties of predicting audience reaction by having no set speech. They can then be more responsive to the behavior of the audience.

One of the most important requisites for effective audience leadership is ability to perceive audience "mood" or "temper." A skilled audience leader is remarkably responsive, not only to the character of the specific audience, but to the dynamic mood changes of that audience. In the theater, applause is a conventional method by which the audience communicates with the players. From the frequency, duration, and intensity of applause an actor may judge the reaction of his audience and so vary his performance. In the course of their travels, the troupers of a generation ago acquired an uncanny skill at reading the "mind" of an audience. Elements other than applause—such as coughing, whispering, rustling of programs, etc.—undoubtedly entered into this communication between audience and players. Since the actor can see little beyond the footlights, he is dependent on sound for his knowledge of audience reaction. The lecturer, however, can ordinarily see as well as hear the members of his audience. However subtle, the process of audience-leader-audience communication is undoubtedly a matter of leader response to the gestures and sounds made by members of the audience. Unquestionably, too, the actor or lecturer who follows a predetermined course and is not responsive to these communications is less likely to be effective than the one who is guided by the audience he leads.

Audience Interstimulation. Aside from shifts in body position and changes in facial expression, the typical audience is normally passive; most of the time the members react covertly rather than overtly. Under normal conditions, therefore, there is little interaction among the members of an audience; the interaction is mainly between the audience and the person on the platform or the actors on the stage. An unusually loud handclap, however, may shift attention from the stage to a member of the audience. For the moment, that member is leader of the situation. Should others take up his applause, the audience members will be interacting with one another; and a process of interactional amplification will occur. This process is the basis for the practice of planting paid handclappers in an audience to stimulate enthusiasm for a doubtful play and to start applause at the proper moments.¹⁹ The effectiveness of the process of interactional amplification will be apparent when we come to analyze behavior in abnormal situations.

Audience leaders frequently depend to a large extent on audience interstimulation for their leadership effects. It is in the attempt to make

¹⁹ Even the great Caruso almost invariably had hireling handclappers scattered throughout his audiences. They not only started the applause at the times Caruso thought most appropriate but aborted applause that broke out at inappropriate times.

an audience less critical and more receptive that speakers commonly start their speeches with a joke and follow this up with some reference to God and country or to the glorious future of the local community. If the members laugh at the first and applaud the second, the speaker has not only caught their interest but has prepared them to interact more readily with one another in the immediate future.

In the old-time melodrama, music-hall, and vaudeville days it was customary for the audience to take a considerably active part. The villain was hissed; the hero was warned of impending danger; the singer was often accompanied by the audience; and the professionally amateur comedian was bombarded with whatever the members of the audience had brought along for the occasion. Their actions contributed to the leadership on the stage and affected other audience members. Audience participation in leadership probably made up in considerable measure for the crudities or inadequacies of the play or skit.

To the extent that members of an audience stimulate one another, the situation moves away from that of the audience type. As long as the predetermined leader can guide audience action, the situation is essentially that of the audience type. Should the audience get out of control—*i.e.*, should some member or members secure leadership more tenacious than that of the actor or lecturer—it becomes a mob.

Density. It is a common observation on the part of audience leaders, both actors and lecturers, that a sparsely filled auditorium makes a "cold" house. All else being equal, a small theater in which every seat is filled ensures a much more responsive audience than does a large one in which the same number of people are scattered about. That the members of the former may be physically uncomfortable does not detract from the fact that they will be more responsive. Evangelists have learned the trick of condensing a sparse audience. If the tent or tabernacle is too large for the audience, the evangelist starts with the plea "Come down front where we can get acquainted, Brothers and Sisters!"

The denser an audience, the more responsive it is and therefore the more easily it is swung toward the mob. Although this fact has been variously explained, the reason for it would seem to be that audience action is a matter of interaction among audience members; the denser the audience, the more its members can interact with one another on the basis of short-range stimuli. At the outset, interaction of audience members involves the substitution of some audience member or members for the appointed audience leader. Some individual must start the applause, laughter, or whatever it is that sweeps the audience. He will be one who is more responsive than are the majority of his fellows to the stage

or platform leadership. His audible reaction stimulates others, whose responses in turn stimulate still others.

The fact that a man in a sparse audience can be singled out and made conspicuous is an inhibiting factor to his making an overt response to the lecturer or actor. He is therefore less likely to rise to leadership than he would be were he closely surrounded by other people. And even though he should forget himself and applaud loudly, others, also easily made conspicuous in a sparse audience are not so likely to follow his lead as they otherwise would be. Moreover, many interactions of audience members are built up in the first instance on the basis of stimuli that can be effective only at short distances. The slight gasp, the chuckle, or the nod of approval that might stimulate a person in the next seat and thence another, and so on through the audience, cannot be effective if no one is sitting in that seat.

CHAPTER XXIV

PUBLICS

Throughout most of human history men have been limited to the primary means of communication—gesture and speech—and have been able therefore to live together only in small, intimate social groups and to interact only in direct, person-to-person situations. With very few exceptions, the interactional situations of premodern peoples have as a consequence been of the types and subtypes that have been discussed in the preceding two chapters. Even today the majority of the peoples of the world—the preliterate primitives and the illiterate masses of China, India, Latin America, etc.—rely entirely on primary means of communication; and a significant proportion of the remainder are dependent mainly on participation in person-to-person situations.

The types of situations that we have so far considered are therefore quantitatively the most significant. But historical developments in the techniques of communication, the most important of which have occurred within the last few hundred years in Western society, have made possible the evolution of secondary forms of group life and of new kinds of situational interactions that have a sociopsychological and sociological significance all out of proportion to the frequency of their occurrence and the numbers of persons involved in them. These are the situations that arise out of the use of such distant-contact means of communication as the written word, the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, and the motion picture. The role of such communications in providing symbolic models and thereby contributing to the personality development of the individual has already been discussed at length. We turn now to a consideration of the ways in which two or more persons may interact on the basis of these distant-contact communications.

The Nature of Publics. The term “public” is commonly used to distinguish the membership of a distant-contact situation from that of a direct-contact situation. Thus the radio comedian is said to have his public, whereas the stage comedian is said to address an audience. This terminological distinction reflects the fact that there are a number of significant differences between distant-contact and direct-contact situations.

In the first place, the membership of a public is ordinarily very much

larger than is that of any of the direct-contact situations. The latter are usually composed of a few people; and even the very largest—such as spectacles, prize fights, baseball games, and football games—seldom involve more than a hundred thousand. The smaller publics, on the other hand, include thousands of people; and the larger ones involve millions. This difference in relative size means that the leaders of publics are much more restricted than are those of direct-contact situations, in the same way as, but to a greater degree than, the leader of a large audience is more restricted than is the leader of a small one.

Moreover, the exact size and character of a public can never be determined exactly. It is possible to count the members of a congenial group, the members of an audience, etc. But radio advertisers, newspaper editors, politicians, and other leaders of publics can only estimate the numbers and kinds of people who are responding to their leadership.¹

Furthermore, the reactions of the members of a public to the leader of it are also indeterminate. When we tell a joke to a group of friends, their responses are immediate and evident; and we can be guided by them. The response of a radio comedian's public to his jokes may be immediate, but they are not evident to him; and the response of an author's public is neither immediate nor evident.² As a result, radio

¹ It is known that in 1947 approximately 37 million American families possessed radios. But at what times they use their sets, what stations they dial, and how many in each family listen in cannot be ascertained with any degree of accuracy.

In studying the panic effects that followed the broadcasting of Orson Welles's *The invasion from Mars*, several polling services who were asked to cooperate with the Office of Radio Research disagreed violently, their estimates of the number of listeners to this broadcast ranging from 4 to 12 million. A compromise figure of 6 million was finally agreed upon as "conservative" (H. Cantril, H. Gaudet, and H. Herzog, 1940).

For a discussion of the current methods of measuring the radio public, see *How radio measures its audience* (F. N. Stanton, 1940); *How radio measures its audience: four discussions by research authorities* (C. B. S., 1941); *Radio research, 1942-43* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton, 1944); "Measuring the radio audience by the personal interview roster method" (S. Roslow, 1943); Chaps. 10-14 in *How to conduct consumer and opinion research* (A. B. Blankenship, ed., 1946); *Radio audience measurement* (M. N. Chappell and C. E. Hooper, 1944); and *The people look at radio* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and H. Field, 1946).

² The radio comedian can judge the success of today's jokes only by tomorrow's fan mail and next week's Hooper rating of his program; the author can judge the effect of what he writes today only by his royalty statement six months or a year hence; and the politician often has to wait until he is up for reelection before he can gauge the total effect of the many things he has done and said during his term in office upon the varied people who form his constituency. Because of the time lag and of the multiplicity of factors other than the leader's behavior that may enter into the determining of the behavior of publics, the leader of a public may easily wander far afield. For a description and discussion of public-opinion polls as an attempt to circumvent this difficulty, see Appendix note 67.

comedian and author, like all leaders of publics, must proceed from point to point on the basis of past experience in the hope that their efforts are achieving the desired results. Because the membership of a public is large but of indeterminate size and character and its responses to leadership are indeterminate and may be delayed, the leadership of publics is always more difficult and is usually more ineffective than is that of direct-contact situations.

Finally, little if any interaction occurs among the members of a public. Each member reacts to the leadership, and he may be affected by his awareness that he is a member of a public which supposedly has a common purpose. But his reaction is not affected by and does not affect the behavior of the other members. Laughter and applause cannot, therefore, "sweep" the public. The members of a public may subsequently interact with one another on the basis of public leadership; but they will then do so as members of various direct-contact situations—as is the case, for example, when people discuss a radio program or a newspaper editorial. The leadership of a public is not, therefore, facilitated—as it usually is in congenial and audience situations—by member interstimulation.^a

Multiplicity of Publics. Political writers frequently describe entire populations as "publics," and some have gone so far as to attempt to describe the "public mind." It is perhaps permissible to designate all those who might become members of specific publics as "the general public"; and in some rare instances a considerable segment of the population becomes a public. But normally, the general public is broken up into many transitory specific publics. All the people who read a newspaper item, a magazine article, a book, an income-tax blank, or a new legal statute constitute for the writer thereof his public. All the members of such a public do not, however, react at the same time. People come into and go out of such a public throughout the life of the printed communication—a day or so for the newspaper item, a month or two for the income-tax blank, perhaps many years for the book and the statement of the new law. During the course of a single day, a given individual may enter and leave hundreds of different publics: as he reads the editorial page of his morning paper, a man is briefly responding to the leadership of the editor; but he promptly passes on to the sports page, the comic section, the world news, etc., sampling the leadership offerings of the many writers who have contributed to the making of the newspaper. And the newspaper is, of course, but one of the many mediums through

^a Broadcasters commonly attempt to elicit an illusion of group facilitation by having a small audience present at the broadcasting studio. The laughter that this group gives is also broadcasted.

which he joins publics. He listens to the radio from time to time; he reads books, magazines, etc.

At any given moment the members of our society will be organized into countless situations of which only a small proportion will be distant-contact in character. Of the latter, there will at that moment be countless specific, however temporary, publics. It has sometimes been estimated that as many as a third of the American people have simultaneously listened to a radio broadcast of great national importance. But such vast aggregations of people under a single leadership are rare and, of course, exceedingly temporary. In the main, even governmental leadership must operate through a vast number of varied specific situations.

The Functions of Publics. As we have said, the appearance of publics is historically related to the development of distant-contact means of communication. Every new invention in the field of communications—radio, for example—has either modified other forms of public interaction or has made possible the growth of new types of publics. Functionally, publics seem to serve as supplements to or substitutes for the types of interactional situations discussed in the two preceding chapters; they exhibit in modified character the attributes of these two types. Thus a radio public differs in degree rather than in kind from that direct-contact audience which is its prototype. We shall here examine these differences in degree mainly in terms of the differences in leadership.

INSTITUTIONALIZED PUBLICS

Contemporary governments, governmental bureaus, corporate businesses, national church organizations, scientific societies, and associations of many sorts operate mainly through one or a number of the new means of communication. In comparison with the social groupings of pre-modern societies, all such organizations have huge memberships; and most of the members are scattered through space and never meet in person-to-person situations. Membership involves in the main response to written or other distant-contact communications; and for the scattered representatives of the organization the responses themselves are usually written or other distant-contact communications, the whole of the organizational membership being held together and directed in this manner. Since all such organizations evidence tendencies toward institutionalization, as was shown in a preceding chapter, we may designate that part of the organizational membership that is reached by its leader or leaders via distant-contact means of communication as an institutionalized public. Institutionalized publics have historically been subject to a number of different kinds of leadership.

Traditional Leadership. In times past, when the only form of

distant-contact communication was the written word and when an exceedingly small proportion of people were literate and could be reached through writing, large-scale and distant-contact organizations were limited to government and religion; and the sphere of each was very much restricted. Local governors and local priests were characteristically more important in their roles as local residents than as representatives of a king or pope, whose leadership was, consequently, largely nominal in character. Under such conditions the relations of subject to king and of churchmember to pope were rather completely institutional and more ideological than real. But in so far as king or pope could exercise actual leadership, that leadership was traditional in character.

The process by which traditional leadership operated can perhaps be most clearly perceived when traditional leadership is regarded as distant and impersonal leadership over the personal leaders of certain person-to-person institutional situations. In the medieval church, the pope was the designated leader of his court; the court provided leadership of the priests; the priests in turn were the leaders of direct-contact situations of a religious order. For over one thousand years the emperors of China were the nominal leaders of their courts; the courts provided leadership for the governmental bureaus; the bureaus issued orders to governmental representatives in the various provinces; and these in turn directed the local magistrates in their direct relations with the emperor's subjects.

We frequently assume that, under the monarchical form of government and under the institutional religion of the Middle Ages, the king and pope decreed and their subjects obeyed. In the vast majority of instances nothing could be farther from the truth. The spheres of both government and religion were institutionally limited. The king and the pope were leaders only in the sense that the patriarch of the old family was a leader in the institutional situations of the family. This limited character of traditional leadership is revealed by the fact that historically expansion of both religious and governmental functions was slow and was secured only as other institutions disintegrated.

Regimental Leadership. Traditional leadership is apparently too much restricted and too unenterprising to provide a people with guidance during any severe crisis, such as war. In any event, we find a somewhat different form of leadership appearing in military and naval organizations, regardless of the character of the government of which these organizations are a part. In an army or navy, the personnel is more or less effectively trained to automatic obedience to the commands issued by superior officers, who are themselves trained to putting into effect programs of action dictated by their superiors. The entire organization is at least semi-institutional in that it operates on the basis of strong tradi-

tions and has something of its own sets of values, concepts of morality, etc. The virtue of this form of organization is that it permits one or a small number of individuals to work out a solution to a problem of collective adjustment and to put this solution into effect with considerable assurance that each individual in the organization will do his prescribed part. It places responsibility for individual initiative in designated and trained leaders and thus makes possible, in theory at least, effective adaptation to changing circumstances. Such leadership is regimental;⁴ it secures its response on the basis of discipline.

In the modern world regimental leadership has been extended beyond the scope of military and naval activities.⁵ School children are often regimented, through fire drill, in an attempt to prevent the panic behavior that would otherwise appear should they be caught in a fire in a school building. Workers are sometimes disciplined into unfailing obedience to the commands of their immediate superiors so that the whole business organization will be highly responsive to the leadership of the executive office. Competition among business organizations makes dynamic leadership necessary for survival, and the modern business leader is in a position not unlike that of the commanding officer of a military force. He must maneuver his organization in anticipation of the economic strategy of his competitors. Wherever the individual efforts of large numbers of people must be coordinated in the solution of a collective problem, regimental leadership is indicated.⁶

⁴ The leadership of the Roman Church has at times tended toward the regimental rather than the traditional. This was particularly true of certain of its orders, *e.g.*, the Jesuits.

⁵ The growth of regimental leadership in the modern world has, quite naturally, had its effect on the people led. For a discussion of the character structure that is likely to arise following a period of regimental leadership, see "The authoritarian character structure" (A. H. Maslow, 1943).

⁶ Lewin and his colleagues for some years studied the effects of different "social atmospheres"—of working under different sorts of leadership. In their experiments boys' clubs were directed by leaders who were either regimental, democratic, or anarchistic in their methods of supervision. It was found that boys of the well-regimented clubs were more "frustrated" than were those more democratically governed. Lewin's subjects were American children, reared in a democratic culture. If the experiments had been run on children accustomed to regimentation, the data might have been quite different. The acceptance of regimental leadership would presumably have been "second nature" to Nazi children, so that much less frustration would have arisen (K. Lewin and R. Lippitt, 1938; K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, 1939; and R. Lippitt, 1940).

It is obvious that the "social atmosphere" in most American industries is more regimental than democratic. For a study of the effects of putting more democracy into industry, see "Training in democratic leadership" (A. Bavelas and K. Lewin, 1942).

But every regimental system tends in time to become so ingrown and so rigid that the leaders as well as the "privates" come to lack initiative. They then attempt to solve new problems with old formulas. Military organizations are, with few exceptions, notoriously conservative. In World War I, for example, the French and British staffs relied upon military formations and stratagems that had developed around the bolt-action rifle and light artillery. Some two years, perhaps two million unnecessary casualties, and a revolution in the general staffs were necessary before an adaptation to the German machine-gun technique was made. That adaptation, trench or static warfare, became so much embedded in the culture of the French and British armies that they relied upon it, more than twenty years later, in defense against German tanks and dive bombers, with consequences that have already become history. This tendency for regimental leadership to become unenterprising has appeared in some business organizations, notably the railroads. The American railroads delayed nearly twenty years before making any significant adaptation (streamliners, fast freights, etc.) to the rise of truck, bus, and airplane competition.

Democratic Leadership. During periods of social change, when institutional forms of political and religious organization are breaking down, individuals rise to the status of leaders more as a consequence of their own efforts than as a result of inheritance or promotion. Social disorders, as we have frequently observed, provide an opportunity for the individual with ingenuity and a domineering personality to take leader status from the institutional personnel and to wield a leadership that is more than nominal. Thus it was the decline of the medieval church that made possible the rise to religious leadership of such "upstarts" as Luther and Calvin. It was the disintegration of monarchical governments that made possible the emergence of popular or democratic leaders during the last two centuries. Likewise, it has been the failure of certain democratic governments that has from time to time made possible the rise of dictatorial leaders.

For the period following the breakdown of an institutional system and until a new institutional pattern is crystallized, leadership is of a quasi-institutional nature. This leadership secures its position and makes its appeal on the basis of the old institutional factors; but the person of the leader is determined to a great extent by competition, and his domination is limited almost solely by the threat of revolt against his person. Our efforts to establish a democratic form of government are essentially efforts to make quasi-institutional governmental leadership permanent and systematic. We have attempted to limit the forms of competition for leadership and to make revolt against undesired leadership a matter of ballot-

ing rather than bloodshed. In a very real sense, then, the democratic plan of government is one in which quasi-institutional distant leadership is made quickly responsive to the members of a "governmental public."

The democratic leader is dependent on the periodically expressed willingness of the majority of those whom he leads to accept his leadership. It has been historically assumed that his leadership will of necessity follow the course which is most advantageous to the majority of his followers (note 68). Apparently unanticipated by the theorists was the fact that competition for leadership under these conditions frequently is based upon conversational appeals rather than on actual abilities in constructive leadership.

Dictatorial Leadership. To the extent that a political leader secures or retains his position of leadership by the use of force, he is a dictator. When the aspirant for political leadership resorts to force in the effort to gain control of a government, he is transcending the established procedures for political advancement under the democratic process. When the elected leaders of a democracy resort to force in the endeavor to make their status permanent, they are exceeding the traditional limits of their office. The former attempt is, in a broad sense, a revolutionary movement; the latter is counterrevolutionary. Even in the more democratic societies, there will appear from time to time some resort to force in the endeavor to achieve or to retain the status of political leadership. The intimidation of voters by the hired ruffians of a political candidate is a commonplace example of the former. The use of the city police to ensure a satisfactory vote for the mayor is an example of the latter practice.

In a monarchy leadership is determined by traditional factors, usually hereditary. In a true democracy the vote of the electorate determines which of the various aspirants shall rule for each succeeding term, and competition among aspirants is limited to conversational appeals. But when the political elite has, in a very literal sense, battered its way to power, the result is for a time at least dictatorship. No dictatorial clique can, of course, come to power simply because it resorts to forceful means. Unless a significant proportion of the people are so wearied of the established system and its personnel that they can be won over to the new movement, the force of the would-be leader will be resisted by the greater force of the established police, army, and navy. Dictatorship is, therefore, a symptom of social disintegration. The conditions that make for the rise of dictators will later be considered as a form of sociopsychopathology.

Once a dictator has come to power, he endeavors to solidify his position by the manipulation of economic appeals and by rapid regimentation of the population. Presumably a true dictatorship would be control of a fully regimented people and would lead by slow degrees to the rigidity and

automatic determination of the person of the leader that is characteristic of traditional leadership. Karl Marx and his followers, however, believed that dictatorship—at least the dictatorship of the proletariat—would be a temporary, transitional phase and that all government would eventually disappear. The social psychologist can only say that so far history has been unkind to all those who have made categorical assumptions regarding government.

INDETERMINATE PUBLICS

The members of large, distant-contact institutionalized organizations are, like those of small and intimate groups, selected and more or less systematically trained for membership. Thus the citizens of the United States and the personnel of the Standard Oil Company have acquired their membership in these organizations through designated procedures and have been, however inadequately, trained to be good citizens or loyal company workers. Publics that form within such organizations have, therefore, a limited membership. Only citizens, registered and of voting age, can vote; and only employees of the Standard Oil Company need keep up with the latest regulations from the home office. Moreover, membership in institutionalized publics is recurrent; and the relations of leader and led, while vastly more complex than those of person-to-person institutionalized situations, are relatively systematic.

In marked contrast are those publics which arise in response to the competitive strivings of numbers of individuals or groups for leadership via distant-contact means of communication. When the home office of the Standard Oil Company or the Chief of Staff of the United States Army "speaks" (*i.e.*, issues a new regulation), all those who are addressed respond more or less accurately, although they may be scattered around the world. But when a newspaper editor writes an editorial, an advocate of soil conservation publishes a book, or an announcer speaks into a microphone on behalf of a certain brand of cigarettes, he is competing with many other would-be leaders to secure a public that is in no way institutionalized. Those who respond to him do so voluntarily, and who they are and what their responses will be are indeterminate.

Recreational Publics. The new distant-contact means of communication are essential to the large-scale political and economic life of modern peoples. Quantitatively, however, the major use that has been made of some of them has been in the provision of recreation. For example, two-way radio is now essential in the operation of urban police and of commercial aircraft, and radio communication is used for the transmission of business and other messages. But at least here in America there must be a

thousand times as much listening to radio for "the fun of it" as listening for orders, directions, and information.⁷ Likewise, for every reader of an order, a scientific article, or directions on how to do this or that, there are many readers of newspapers, magazines, and books who are interested largely in the current pleasure they may secure from them.

The provision of recreational satisfactions through the printed story, news story or pure fiction, and of entertainment via radio and television follows the dramatic principles that were discussed in the preceding chapter. The application of these principles to distant-contact leadership of a public is, however, complicated by the peculiar characteristics of all publics that were described earlier in this chapter—*i.e.*, the presumably large but actually unascertainable membership, the inability of the leader to determine immediately, if ever, the effectiveness of his leadership, and the spatial dispersal of the members. Each medium of communication imposes, moreover, special limitations upon leadership.

Systematically Shifting Leadership. There are some distant-contact situations in which the leadership shifts systematically from person to person in accordance with an established pattern. A radio debate is perhaps most clearly illustrative of this type. In it leadership alternates according to the formula for public debate. Systematic, too, is the shift in leadership that occurs when publications print alternately articles for and against some controversial question. Less obvious, but none the less controlled, is the shifting of leadership in the trade, technical, and scientific journals. Technicians and scientists more or less compete among themselves for space in the journal of their specialty, but for reasons of policy editors tend to give each of the competitors his turn in the pages of the journal. Shifts in leadership are not, however, always of this systematic character.

Random Leadership and the Congenial Public. Some forms of distant-contact leadership are similar to that which arises under the mildly competitive conditions found in congenial situations. For some people, personal correspondence may serve as a partial substitute for membership in such situations. The correspondence between two friends constitutes a retarded give and take which is somewhat comparable with that which occurs during an informal conversation. Obviously, however, the art of letter writing is quite distinct from the art of conversation. A second form of distant-contact interaction which has its congenial elements is the telephone conversation, particularly that of the old party-line character. At one time the telephone was an important medium

⁷ For a general analysis of radio and its role in contemporary American life, see *The American radio* (L. White, 1947).

of recreation, especially for people in rural communities. Housewives on a party line could "get together" for a chat, and at such times they interacted much as they did in face-to-face associations.

The random, mildly competitive form of leadership shifting that is characteristic of the congenial situation can also be seen in certain types of newspaper material. The local items in the old-time country newspaper served much the same function for those whom these items concerned as would oral rendition to the neighbors; to the readers these items served much the same function as would hearing of the incidents. The fact that Farmer Brown's cow had twin calves might be an item of conversational leadership for him, either in congenial situations or as disseminated through the local paper. He might get something of the same glow of pride from seeing his name in print and from visualizing the readers as they read the item as he would from the attention that his story would arouse should he tell it in person. Knowing this, editors made a point of working in as many local names in each issue as was possible. Something not unlike the rivalry in a congenial situation existed among those people who aspired to get their names in the paper.

In the modern metropolitan press there is nothing quite comparable with the local items in the old-time country press, although the difference is one of degree only. One of the few places where leadership shifts in a somewhat random fashion is the "Letters to the Editor" section, although here there is a tendency for certain people to be chronic contributors and for the vast majority of readers to contribute nothing. We may, however, say that the reader of an item of this order is reacting to leadership which arose on the mildly competitive basis which is characteristic of the congenial situation. Certainly there are many people who compete to get their names in the paper and some who will do almost anything to provide a story that is certain to secure space.⁸

Rather than providing an opportunity for reader leadership, the modern newspaper provides printed substitutes for the stories told by conversational leaders in congenial situations. A large proportion of what we call "news" is really printed rumor. Most of us read news items for the same reasons that we listen to rumors—to be entertained—although of course we rationalize such reading by saying that we must keep posted on world events.⁹ Aside from the stock-market quotations, the straight

⁸ Death notices have been occasionally inserted in the newspapers by perfectly live but rather hysterical "corpses"; and marriage notices have been similarly published when no marriage is even contemplated except by a would-be bride. When normal activities fail to "make the publication grade," abnormal procedures are undertaken by a surprisingly large number of people.

⁹ Students of journalism are inclined to apologize for the newspaper on the grounds that it is a great educational medium. Although this means of distant-contact com-

factual material that is contained in an edition of the average newspaper could be adequately recorded in an extremely small space. If it were so presented, however, there would be few readers. Barren facts or outright fictions are therefore "written up," just as in the rumor process the grain of truth or suspicion is dressed up to make a good story. In a sense therefore newspapermen are professional rumor makers. Among them, some have taken as their specialty political rumors; others, financial, local, national, or international rumors; and some few, scandal rumors. These specialists tend to vie with one another for space in the paper, just as in person-to-person situations individuals may compete with one another for a chance to tell their stories. Radio has attempted to exploit the desire of many people to "appear in public" through the device of studio audience quiz and give-away programs. The latter have been tremendously popular at times, presumably not alone because the winner of a radio contest profits materially but also because success in the competition means a certain amount of publicity.

Propaganda and the Conversional Public. In the United States, western Europe, and some other places, the commercial exploitation of the new means of communication often takes the form of making free or below-cost recreational offerings in order to secure publics that might then be subjected to conversional leadership on behalf of commercial, political, religious, or other interests. Both the newspaper and the magazine offer news or other stories and other inducements to readers in order that they may at the same time print advertising materials. The radio offers music, dramas, and shows in order that the publics thus secured may be told the virtues of such and such a product. Wherever, as with us, the lines of communication are comparatively free and where, as is the case under a democratic system of government and a competitive system of business, the institutionalization of distant-contact organizations has not progressed to the point of eliminating individual striving for leadership, the struggle to achieve or to maintain a position of leadership takes in part the form of propaganda (note 69), which is directed toward securing publics and converting them to the leader's support. In the United States and to a lesser extent elsewhere, political parties, competing busi-

munication is undoubtedly a factor in the personality development of the modern individual and a primary agency of propaganda, it functions for the reader more as a recreational than an educational medium. See "Press" by D. M. Keezer (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 325-343) and *News and the human interest story* (H. M. Hughes, 1939). Although even the most reputable newspapers contain a large portion of printed rumor, the personalized rumor reaches its purest written form in the various motion-picture magazines. They contain little except highly dramatized stories about trivial (and often fictitious) events and characteristics of the personages in the motion-picture world.

ness interests, and minorities within such groups as unions, corporations, associations, etc., all resort to some extent to propaganda in the effort to secure or to retain leadership. Furthermore, those in a position of leadership frequently endeavor to stalemate the propaganda of aspirants for their position by what is termed "censorship."

The Techniques of Propaganda. The effort of anyone to convert people to the acceptance of his leadership or the attempt of anyone to "put across" the ideas and practices he represents is in a broad sense propaganda. The thing he represents may be a special political view; a new religious faith; the idea that one commercial product is more desirable than another; the notion that a specific painting, book, or play is worth seeing or reading; or the objectively verifiable but commonly disbelieved idea that patent medicines offer little of profit to any but the maker. When ideas are imparted through schoolroom channels, we term the process "pedagogy." Pedagogical techniques may or may not be essentially those of propaganda; and, as in the latter, the ideas imparted may or may not be in accord with scientific belief.

The techniques of propaganda as used in the leadership of publics differ from the techniques of conversion-audience leadership only to the extent that the medium of communication is different. The newspaper, book, or radio public is larger than is the lecture audience; and the symbols used must be simpler (in accordance with the principle of the hypothetical listener). Since the members of a public are spatially separated, there is, at the outset, little possibility of member interaction. And the communication value of gestures is, of course, lost in distant-contact communications; the desired reaction must be secured by words, printed or spoken, supplemented only by graphic symbols.

One advantage that the distant-contact propagandist has over the conversion-audience leader is that his distance and the impersonal nature of his medium permit him to some extent to disguise any personal interest that he may have in the effects of his leadership. This factor of personal interest has frequently been made the basis for a theoretical distinction between propaganda and advertising. It has been argued that the advertiser, a commercial propagandist, always reveals his personal interest and that the members of his public therefore discount everything he says. This fact, the argument runs, makes his efforts quite unlike those of the political, religious, or social propagandist, who commonly disarms his public by pretending a personal disinterest. Dialectical hairsplitting of this sort can have little more than theoretical significance. Advertising may be a special form; but certainly the advertiser's implicit admission that he has a selfish interest in the effects of his efforts

does not remove those efforts from the category of propaganda.¹⁰ It is doubtful whether the average man is any more sophisticated in regard to commercial advertisements than he is concerning any other minority-group pressure. He responds to them, if at all, quite indiscriminately.

As with any form of leadership, there are techniques of propaganda only in the sense that there are techniques of painting or of novel writing. Propaganda, like conversation, is an art; and, although certain general principles may be discerned, their application is largely a matter of individual ingenuity. It is as futile, therefore, to attempt a description of *the* successful propaganda methods as it would be to describe how Rembrandt obtained his effects and then to put these forth as the rules for good painting.¹¹

His methods may defy complete analysis, but the principles that the propagandist employs are few and simple. He attempts to erect a super-cosmic drama in which his person or the idea he represents becomes stereotyped as a kind of hero or, in some instances, as a heroine. The first step in this direction consists in providing his public, through newspaper and other distant-contact mediums, items that make his person fit one of the more or less conventional personality stereotypes.¹² It makes little difference whether his "person" is a political party, a society for the prevention or preservation of something or other, a business corporation, a package of cigarettes, an idea or philosophic system, or an actual

¹⁰ Pseudo economists have long claimed that the function fulfilled by commercial advertising is that of educating the buying public to the value of newly developed products. It is of course true that advertising is occasionally a means of acquainting the public with some new technological development and thus of encouraging its application to man's living. But as any disinterested student must realize, the major part of advertising is competitive, *i.e.*, a struggle between industries for customers or a struggle between two or more producers or distributors of a similar commodity. Quite unlike the usual elaborate rationalizations is the following analysis by an advertising man: *Our master's voice: advertising* (J. Rorty, 1934). See also the article on advertising by L. S. Lyon (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 469-475); and *Attention and interest factors in advertising* (H. J. Rudolph, 1947).

¹¹ To know how an effect is achieved does not necessarily ensure ability to secure that effect. Some idea of the complexities of the art of propaganda can be gained from the following: *Crystallising public opinion* (E. L. Bernays, 1934); "The poisoned springs of world news" (G. Seides, 1934); "The technic of mob rule" (G. Boas, 1935); "The screen enters politics" (R. S. Ames, 1935); "Huey Long and his background" (H. Basso, 1935); *The politician* (J. H. Wallis, 1935); and "Goebbels' conception of propaganda" (H. Herma, 1943). But by far the best study of the art of demagogic leadership still is *Mein Kampf* (A. Hitler, 1925).

¹² For an excellent summary of the history and development of the technique of directing the formation of stereotypes, see "Publicity" by E. Gruening (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 698-701).

human being. What he must do is to give himself or whatever his leadership stands for a personality, one that in the minds of his public can be fitted to the role of hero or heroine in the drama that he is fashioning.

At the same time and in the same manner, he must dramatize the need for his leadership by casting his opponent, either an actual or a potential leader, in the role of villain. Again, it makes little difference if this opponent is a political party, a competitive business organization (in this instance the effect is usually secured by inference only), a traditional superstition, a new scientific discovery, a minority group, or even the weather. His task is to blame some real or synthetic personality with the troubles, real or fictitious, of those whom he would lead.

It is necessary only to add that the propagandist's drama must have as simple conflict elements, as crystal clear and absolute a dichotomy between hero and villain, and as obvious a climax, as has a children's fairy tale. When the drama is hammered in with the dependence on repetition and artificial suspense which is used in the children's story, only convention or the counter appeal of opposition leadership will prevent the propagandist's public from responding in accordance with the role in which it has been cast.

Propagandists often throw in two or three villains for good measure, as was the case when Hitler so characterized the Socialists, the Communists, and the Versailles Treaty as well as the Jews during his rise to power in Germany. The stereotyped elements upon which he relied in casting the German people as the heroine for his political drama are exceptionally clear. He flattered them with the idea that they were pure of heart and mind, possessed of all the ancient Germanic virtues, and destined to take their rightful place in the domestic scheme of things, provided only that they would marry the hero, Hitler, who would save them from the composite villain. If subsequent events did not unfold quite according to the romantic tradition, it need only be said that they never do—neither political nor medicinal panaceas live up to their promises.

Effectiveness of Propaganda. Propagandists attempt to convert a relatively few individuals, who in turn are to convert others by word of mouth. These converts in a sense act as the agents of the propagandist. The rumor process may also contribute to the effectiveness of the propagandist, since what he says may become the basis for rumors. Possibly it is in congenial situations, rather than in those of any other type, that most actual conversions take place. No doubt the propagandist directly influences only those individuals in his public who for reasons growing out of their life experiences are already able to believe. Cer-

tainly the direct effects of propaganda can easily be exaggerated.¹³ Leaders, political or otherwise, are a reflection of their milieu; in order to be successful, the propagandist must offer something that the people feel they need. If they are reasonably content with what they have, propaganda will not be very effective. It is therefore to the social conditions which make people susceptible to conversion, rather than to propaganda itself, that we must first look for an explanation of political or other leadership which has used propaganda to secure leadership status.

Censorship.¹⁴ Censorship operates to prevent opposition propaganda by control of the press and of other distant-contact mediums. The procedure is analogous to the efforts of a conversional lecturer to ensure the attendance of everyone at his lecture and a lack of attendance at all other concomitant lectures. Censorship can be utilized only by those who are already in a position of leadership. Methods of control may take such forms as the buying up of an opposition press, the refusing of advertising to those papers which do not cooperate, or governmental dictation to all news organs and news sources. The use by economic and religious organizations of governmental agencies for censorship purposes is a commonplace and takes such forms as suppression of books and plays,¹⁵ suppression of unfavorable reports, etc.

¹³ During the 1948 presidential campaign, the weight of newspaper, magazine, and radio propaganda was on the side of the Republican candidate. It was so generally assumed that President Truman could not possibly be reelected that, except for his own personal efforts, almost no attempt was made to propagandize on his behalf. Nevertheless, he obtained a significantly higher proportion of the popular vote than did his Republican opponent.

For a scientific study of the forces that influence voting behavior, see *The people's choice* (P. F. Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1948).

¹⁴ Almost as much confusion surrounds the use of the term "censorship" as surrounds that of "propaganda" (see Appendix note 69). To define "censorship" as any interference with lines of communication would make practically every parent, teacher, and in fact anyone directly or indirectly concerned with the processes of socialization, a censor, since these people are constantly putting restraints upon communication in the effort to prevent antisocialization. To define "censorship" as a restraint upon the communication of facts or of "rational appeals" is to give the term only subjective application.

For material on political censorship, see the article "Censorship" by H. D. Lasswell (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 290-294) and the references in Appendix note 69.

¹⁵ Almost anything that might be communicated has at some time or other been subjected to censorship in some place or other. In the field of literature, we might cite such books as Homer's *Odyssey*, Shakespeare's *Richard the Second*, and Doyle's *Sherlock Holmes*. Even *Alice in Wonderland* was once banned by the governor of a Chinese province on the ground that, because it makes animals talk, the book puts them on a par with human beings.

Counterpropaganda. The term "counterpropaganda" came into use during World War I to indicate the use of propaganda to checkmate the propaganda efforts of another interest group. Under some circumstances it is more effective and expedient for established leadership than is direct censorship. For obvious reasons the democratic political leader is dependent more on counterpropaganda than on censorship to keep himself in power. Much advertising is counterpropaganda that is forced upon a business interest by the propaganda efforts of a competitor. In brief, counterpropaganda arises whenever two propagandist agencies work at cross purposes, one endeavoring to secure leadership by conversion and action or by usurping the *status quo*, the other endeavoring to maintain his leadership in the *status quo* or by conversion to other forms of action.

During the early years of World War I the British endeavored to secure American participation on the side of the Entente. Toward this end they flooded the United States with faked news stories that cast Germany in the role of villain and the Entente in the role of hero. In the attempt to offset this propaganda and to keep the United States neutral, Germany carried out a campaign of counterpropaganda. This latter was strikingly unsuccessful, primarily because the Entente possessed the most adequate channels of propaganda and because the Germans appeared to have great difficulty in understanding American ways of viewing events.

Following World War I, so much was made of the role of propaganda in bringing about our participation that "propaganda" became for us a stereotyped villain.¹⁶ Propaganda became, in fact, very much the root of all evil. As a consequence, the British refrained, after the outbreak of World War II, from making any appeals to us that could be easily recognized and labeled as propaganda. That they did their utmost, nevertheless, to convert us to the view that our salvation as a nation lay in theirs goes without saying.

Public Opinion. The dependence of democratic political leaders on the recurrently expressed "will" of voters and of competing businesses and other organizations on the good will and patronage of customers has given rise to the concept of public opinion and, within recent times, to the development of devices for the measurement of public opinion. These devices are the basis for the well-known public-opinion polls.

The technical problems of opinion measuring, such as that of obtain-

¹⁶ The term "propaganda" does not everywhere possess the offensive meaning it has been given almost universally in America. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, has its Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, which it considers as purely educational in character.

ing a representative sample of the population, avoiding interviewer bias and the distortions that may be introduced by the form of the questions asked, etc., need not concern us here. The principal use made so far of polls, *i.e.*, for newspaper and magazine reporting, likewise has little sociopsychological significance. But the growing reliance of politicians, governmental administrators, business executives, and other leaders or would-be leaders of distant-contact organizations upon opinion poll results is a development of considerable importance. To the extent that leaders or would-be leaders are guided by poll findings and to the extent that these polls provide accurate measurements of current public opinion on given matters, they facilitate the interaction in publics of leader and led. To this extent they are a means of surmounting one of the restrictive characteristics of all publics, *i.e.*, that public leaders cannot know immediately and directly the effect of their leadership upon members. Continuous and effective polling of public opinion and the systematic use of poll results in the guidance of leaders of large organizations which deal with the "general public" would, therefore, take much of the guesswork out of policy formation and would provide a desirable substitute for the intimate knowledge which the leaders of small, direct-contact organizations rely upon.¹⁷ In ideological terms, the result would be more democratic relationships between various publics and their leaders.¹⁸

PUBLIC WHIM AND FANCY

In a society like our own, where instability is characteristic of many aspects of social life, there are numerous quick and violent shifts of behavior—fugitive patterns of action that come and go without apparent cause and in much the same manner as does the rumor story. The leadership responsible for the origin and spread of such patterns is as random and shifting as is that involved in rumor. The patterns themselves are, in fact, fugitive; but since today they are often spread by distant-

¹⁷ For attempts to measure current public opinion, see Appendix note 67, the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and the following books: *The pulse of democracy* (G. Gallup and S. F. Rae, 1940); *What our people think* (W. A. Lydgate, 1944); *Gauging public opinion* (H. Cantril et al., 1944); *Propaganda, communication and public opinion* (B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. Casey, 1946); *Public opinion and propaganda* (L. W. Doob, 1948); *A guide to public opinion polls* (G. Gallup, 1948); and *American opinion on world affairs* (L. S. Cottrell, Jr., 1948).

The difficulties of accurately measuring public opinion regarding even such a relatively simple issue as a forthcoming election and the inadequacies of our present measurement techniques were dramatically demonstrated in the 1948 presidential election. Almost without exception the polling agencies—both commercial and non-profit—found that voter opinion was in favor of the Republican candidate.

¹⁸ For a development of this idea, see "Consensus and mass communication" (L. Wirth, 1948).

contact means of communication and since vast numbers of people may adopt and spread them, we may perhaps think of them, in distinction to the word-of-mouth rumor, as public whim and fancy. The various kinds of public whim and fancy are usually distinguished by the terms "fads," "booms," and "crazes." Although the three terms are by no means mutually exclusive, the name "fad" has generally been given to the more trifling deviations from normal behavior; the term "boom," to vital and protracted ones; and the term "craze," to those which have an intermediate position and the outstanding characteristic of becoming for the moment a primary but superficial concern of the people who are involved.

The Fad. Hardly a week passes in contemporary America but that some new slang word, catch phrase, verbal inflection, minor modification of dress or mannerism, popular song, dance step, or game makes its appearance and wins popular favor. The spread of the latest popular song can be traced to some extent, and the influence of such mediums as the radio in speeding up its spread is quite evident. There is little possibility, however, of tracing the spread of slang words or dance steps; and the reason why one of the many songs that are plugged by bands should rise to favor while the rest never "catch" is a mystery that tin-pan alley¹⁹ would give millions to solve. All we can possibly say is that of the countless new modes of behavior that are no doubt invented annually, some few are taken up by individuals here and there and are used as the basis for leadership in their congenial groupings. These then spread or fail to spread in the same way and for much the same reasons that a rumor does. Like a rumor, a fad must be appropriate to the time and place.

At all times the more ingenious members of our society are making bids for public leadership either in their professional capacity as writers, actors, painters, etc., or in their capacity as private citizens. Within each professional group there is intense competition for professional leadership. Song writers drum out a hundred or more pieces annually; hundreds of novels are turned off the presses each year; thousands of artists paint countless pictures, while others mold a multitude of statues; playwrights, producers, and actors try out some dozens of new plays; script-writers, producers, and performers try out hundreds of new radio-program ideas; and motion-picture producers grind out their usual schedule of comedies and melodramas. In these fields, essentially recreational, there are of course some recognized leaders—popular authors, song writers,

¹⁹ The history of fads in popular music is given in *Tin pan alley: a chronicle of the American popular music racket* (I. Goldberg, 1930) and in Part II of *Radio research 1941* (D. MacDougald, Jr., 1941).

artists, actors, etc.—who may be in rather steady demand. But the leadership of such people plays a relatively small part in the fad. The song that sweeps into wide if brief popularity is socially selected from the many offered; few people know the name of the composer. The best seller is frequently an author's first, and occasionally his last, book. The play that makes theater history may have been a producer's gamble; the actress who rises to sudden fame may do so in spite of and at the expense of another upon whom producers have lavished fantastic publicity; and the motion picture that catches the popular fancy may have been a "sleeper" at the outset. In other words, leaders strive for leadership; but from all that they offer, a little is taken and the remainder is rejected or passively tolerated by members of the general public.

Occasionally it is possible to trace the unusual popularity of a book or a play to some accident that has given it an exceptional initial impulse or provided it with free advertising. Any one of these may be the "break" that publisher and theatrical producer are always hoping for. At one time it was considered a seal of popularity for a book to be banned in Boston. A war or other disaster will make a book related to the subject timely and may help to ensure its success. The absence of anything more important to talk and write about at the moment may mean that a new book or play is given unusual attention in the newspapers and acquires the status of a popular topic of conversation.

In the main, however, there is as yet no adequate explanation for the fact that one of the many books published each year sells in the hundreds of thousands rather than in the thousands²⁰ or of the fact that one play becomes a national success whereas a hundred others come and go. As popularity grows, some critics and experts will claim to know just why the book or play was successful. But it is evident that their deduction is an *a posteriori* one, since their knowledge is not put to use in the writing of best sellers or of box-office successes.

The random character of leadership in fads is even more apparent in those fads—such as the slang phrase or the "wisecrack"—which are not subject to commercial exploitation. In Hollywood and New York, our great entertainment centers, there are hundreds of men and women who devote their time to inventing gags for use by comedians. Of the many that are broadcast by radio and motion picture, some few are taken up and have their brief period of popularity.

Most fads have a short life, probably for the same reason that ru-

²⁰ Berreman has found that initial advertising, particularly that which is directed toward the book dealers, increases the probability of a novel's selling up in the tens of thousands. But he found no explanation for the fact that, of the many books that become good sellers, one or two will go on to become best sellers (J. Berreman, 1939).

mors quickly die out. The fad pattern is taken over because it attracts attention to the user. But the more it spreads, the less is its attention-invoking value. At some point in its spread, a fad becomes so commonplace that it will be abandoned in favor of some new attention-getting device. Some words, games, dress items, and mechanical gadgets do, however, have sufficient intrinsic value so that, although they are originally diffused throughout the society as fads, they subsequently become a part of the stable culture.²¹ In the late 1920's the zipper was an exceedingly faddy device and was used primarily as an ornament. As a practical mechanism for closing things it has survived its faddy period. Many of the things that we today use and take for granted—the bicycle, the juke box, slacks, etc.—were at one time or another attention-getting fad items. Of those things which we today consider so extremely smart, clever, and up to the minute, a few will survive as utilitarian commonplaces; most, however, will be obsolete tomorrow.

The Boom. The fad involves some trivial change in behavior that may ultimately become incorporated into the social heritage. The boom, in contrast, is vital and self-liquidating. Like a fire, the boom consumes the substance necessary for its existence and thus dies out automatically. Booms usually involve some aspect of economic behavior and generally occur during what the economist speaks of as the prosperity phase of the business cycle. Booms in stocks, such as the ill-fated one of 1927–1929, are perhaps the most characteristic; but almost any economic good or activity may be the basis for a boom. Land has been boomed from time to time and from place to place. Southern California lands were the basis for a boom in the 1880's and again in the 1920's; Florida real estate was boomed about 1923;²² and from time to time most communities get excited about a new subdivision, a race-track project, a local oil-well development, or something of the sort. The gold rush to California in the middle of the last century and to Alaska in 1898 were booms that had vast social consequences. Tulip bulbs were at one time the basis for a most extravagant boom in Holland.²³ A bulb exchange was established during the height of this peculiar boom, and bulbs sometimes sold for more than their weight in gold.

There is usually some little grain of truth or reason at the basis of

²¹ But one of the more spectacular of the gadget fads of recent years, that of the ball-point pen, was based almost entirely on the extrinsic (attention-getting) value of the object. Time proved that the device itself had no intrinsic advantage over the traditional fountain pen. At the height of the fad, however, millions of dollars were spent for these ornaments.

²² See *Boom in paradise* (T. H. Weigall, 1932).

²³ See *Memoirs of extraordinary popular delusions* (C. Mackay, 1850).

the boom. This may be the discovery of *some* gold, a *slight* rise in land value, or the *hope* that some new venture will pay dividends. Spread by and through newspaper and other publicity and the rumor process, that grain of truth is soon swollen into a dramatic opportunity for easy and fabulous wealth; and more and more people are led to drop their normal economic activities to join in the new quest. Presumably those who first respond to the boom stories are the less stable and more suggestible members of a community, but constant repetition and external elaboration of the boom story bring about the interactional amplification that has previously been mentioned. Just as few individuals are capable of remaining calm and critical as members of an audience that is wildly enthusiastic, so few people can avoid being caught up in the boom fever. Even as an old platitude may through the audible response of others to it indirectly arouse enthusiasm in a weary listener, the legendary tales that are revived during every boom may indirectly lead even the sophisticated economist to invest his savings in the boom object.

The ideas that are accepted as valid and are made the basis for actions during the course of a boom may seem incredible after the inevitable crash has occurred. But there would seem to be no vaccine that will immunize people against the boom virus.²⁴ The boom appears to be a recurrent attribute of the capitalistic system, and each succeeding boom gives grim point to the statement that men learn from history only that they do not learn from history.

The Craze. Booms generate relatively slowly; but they generally collapse with startling suddenness. Crazes, on the other hand, generate as rapidly as the fad, although they collapse as suddenly as the boom.

²⁴ In periods of economic activity the stock-market boom is often sufficiently absorbing to distract people from the lure of other boom possibilities. It is, therefore, in periods of economic contraction that booms follow the most unconventional directions. The years subsequent to 1929, when the public was most averse to speculation in industrial stocks, saw many brief local and national booms. Of local booms that of "ambergris" on the West Coast near San Francisco was a good example. Ambergris is a substance once very valuable for the making of perfume. It is thought to issue from the sperm whale and is found occasionally washed up by the sea. In March, 1934, a large lump of material thought to be ambergris was picked up along the West Coast by poverty-stricken villagers. The thought of great wealth to be had for the finding sent hundreds of people to the beaches, and for months thereafter everything otherwise unidentified that the sea washed in was "ambergris." None of the finds actually proved to be ambergris, and the sequel to the story was the eventual revelation that technological developments had long since made ambergris of relatively small value anyway.

For a description of boom phenomena in their various historic aspects and a bibliography on the subject, see "Boom" by M. S. Handman (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 2, 638-641).

The area of behavior that is involved in the craze is usually quite limited, but the people who are affected invariably devote a disproportionate part of their time to the craze activity. They figuratively go crazy about some actually unimportant thing. Occasionally the craze involves quasi-economic behavior, as was the case with the "send a dime" craze—a chain-letter method of getting rich that flowered in the spring of 1935.²⁵ In the main, however, the craze concerns some new or revived recreational activity.

The miniature-golf craze of a generation ago will illustrate these points. During the palmy days of 1925–1929, one of the dominant sports was golf. Expensive golf clubs sprang up all over the country, and the ancient Scotch game promised to become America's preoccupation. In 1929 the financial crash left many people with golfing equipment and with some skill at the game but with no opportunity to play. They found an outlet in a vacant-lot form of golf, which had been unsuccessfully sponsored by an equipment manufacturer for some years previously. Within a few months the craze for miniature golf spread over the entire country, and innumerable courses were erected. A few months later grass was growing in the paths of these courses, although millions of dollars had been invested in this craze. At its height, excitement was so great that even one of our saner intellectuals could write in *Harper's Magazine* to the effect that miniature golf was our recreational if not our financial salvation from the depression.

One of the more recent of the crazes that have reached national proportions was the preoccupation with and idolization of Frank Sinatra, a dance-band singer, that swept through the ranks of adolescent girls toward the end of World War II. For months Frankie was apparently the dominant topic of conversation and of interest with tens of thousands of youngsters; Sinatra clubs sprang up all around the country; the girls gathered in groups to listen in rapt attention to his recorded songs; and his appearance in public auditoriums or theaters was the occasion for a collective emotional spree reminiscent of the days of the old-time evangelist. One attempt to explain this particular craze stressed the fact that through the war years the status of young women was in general low in comparison with that of young men, who as warriors were

²⁵ This was perhaps the most incredible craze of the many that have swept the country in recent years (T. Olson, 1935).

Early in 1949 a new and considerably more expensive version of this craze appeared in Los Angeles and soon spread to many large American cities. In this new version people imagined that they could get rich quickly by joining what were called "Pyramid Friendship Clubs," to which each member was supposed to contribute \$2 and two new members at each meeting and from which he would theoretically obtain \$4,096 at his twelfth meeting (*Time*, Feb. 28, 1949, p. 26).

the nation's heroes and the object of much public acclaim. The publicly neglected adolescent girl may, perhaps, have been more than normally susceptible to adopting a pattern of action that would ensure her some attention, however unfavorable, from her elders and make her feel that she was of some importance in the social scene.

Like the boom, the craze is self-liquidating; the reason for its automatic collapse is, however, found in psychological rather than in economic factors. Ordinarily the primary value of a craze activity is that at the outset it makes an individual stand out from his fellows and thereby gives him notoriety. The moment the craze activity has become general, it loses this attention-getting value, and is then likely to be dropped by everyone. Games that are amusing and interesting may spring into popularity as fads and in time settle down to a steady and lasting life. Such was the history of the jigsaw puzzle. Those games, however, which become overnight the preoccupation of a large number of people seldom have anything more to recommend them than the fact that they are new and popular. This was the case with the game or contest of flagpole sitting, a tragicomedy of the late 1920's and early 1930's, which fell from popularity as soon as virtually every hamlet in the United States had its national contestant and the flagpole sitter no longer made news. A decade later an equally fantastic craze for public exhibitions of goldfish eating swept through college student bodies. It reached its climax with the eating of phonograph records and then died out, presumably for lack of anything less digestible to eat.

FASHION PUBLICS

Prestige as a Basis for Leadership. In any field of social life there are some names that make news; and such names may of themselves give a value to whatever the name is associated with. The attention-evoking power of such a name—place or personal—is termed “prestige.” In some fields—notably scientific medicine and the physical sciences—there is probably a close relationship between the prestige of a name and the scientific merit of the man; for there is general agreement as to what does or does not constitute achievement in these fields. But wherever evaluations are arrived at subjectively, as in art, music, and literature, the accomplishment is judged in surprisingly large part by the prestige of the name attached to it; thus whether a painting attributed to Rembrandt is good or bad depends almost entirely on whether or not it is authentic.²⁶

²⁶ For the effect of prestige on the acceptance of paintings, see “Further data on suggestion in pictures” (P. R. Farnsworth and I. Misumi, 1931). The perfect demonstration that it is not the painting per se so much as the prestige (largely a function of

In person-to-person situations prestige factors operate in many ways, some of which we have already indicated. In distant-contact situations prestige operates to give certain authors, columnists, etc., a steady reader public, regardless of what they may write; to provide motion-picture stars with acclaim, no matter what the vehicle; etc.

Fashion Prestige. The power of prestige factors in public leadership is nowhere more apparent than in the realm of fashion. The term "fashion" is often used indiscriminately to refer to currently accepted manners, morals, or modes of dress. It is rather doubtful, however, whether changes in manners and morals originate in some prestige source and spread therefrom to all the members of a society. The processes that make for modifications in manners and morals are subtle and complex. Clothing changes, however, are unquestionably influenced by the prestige of their originators. We shall therefore restrict "fashion" to changes in modes of dress.

The process by which new clothing fashions spread is much the same as that which is responsible for the dissemination of rumors, fads, booms, and crazes.²⁷ Wearing clothes of the "latest style" is a bid for leadership in person-to-person situations, and to cling too long to the old marks out an individual for social disapproval and possibly contempt. The leadership process involved in fashion changes is, however, very different from that occurring in the fad, boom, or craze. In the realm of fashion there are prestige leaders, either specific people or places, the names of whom or of which are recognized as authoritative and thus give authenticity to the new modes of dress. There are in addition various prestige fashion magazines devoted to the dissemination of the latest word on fashion trends by prestige designers, fashion journalists, and fashion leaders. Although a fad or craze pattern might be originated by almost anyone, only those clothing innovations sponsored by a prestige name have a chance to become fashionable. Competition for leadership in the dress-fashion field is, therefore, restricted to established designers. From their varied offerings the new—the fashionable—will be "chosen."

Men's Styles. There was a time when the male was the ornate sex; time and changing art vogues) of the painter that determines the value of a picture is the case of the modern Dutch artist Hans van Meegeren. An unknown in his own right, he painted and sold at high prices forgeries of the famous seventeenth-century artist Vermeer. The experts unanimously identified these fakes as original Vermeers, and it was not until van Meegeren actually painted a "Vermeer" for them that they were willing to concede their error (*Time*, Sept. 10, 1945, p. 68).

²⁷ An analysis of changes in fashions can be found in *Three centuries of women's dress fashions; a quantitative analysis* (J. Richardson and A. L. Kroeber, 1940).

but since the days of the powdered wig and the pantaloons, no very significant changes have occurred in the number and general character of the articles of clothing worn by men of the Occident. In the course of time, waistcoats have changed to vests; collars have grown lower and have changed from starched linen to celluloid and later to unstarched linen and then to plastic-impregnated cloth; trousers have alternated between wide and short, narrow and long, and wide and long; coats have shortened and lengthened; and materials have changed. Sports clothes, including the serviceable slacks, have grown in favor, oxfords have replaced high shoes, and button shoes have become curiosities. Fads, such as the beret, have come and gone. During times of war, civilian clothes have taken on a slightly military tone. But the well-dressed male today wears much the same sort of clothing as did the men of a century ago, in spite of the diligent efforts of stylists to brighten, and some have said lighten, his dress.

The minor variations in men's clothing were for long supposed to have originated in London, traditionally the prestige center for male attire. Presumably, also, certain members of the British Royal House have been style leaders. But it is easy to exaggerate the importance of London's Bond Street and the part that certain Englishmen have played in the clothing habits of men of the Western world. Styles in youth's and young men's informal wear change; but no one appears to know or to care whether these changes have originated in London, Los Angeles, New York, or in some noted university. Furthermore, for business and dress wear last year's suit is quite likely to be good style for next year.

Women's Styles. Women's fashions, on the other hand, change with comparative rapidity. Modern women are exceedingly style conscious. Tradition sanctions their use of clothing as a bid for attention; and even today most other means of securing favorable attention—political, financial, and similar achievements—are closed to them. Originally fashion changes were a consequence of the competition among the women of the French court for royal favor. Certain of the more notorious courtesans became accepted as fashion leaders; and the women of other courts—English, Italian, German, Russian—came in time to follow the lead that was set in Paris. After the French Revolution, Parisian clothing leadership drifted into the hands of the designers, whose names, rather than those of their noted clients, became the badge of fashion approval to all the women of the Occident who could afford to be stylish. Paris became synonymous with "right." For over a century all the more important trends originated among Paris *couturiers*. But in recent years the prestige of Paris has been seriously threatened, and interestingly

enough, Hollywood is rapidly gaining some of the prestige that Paris once had exclusively.²⁸ At present, the more noted of the motion-picture stars seem to play a role for the average American woman comparable with that which the noted courtesans of France once played for the aristocrats of western Europe.

The Nature of Fashion Leadership. Thinking that they perceived a pattern or cycle in fashion changes, some observers have concluded that there is a natural law behind the fashion process.²⁹ Upon close examination, the "cycle" in fashion changes turns out to be no more than a reflection of the fact that the possibilities for change are limited. Thus, to cite but one example, if dress lengths are to change from year to year, they must get shorter for a time and then longer for a time. There are no other "directions" in which they can change, and there are absolute limits to how short a skirt can be and still be a skirt and to how long a skirt can be and still permit the wearer to walk. The rise and fall over the course of years may give the illusion of a natural "cycle"; but it is only an illusion.

Other observers, finding that any particular woman must follow the style trend or be unfashionable, have concluded that the fashion leaders dictate styles. No doubt a political dictator might—and some few have—by edict set the fashions in women's clothing as in other things.³⁰ But no clothing stylist, even though fortified by the power of prestige, in any sense "dictates" to the women of America that skirts will be longer, fuller, or whatnot. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that the great designers invariably offer their clientele a number of variations on the current

²⁸ For discussion of the gradual transition from exclusive dependence on the "Designed in Paris" label to some dependence on the "Designed in Hollywood" one, see "Fashion and the Hollywood handicap" (E. K. McDonnell, 1935). For a description of the attempts of the New York City clothing industry to make "New York Creation" the prestige label, see "New styles in unions" (J. C. Furnas, 1941).

²⁹ As far as the authors know the only study of dress fashions that can be justly called experimental is that reported in "Fad and fashion leadership among undergraduate women" (J. E. Janney, 1941). Here the course of 67 unique clothing patterns was followed among a group of 279 college girls. The patterns were all originated by girls with prestige in other fields. Girls who failed to follow the new dress patterns were in general regarded by their classmates as socially inept.

³⁰ Women's clothing styles were more or less successfully frozen by wartime regulations in the United States between 1942 and 1946. But this period of constraint was made up for in 1947 and 1948 by the frenzied concern of many women with the so-called "New Look," which was in fact in good part a revival of the styles of the 1890's. The perpetuation of the "old look" during the war was dictated by political fiat, but the New Look was not in any sense dictated by clothing designers. For a detailed study of the limited ability of fashion leaders to determine clothing trends, see "The limits of fashion control" (N. K. Jack and B. Schiffer, 1948).

styles. They may attempt to predict from the "trend"—the tendency of more women buyers to purchase this rather than that—whether next season's demand will be for shorter or longer skirts, etc. But even so, no designer would think of gambling on the trend. He (or she) will hedge by offering longer as well as shorter skirts; and until a trend is well established, all the various style publicists and publicizing mediums remain coyly indefinite. The style leader is, after all, but one of the factors in a vast and complicated public interaction. Like the popular radio comedian, the stylist will be "listened to." But which of his varied offerings—if any—will be taken up and made the basis for a new clothing style depends on the members of his public.

Finally, just as the radio comedian must not offend the sensibilities of his public, the clothing stylist cannot expect to gain a following for an offering that offends his public's sense of modesty or of economic expediency. When we reflect upon the cumbersome hoopskirt, the unhygienic corset, the grotesque bustle, the plunging neckline, and other idiosyncrasies of fashion in women's dress, we might well be tempted to conclude that modesty and utility play a very minor part in clothing leadership and that the prestige of the originator has a dictatorial effect. But there is an ancient saw as true of women and their clothing as of horses and their water: "You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink." Fashion leaders lead women to the shops, but what the women will buy is quite unpredictable. Millions are spent each year in trying to predict the trend of the styles of tomorrow; but within certain obvious limits all we can say of the styles of tomorrow is that they will be determined by the interactions of the publics of tomorrow, and that the course that these latter will take depends on factors that are as yet too complex for human analysis.

CHAPTER XXV

ABNORMAL SITUATIONS

In scientific usage the terms "normal" and "abnormal" imply a quantitative distinction. They do not indicate subjective approval or disapproval. To science, anything that is commonplace, recurrent, and characteristic is considered normal. This is just as true of the behavior of human beings as it is of the behavior of electrons, atoms, and molecules, of amoebas, insects, and elephants, and of planets, stars, and galaxies. The fact that molecular, insect, human, or planetary behavior may be such that it destroys the things which behave is not a matter for scientific evaluation. If that behavior is characteristic, it is normal.

In the preceding three chapters, we have endeavored to analyze the more important types of interactional situations that appear to be normal to human societies. In this chapter, we shall consider those situations which are the exception rather than the rule. Like all distinctions in the realm of human behavior, this one is of course a matter of degree. No given situation can be completely characteristic or entirely exceptional.

In our society, some of the normal situations involve random and dynamic changes in behavior—the fad, the boom, the craze, and the fashion. But these changes, although they are not orderly or systematic, are the rule rather than the exception. As individuals, we are prepared to follow the current of these changes; this preparation is a part of our present social heritage. Other random and dynamic changes occur in situations which are not socially established and for which the members have not been socially prepared. Such situations are abnormal in that participation in them involves a denial of what the participants have been taught to consider as social realities. For just as the maladjusted individual may in the effort to achieve an adjustment break away from his social training and see snakes where he has been taught to see none, so numbers of maladjusted people may during the course of an interaction break away from their social heritage and follow a new and fantastic road to personal, economic, or political salvation.

The Abnormal Situation as Tension-releasing. Abnormal collective behavior, like abnormal individual behavior, appears to be a method of resolving psychological tensions that have arisen as a consequence of maladjustment.¹ All the types of abnormal situations that we

¹ For an interesting account of the release of the tensions of adolescence through

shall discuss appear most frequently during times of social disintegration and among those elements of the population most adversely affected by that disintegration. The spectacular rise of Father Divine,³ of Doctor Townsend, of Huey Long, and of other leaders of "mass movements" during the 1930's was, for example, closely related to the economic hardships caused by the great depression; and all drew their followers from segments of the population (Harlem Negroes, destitute elders, "poor whites") that had been most sorely affected thereby. Furthermore, all such "movements" tend to break down with the gradual reestablishment of some semblance of economic normality.

There is every reason to believe that abnormal collective behavior is a symptom of widespread maladjustment, that it is an attempt, however random, to change or escape from the circumstances that bring about maladjustment, and that it serves, if nothing else, to effect some release of accumulated tensions. Apparently the "circus" aspect of the old Roman practice of pacifying the discontented masses with a little bread and a lot of circus was based upon a recognition of the tension-discharging function of certain forms of collective behavior. We today seem to find a gratifying release from the monotony of normal life—itsself tension-generating—by occasional participation in some more or less commonplace, but to us as individuals unusual, form of collective activity—such as shouting ourselves hoarse at a political rally, a football game, or a prize fight and dancing, laughing, and drinking ourselves weary at a night club or the like.

THE AUDIENCE FANATIQUE

In some social systems, it has been the practice to hold ecstatic rituals under culturally indicated circumstances. Ordinarily the members of the situation, starting as an audience under the leadership of a magician or priest, have gradually become activated until, at the climax of the ritual, they have reached a condition in which the usual social restraints upon behavior have become inoperative. The primitive war dance, for example, was a magic ritual that was supposed to frighten the guardian spirits of the enemy, to appease those of the dancers, and thereby to ensure success. What it actually did, of course, was to make the tribal members more responsive to leadership and less responsive to painful

abnormal collective behavior, see "A recent epidemic of hysteria in a Louisiana high school" (E. A. Schuler and V. J. Parenton, 1943). For the story of a "mental epidemic" among a group of women who were below the level of the general American population in educational and economic status, see "The 'phantom anesthetist' of Matoon" (D. M. Johnson, 1945).

³ For a discussion of the rise of Father Divine, the Oxford Group, and the Townsend Plan, see *The psychology of social movements* (H. Cantril, 1941).

stimuli. Through audience interstimulation the suggestibility of each member was increased to the point at which the war chief could secure almost automatic response to his commands. His hysterical followers would obey without regard for their personal safety.

The occurrence of the primitive war dance was institutionally specified. In the modern world, the closest approach to an activated audience that is customary, recurrent, and socially prepared for is the auction. In the auction situation the members are pitted one against the other, and a form of interaction that encourages the members to buy things they will not want an hour later or to pay prices they would not have paid at a department store is thereby induced. The interaction of the members of the auction situation is, however, passive and "rational" in comparison with that of the primitive war dance.

Most nearly approaching the degree of activation achieved in the war dance is the interaction that occurs in the audience *fanatique*. With the possible exception of the semireligious³ and regular outbursts of such sects as the Holy Rollers and of the Negroes in our deep South, there is nothing recurrent or characteristic about the appearance of the audience *fanatique*. This situation thrives on discontent—economic, social, or physical; but the inception of an audience *fanatique* is almost entirely dependent on the whim and fancy of evangelical leadership.

Evangelical Meetings. Typical of the audience *fanatique* is the condition to which evangelists⁴ frequently lead their congregations in "saving their souls" or in "healing" their bodies. The evangelistic harangue makes its greatest appeal to the disgruntled, the thrill-seeking, the unoccupied, the unhappy, and the discouraged members of a community. By the skillful use of the simplest stereotypes, religious and patriotic, the evangelist converts his listeners to the acceptance of the idea that he represents superhuman forces. Since the audience members have seldom been socially trained to the acceptance of this idea, considerable dependence is placed on audience interstimulation, through which leadership stimuli may be intensified to such a degree that they become psychologically imperative. The evangelist initiates a pattern of interaction

³ Psychological studies of the religious aspects of the audience *fanatique* can be found in the following: *A psychological study of religious conversion* (W. L. Jones, 1937); "Economic distress and religious experiences: a study of the Holy Rollers" (A. T. Boisen, 1939); "Peyote and the Indian" (D. McNickle, 1943); *The Jehovah's witnesses* (H. H. Stroup, 1945); *Revivalism in America* (W. W. Sweet, 1944); and *Black gods of the metropolis; Negro religious cults of the urban north* (A. H. Fauset 1944). See also H. W. Schneider's article "Religious revivals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 363-366).

⁴ A description of the methods of one of the leading evangelists of the interwar period of this century is given in *Sister Aimee* (N. B. Mavity, 1931).

among the audience members, guides it toward acceptance of his "divine" or almost divine leadership, and, this accomplished, leads the members of the audience in whatever direction he desires. Few are the individuals who possess the superb showmanship that is necessary to make temporary religious fanatics out of the relatively stolid members who are likely to assemble in tent or temple, but these few are remarkably effective.

Skill in developing audience fanaticism has been directed to various ends. It has been said that the late Billy Sunday often used his skill to divert the attention of striking laborers from their grievances against their employers. He was encouraged to evangelize a community that was torn by industrial strife and thereby to arouse workers to such an interest in saving their souls that they would forget to be concerned about wages and conditions of labor. Under the manipulation of political evangelists, political rallies and conventions have been swung over the rather vague line that distinguishes a conversion audience from an audience *fanatique*.

THE UNCOORDINATED RIOT SITUATION⁵

The audience *fanatique* follows a specific leader, who guides the interaction into rather well-defined and hence predictable channels. The leadership of some abnormal situations, however, is as shifting as is that of the game situation and as unpredictable as is that of the fad; and the pattern of interaction spreads until the actions of all members of the group are quite similar to those of the leader. Such is the nature of uncoordinated rioting, possibly the most senseless and meaningless behavior in which men indulge.

Mimicry in the Brawl. The key to the character of the uncoordinated riot situation is found in the nature of the leadership process. By analogy, the reactions of the members of the situation to the one who initiates action are like those of psychopathic individuals who merely repeat what is said to them; but the behavior that is mimicked in such a riot is anything but verbal, and the results are far more displeasing. The behavior that is mimicked may take any one of a number of forms. The process may be illustrated by the relatively common barroom brawl. Perhaps the men are seamen, laborers just out of mine or factory, or a heterogeneous collection of men from various walks of

⁵ The term "crowd" has been used so loosely that we shall avoid it here. Martin, for example, uses the term to include relatively noninteracting aggregates of people, certain types of audiences, panic situations, uncoordinated and coordinated riots, and even the pattern of revolution. See *The behavior of crowds* (E. D. Martin, 1920). See also Chap. XIV in *Social learning and imitation* (N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, 1941).

life. Their normal behavior is peaceful enough. They drift in and get a drink, talk with friends or friendly strangers, and then drift out again. But, as every bartender knows, these normally peaceful men may need nothing more than an example to set them to cracking one another's heads for no better reason than that one of their number begins fighting with another. A heated argument between two erstwhile friends which culminates in an exchange of blows may be the relatively innocent starting point for an uncoordinated riot in which many men are injured and considerable property is destroyed.

The moment that overt conflict appears between two men, the bartender or his bouncer⁶ may assume leadership of the men who are assembled around the bar. If he does not and if no one steps in as a self-appointed representative of peace and order, others may mimic the combatants and begin a riot. Audience participation usually starts with a good-humored taking of sides on the part of the noncombative members of the situation; then comes a rapid following of the argument pattern suggested by the combatants and a quick culmination in indiscriminate attack upon one another. The original combatants are leaders only in the sense that they set a pattern to be taken up by those around them. They are not leaders in the sense in which we have previously used the term.

The interaction that takes place in the uncoordinated riot has no focal point, *i.e.*, it is not polarized. Once such a riot is under way, it is, therefore, usually impossible for any single individual to get the attention of the members of the situation and thus secure control over them. Only physical exhaustion or the introduction of some superior physical force will terminate the situation. In view of this fact, all those who deal with congregations of men, particularly men of the floating type who are poorly disciplined and more or less maladjusted, must be riot conscious and ready to take command of the situation at the first indication of trouble. Dance-hall, saloon, flophouse, and other bouncers are employed to check a disturbance at its inception. If they let open conflict spread from one set of combatants to another, the situation will get beyond control.

Uncoordinated riots may at times be expressive of underlying tensions, as is the case when difficult economic conditions have led to general dis-

⁶ The bouncer simply evicts troublemakers by force. Lacking a bouncer, the old-time bartender might "organize" a potential riot into a harmless situation. When two men passed from argument to open conflict, the bartender jumped into the role of referee. By the quick command "Give them room, boys!" and by other proper actions he made a show of the impromptu battle and put his other customers in the role of spectators. The situation then became one of an audience, with the members focalized upon the combatants rather than upon one another.

content and uncertainty. Chronically maladjusted classes have in some instances indulged in rather periodic rioting among themselves as a release for their tensions.[†] During times of war, soldiers and sailors frequently express their long-standing maladjustments to the conditions and dangers of military life through rioting, either among themselves or in association with civilians.

Uncoordinated riots usually occur among people who are somewhat accustomed to settling their personal differences by rough-and-ready methods. The waterfront dives in any large port have a heavy incidence of uncoordinated rioting. It must not be supposed, however, that such rioting is a pastime unknown to the "cultured" members of society. Not even the highest class of night club or other amusement place in which people are not organized into an audience is riotproof. Wherever and whenever people congregate and yet lack effective organization, they are capable of following the suggestion of any two who decide to fight it out in public. Effective organization may arise through congeniality, as in a gathering of people in the park on a sunny afternoon; in conventional factors, as at a garden party; or through leadership, as in the audience. Something interesting to do may of itself be sufficient to prevent susceptibility to rioting, as is the case when people are interested in play in an amusement park.

THE PANIC SITUATION

Although the other characteristics of a sudden crisis situation are usually quite different from those of the uncoordinated riot, the leadership process may be of the same mimicking order. Abnormal circumstances, such as fire in a theater, listing of a ship at sea, or earthquake or, during times of war, a bombing affecting people in crowded streets, are unanticipated and are all too often unprepared for. Everyone is more

[†] Such rioting has been, for example, an important form of Sunday recreation during the past century for the poor of some of our large cities. See K. Smellie's article "Riot" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 386-388).

The following are a few of the many vital, widespread, and long-lived riots of American history: the Negro Riots, Philadelphia, 1838; the Native American Riots, continuous for three months in 1844; the Abolitionist Riots preceding the Civil War; the Draft Riots of 1863 in New York City; the violent rioting that was due to prolonged economic difficulties in the larger cities in the 1870's; and Chicago's destructive Haymarket Riot in 1886.

Characteristic of the uncoordinated riots of recent years was that which occurred in New York's Harlem in March, 1935 (*Time*, Apr. 1, 1935, 12-13); the Harlem riots of August, 1943 (H. Orlansky, 1943; K. B. Clark, 1944; K. B. Clark and J. Barker, 1945); the Detroit riots of June, 1943 (A. M. Lee and N. D. Humphrey, 1943); and the VJ Day riots in San Francisco, in which soldiers, sailors, and civilians riotously celebrated the end of the war with Japan.

or less startled and aroused for action but is incapable of achieving immediately a pattern of adjustment to the circumstances. Technically we might say that the members of the situation are unprepared to react adequately to the stimuli. They are, for example, familiar with the sight and smell of smoke but not with smoke-in-theater. If by any chance they have previously experienced this latter combination of factors, they will have learned, not to depart in an orderly and systematic fashion from the presence of the noxious stimuli, but to be panic-stricken (W. Trotter, 1940).

A few moments after smoke is evident in a theater, a moment after it becomes apparent that something is wrong with the ship, or the instant after the first quake has passed or the first bomb has dropped is the "psychological moment" for the appearance of responses that may be imitated. The attention of everyone is on the new circumstance, everyone is ready to act, and everyone is for the moment restive. Unless leadership steps in and achieves a temporary regimentation (by, perhaps, the forceful command "Stand still!"), the first one to act in an imitable way sets the pattern for all.

Theater Panics. Before the days of fireproof theater construction, fires in theaters were not uncommon.⁸ Frequently more people died from being trampled to death than from suffocation or burns. No matter how many or how wide the doors, they might be so much jammed by the pressure of the panic-stricken audience that few people could escape. After the tragic Iroquois Theater fire in Chicago in 1903,⁹ theater audiences in this country were for many years so fire-conscious that it was dangerous for an actor to smoke as a part of his characterization, since someone was likely to yell "Fire!" and start a stampede for the exits. Years of advertising the impressive but by no means completely effective asbestos curtain were required to make people forget the hazards of a theater fire. It would seem, therefore, that people are often not so much unprepared for crisis as they are prepared for panic. Quite possibly

⁸ Most panics are initiated in direct-contact situations. A notable exception was that panic set off in 1938 among the war-apprehensive people of the Eastern Seaboard by the radio broadcast—in reporting form—of a play in which the region was supposed to be under attack by a military force from Mars. In this instance, there was no single leadership pattern that the listeners could mimic. Instead, each direct-contact group formed its own little panic situation. See *The invasion from Mars* (H. Cantril *et al.*, 1940) for a detailed study of this unusual panic.

For broader treatments of panic behavior, see "Panic states and their treatment" (H. W. Brosin, 1943); "Causes and control of riot and panic" (H. Cantril, 1943); and "The literature on panic" (A. L. Strauss, 1944).

⁹ Two great fire panics are described graphically in *World's greatest calamities: the Baltimore fire and Chicago theatre horror* (H. D. Northrop, 1904).

the tales of theater, ship, earthquake, and other disasters help to make the members of a crisis situation susceptible to panic leadership.

The responses of the members of an audience in a theater to the cry "Fire!" are of the same order as are the responses of the men in a bar-room to the two fighters who set off an uncoordinated riot. The members of the theater audience mimic the actions of the one who overtly expresses his panic and communicate panic one to another, much as they may previously have communicated their appreciation of the program. This panic, which can be objectively described as an effort to get away—to run—is amplified, like applause, through interstimulation.

War and Panic. The German army, which was the first to apply modern principles of social psychology to military combat, did everything possible to induce panic behavior among the civilians of France during the campaign of 1940. The so-called "war of nerves" was intended to mystify, impress, and weary the populace. It served to prepare the French people for panic reaction to the crisis that came at the first breaking through by the Germans. Using many ingenious devices—such as the planting among the civilian population of traitors who, at the signal, were to set off rumors of impending catastrophe or to provide flight behavior as the pattern of action to be mimicked—the Germans succeeded in filling the roads with hordes of panic-stricken refugees. Further chaos was created by air attack upon these masses, with the result that the French and British military found the roads impassable and could not, therefore, move supplies and troops up to the battle zone.¹⁰

Prevention of Panics. Just as the uncoordinated riot may be checked by the bartender, panic may be checked by effective leadership. The usual technique in the theater in those days when fire was a real hazard was to keep the play going on as though nothing had happened. If by this means the members of the audience could be held in their places until they had to some degree become accustomed to the idea of danger, panic could be averted. Sometimes the orchestra would strike up the national anthem, which would almost automatically bring the audience members to their feet and hold them in their places. This technique was most effective. We have all been trained to stand still when the

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of the German army's application of social psychology to military conquest, see *German psychological warfare* (L. Farago and L. F. Gittler, eds., 1941); and "Selecting the Nazi officer" (H. L. Ansbacher and K. R. Nichols, 1941). For accounts of the efforts of American social psychologists in war work, see *Psychological effects of war on citizen and soldier* (R. D. Gillespie, 1942); "Social psychology and the civilian war effort" (G. W. Allport and H. R. Veltfort, 1943); "Social psychologists in national war agencies" (D. G. Marquis, 1944); "Social psychology and the civilian war effort" (G. R. Schmeidler and G. W. Allport, 1944); and "American social psychology and the war" (D. Cartwright, 1946).

national anthem is being played ; and when baffled by unprecedented crisis conditions, we usually respond to anything that is familiar.

Theater panics are rare today, but the danger of panic in certain other places has not appreciably diminished (H. R. Veltfort and G. E. Lee, 1943). Barring prevention of crises, the only means of preventing panic is to provide antipanic leadership, a provision that is not easily accomplished. It is the legal right and duty of a ship's captain to assume regimental command over his crew and passengers in times of crisis, but this legal right does not of course give him actual power of leadership. Unless the members of a crisis situation have previously been given long regimental training and are, therefore, unfailingly obedient to the commands of the designated leader, antipanic leadership will at best be fragile. Nevertheless the British demonstrated during the German blitz and later when London and its environs came under attack by buzz bombs that the most hazardous event can be prepared for and the outbreak of panic thereby prevented if that event is recurrent. The first few air raids of World War II on Britain did induce panics, but organization of the civilian population into air-raid blocks with wardens, etc., soon provided sufficient regimentation to make possible orderly collective adjustment to subsequent bombings.

Mutual Aid. Stories of ship disasters are usually romanticized to fit the women-and-children-first tradition. The fact is that men, particularly the stronger men, are far more likely to survive than are either women or children, although there are authenticated instances in which people under crisis conditions have acted in the most self-sacrificing way. In ship, mine, earthquake, and other sudden crises men have been known to work together at the risk of their individual welfare and even to sacrifice themselves so that the majority might be saved. Such incidents have been made the basis for the theory of natural group loyalty or mutual aid. For every recorded case of mutual aid there are, however, many of brutal and mutual destruction.

Apparently, the behavior of people under crisis conditions is determined almost entirely by the nature of the leadership that happens to arise. Self-interested leadership results in general panic. Heroic leadership leads to heroic action, which may or may not be collectively expedient. Too frequently heroic behavior is stupidly melodramatic. It has happened that, when women and children have been given precedence in a ship disaster, the heroic males have packed them into boats and set them adrift without men to man the boats. On the other hand, it has also happened that a leader has arisen—sometimes an inconspicuous member of the crew or an otherwise undomineering passenger—who has organized the people around him in a most efficient manner. Under such leadership

in crisis conditions people are capable of Herculean efforts.¹¹ But unled, except by the example of a panic-stricken person, they become maddened beasts. In the crisis more than in any other situation there is need for sane individual leadership. Undoubtedly it was the calm, forceful leadership of Prime Minister Winston Churchill which, more than any other single factor, prevented the rise of panic among the people of the United Kingdom when, in 1940, the unexpected fall of France and the incredibly disastrous flight from Dunkerque subjected them to the threat of imminent invasion.

A famine, flood, or plague may constitute a crisis and may result in panic. Rapid social changes also precipitate crisis conditions; and if panic is to be avoided, forceful individual leadership must operate to guide people through social transition. It is a social crisis, or what can be made to appear as a social crisis, that makes possible the rise of a political dictator. Furthermore, as we have already suggested, the dynamic character of our present milieu permits, indeed necessitates, the appearance of dominating and dynamic individual leadership in many walks of contemporary life. This line of thought takes us toward the problem of revolutionary leadership; but before considering it, we must turn our attention to two types of situations—coordinated riots and mass movements—which are the materials from which revolutions are fabricated.

COORDINATED RIOT SITUATIONS

The Mob. The term "mob" usually implies violent overt action, destruction of life and property, and temporariness. We have designated actions of this order in which leadership operates by mimicry as uncoordinated riots. In the uncoordinated riot, action is undirected. In contrast are those situations in which violent, destructive, and transitory action is guided by a single member who is followed rather than mimicked. Such situations may be termed coordinated riots and the members of them true mobs.¹²

¹¹ The seemingly superhuman strength that is sometimes observed in crisis situations appears to be due at least in part to three factors. The exciting forces, mediated by the sympathetic autonomies, cause the adrenal glands to release more than the customary amount of adrenalin into the blood stream. This compound acts as a whip. The release of blood sugar keeps the individual from quickly fatiguing. Furthermore, when attention is shifted to more exciting stimuli, a hypalgesia (lessening of response to pain) occurs; and a man is not so likely to stop his efforts because of pain as he would under ordinary conditions.

¹² The term "mob," like that of "crowd," has been applied to almost every conceivable type of social situation, to the confusion of students of social situations. L. L. Bernard in his article "Mob" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 552-554) distinguishes between the "purposive and active" and the "confused and random" types of mobs. Apparently he has in mind the distinction that we have drawn between the coordi-

Lynching. For most peoples the collective killing of a human being is acceptable only when it is the consequence of institutional procedures, and mob killing is socially disapproved. During the early days in the Far West lynching was, perhaps, a conventional substitute for due process of the law in dealing with horse thieves and certain other antisocial persons. To the extent that the lynching actually served in lieu of usual forms of crime suppression, it can be considered as simply an atypical form of collective behavior. But the sporadic lynching of Negroes in the Southeast and the rarer lynching of white kidnappers or other public enemies are definitely abnormal patterns of interaction.¹³

The technique of the lynching mob is today almost exclusively American. Many lynchings are in a sense protests against locally unsatisfactory judicial systems. But they never cure the source of social difficulty and may thus be considered merely as vengeance wreaked upon a symbol of locally undesirable social conditions. In certain regions of the United States there is a constant tension between poor whites and equally poor Negroes. Although their poverty is traceable to complex social factors,¹⁴ the whites tend to blame their plight on the Negroes. The Negroes provide a villain for the social drama in which the whites

nated and the uncoordinated riot. Following somewhat the lead set by Tarde, Le Bon devoted considerable attention to what is primarily the coordinated riot type of situation. See *The psychology of revolution* (G. Le Bon, 1913) and *The crowd: a study of the popular mind* (G. Le Bon, 1910).

¹³ F. W. Coker points out that modern lynchings should not be confused with the extralegal punishment of criminals under early frontier conditions ("Lynching," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 9, 639-643). Today lynching is not a substitute for law and order. At best it is a social protest against the delays and uncertainties of the processes of the law; at worst it is a brutal form of recreation.

All lynchings receive implicitly, if not openly, a degree of social sanction. The San Jose, California, affair of 1934 was given favorable mention by many leading citizens and even by the governor of the state. And in many parts of the South the whites quite freely express the view that lynching is the only method of keeping their group in power. The activities in Nazi Germany purporting to "protect the purity of Nordic blood" were much the same sort of phenomenon.

¹⁴ Coefficients of correlation of approximately $-.63$ have been claimed between the numbers of lynchings that occurred between 1882 and 1930 in fourteen Southern states and the Ayres indexes of economic activity in those states. Between the number of lynchings and the per-acre value of cotton the figure was at first thought to be even higher. Hovland and Sears, who gathered the data, interpreted them in terms of "displaced aggression." The "poor whites," adversely affected by hard times and unable to improve their lot, relieve their frustrations in aggressive acts against the innocent Negro (C. I. Hovland and R. R. Sears, 1940). However, the treatment of the Hovland-Sears data has since been questioned (A. Mintz, 1946). It now appears that the relationship between the indexes and the number of lynchings is far lower ($-.34$). See also Chap. XV of *Social learning and imitation* (N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, 1941).

find their part a tragic one. The whites are therefore ready to direct the force of all their discontent upon any Negro who gives or seems to give just cause for wrath. Should a Negro rape a white girl or should, as occasionally happens, a white girl make the charge simply to gain attention, that Negro may become a tangible villain in the minds of the whites.

Ordinarily the first stage in the crystallization of the dramatic form that may be discerned in any Negro lynching is the arrest, by accredited officials, of some Negro male. Rumors soon spread among the whites of the community to the effect that they must play an active part as hero. To see that the officials do their duty, men with nothing more interesting to do drift down to the courthouse and there provide an audience for anyone who feels most inclined to speak. This may be the father of the girl, a political opponent of the local sheriff, or someone else with a bone to pick. He harangues the group, usually upon the need for keeping "niggers in their place," and may deliberately direct his efforts to the formation of a lynching party. Whether he does or not, there is always the chance that his audience will become activated and that leadership will be snatched by someone who cries "Let's lynch the black . . . !" All too frequently the activated audience then becomes a mob, responsive to the loudest voice. Since many of the members have previously participated in lynchings and all know the technique of lynching, they can follow the leader without difficulty. If they blunder and consequently strangle rather than hang their victim, such a detail escapes notice in the excitement of the moment. Since they have destroyed but a symbol of their discontent and have in no way changed the cause, they have accomplished nothing except perhaps a further intimidation of the Negroes.

Social Disorganization and Mob Violence. There is a close relationship between critical social circumstances and mob violence.¹⁵ Every race, labor, and political riot is preceded by a long period of increasing covert friction between two racial (actually cultural) groups, between dominant employers and subservient laborers,¹⁶ or between the politically

¹⁵ Following the liberation of France from the Germans, there occurred many mob attacks on individuals who were accused of having collaborated too willingly with the German conquerors. Prostitutes, for example, were in many instances stripped of their clothing and driven through the streets "in shame" for having profited by the occupation while respectable women suffered. After the fall of Italy there occurred a long period of sporadic rioting, some of which was no doubt fostered by communist leadership, but all of which expressed the long-standing misery of the participants.

¹⁶ In the days of the hard-driving captains of sailing vessels, revolt on the part of seamen was a constant hazard. To such revolt the term "mutiny" was applied. F. L. Schuman ("Mutiny," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 166-167) defines mutiny as "pro-

dominant and the politically subordinated. This friction grows out of functional breakdown of the old system of relationships and is usually a concomitant of underlying social changes. Ultimately the time comes when the members of one faction feel that their survival is dependent on the annihilation of the other. Even then, overt breach may be long postponed for the simple reason that no one member of the disgruntled group can with impunity act as an individual to protect or to regain his "rights." During periods of tension, sporadic one-man wars may occur; but these can be dealt with quickly and easily by the police or other recognized agents of society.

Effective organization of individual discontent is usually precipitated by some rash act on the part of the "enemy." This is the incident that is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the cause. It may consist of refusal to listen to the complaints of the disgruntled, of an added insult—as a lowering of wage scales—or of a savage and enraging burst of gunfire. It need not be important in itself; it is simply the last straw. This final straw precipitates the crisis and makes it possible for leaders to arise—first, perhaps, as conversion-audience leaders rather than as leaders in overt action against the oppressors. In such a crisis a leader may weld the disgruntled into a mob that is capable of intense violence against the common "enemy."

Race and Labor Riots. Following the northern migration of Negro labor, race riots occurred in a number of Northern cities. White laborers had come to attribute their discontent to the presence of the cheap Negro labor; and when tension became acute, some minor incident precipitated rioting between the two racial groups. In central Europe, rioting against the Jews has long been a favorite device of political leaders. When discontent among the non-Jews threatens the political *status quo*, a pogrom is instigated in the hope that tensions will be dissipated in attack upon the Jews rather than upon the political leaders.

Labor riots¹⁷ have occurred quite frequently since the advent of industrialism. The riots of poor and embittered laborers in Elizabethan England provide some of the most depressing pages of Western history. The rise of labor unionism, with its appointed leaders and bargaining tactics, has acted to reduce the danger of sporadic rioting; but in periods of general economic difficulty the unions usually lose their

test behavior on the part of subordinates whose normal deferential attitude toward commanders . . . [has] broken down," a definition that applies equally well to revolt against political leadership on land.

¹⁷ The great railroad strike of 1877 is described in *Annals of the great strikes in the United States* (J. A. Dacus, 1877). A more recent review of American strikes is given in *Industrial conflict* (G. W. Hartmann and T. Newcomb, eds., 1939).

hold upon the workers, and rioting occurs among the more desperate. The labor riot differs from the race riot only in that the "enemy" is more concentrated, consisting as it does of a single employer or group of employers and their hirelings. The police and even the state militia may belong to this last category, in which case the labor riot takes on the appearance of a political riot. The action of rioting laborers is limited only by the ingenuity of the self-appointed leaders and the endurance of the mob. There is no necessary relationship between the ability of these leaders as riot leaders and their skill as military or political strategists. Although prestige may assist a man in securing leadership of rioting laborers, the primary qualities for leadership of any riot are probably a strident voice, inability to think beyond the exigencies of the moment, and a powerful, thus confidence-inspiring, physique.

The organization of people in a riot situation is always subject to quick and unpredictable repolarization. The coordinated riot may degenerate into an uncoordinated one, and it is by no means uncommon for a riot leader to find that someone has usurped his place as leader and that he is being chased rather than followed.

THE MASS MOVEMENT

When a series of abnormal situations arise upon the basis of a fantastic idea or belief, the result is a "mass movement,"¹⁸ which can be most readily described as a collective flight from reality. Perhaps the most spectacular and prolonged mass movement of recorded history was the medieval Crusades, during which a significant proportion of the population of western Europe migrated toward the Holy Land, inspired by the fixed belief that peace and prosperity would be granted all Christian peoples if the Infidels could be driven from Jerusalem.

Here in America every period of political and economic crisis has fostered at least one mass movement. Many of these have centered around some new interpretation of the divine will. The witch-hunting that swept over the New England colonies during the 1690's is perhaps the earliest on record. During the critical times following the Revolution, a great religious revival occurred among the destitute people of what were then the western parts of the newly organized country. And time after time since, groups of malcontents have gathered around some

¹⁸ When, as frequently happens, the movement centers around the person of a single leader—a messiah—it is more properly termed a messianic than a mass movement. See "Messianism" by H. Kohn (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 356-363). The distinction is not, however, adhered to in the sociopsychological literature; Cantril, for example, considers the movement that centered around Father Divine a "mass" movement (H. Cantril, 1941). See also "Acculturation and messianic movements" (B. Barber, 1941); and *Mass persuasion* (R. K. Merton et al., 1946).

psychopath who promised to show the way to earthly perfection. Many of our various religious sects were started by such "messiahs" and began as fanatical mass movements.¹⁹ Of these the rise of Mormonism has perhaps been the most startling and had the most profound and lasting consequences.

Although all mass movements have a quasi-religious element—the "idea" involves new and previously unrecognized "laws" of life—not all are concerned with religious salvation.²⁰ Moreover, even the religious mass movement may be at basis an attempt to solve some pressing economic or political problem. As was mentioned earlier, the economic difficulties that were precipitated by the stock-market crash of 1929 gave rise to a considerable number and variety of mass movements. These involved quasi-religious factors, but all the movements were directed toward the material improvement of the people involved. Thus the followers of Doctor Townsend came to believe that he had discovered a new law of economic life and that he was a worker of economic miracles. His "plan," however, was directed toward providing, through a fantastic pension scheme, all the old people of the country with a high material standard of living. An even larger religious element was involved in the movement that developed around "Father" Divine. This movement sucked in and further impoverished a great many Northern Negroes and even a few whites. They joined Divine's "Heavens" under the delusion that he was God and that, once they had entered one of his earthly heavens, they would live in permanent peace and perpetual prosperity.

The economic crisis of the early 1930's precipitated the overt expression of many preexisting tensions in Europe, too. In Germany limited mass movements had been appearing all through the preceding decade. It was there, for example, that the back-to-nature, so-called "youth movement" first made its appearance. Repercussions of this particular movement reached America in the form of the nudist cult, a movement

¹⁹ Not all fanatical mass movements begin with a new messiah. Once in a generation or so many Japanese are struck with a sudden frenzy in which worship of the traditional sun goddess is the focal point. Excesses of all kinds occur, wild over-activity and pilgrimages to certain shrines (E. H. Norman, 1945).

²⁰ One recent, localized mass movement centered around the idea that a "master cell"—presumably organic—had been discovered which could impart to water wondrous health-giving qualities and ability to increase the fertility of land. For an extensive news report on this movement, see "The miracle of Middleboro" (*Time*, Aug. 2, 1948, pp. 56-59).

The earmarks of a cult can be clearly seen in the recent adoration of Sister Kenny (J. E. Hulett, Jr., 1945), who has been set apart as a heroine, opposed by the villainous scientists.

based upon the idea that the way to health and happiness lay in removal of one's clothing.²¹ But one element of a profound mass movement, nudism in Germany was less significant in itself than as an indication of the discontent of the people and a forerunner of what was to come. With the further sharpening of discontent after 1929, the conditions were propitious for a great politico-religious upheaval; and it was around the person of Hitler and the ideologies of Nazism that this occurred. Securing its early support on the basis of mass fanaticism, the Nazi party soon pushed on to effect an insidious revolution in German economic, political, and religious life.²²

THE REVOLUTION

In the wider sense, the revolution is sociological rather than socio-psychological. It is a long series of events through which major changes in a social system may be effected. But the preface to revolutionary violence is usually one or a number of mass movements, and that violence invariably takes the form of coordinated political riots.²³ Mass movements and political riots always have their revolutionary implications, although a given mass movement may have no lasting political effects and many riots are necessary before revolutionary changes in a political system can be effected.

Leadership in Revolution. Revolution is not of itself a change in the social system. It is but a change in leadership, on which depends the attainment, largely through trial and error, of the change in conditions. The layman is inclined to believe that the presence of radical leaders makes for revolution. The fact is that radical leaders simply

²¹ Interestingly enough there was a revival of the nudistic way to salvation in early postwar France. Perhaps excessive exposure of the body to sunlight was the only luxury that war-impoorished French women could indulge in. At any event, there occurred during the summer of 1946 a rather fantastic trend toward nudity in public.

²² For an account of the rise of the Nazi party as a social movement, see Chaps. VIII and IX in *The psychology of social movements* (H. Cantril, 1941).

²³ The years following the economic crisis of 1929 witnessed a considerable outbreak in coordinated riots. In Germany, Italy, France, England, America, and elsewhere, riots of a politico-economic character were frequent and prolonged. In Paris, for example, general street rioting between communists and socialists, between each of these and the "general public," and between all of these and the police followed the revelations of political corruption in the Stavisky affair (A. Werth, 1934). Severe rioting occurred between labor and the police and between civil servants and the police following a general reduction in wages ordered by the French government in July and August of 1935. In America there were farmer riots (mainly against mortgage foreclosure) during 1933 (C. Hicks, 1934; and N. C. Meier, G. H. Mennenga, and H. J. Stoltz, 1941) and riots accompanying the San Francisco general strike of July, 1934.

direct or attempt to direct mass movements and coordinate or attempt to coordinate a large number of riots, both labor and political. The radical is no more the cause of revolution than the rudder is the cause of the motion of a ship. Like the ship's rudder, the radical leader endeavors to direct the surging mass.²⁴

Although political riots are generated by malfunctioning of a social system, they are invariably directed toward the destruction of persons or classes of persons, who serve as a symbol of the causes of discontent. Revolting masses do not relate their discontent to the social system itself but to the people who represent that system—police, army, aristocracy, or whatnot. It is the established political and economic elite who are for the masses the tangible "villains" of the drama in which they themselves play a tragic part. The rioting is therefore directed toward a destruction of a symbol of the social system rather than toward reformation of that system. Only when conditions have become so intolerable that revolt follows revolt in disorderly succession does radical leadership representing a new philosophy of political and economic life become significant. Then and only then may it grasp leadership and direct revolt toward something more fundamental than a change in the personnel of political and economic leadership.²⁵

Once one has escaped from the rather naive idea that radical leaders make revolt and thus revolution, it becomes evident that it is the failure of reactionary leadership to adjust to changing conditions that results eventually in the overthrow of such leadership. It was, for example, the traditionalism of the French aristocrats rather than their greedy parasitism that led to the French Revolution and to their downfall. Economic changes had brought about the growth of a new class—the bourgeois or middle—which was refused political recognition. Crushed between economic pressures from behind and the unyielding wall of po-

²⁴ It is true, of course, that the professional revolutionist endeavors to excite as well as direct the populace. But if there is no social sore already at the festering point, his efforts will usually be in vain. In a period such as our own, when the struggle for political and economic leadership is intense, it is perhaps natural for men to view with alarm everything they dislike or do not understand. But leaders and leadership, whatever their nature, are an integral part of a complex pattern of forces; and propaganda, a name for one of the methods by which new leaders rise to power, cannot be looked upon as the chief villain of the drama of social change.

²⁵ A distinction must be drawn between revolution and the kind of "palace revolt" that has so long been a substitute for popular elections in some Latin American countries, and between revolution and conquest disguised as revolution. The Nazi conquest of Austria was aided by Austrian traitors who claimed to represent a revolution of the masses but who were in fact stooges for the Germans, who conquered by threat of arms. Subsequently, the Russians used the same "revolutionary front" technique in their politico-military conquests after World War II.

litical traditionalism in front, this class grew more and more discontented. Rioting was precipitated by an incident and spread throughout the industrial cities of France. For many days the movement had a common enemy, the aristocracy, but no single leadership. In time some few men rose to domination here and there, men prepared by training in radical doctrines to coordinate riotous action. They brought a form of order out of chaos and directed revolt toward revolutionary accomplishment. The Russian Revolution followed much the same pattern.²⁶ The Nazi Revolution in Germany deviated from the pattern only, perhaps, in that it involved more of the mass movement and less of mob violence and in that it led so very rapidly and directly into the ill-fated German endeavor to subjugate other peoples through military conquest.

The part played in revolutions, not by the persons who rise to temporary leadership under riot circumstances, but by radical leaders—men trained in some doctrine of social reconstruction—is indicated by what may happen when no such leadership is available. The Taiping Rebellion in China is a case in point. The social confusion in southern China resulting from the impact of Western industrialism aroused a mass discontent, which by 1850 became so intense that local riots against the persons of government officials were frequent. There was, however, no coordinating philosophy and no trained radical leadership. This left the field of revolutionary leadership open to a religious fanatic, who proceeded to proclaim himself a direct representative of the Christian God. Although he had no plan or program for social reconstruction, he had an intense desire to be ruler of the masses. On the tide of sporadic revolt he swept into power and for years ruled insanely over millions of Chinese people. Possibly his rule was no less expedient than was that of the old imperial government, but in time the people were led to revolt against his leadership.²⁷ The way was then open for reconquest by imperial troops.

Every harassed government fears the "incident" that will inflame the masses. The incident need not be important in itself. It is adequate if it can be dramatized into a convincing illustration of the fact that the recognized leaders, political or economic, are villains and that the victims of the incident are symbolic heroines to be rescued by the heroic action of the rioters. Thus the execution in America in the summer of 1927 of Sacco and Vanzetti, publicized "martyrs" to Communism, was sufficient excuse for violent rioting on the part of Paris malcontents.

²⁶ Suggestive of the sociopsychological aspects of revolution are *Leaders, dreamers, and rebels* (R. Fülöp-Miller, 1935); "On the psychology of modern revolution" (K. Riezler, 1943); and "Causes of revolution" (L. Gottschalk, 1944). See also *American radicalism, 1865-1901* (C. Mc. Destler, 1946).

²⁷ See *Gordon in China* (B. M. Allen, 1933).

If those who are discontented can be quickly provided with a victim, and it makes no particular difference who the victim is or was, the climax may be resolved to the advantage of those whose leadership is threatened. In this connection, it is again pertinent to point out how universally we think and act in terms of the dramatic form. People will return to their homes gratified, as from a satisfying motion picture, after they have lynched a Negro, all ignorant of the fact that the Negro was but a symbol of and not the basis for their previous discontent. Having witnessed or having heard about the defeat of the villain who may have been nothing more than a martyr to the cause of those in power, people who have long been dissatisfied with their governmental leaders may feel that they will now live happily ever after. The Russian practice of holding public "purge" trials, during which men who have been in positions of authority "confess" to crimes against the state, is considered by some students of Russia to be based upon this peculiar characteristic of men in the mass. According to this view, when tensions accumulate dangerously, the government distracts attention from the real causes of discontent by throwing the blame for conditions on a select number of "traitors" to Communism, who become political whipping boys.

RECAPITULATION

The theme of this book is that the individual plays but a small role on a great and crowded stage and that he plays that role largely in accordance with a socially predetermined script.

From his society the individual derives those personality attributes which give him social stature and which adapt him to nature and to the persons who surround him from birth to death. If his society is a stable one, he will be guided at almost every step; undirected trial and error will play little part in what he does; and his experience will include few important errors.

Should his society, however, be a dynamic, changing one like ours, he will be in painful measure thrown upon his own resources. Since undirected trial and error—apparently his only "natural" means of learning—is largely error, he will often fail to make effective adaptations; and his errors may be fatal. Should he, furthermore, by force of social circumstances be one of those few who are equipped and expected to provide some measure of individual leadership for others, success will depend mainly on his happening to lead them in the direction in which they happen to be going. With some striking exceptions, the individual counts for little in the social scheme of things.

In all this the place of a scientific social psychology should by this time be self-evident. Modern social psychology has disposed of that ancient

argument against social change—that the particular form which a society takes is an expression of man's innate and therefore unmodifiable nature. But modern social psychology has at the same time discovered something of the complexity of the processes by which men are socialized and interact and thereby has disposed also of the idea—so often advanced in one form or another—that society can quickly and easily be perfected if men only "will it."

Today we are in process of change, and a large measure of confusion reigns. We must nevertheless as individuals endeavor to adjust ourselves to social life. In this endeavor sociopsychological knowledge can be of significant assistance. An understanding of the laws of physics may help the individual to invent an efficient water wheel and will certainly prevent him from wasting his time on a perpetual-motion machine. An understanding of even what little is now known of the character and nature of sociopsychological processes may, in a like way, aid the individual in inventing a more adequate pattern of adjustment to the dynamic world around him than that which a disordered society has provided for his use. Such an understanding should at least prevent him from attempting to evade the realities of social life.

APPENDIX

1. Cooley's contribution to the development of social psychology can be traced through the literature. He wrote clearly and convincingly, and many subsequent writers have often borrowed his terms and his concepts and have frequently credited him as the source of the thesis they have elaborated.

It is possible that George Mead contributed fully as much; but the medium of his contribution was the classroom, and the effect of his teaching is not, therefore, subject to historical analysis. Mead wrote little and that badly. He was, however, an inspiring teacher. During the first quarter of this century he developed in the classroom the same point of view as that which Cooley presented in his books. In fact, Mead seems to have carried his analysis of the processes by which society develops human nature much farther than Cooley did and to have given more stress to the situational nature of individual behavior—to that extent anticipating recent trends in sociopsychological thinking.

Mead's system centered on the process of "imitation." But unlike Tarde, Mead considered imitation descriptive of a process rather than explanatory of its consequences. In his terminology, the child takes on, or attempts to take on, the role of the person he is imitating. This role Mead terms the child's *other* (other self). In the course of time the child will take on in succession a great many specific roles, out of which there gradually emerges a fairly well-integrated personality which Mead terms the *generalized other* or *me*. In Chapters VIII and IX the present authors discuss the process under the phrase "learning by example."

Mead's system has been published posthumously under the title *Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (G. H. Mead, 1934). For an evaluation of his contribution by one of his more ardent followers, see "The social psychology of George Mead" (E. Faris, 1937). An attempt to fuse the social psychology of Mead with that of John Dewey can be seen in *The social self* (V. E. Helleberg, 1942).

2. A notion of the history of twentieth-century social psychology can be gained from the following books. They are arranged chronologically in order of their first editions. The chronology will serve to give the student some idea of how recently social psychology has emerged from the preconceptions of the past and a notion of its psychological (*), neurological and psychoanalytical (†), and sociological (§) origins. The list contains the majority of the published works in English that attempt to treat, somewhat broadly, the problem of social psychology. Those by Sprowls and Karpf are studies of social psychology as a science rather than studies in the science.

‡1901 Ellwood, C. A., *Some prolegomena to social psychology*.

Doctoral thesis in which it is argued that social psychology must be the psychological interpretation of group (i.e., cultural) phenomena. This concept has set the boundaries for Ellwood's later works on the subject (listed below).

‡1902 Cooley, C. H., *Human nature and the social order*.

The modern classic in social psychology. Human nature is considered as a

consequence of habits acquired through experience with members of society—thus, as an indirect consequence of the “social order.”

*1908 McDougall, W., *An introduction to social psychology*.

Under the influence of English philosophical and, especially, evolutionary doctrines, McDougall achieved a text that captured the attention of all social theorists and proved convincing to many.

†1908 Ross, E. A., *Social psychology*.

A study of the “planes and currents” within contemporary society. The influence of Tarde is pronounced, both conformity and nonconformity being described as a consequence of behavior imitation.

*1911 Baldwin, J. M., *The individual and society: or psychology and sociology*. This book reflects the practical outlook of a pioneer of the school of functional psychology.

†1917 Ellwood, C. A., *An introduction to social psychology*.

A description, rather than analysis, of sociological phenomena such as “social unity” and “social change.” Certain psychological terms (*e.g.*, the instinctive) loom large.

†1917 Bogardus, E. S., *Essentials of social psychology*.

A brief analysis of “group” phenomena.

*1920 McDougall, W., *The group mind*.

Although published after World War I, most of this—a sequel to his *An introduction to social psychology*—was written before that catastrophe. Its subtitle well describes its contents: *A sketch of the principles of collective psychology with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life and character*.

†1921 Ginsberg, M., *The psychology of society*.

An analysis of the “Great Society” in psychological terminology, mainly of the old instinctive school.

†1922 Freud, S., *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*.

The original psychoanalyst indicates that for him all psychology is a type of social psychology. In this book Freud weaves the theories of Le Bon into his psychoanalytic doctrines.

†1922 Williams, J. M., *Principles of social psychology*.

The author defines social psychology as a science of motives of peoples in social relations. He leans upon the old instinctive theory and endeavors to explain the conflict aspects of social life by resort to motives, interests, and attitudes, without realizing that he finds their origins in the very phenomena by which he explains them.

*1923 Gault, R. H., *Social psychology*.

For its time this text contained good summaries of experiments in the socio-psychological field. In many respects its viewpoint can be considered as a reaction to the philosophy of McDougall, then accepted.

*1924 Allport, F. H., *Social psychology*.

For a time the most read psychological text in the field of social psychology. It catered to those who wished to see the application of experimental method.

†1924 Bernard, L. L., *Instinct: a study in social psychology*.

A vigorous denial of the idea that social behavior can be explained as an expression of biological determinants—instincts—and an effort to set up a behavioristic interpretation of social behavior.

†1924 Bogardus, E. S., *Fundamentals of social psychology*.

An expansion of his earlier work with greater stress upon the training of the

individual through social experience. Such sociological problems as the cultural processes, termed "diffusion," "accommodation," and "assimilation," and such "group" phenomena as fads and fashions, crowds, and mobs are considered in detail. Throughout, the "individual" remains in the background, the "group" in the foreground (2d ed. 1942).

‡1925 Ellwood, C. A., *The psychology of human society*.

An extension of his thesis that social psychology should be "psychological sociology." He claims for the book that it takes up the story of human life where Allport's text leaves off.

‡1925 Znaniecki, F., *The laws of social psychology*.

An attempt to reduce to a few principles the complex phenomena of "group" behavior.

*1925 Dunlap, K., *Social psychology*.

This book can perhaps best be described as an experimental psychologist's views on certain social problems. No attempt has been made to canvass the experimental literature. See *1934 Dunlap, K.

‡1926 Bernard, L. L., *An introduction to social psychology*.

Using, with caution, behavioristic psychology, the author makes a detailed and rather technical analysis of the processes by which the individual acquires out of the social environment (the behavior patterns of the human beings surrounding him) his life adjustment techniques. Difficult to read, this book was perhaps the most penetrating analysis from the sociological approach since Cooley's *Human nature and the social order*.

*1927 Sprowls, J. W., *Social psychology interpreted*.

A study and evaluation of the basic concepts advanced by social psychologists.

‡1927 Young, K., *Source book for social psychology*.

Materials drawn from many sources upon a wide variety of topics ranging from individual differences to public opinion.

‡*1928 Mukerjee, R., and N. N. Sen-Gupta, *Introduction to social psychology*.

In this book an attempt is made to indicate how the mental life of a man is molded by the "group" environment. Although approaching from both the biological and psychological angles, it succeeds mainly in being a sociological treatment. Social organization is stressed.

*1929 Murchison, C., *Social psychology*.

The subtitle—*The psychology of political domination*—suggests the contents of the book. It is not intended as an elementary text but rather as a treatise on subjects that have not been much affected by experimentation.

*1929 Ewer, B. C., *Social psychology*.

An attempt to weave the ideas of McDougall and Allport into a unitary synthesis.

*1929 Kantor, J. R., *An outline of social psychology*.

A behavioristic text with particular stress on the development of a theoretical position.

‡1930 Young, K., *Social psychology*.

A critical synthesis of the concepts and materials presented in his *Source book for social psychology*. The field is considered as a study of the "contents" of human behavior, mainly derived from social experience (2d ed., 1944).

*1930 Smith, J. J., *Social psychology*.

A description largely in terms of "the sentiments" (which are supposedly associated with some of the most obvious of social relationships). Subtitled *The psychology of attraction and repulsion*.

‡1931 Folsom, J. K., *Social psychology*.

A continuation of the Cooley thesis but with considerable stress upon motivational analysis. Evidence is drawn from a wide range of sources to support the contention that individual behavior grows out of social experience.

‡1931 Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless, *Social psychology*.

An analysis, mainly in terms of W. I. Thomas' "wishes," of the social behavior of the individual. It represents the then-current social psychology of the so-called "Chicago school" of sociologists.

*1931 Murphy, G., and L. Murphy, *Experimental social psychology*.

This large book (709 pages) stresses the experimental aspects of social psychology. Child study is given far greater attention in this than in most of the texts of this list. The book has little "plot" but is the best compendium in psychological literature of those experimental studies which have a more or less social slant. See *1937 Murphy, G., L. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb.

‡1932 Karpf, F. B., *American social psychology*.

A detailed and critical analysis of the basic concepts that have been advanced by social psychologists, both here and abroad, with consideration of their historical setting and the relation of each concept to the field as a whole.

*1934 Dunlap, K., *Civilized life*.

This is essentially a revision of Dunlap's earlier text.

‡1934 Myerson, A., *Social psychology*.

Two main theses are stressed by this neurologist: "The first is that the visceral-organic structure of man is basic to the understanding of psychology. . . . The second thesis is that apart from his group a man is a mere potentiality. He is developed in a milieu that fosters, modifies, or destroys his capacities."

‡1934 Brown, L. G., *Social psychology*.

This book is a "natural history of human nature." The illustrative material is derived from actual student experiences yet is presented in such a form as to indicate the essential unity of the behaving human being.

*1934 Dennis, W., *A manual of exercises and experiments in social psychology*.
The title is indicative of the contents.

*1935 Murchison, C., ed., *A handbook of social psychology*.

This text contains eight chapters on the infrahuman, four on racial psychology, and one each on language, sex, age, magic, material culture, the physical environment, attitudes, social maladjustments, human populations, and the influence of social situations on the behavior of the child and of the adult.

*1936 Brown, J. F., *Psychology and the social order*.

A follower of the topologist, K. Lewin, rewrites social psychology in terms of field theory. There are sections devoted to sociology, psychology, and political science.

*1936 Gurnee, H., *Elements of social psychology*.

Following the thesis "Social psychology is, after all, *psychology*," Gurnee stresses the experimental aspects of the field.

*1936 Freeman, E., *Social psychology*.

The stress throughout is on the side of social applications. An environmentalistic bias is acknowledged.

‡1936 LaPiere, R. T., and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social psychology*.

A systematic integration of the psychological and sociological approaches to social psychology (2d ed., 1942).

*1937 Murphy, G., L. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental social psychol-*

ogy. The 1931 edition has been rewritten with a broader definition of the word "experimental" in mind. Newcomb has major responsibility for an extensive section on attitudes.

- *1938 Katz, D., and R. L. Schanck, *Social psychology*.

An attempt to conceive of the entire field "within the bounds of the experimental tradition." The book reflects but goes beyond the theoretical framework of F. H. Allport's *Social psychology*.

- †1938 Reinhardt, J. M., *Social psychology*.

The area treated is limited to "the individual personality and modes of adjustment which arise as a result of experience in the socio-cultural environment."

- *1940 Bird, C., *Social psychology*.

The aim of this book has been "not to assemble researches but rather to clarify, and if possible show the solutions for, social problems through the medium of research."

- *1940 Klineberg, O., *Social psychology*.

Particular emphasis is placed on attempted integration of ethnology, comparative sociology, and psychology.

- *1941 Britt, S. H., *Social psychology of modern life*.

The author, who has long urged more cooperation between sociologists and psychologists, has aimed his book at both groups and at the lay public as well.

- †1942 Krout, M. H., *Introduction to social psychology*. This elementary text reverses recent trends in social psychology and attempts a "psychological" approach to what are usually considered sociological problems.

- *1942 Drake, R. M., *Work book in social psychology*.

Based specifically on Britt's *Social psychology of modern life*, this little workbook outlines the larger text and provides questions as aids in the training of the student.

- *1946 Drake, R. M., *Outline of social psychology. Vol. I*.

The stated aim of this outline has been to offer "more than a skeleton outline and less than a formal and wordy discussion."

- *1947 Newcomb, T. M., and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in social psychology*.

Published under the auspices of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, this book of seventy-five chapters has been written "to present illustrative selections of the ways in which the influence of social conditions upon psychological processes have been studied" (p. vii).

- *1948 Krech, D., and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and problems of social psychology*.

As the title indicates, the authors have attempted to treat both the theoretical aspects of the discipline as well as the area of social action. Special effort has been taken to tie the data of the laboratory to "real-life" situations.

- *1948 Sherif, M., *An outline of social psychology*.

A development of Sherif's earlier work on social norms and ego-involvement.

- *1948 Vaughan, W. F., *Social psychology, the science and art of living*.

In most textbooks of social psychology the discussion is limited to what man does and why he does it. But in this vividly written book there is an attempt to say how man *ought* to behave.

The following list contains a number of references to thought-provoking articles and books that have appeared during the past decade.

"The image of the other man, a study in social psychology" (G. Ichheiser, 1940).

"The problem of the concept in social psychology" (H. Blumer, 1940).

"Review of current social psychology" (S. H. Britt, 1940).

- "On the data of social psychology" (S. Q. Janus, 1940).
- "The methodology of social psychology" (G. Y. Rusk, 1941).
- "Important developments in American social psychology during the past decade" (L. S. Cottrell, Jr., and R. Gallagher, 1941).
- "Interpersonal theory and social psychology" (E. Beaglehole, 1941).
- "Sociology and psychology in the prediction of behavior" (K. F. Walker, 1941).
- "Methods in the study of collective action phenomena" (F. H. Allport, 1942).
- "Comment" (R. Bain, 1942).
- "Recent discussion regarding social psychology" (L. L. Bernard, 1942).
- "The field of social psychology" (R. B. Liddy, 1942).
- "A revised behavioristic approach to social psychology" (M. Smith, 1942).
- "Student interests in social psychology" (L. L. Bernard, 1943).
- "Factor analysis in experimental designs in clinical and social psychology" (E. S. Bordin, 1943).
- "The psychology of participation" (G. W. Allport, 1945).
- "The sociology of personal behavior" (R. F. Creegan, 1945).
- "The beginnings of social psychology" (E. Faris, 1945).
- "The psychology of the corporate act" (M. Smith, 1945).
- "Summary—methods, theory, and appraisal" (D. Chapman, 1946).
- "The Gestalt view of the process of institutional transformation" (G. W. Hartmann, 1946).
- "The use of clinical methods in social psychology" (D. W. MacKinnon, 1946).
- "Die Bedeutung der Charakterologie für die Sozialpsychologie" (E. J. Walter, 1946).
- "The place of personality in social psychology" (H. Cantril, 1947).
- Understanding man's social behavior* (H. Cantril, 1947).
- "Some methodological remarks related to experimentation in social psychology" (M. Sherif, 1947).
- "Studying social behavior" (T. M. Newcomb, 1948).

Articles related to problems of social psychology appear occasionally in a number of the sociological and psychological (and, on rarer occasions, in educational and clinical) journals. The following journals are devoted wholly or in large part to this field:

- Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (founded in 1906).
- Journal of Social Psychology* (founded in 1929).
- Character and Personality* (founded in 1932), now *Journal of Personality*.
- Public Opinion Quarterly* (founded in 1937).
- Sociometry* (founded in 1937).
- Psychodrama Monographs* (founded in 1944).
- Journal of Social Issues* (founded in 1945).
- Sociatry* (founded in 1947).
- Human Relations* (founded in 1947).
- International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research* (founded in 1947).

3. The majority of studies of family lines do not yield evidence at all pertinent to the nature-nurture controversy. It would appear that for many researchers in this field the problem is solved in their own minds before they begin their analyses of family lines; i.e., they assume as true that which the subsequent analyses are expected to prove. They fail to see that, with their techniques so crude and clumsy and the problem so intricate, little factual information bearing on the

nature-nurture controversy can possibly emerge. When a researcher has, for example, calculated the number of musicians in each generation of the Bach family, he has offered no data to show why the Bachs were musical at one period and not another. Was the subsequent disappearance of musicality in the Bach family the resultant of "wrong" matings, a change in the economic status of musicians, of both factors, or of neither? Family studies do not give the answer. The mere fact that distributions of musical and nonmusical personages may vaguely resemble the geneticists' distributions of black and vestigial fruit flies has little or no explanatory value.

4. The fact that folklore and fable contain many references to feral man suggests that feral man has long intrigued the layman as well as the theorist. A fairly recent wave of interest has led to articles on a "baboon boy" from South Africa and a book that describes two "wolf girls" from India. The existence of the "baboon boy" has already been denied even by its American advocate (J. P. Foley, Jr., 1940). But the existence of the "wolf girls" is still accepted by at least one child specialist, who has written a popular and extremely naive book on the subject (A. Gesell, 1941). Reviews of this book make it quite clear that others are more skeptical of the evidence. The inconsistencies in the reports on these Hindu girls are enormous. Moreover, no scientist was able to examine the girls while they were still alive. The scientific world was kept for years in ignorance of their very existence—because their discoverer and protector, a missionary, did not wish to lessen their matrimonial possibilities! For other articles on the subject of feral man, see "Feral man and extreme cases of isolation" (R. M. Zingg, 1940); "The significance of feral man" (W. Dennis, 1941); "A reply to Professor Dennis" (R. M. Zingg, 1941); "Wolf-child histories from India" (D. G. Mandelbaum, 1943); and "Wild men and wolf boys" (W. J. Bishop, 1947). Of the several scientists interested in Hindu "wolf girls" the anthropologist Zingg is one of the few who are still hopeful of their authenticity.

Although there are no unquestioned cases of feral man, there are cases of children who have been reared by foster parents who are brighter or duller than their own parents. During this century a considerable number of foster-children studies have been undertaken. The better controlled of these experiments agree with one another. As one reviewer phrases their findings: "When children of *school age* are given one of the more modern revisions of the Binet Scale, such as the Stanford or the Kuhlmann revision, under standard conditions and by competent examiners, most of the intelligence quotients thus earned will show only small fluctuations upon retesting with the same scale after intervals varying from 1 to 6 or 7 years. Considering all the evidence, it is safe to say that 50 per cent of the elementary-school children will not change their standing by more than 5 points of IQ in either direction, while the remaining 50% will show somewhat greater variation." (F. Goodenough, 1940, p. 357.) See also "Environmental influences on mental development" (H. E. Jones, 1946).

It should be possible, theoretically at least, to disentangle the interwoven strands of nature and nurture by holding one constant and varying the other. Thus, we might equate environments and vary heredities, or vice versa. But the first of these is not the easy task it might seem to be. For by what procedure can we prove that the environments that have surrounded two people from birth have been identical? Those measures of environment that are available—tests of socioeconomic status¹—yield rough approximations only. The environmental stimuli

¹ For discussions of socioeconomic status, see "The measurement of socioeconomic

that have impinged upon a person during his lifetime are so many that they are beyond all present possibility of calculation. Certain of these stimuli greatly affect the human animal, whereas others affect him relatively little. But the weights that should be assigned to these stimuli and their relative values as behavior modifiers can still only be guessed at. And since we cannot evaluate with any degree of assurance the environmental forces that surround any one person, we cannot hope to learn with exactitude whether or not they are the equivalent of the stimuli that have made up the environment of another human being.

Equating heredities and varying environments is almost as difficult. Blood relatives resemble each other in intelligence and personality more than do people selected at random from the population at large. The former are more alike in genetic structure than are the latter unrelated groups. Similarity in heredity, however, tends to be paralleled by similarity in environment. Thus, by and large, relatives tend to have been subjected to more of the same sorts of environmental pressures than have nonrelated people. The only persons with presumably identical heredities are pairs of identical twins. Yet, unfortunately, these exceptional folk when reared together tend to have the most similar environments of all mankind (P. T. Wilson, 1934).

To circumvent this difficulty, a number of studies have been made of identical twins reared apart (H. H. Newman *et al.*, 1937; I. C. Gardner and H. H. Newman, 1940; N. Yates and H. Brash, 1941; B. S. Burks, 1942). So far only slightly more than a score of pairs have been located, and many of these have unfortunately had quite similar environments. The resemblances in intelligence between identical twins reared apart seem to be intermediate between those of fraternal twins and of identical twins reared together (Q. McNemar, 1938). For further references on the nature-nurture issue see the many articles of *The 39th yearbook of the national society for the study of education* (G. M. Whipple, ed., 1940) and "Heredity and environment: a critical survey of the published material on twins and foster children" (R. S. Woodworth, 1941).

5. Unfortunately the relative strengths of human drives cannot be measured like those of animal drives. If one desires to test an animal that has been deprived for some time of both food and water, one can place it in a box surrounded by an electric grill. On one side of the grill will be placed food and on the other water. The number of the grill contacts and crossings (during which the animal is electrically shocked) will furnish a rough measure of the relative strength of each drive, or so believe certain of the animal psychologists (C. J. Warden, 1931). A number of other laboratory devices are also at hand for measuring animal drives. See "A comparative study of sexual drive in adult male rats as measured by direct copulatory tests and by the Columbia obstruction apparatus" (C. P. Stone *et al.*, 1935).

6. Adler has rejected the Freudian assertion that "psychical" processes derive all their energy from the libido and has attributed all such processes to attempts to compensate for some sort of physical, social, or moral inferiority. Thus, says Adler, the musician enters the field of music because he is stimulated by a defective auditory equipment; the artist enters his profession spurred on by color weakness;

status" (G. A. Lundberg, 1940); "Measurement of social status" (L. D. Zeleny, 1940); "The concept of social status" (R. B. Cattell, 1942); "A comparison of three measures of socioeconomic status" (G. A. Lundberg and P. Friedman, 1943); and *Indices of socio-economic status* (G. Knufter, 1946).

the behavior of the cripple is aimed at attention getting as a compensation for his defect. But research has not shown musical students to be defective along auditory lines (P. R. Farnsworth, 1941) or artistic children to be color weak (S. Atwell, 1939). And although the personalities of some cripples² are abnormal because of their unfortunate condition (B. B. Rosenbaum, 1937), many cripples show little personality distortion that is attributable to their deformities (R. C. Kammerer, 1940). Adler has been a little too eager to prove his case by citing instances that seemed to him to fit his theory—a deaf musician, an orator who stammered at one time, a professional strong man who has been a consumptive, etc. No one doubts that a defect may spur a given individual to action. But that all spurs to action occur as compensations for defects of some sort, only Adlerians believe (A. Adler, 1917). Dollard has made the interesting observation that the Adlerian principle of overcompensation for felt inferiorities is peculiarly bound to our own competitive culture. Since it functions far less among other groups, it cannot be considered a general principle for social psychology (J. Dollard, 1935).

7. From physical chemistry has come the term "sublimation," a much used concept in psychoanalysis. Ordinarily, says Freud, one's biological drives cannot be expressed in crude form, since they conflict with the social patterns. So they become sublimated, expressed in a new line of activity that is regarded by the social group as being on a more acceptable level. A blocked sex impulse reappears in artistic creation, in managerial ability, or in world domination. The proofs for these contentions supposedly lie in the freely associated material brought to consciousness through the procedure of psychoanalysis. But, as a matter of fact, the so-called "free associations" of the patient are actually rigorously controlled and directed by the analyst. The latter, who of course was himself psychoanalyzed (converted to the ism) some time before, suppresses and dismisses those associations which are not useful to his theory and waxes enthusiastic over all which have to do with sex (C. Landis, 1941). The proof, then, becomes little more than the announcing of a theory for art or some other activity that was already present in the mind of the analyst. The analyst obviously received it from his father confessor, who in turn obtained it directly or indirectly from Freud. The concept of sublimation is, therefore, a dogma that is taken on faith by all good Freudians but is of little value to the social psychologist.

The psychoanalytic mechanism of sublimation holds that adult motives are reducible to biological urges (usually sexual or eliminative) and that the motive power for adult activity is the energy of the urge that is now expressed in disguised form. In opposition to this view is one known as the functional autonomy of motives. Gordon Allport,³ its most convincing proponent, regards adult motives as "infinitely varied, and as self-sustaining, *contemporary* systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them. . . . Theoretically all

² The most exhaustive consideration of the personality of the cripple is that to be found in "Adjustment to physical handicap and illness" (R. G. Barker *et al.*, 1946). See also "Studies in adjustment to visible injuries" (G. Ladieu *et al.*, 1947; R. K. White *et al.*, 1948; T. Dembo *et al.*, in press).

³ His doctrine has been attacked by a follower of McDougall (P. A. Bertocci, 1940). For Allport's answer, see "Motivation in personality: reply to Mr. Bertocci" (G. W. Allport, 1940). See also "Some remarks on the place of the individual in social psychology" (H. G. McCurdy, 1943).

adult purposes can be traced back to these seed-forms in infancy. But as the individual matures the bond is broken. The tie is historical, not functional." (G. W. Allport, 1937, p. 194.)

To clarify the implications of these two views, let us contrast the manner in which each would "explain" the peculiarities of the miser. Certain psychoanalysts would trace the miser's dominant motivation and that of his polar opposite, the spendthrift, to an abnormality of bowel control in early infancy. But one who holds to the functional autonomy of motives, although admitting that all adult motives are built on earlier ones, would institute clinical studies to find the pertinent factors responsible for these peculiarities of monetary behavior. A number of such clinical studies have been made. They all agree in showing that miserly⁴ and spendthrift behaviors are associated with a large number of environmental variables, bowel difficulty in infancy being only one of the many.

The doctrine of sublimation is a reflection of a particularizing tendency seen especially among practical people—and psychoanalysts are practical therapists, not scientists. Man is forever on the lookout for a single or type explanation for every happening he cannot immediately understand; it is therefore disturbing to find that two superficially (phenotypically) similar behaviors can be "caused" by quite dissimilar events. But whether we want to or not, we are forced to accept the fact that the bases of social motivation are many and varied.

8. At least three other phenomena in addition to "feeling-states" are designated by the term "emotion."⁵ Some writers use the term "emotion" to refer to covert physiological responses, to any considerable change in the metabolic condition that lasts but a short time. These responses may or may not be perceived by their possessor. Others use the term to refer to the rather immediate and relatively untutored overt activity that accompanies the visceral disturbances, although this activity more commonly receives the title "natural expression of emotion." These expressions differ so markedly from person to person even under rather similar conditions that only a few patternlike forms can be seen (N. L. Munn, 1940). An exception occurs in the case of the startle responses, which have a rather uniform pattern.⁶ The term "emotion" is also used to refer to the staged or stereotyped expressions that serve as symbols but differ from society to society (see Chap. VI).

⁴ One miserly person studied by a friend of the authors was found to be over-compensating for a background of "proud" poverty. Although the importance of money had been continually played down in his family, the need for it had been painfully clear to him. By the time money did begin to "roll in," his habits of extremely frugal living had become well established. He could spend his fortune in reverie only; he lived to accumulate wealth which he frankly admitted he could not force himself to spend. Incidentally, the records obtained from his mother showed that no eliminative difficulty had occurred during infancy. See also the discussion of Freud's anal-erotic type in Appendix note 51.

⁵ For references on the feelings and the emotions, see *Emotions: their psychological, physiological and educative implications* (F. H. Lund, 1939); "Recent developments in the field of emotion" (W. A. Hunt, 1941); *Emotion in man and animal* (P. T. Young, 1943); and *Emotions and bodily changes*, etc. (H. F. Dunbar, 1946). For an attempt to tie the emotions to motivation, see "A motivational theory of emotion to replace 'emotion as disorganized response'" (R. W. Leeper, 1948).

⁶ The "natural expressions" of startle are described in *The startle pattern* (C. Landis and W. A. Hunt, 1939).

9. In recent years psychologists, particularly Gesell of Yale and his students, have attempted to study maturational factors by the aid of an ingenious technique known as "co-twin control." One member of a pair of young identical twins is made the experimental subject, and his pair-mate the control. While the former is being subjected to a specific training regime, the latter is receiving no special training. The time needed for the experimental subject to learn the task is noted. At a later date the control subject is put through a similar training regime, and the time necessary to learn the task is recorded. If the second child taught needs a shorter training period than did his twin, the timesaving will undoubtedly be due in part to greater maturation. In any such experiment, however, there are probably many other factors, such as motivational and personality differences caused by the earlier training of one of the twins and incidental training, a carry-over from somewhat similar types of behavior. Thus the control twin may develop inferiority feelings because he is kept from learning to perform the tricks his experimental twin can do. Or he may transfer some of his incidental earlier training to the new problem. In one of the earlier maturational studies the experimental twin was taught to climb stairs. But the researcher could not keep the control twin from climbing on boxes, stools, and the like, all of which aid ability to climb stairs. For crude, demonstrational purposes the co-twin technique is, however, useful. See "Maturation of behavior" (A. Gesell, 1945) and "Maturation of behavior" (M. B. McGraw, 1946).

10. As is true of so many issues, whether or not there are animal societies depends in great degree on the definitions used. If one is interested in stressing continuity in human and animal worlds, a definition of "society" must be proposed that will embrace at the very least the social activities of the apes and the social insects. But if, on the other hand, one is desirous of playing up the hiatus between man and the subhuman animals another sort of definition is necessary.

In *The emergence of human culture* Warden has contended that only man can be said to possess a genuine society. To support this conclusion he has proposed as criteria for society: (a) invention, (b) communication, and (c) social habituation—acquired social organization (C. J. Warden, 1936). There are, of course, instances of animal behaviors that meet each of these criteria to some slight degree. But the completeness of man's social organization is missing. For another attempt to discover what human implications are derivable from animal organizations, see *The social life of animals* (W. C. Allee, 1938). See also the last two paragraphs of Appendix note 62.

11. Failure to distinguish conceptually between the natural (biological and physical) forces that act as limitations upon man as a social being and the social heritage that makes him social has led many social scientists into the pessimism of a cul-de-sac. *Civilization and climate* (E. Huntington, 1915) and *The biology of population growth* (R. Pearl, 1925) are noteworthy examples of this failure and the fatalistic viewpoint to which it leads. In these books man is seen as the helpless victim of inexorable natural forces—of climate and of a "nature-determined" birth rate, respectively.

Because their own society is a rapidly changing one, contemporary sociologists have concentrated upon the phenomena of change and have endeavored to discover the process or sequences by which social changes have come about. The survey reported in *Recent social trends in the United States* (President's Research Committee on Social Trends, 1933) was an effort to find where we are going socially by analyzing historically how we have arrived where we are.

12. One aspect of status that has considerable sociopsychological importance is

that of occupational prestige. Some occupations are considered as more honorable, more admirable, and more worthy of prestige than others; but no universal agreement as to the proper rankings exists. Laymen in the first years of the U.S.S.R. regarded the businessman and the priest as less worthy than we do in America (J. Davis, 1927). All good democrats give the military man less prestige during peacetime than during periods of active warfare.

Examining a minuscule aspect of the problem of status, Coutu tested in 1934-1935 the professed attitudes of three groups of college students—law, medical, and engineering—toward twenty white-collar occupations. Each student group gave its own prospective occupation the highest rating. But because medicine received second place in the ratings of the two nonmedical groups, it achieved top position in the combined ratings. The engineers bunched their ratings together; even their lowest occupation received many prestige votes. The medical students, on the other hand, so spread their ratings that the position of college professor, which came third on their scale, had a prestige score similar to that received by osteopathy, which ranked at the bottom of the engineering scale. No other occupation was considered by the medical students as at all close to medicine in occupational prestige. If such an attitude is common among physicians, it may account in part for their traditional hostility toward socialized medicine. It is likely that any change in the management of medical affairs would lower the prestige attached to medicine (W. Coutu, 1936). See also "The relative social prestige of representative medical specialties" (G. W. Hartmann, 1936); "Social prestige values of a selected group of occupations" (C. W. Hall, 1938); "The attitudes of college women toward women's vocations" (R. B. Stevens, 1940); "Analysis of a prestige frame of reference by a gradient technique" (C. E. Osgood and R. Stagner, 1941); "The relationship of occupation to personality" (M. D. Vernon, 1941); "An empirical scale of prestige status of occupations" (M. Smith, 1943); and "Changes in social status of occupations" (M. E. Deeg and D. G. Paterson, 1947).

Status has been termed the "pseudo quality" of a man's personality; the impression he makes on others, the "sham quality"; and the inherent core of his personality, the "real quality" (G. Ichheiser, 1941).

13. Failure to realize that the term "society" symbolizes an abstraction derived from very real phenomena has frequently resulted either in implied denial of society's existence or mystical interpretations of its character. The former error is in part responsible for the uncritical material given in many of the popular biological treatises. Biological speculations to the contrary notwithstanding, man does not behave in a social order as he would on Robinson Crusoe's island. The second error has been more serious. European scholars in particular have been guilty of conceiving of society as if it were a definite entity. Stripped of their impressive terminology, all such concepts are revealed as comparable with Hitler's "Germanic Spirit." Kant (I. Kant, 1929) and more particularly Hegel (G. S. Morris, 1892) set the pattern for this type of metaphysical thinking. To Hegel the state was an embodiment of the society's "soul." Wundt's elaborate analysis of "folk psychology" (W. Wundt, 1916) has been thought by some to imply a somewhat similar concept. From a different approach McDougall in *The group mind* (W. McDougall, 1920) has been taken by his opponents as arriving at a similar concept of society.

Use of the "organic analogy" in conveying the idea that men do not behave irrespective of the behavior of their fellows has frequently led to the unwarranted assumption that sociologists accept as valid the above-mentioned mystical interpre-

tations. Although one English sociologist leaned toward it (L. T. Hobhouse, 1911), few American sociologists have followed the Hegelian tradition.

The organic analogy is a comparison of some of the processes of human interrelations with those of an organism, generally the human body. Spencer made great use of this analogy (H. Spencer, 1893-1897), and Cooley a cautious use. Certainly there is much to commend it as a communicative device. We may compare the unity of society with the unity of the human organism. The way in which events that transpire on the stock exchange in New York are communicated to San Francisco, there to affect the behavior of men, may be likened to the way a man's feet may respond to visual stimuli from an onrushing motorcar. The complex social phenomena that result from communication between human beings can be compared with the coordination of body movement and processes through neural communication. A similar comparison may be made between the transportation of goods and persons within society by railroad, motorcar, and steamship and of tissue food supplies and wastes within the organism by the blood stream. The analogy is especially fruitful in conveying ideas of how intimately the parts of the social pattern are related and of how the individual's welfare is bound up with the total. It is true of society, as it is of the human body, that to take it apart destroys the essential and distinctive attributes of the entity—that which in the human body we term life. Just as we do not necessarily have a living organism merely because we have ten fingers, ten toes, two legs, two arms, one head and one torso, we do not have a society simply because we have twenty men. If we are to have a society, the men, like the parts of the organism, must be interrelated. Furthermore, just as the hand cannot live if the body dies, the individuals may not survive if the society actually disintegrates.

But the organic analogy, like all analogies, is in danger of being taken too literally. Traditionally it has been assumed that the human organism possesses, during life, a superorganic entity called the "soul," which is presumed to be the embodiment of the life "stuff" and the director of life activities. Those who speak and write as though society were an entity, rather than an abstraction from entities, carry the analogy to its illogical conclusion. There is, we now believe, no need of transcending the mundane and entering into mysticism to explain social phenomena. The psychologist no longer bothers about the human soul but leaves this problem to the theologian. The sociologist is likewise not concerned with the "soul of society." See *Social organization* (C. H. Cooley, 1923, Chaps. I, II, and XXXIV).

14. The layman is prone to think of association, or lack of it, in terms solely of simple cause and effect. That this is by no means the whole picture is well shown by Barker and his colleagues (R. G. Barker *et al.*, 1946), who have illustrated the complexities of the problem by describing the possible relationships between physique and behavior.

1. "Physique and behavior may be dynamically independent within the individual and statistically uncorrelated in massed data." Thus, fingerprint patterns have never been shown to be related to behavior of any sort.

2. "Physique and behavior may be statistically correlated in massed data, but be dynamically independent within the individual." (a) "Correlation without causal interdependence may result from conditions that operated in the past." What, for example, is back of the fact that important executives are heavier than their less important colleagues? One can answer that both their business successes and their weight may be in part due to the superior social and nutritive advantages

bestowed by their upper class parents. (b) "The correlated characteristics may be the independent products of currently operating conditions." To illustrate this point, the authors have noted that "tough, pigmented skin and squinting behavior are frequently associated, and both may be independent products of the action of the sun and wind."

3. "Physique and behavior may be dynamically interrelated in such a way that physique determines behavior." (a) "Physique may influence behavior by acting directly upon neuromuscular mechanisms"; *e.g.*, scar tissue may lead to restricted joint action. (b) "Physique may influence behavior far beyond the limits of the neuromuscular mechanisms directly affected"; *e.g.*, cold hands may lead to going into the house. (c) "Physique may influence behavior by serving as a stimulus to the self and others"; *e.g.*, a "Negro could not be elected president of the United States."

4. "Physique and behavior may be dynamically interrelated in such a way that behavior determines physique." (a) "Behavior may influence physique by directly determining muscle tonus, posture, glandular activity, and metabolic state." Thus, the posture and muscle tone of a man immediately after receiving news of his defeat for office will be different from what they were at the time the campaign photographs were taken. (b) "Behavior may influence physique by determining conditions of growth and function over both short and long periods of time." Thus, "The physique of a sedentary business executive will change if he becomes a cowboy."

15. It is common observation that changes within the body tend to accompany sudden and striking alterations of the environment outside the body. Under certain conditions of environmental change it often happens that an individual's blood vessels dilate or constrict, that swallowing becomes difficult, that feelings of suffocation exist, and that fainting with its attendant redistribution of blood occurs. So it is no wonder that from the earliest days of the scientific era, and even before, men have tried to measure these visceral changes and to see social significance in them. Instruments have been constructed for the measurement of blood pressure, blood volume, rate of heartbeat, body temperature, metabolic level, blood quality, skin resistance to slight electric currents, acidity of body fluids, ratio of the length of expiration to the length of inspiration, the character of the electric currents generated by the muscles and nerves, and a number of other body conditions.

The research so far undertaken shows that the relation between change of opinion and the several measurable aspects of body condition is slight. A fairly consistent, though small, relationship does, however, exist between conflict and frustration on the one hand and body state on the other; *i.e.*, conflict situations are mirrored slightly in covert changes. Presumably the frustrating circumstances bring about emotional upsets, the visceral aspects of which can be measured. But no other important relationships have been so far discovered. See "A study of the autonomic excitation resulting from the interaction of individual opinion and group opinion" (C. E. Smith, 1936); "The measurement of emotions aroused in response to personality test items" (G. S. Speer, 1937); "The measuring of attitudes toward war and the galvanic skin reflex" (S. N. F. Chant and M. D. Salter, 1937); and "Some physiological changes during frustration" (H. Jost, 1941).

It is possible that overt habits may be paralleled in some covert manner. McDougall felt so certain that such was the case that he postulated a chemical unknown to account for the extremely seclusive, nonsocial, and shut-in type of personality deviation which is known popularly as the introverted temperament (W. McDougall, 1929). Subsequent experiments, however, have been unable to

show that introverts, no matter how defined, are substantially different from extroverts, their polar opposites, in any physiological characteristic so far measured. Nor can any other personality deviants of the milder sorts be singled out with any facility on the basis of unusual bodily condition (L. P. Herrington, 1930; J. Dispensa, 1938). One researcher (L. P. Herrington, 1942) has seemingly had some measure of success in measuring "pressure of activity" by physiological means. See "Some relationships between personality and body chemistry" (G. J. Rich, 1933); "The inter-relations of certain physiological measurements and aspects of personality" (K. T. Omlwake, E. S. Dexter, and L. W. Lewis, 1934); "The biochemical variability of the individual in relation to personality and intelligence" (H. Goldstein, 1935); "An experimental study of personality, physique, and the acid-base equilibrium of the blood" (J. A. Hamilton and N. W. Shock, 1936); "The patellar reflex and personality" (J. P. Guilford and R. C. Hall, 1937); "Autonomic action in relation to personality traits of children" (R. P. Darling, 1940); and "Physiological factors in behavior" (N. W. Shock, 1944).

From time to time there has been considerable hope that the study of brain potentials (free electric currents) would yield information of use in ascertaining personality deviants. But so far, except with epileptics (W. G. Walter, 1939) and with peptic ulcer cases (S. Rubin and K. M. Bowman, 1942), there has been little success; and, anyway, the reliability of measurement of brain potentials is so far very low (J. M. Hadley, 1940). See "The relationship between brain potentials and personality" (A. B. Gottlob, 1938); "A note on the relationship between 'personality' and the alpha rhythm of the electroencephalogram" (C. E. Henry and J. R. Knott, 1941); "Electrical activity of the brain" (H. H. Jasper, 1941); "Relation of neurotic traits to electroencephalogram in children with behavior disorders" (J. J. Michaels and L. Secunda, 1944); "Electroencephalography" (D. B. Lindsley, 1944); and "Contrast between electroencephalograms of 100 psychoneurotic patients and those of 500 normal adults" (M. A. Brazier *et al.*, 1945).

The effects of sex hormones on adolescent interests and attitudes constitute at present a promising field of research. Boys of high hormone activity show more interest in heterosexual activity, personal adornment, and strenuous competitive sports than do adolescents of low hormone activity (R. T. Sollenberger, 1940). Women whose glands are producing a surplus of the follicular hormone showed a heightened interest in men; but when progesterin was the more important secretion, more personal and "introverted" interests appeared (T. Benedek and B. B. Rubenstein, 1939). For the effects on overt behavior of glandular malfunctioning, see "Pituitary disturbances in relation to personality" (L. A. Lurie, 1938); and *Sex and internal secretions* (E. Allen *et al.*, 1939).

16. Years ago J. B. Watson so oversold his extreme behavioristic views that all behaviorism was identified in the popular mind with Watsonism, and all students of human behavior were thought to preach the same incomplete psychology. Many a person outside the field of professional psychology believed that psychologists dealt only with overt activities. But nothing was farther from the truth. Covert activity was explicitly recognized, even by the majority of behaviorists; and the delayed reaction was much studied. Present-day psychologists also include covert activities in their theoretical systems.

Hull, a modern behaviorist who is interested in symbolic logic, has a number of covert parts to his system. The "excitatory potential" and the "stimulus trace" are typical. Hull's statement on the "stimulus trace" can be taken as illustrative:

"The concept *stimulus trace* has substantially the status of a symbolic or logical construct. While there are physiological indications that the expression represents an entity which may ultimately be observable in some indirect manner, for the present purposes it may be regarded as unobservable." (C. Hull *et al.*, 1940, p. 23.) See also *Principles of behavior* (C. Hull, 1944).

Tolman, who occupies a mid-position between behaviorism and Gestalt psychology, discusses covert behaviors under the name "behavior determinants." These are "the intervening variables to be conceived as functioning between the initiating (independent) causes of behavior on the one side of the equation, and the final resulting behavior on the other side of the equation" (E. C. Tolman, 1932, p. 438).

The original topological psychologist, Lewin, also had a classification of behavior which approximates that of the overt-covert. According to Lewin, an individual has an outer region, motor and perceptual (speech and gestures occur here), and an inner core, the inner-personal regions. "Needs or other states of the inner-personal regions can influence the environment only by way of a bodily action, that is, by way of a region which one can call the motor region." (K. Lewin, 1936, p. 177.) See also "On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables" (K. MacCorquodale and P. E. Meehl, 1948).

17. Direct study of many of our most important nonsymbolic behaviors, such as war activities and interracial responses, is difficult if not impossible. War behaviors cannot be brought into the laboratory for analysis. And even an ever-present companion could gather but scanty data on a person's reactions toward the members of some particular race. The social psychologist can only measure opinions concerning future war behaviors (G. J. Dudycha, 1943; D. J. Levinson and R. N. Sanford, 1944; H. Carter, 1945), in the hope that these symbolic opinions will reflect the more important later nonsymbolic activities. But this hope seems not to have been completely realized, since the complexities of war behaviors preclude measurement on a single opinion continuum (V. Jones, 1942; G. J. Dudycha, 1943). The social psychologist also tests opinions on the several national and culture groups (G. E. Bryant, 1941; R. Zeligs, 1941; E. S. Marks, 1943), in the hope that through these he can forecast what will happen in later interracial contacts. Measures are sometimes made of opinions that have no nonsymbolic parallels. Thus a subject may be asked his opinion about the nature of the Deity or about the possibility of experiencing the Divine Presence (R. D. Sinclair, 1928).

Opinions are sometimes measured by ratings (E. Monjar, 1937), by rankings (S. E. Asch, H. Block, and M. Hertzman, 1938) or by paired comparisons. Thus to measure student opinion regarding the efficiency of the men who have served as President of the United States, one might have the students rank the names of these men from best to worst; rate them on a five-point scale from excellent through good, average, and poor to very poor; or compare each name with every other name. The last-mentioned procedure, that of paired comparisons, would be too time consuming for use in a study involving all the presidents. It has, however, been used in a study involving ten presidents (L. W. Ferguson, 1936). These three simple techniques for measuring opinions all yield essentially similar data. Attempts have also been made to measure the intensity with which attitudes are held (L. Postman and C. Zimmerman, 1945; H. Cantril, 1946; L. Guttman and E. A. Suchman, 1947). Opinions have also been measured by the autobiographical, the questionnaire, the interview, and the case methods (B. J. Breslaw, 1938; R. C. Oldfield, 1941; W. V. D. Bingham and B. V. Moore, 1941; L. W. Doob, 1941; L. S.

Cottrell, Jr., 1941; R. F. Berdie, 1943; G. A. Lundberg, 1941; H. E. Jones, 1943; and E. E. Ghiselli, 1939).

The opinion-scale method is not markedly different from that of the questionnaire. The former usually contains fewer questions; and, unlike those of the questionnaire, the question items have agreed-upon values. The early Bogardus test of "social distance," for example, was a questionnaire of only seven questions, each having an arbitrary weight (E. S. Bogardus, 1928). The person whose opinion was desired was presented with a list of races on which he was to indicate, by checking one or more of the seven questions, his willingness to associate with the members of each of the races listed. In this manner social distance was supposedly measured. It was assumed that admission of the members of a particular race "to my club as personal chums" has a social-distance value equidistant between that of "admission to close kinship by marriage" and that of "admission to my street as neighbors." It was similarly assumed that the scale value of the last-mentioned item fell exactly between that of the "club" item and that of "admission to employment in my occupation in my country," etc.; and thus, if the "club" item were given an opinion weight of 2, the "kinship" item would deserve a weight of 1, the "street" item a weight of 3, and the "occupation" item a weight of 4. The assumption that the scale steps should be values of 1, 2, 3, and 4 is not, however, a proof that these are fitting weights.⁷ The Thurstone scheme of "attitude" measurement (L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, 1929), with its provision for less arbitrary opinion weights, has met with a warmer reception from measurement-minded social psychologists.

In the construction of a war scale fashioned after the Thurstone pattern,⁸ first, comes the collection of a large number of statements (items) about war. These are then rated by a sizable group of intelligent, but not necessarily unbiased, judges (L. W. Ferguson, 1935; and R. Pintner and G. Forlano, 1937). The rating table is divided into a number of sections, say 11, with number 1 for the most pacifistic opinions and number 11 for the most militaristic. The judges sort the war items into these sections. Those items which are consistently sorted, *i.e.*, which have similar meanings to all judges, are kept. The median of each item's sortings becomes its scale or opinion value. If the value is large, the item has a militaristic value; if small, a pacifistic one. Thus the statement "There can be no progress without war" is militaristic in sentiment and has a scale value of 10.8 (1941 Stanford University norms). Near the pacifistic end of the continuum is the statement "The evils of war are greater than any possible benefits" with a value of 1.5. A neutral statement is "Defensive war is justified but other wars are not" (scale value 6.4). The statements are now ready to be offered to the individual whose opinions are to be tested. If he agrees with statements whose adjudged scale values are large, he is labeled a militarist; if he checks items with small values, a pacifist. The

⁷ For a revised edition of the social-distance scale constructed by a modern system of weights, see "A social distance scale" (E. S. Bogardus, 1933). For a check on the validity of the social-distance technique, see "Checking the social distance technique through personal interviews" (G. Hendrickson and R. Zeligs, 1934). See also "A social distance test in the Near East" (S. C. Dodd, 1935) and "Social distance in daily vocabulary" (E. S. Bogardus, 1948).

⁸ In the psychological literature the Thurstone scales have in the past been usually referred to as attitude scales. The term "opinion," favored by sociologists, is now also gaining acceptance among psychologists.

item weights are relatively stable but may shift as the culture's normative attitudes shift (P. R. Farnsworth, 1943).

There are now available commercial scales for measuring opinions on communism, patriotism, the United States Constitution, law, censorship, reality of God, treatment of animals, evolution, birth control, and capital punishment; on affection-aversion for parents; on the Dies Committee; etc.

Modifications of the Thurstone technique have been proposed by a number of opinion testers (R. H. Seashore and K. Hevner, 1933; C. Kirkpatrick, 1936; M. Ballin and P. R. Farnsworth, 1941; L. Guttman, 1944; and L. Festinger, 1947). Generalized or master scales, which can be applied to any one of a given class of objects or values, have been developed with somewhat questionable success (H. H. Remmers and E. B. Silance, 1934; D. M. Thomas-Baines, 1936; and M. Dimmitt, 1936). In certain of the newer opinion tests statements of opinion like the illustrations given above have been replaced by descriptions of behavior situations—such as, "If my continent were invaded I would immediately take up arms" (C. R. Pace, 1940; F. H. Allport and G. A. Hanchett, 1940; and D. D. Day and O. F. Quackenbush, 1940). A simple five-point rating scheme, proposed by Likert (G. Murphy and R. Likert, 1938; D. C. Miller, 1940; J. Harding, 1941), has the reputation of being as useful a tool as the more time-consuming Thurstone procedure. This position, however, has been disputed (L. W. Ferguson, 1941) and later defended (A. L. Edwards and K. C. Kinney, 1946; A. L. Edwards, 1946).

Groups of opinion scales have been factor-analyzed in an attempt to purify the tests and to find smaller batteries with which to replace the large ones now in use. In one such study, ten opinion scales were reduced to two or three by the procedure of factor analysis (L. W. Ferguson, 1942, 1944). In another, thirteen opinion and adjustment scales were reduced to five (J. G. Darley and W. J. McNamara, 1940).

In a number of studies, the attitudes of parents and children have been compared; the greatest resemblance in attitudes is found between the spouses, and the smallest between father and children (T. D. Peterson, 1936; T. Newcomb and G. Svehla, 1937; M. M. Smith, 1938; and H. H. Remmers and L. D. Whisler, 1938). The opinions of one sample of close friends were found to correlate $.24 \pm .07$ (C. N. Winslow, 1937). Opinion studies on college students and on the several economic, social, and age strata are numerous. Typical are the following: "The Thurstone attitude scales: II. The reliability and consistency of younger and older intellectual peers" (I. Lorge, 1939); "Certain factors related to liberal and conservative attitudes of college students: parental membership in certain organizations" (P. J. Fay and W. C. Middleton, 1940); "An analysis of attitudes toward fascism and communism" (D. Katz and H. Cantril, 1940); "Attitude homogeneity and length of group association" (M. Smith, 1940); "A comparison of the public attitudes of 711 eminent business executives with those of 65 distinguished 'progressive' educators" (G. W. Hartmann, 1941); "Standardization of a race attitude test for Negro youth" (E. S. Marks, 1943); "Further validation of the Wert-Myster farming attitude scale" (A. M. Myster, 1944); "Development of a scale to rate attitude of community satisfaction" (V. Davies, 1944); and "Attitudes toward Soviet Russia" (G. H. Smith, 1946). See also Appendix note 67.

Opinion scales, particularly those of the Thurstone variety, have been much employed in measuring opinion shifts. In the main, the data agree with common-sense observation. Opinions can be altered, at least for the period of a year, in a number of ways, *e.g.*, by reading and study, by hearing lectures and debates,

and by field trips to institutions (L. J. Epstein, 1941; F. T. Smith, 1943; W. Allard, 1941; R. M. Bateman and H. H. Remmers, 1941; H. Gilkinson, 1942; E. E. Emme, 1943; R. M. Collier, 1944; D. H. Russell and I. V. Robertson, 1947; L. E. Rathas and F. N. Trager, 1948).

But just what these changes in symbolic behavior mean when they are translated into nonsymbolic terms is not often known. Do the symbolic tests provide a measure of the preparation to respond to the concrete situations that are symbolized in the tests? Apparently in a few instances they do. But in the majority of instances proof is impossible to obtain, and in some instances they definitely do not. It has, for example, been shown that the child's verbal attitude toward honest or dishonest behavior (his symbolic opinion) is of little or no value in forecasting what he will do when he is put up against a real classroom experience in which dishonest behavior is a possible solution to his difficulties (S. M. Corey, 1937). From consideration of the data one is led to suspect that opinion tests actually measure ideologies far more successfully than they forecast nonsymbolic behaviors (R. T. LaPiere, 1938). Criticisms of opinion testing, descriptions of new techniques, and reviews of the current articles in the field have been appearing periodically (H. S. Tuttle, 1940; H. W. Dunham, 1940; R. K. Merton, 1940; D. D. Day, 1941; H. M. Johnson, 1943; B. L. Riker, 1944; S. C. Ericksen, 1944; G. Nettler and E. H. Golding, 1946; L. Guttman, 1947).

The term "interest" has been applied to certain other forms of symbolic activity, particularly those in which a selection between two or more alternatives is to be made. The most extensive work on the subject centers in the laboratory of E. K. Strong, Jr., who has developed the Vocational Interest Blank (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1933 and 1943; S. G. Estes and D. Horn, 1939; D. E. Super, 1940; R. K. Campbell, 1941; W. A. Thomson, 1941; H. D. Carter, 1944; M. I. Wightwick, 1945). See also "Liking and disliking persons" (W. F. Thomas and P. T. Young, 1938); "The place of interests in vocational adjustment" (J. G. W. Davies, 1939); "Economic problems and interests of adolescents" (P. M. Symonds, 1940); *Interest inventory for elementary grades (for grades 4, 5, and 6): Form A.* (M. Dreese and E. Mooney, 1941); "A comparison of interest measurement by the Kuder Preference Record and the Strong Vocational Interest Blanks for men and women" (J. R. Wittenborn *et al.*, 1943); and "Interests" (R. F. Berdie, 1946).

18. The term "symbolic" as used in the text must not be confused with that of "symbolism" as used by either sociologists or psychoanalysts. (See E. Sapir's article "Symbolism," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 492-495.) Sociologists and anthropologists often use the term "symbolism" to refer to social practices that have lost much of their original significance and remain only as symbolic of their former meaning (J. H. Mueller, 1938). Thus the American Thanksgiving Day is sociologically symbolic of the great harvest feast and thanksgiving which was practiced, with religious significance, by the Pilgrims and some of the Indians. Sociopsychologically, however, Thanksgiving Day practices are not all symbolic. Whereas the speeches and editorials broadcast on this day are symbolic behavior, much of the action that transpires is nonsymbolic. It is doubtful, for example, whether the vast quantities of food consumed on this occasion now have much symbolic meaning for the eaters, although to the early Pilgrims there may have been a symbolic aspect.

In the justification of some of their practices and theories the psychoanalysts have resorted to a "symbolic" interpretation of dreams and other psychic phenomena. It is assumed that, because of the psychic "censor," taboo drives are converted

into symbolic manifestations which can then escape from the "unconscious." Thus a phobia for steam engines might be interpreted as a morbid "fear of father," the engine being symbolic of father. For purposes of psychotherapy such reasoning may have its values. But the psychoanalytic concept of symbolization has very little in common with the sociopsychological distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic behavior.

19. A number of experimenters have attempted to verify the belief that radio lecturers and other speakers who are not seen can give to their listeners, directly or through their phonographic recordings, some idea of themselves. The analyses show that the audience has rather clean-cut stereotypes as to how certain people—old persons, truthful people, fat men—normally talk. These beliefs have sufficient validity to make judgments of personality characteristics but little better than pure chance (P. Eisenberg and E. Zalowitz, 1938; J. H. Caro, 1939; H. Fairbanks and L. W. Hoaglin, 1941). Listeners are apparently unable to judge how much fatigued a speaker thinks he is or his emotional balance, his introversion, or his outstandingness as a leader (P. J. Fay and W. C. Middleton, 1943; *et al.*).

20. The gestures that accompany verbal expressions are not only visual but are tonal as well. Speech and song are made by air waves that are capable of almost infinite variation. Thus the highly trained actor can read the same selection into a recording device in five different manners—to represent anger, contempt, fear, grief, or indifference (G. Fairbanks and W. Pronovost, 1939). The singing of even a single note may be varied so as to elicit several different moods in others (M. Sherman, 1928). Music, tonal material arranged in patterns, has its gestural effects which are quite distinct from those given by the libretto. In bugle calls and in African signal drumming musical gestures become almost a language. In general, however, their function is to create moods in the listener. See Appendix note 32.

21. The experiments of K. Dunlap have led him to believe that the mouth muscles play a greater part than do the eyes in determining the so-called "emotional effect" of facial expressions. A number of individuals were photographed while they were subjected to situations that tended to arouse genuine emotions. The photographs were cut horizontally (through the bridge of the nose). Other subjects were then requested to judge what emotions had been aroused. They viewed not only the separate halves and the unmutated photographs but composites in which a mouth portion (lower half) was attached to the wrong eye portion (upper half). When identical eye photographs were attached first to "smiling" lips and then to "surly" lips, the "smiling" eyes of one composite became "surly" eyes in the second (K. Dunlap, 1927). Howells also believes the mouth to be more expressive than the eyes (T. H. Howells, 1938). So perhaps the highwayman of wild-west days with his handkerchief over his mouth was wiser than the eye-masked bandit of our day. But others are convinced that the upper part of the face depicts better surprise and fear (N. G. Hanawalt, 1944).

In another study subjects were shown two sets of pictures, one of the face only and the other showing the face, shoulders, arms, and hands of a young woman. It was found that shoulders, arms, and hands contribute much to the expression of emotions (L. W. Kline and D. E. Johannsen, 1935). See also "Expressive movements related to feeling of dominance" (P. Eisenberg, 1937); "A study of the judgment of manual expression as presented in still and motion pictures" (L. Carmichael, S. O. Roberts, and N. Y. Wessell, 1937); "Experimental studies of the symbolism of action and voice: I. A study of the specificity of meaning in facial expression" (D. Dusenbury and F. H. Knower, 1938); "Judging personality from

expressive behavior" (S. G. Estes, 1938); *The expression of personality* (W. Wolff, 1943). Husband was unable to deduce anything concerning his subjects' personalities from analyses of their photographs (R. W. Husband, 1934). Thornton found that the person wearing glasses tends to be rated higher in intelligence, dependability, industriousness, and honesty (G. R. Thornton, 1943).

22. A fine example of the relations of socialized behavior and gesture can be seen in handwriting. In fact, analysis of handwriting specimens was employed in the Downey *Will-temperament test*, one of the earliest of the tests that purported to measure the more social aspects of man's make-up, his personality (R. S. Uhrbrock, 1928).

By an analysis of handwriting many graphologists can determine the sex of the writer with considerably better than chance successes. Allport and Vernon gave handwriting the apt title "crystallized gesture." They have carefully searched the literature for data that show the relation of such gesture to personality and have themselves experimented in this field. They have found that the elements of handwriting (size, speed, point, and grip pressure) "correlate with many attributes of movement selected from widely different performances [walking, counting, tapping, estimation of weights, handshake, etc.]. . . . The pattern of handwriting, its total graphic character, was found, likewise, to be interlocked with other expressive behavior. Judgments made from script and judgments made from the direct observation of behavior showed a definite, though not perfect, correspondence." (G. W. Allport and P. E. Vernon, 1933.)

See also *Graphologie* (L. Klages, 1935); *Graphologie als Wissenschaft* (A. Wenzl, 1937); "Judging expressive movement: I. Judgments of sex and dominance-feeling from handwriting samples of dominant and non-dominant men and women" (P. Eisenberg, 1938); "The ability of untrained subjects to judge neuroticism, self-confidence, and sociability from handwriting samples" (W. C. Middleton, 1941); "A comparison of the diagnoses of a graphologist with the results of psychological tests" (D. E. Super, 1941); "The reliability and validity of two graphologists" (B. Crider, 1941); "Handwriting pressure: its measurements and significance" (G. R. Pascal, 1943); *Graphology; a handbook* (H. A. Rand, 1947); "'Neuroticism' and handwriting" (H. J. Eysenck, 1948).

23. Among the many theories of the origin of language elements is the onomatopoeic—sometimes called bow-wow—theory, which holds that many words have come into the several languages as imitations of natural sounds. For certain words—buzz, cuckoo, and the like—this theory seems tenable; but its usefulness—how far it can be extended in an explanatory way—is limited. Most students of language now feel that most words cannot be accounted for by this theory. See "Origin of language" (A. Jóhannesson, 1946); "The origin of language" (R. A. S. Paget, 1944).

For a consideration of experiments that throw light on language changes of a phylogenetic sort, see "The psychology of language" (D. V. McGranahan, 1936); "An appraisal of psychological research in speech" (W. E. Utterback, 1937); "Language and psycholinguistics: a review" (N. H. Pronko, 1946); "The psychology of language" (G. K. Zipf, 1946).

24. Scientists interested in the great ape cannot tell us with any degree of certainty the causes for his failure to learn to speak the human languages. Apes do appear to possess a few differentiated emotional cries, but these can hardly be said to form a language and are not a product of apes' relations with the human languages. The anthropoids understand well, and many appear to possess mental

ages far above the level necessary for articulate speech; but, so far, the most strenuous efforts to train apes to speak have yielded a very few words, at best. Apes would appear to be visual rather than auditory imitators. Their mental development for a time seems to progress much like that of human beings. But after a few years they lag farther and farther behind the human child, largely, it is believed, because of their lack of overt language (W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, 1933). See "Chimpanzee intelligence and its vocal expressions" (R. M. Yerkes and B. W. Learned, 1925); *Gorillas in a native habitat* (H. C. Bingham, 1932); and "The language of animals" (G. Révész, 1944).

When engaged in cooperative work in the laboratory, apes can be taught to signal to each other. This form of communication, however, does not indicate the nature of the task to be done but is merely an order to "do something for me" (M. P. Crawford, 1937).

25. Korzybski has founded a philosophy of language and a system of mental hygiene on the fact that verbal symbols are frequently empty or have twisted meanings (A. Korzybski, 1941; R. Rhine, 1943). Confusion over symbols is thought to induce anxiety neuroses. Mental patients are taught to shift their attention to verbal symbols whose semantic values are clear and obvious. For the psychopath, words too often have taken on purely personal meanings—they do not indicate to him what they mean to the more normal portion of the population.

A system of language training related to the Korzybski philosophy is now in operation in a number of American high schools and colleges (S. I. Hayakawa, 1943). Word usage in journals and books is studied. Words having personal-emotional (connotative) meanings are culled and replaced by others having agreed-upon (denotative) semantic value. Thus the statement "Uncle Joe wants friendly nephews" becomes, perhaps, "The U.S.S.R. is pressing for the establishment of puppet states along its borders." The theory behind this educational philosophy is that engaging in such analysis will improve the student's efficiency in thinking. This hypothesis is an intriguing one but difficult to prove or disprove.

26. Language development would seem to be closely related to general intelligence. From knowledge of the vocabulary of an older child⁹ one can predict his IQ with great accuracy. Language undoubtedly has its genetic basis, but quite obviously it is socially developed. It has been found, for example, that the occupational status of the parent is related to the length of sentence that the preschool child employs. Children whose parents belong to the professional classes are as a rule far better in this phase of language development than are those whose parents are of the lower classes (D. McCarthy, 1930). Goodenough found a parallel between talkativeness of preschool children and occupational status of their parents. As the occupational status decreased, so did the talkativeness (F. L. Goodenough, 1930). Moreover, it has been shown that the correlation between a child's mental age and the education of his parents is negligible until the child is eighteen months of age, when a big increase in the correlational value occurs. It is at this age that language becomes an important tool for the child (N. Bayley, 1940).

Because "only" children associate with adults far more than do children with siblings, it is to be expected that their linguistic development will, on the average, be superior. Furthermore, since twins learn to respond to each other's gestures,

⁹ For the first two years in the life of the baby there is no measurable relationship between the intelligence test score and language development (O. C. Irwin and H. P. Chen, 1945). An exception, of course, occurs in the case of the mental defective whose language development is extremely retarded.

their need for speech is less; and their linguistic development should therefore be relatively slow. Observations bear out these deductions (E. A. Davis, 1937).

27. During the process of babbling, the child stimulates his own ears and the kinesthetic receptors of his voice-box area. In time a circular response is elicited in which a reaction, for example, the babbling of "da," serves as the stimulus for the repetition of that response, for the continued babbling of "da-da-da." If the parent says "da," the response will be further facilitated. Parrots who repeat what they hear or have heard on previous occasions are at this stage of vocalization. Their vocalizations are not, however, truly linguistic, as is shown by the fact that these birds are as likely to say "Polly wants a cracker!" when gorged with food as when hungry. True language does not exist until vocal response is associated with some object, process, or symbol of these.

For accounts of the development of language in the child, see "Language" (E. A. Esper, 1935); "Research on speech sounds for the first six months of life" (O. C. Irwin, 1941); "Language development in children" (D. A. McCarthy, 1946).

A number of studies have been made of the conditions under which social and nonsocial (egocentric) varieties of speech occur. In social speech the child questions, answers, commands, requests, criticizes, etc. In egocentric speech he talks to himself, although some other person may be talked to but ignored if he answers. The actual percentages of these two varieties of speech for different age groups and social groups are not known. Piaget reports that they are equal (J. Piaget, 1926), whereas McCarthy reports that egocentric speech is present in only 3 to 6 per cent of her children's responses (D. A. McCarthy, 1930). Since these two authors were dealing with different societies (French-Swiss and American, respectively), cultural differences may account in part for the discrepancy. Lack of objectivity in recording, divergencies in interpretation, and other factors probably share the responsibility. See also "'Egocentricity' in adult conversation" (M. Henle and M. B. Hubbell, 1938).

28. Much has been written about the causes of speech defects; but, except for defects resulting from obvious anatomical difficulties (such as cleft palate, which results in an unmistakable voice quality), little is really known. Speech specialists and psychologists are, however, giving the matter their serious attention and have so far developed many systems of therapy.

Views on the causes of stuttering and stammering oscillate between the physiogenic and the psychogenic. One group of therapists believes that speech defects are associated with left-handedness, and advice is frequently given that a naturally left-handed person should not be forced into right-handed behavior. Unfortunately, it is not known whether people are ever naturally left-handed, right-handed, or ambidextrous. It is known, however, that environmental pressures can inhibit tendencies to left-hand dominance (G. E. Carrothers, 1947; G. Hildreth, 1948). A number of researches indicate that the typical stutterer has more left-handed relatives than does the average normal speaker. But whatever vocal ill effects appear after a forced change from left- to right-handed behavior may quite possibly be due to the abrupt change in manual habits and might conceivably occur if a right-handed child were as speedily forced to become left-handed. There is considerable argument about the advisability of attempting to change a child's handedness. The sensible procedure, therefore, would be to attempt a slow change (A. Blau, 1946), or preferably to allow the child to remain as he is, since there is no evidence for the popular belief that the left-handed are inferior in various ways to the right-handed. In fact Ruch (F. L. Ruch, unpublished data) has found that the left-handed

are similar to the right-handed in scholarship, intelligence, emotional stability, and degree of contrariness. Even Travis, who for some time held to a theory of cerebral dominance, did not hold that speech troubles are associated with left-handedness as such. He felt that the trouble is more likely to arise (as in ambidexterity) when neither side of the brain has dominance, *i.e.*, when there is a "relative lack of unilaterality of motor lead control." See "Stuttering and the concept of handedness" (L. E. Travis and W. Johnson, 1934); and "Theories of handedness" (A. Schiller, 1935 and 1936).

The psychological causes of speech defects are stressed in *For stutterers* (S. Blanton and M. G. Blanton, 1936); "Psychosomatic study of fifty stuttering children" (M. Krugman, 1946); and *Speech correction* (C. Van Riper, 1942). It should be noted that Travis himself has for some time been adopting a more psychogenic view: "Stuttering," he says, "is a defense created with extraordinary skill and designed to prevent anxiety from developing when certain impulses of which the stutterer dares not become aware, threaten to expose themselves." (L. E. Travis, 1940.)

Wendell Johnson has the interesting notion that stuttering is an evaluative disorder. The stutterer fears normal nonfluency, *i.e.*, frequent repeating, pausing, saying "uh," "ah," etc., to the extent that he stammers in an attempt to avoid what he regards as improper speech. Were the Caucasian child reared as an Amerindian, his speech habits would never be criticized. Hence, no fears of nonfluency would arise and no stuttering could possibly develop. This is proved, says Johnson, from his observations that Indians do not stutter and that all the Caucasian stutterers he has examined were normal speakers when small children (W. Johnson, 1946).

29. In *Experimental social psychology* (G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, 1937, pp. 181-187) a distinction is made between three at least quantitatively different uses of the word "imitation." The first is on the order of the conditioned response; the person does not know what he is "imitating" but "unconsciously" associates certain phenomena. The responses that occur as one learns to talk would perhaps fall into this category, as would "unconscious imitation" of handwriting. In one study (D. Starch, 1911) people were given examples—one typewritten and three written by hand with varying degrees of letter width and slant—and were told to copy them in their own normal handwriting. Practically all unwittingly modified their handwriting style in conformity with the written models, either in slant, in letter width, or both. This use of the term "imitation" would apply also to the "circular" response. Among the insane and those of low mental age there is a tendency for many socially stimulated acts to be of the circular order; *e.g.*, when asked a question, a person may not answer but may simply repeat the question in whole or in part. The phenomenon is termed "echolalia" or "echophrasia." It is probable that many of the phenomena more generally included under the topic "suggestion" also fit this use of the term "imitation."

The second use of the term—and that followed by the present writers—occurs in "imitation after a trial-and-error period." There is, characteristically, a long preliminary practice period necessary before imitation is possible. The musically untrained schoolboy cannot imitate Fritz Kreisler. He must first become an extremely proficient violinist. Likewise, to copy the behavior of any model, one must already have acquired certain of that model's abilities. The necessity for a long preliminary practice period prevents imitation of many of the models one might wish to use.

The third use of the term is in "deliberate" imitation: "Where the thing to be imitated has been learned already, sudden and effective imitation without trial and error may, of course, appear" (p. 187). This is the common-sense use of the term "imitation."

It might be well to add that frequently what is labeled imitation is not imitative at all. The sound of a "missing" airplane motor may so arouse the curiosity of a number of people on the street that all may look up in search of the plane. There may be little or no imitation, one of another, but merely a common source of stimulation. Similarity of behaviors does not necessarily mean that imitation has occurred. Even in the jungle monkeys commonly use their hands in ways that look almost human, and many an egotistical human being has exclaimed at their "imitation" of human ways. Yet it would be just as sensible to speak of man's "imitation" of monkey ways. The similarities in the two sets of behaviors are largely functions of similarities of structure.

30. A distinction should be made between the social functions of play and the reasons for the origin of play. The former can be quite clearly perceived; the latter must remain in the realm of pure speculation, although some theories are more plausible than others. Thus, to regard play as having arisen in order to prepare the child in some respects for life's problems is merely to call attention to the social utility of play. The theory that play is the expression of an instinct possesses the same fallacy inherent in the more general instinct hypothesis. To regard play as a recapitulation of certain of the habits of the race in the past is hardly in keeping with the facts. Youngsters do not necessarily go through a soldier stage or an Indian stage or any other specific stage in their play development. The type of play is determined by social and mental-age factors. The recapitulation theory can also be condemned as contrary to the teachings of present-day biologists, who do not credit the Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The theory that play arises because youngsters have excess energy that must be expended is no more than doubtful biological speculation. We know that the healthy youngster does play if given the opportunity and that he will frequently continue when psychologically fatigued. But just what his neurological state may be—whether or not his excess nervous energy (if any) is consumed—has not been determined. Because of the difficulties in finding the reasons for the origin of play, it is more fruitful to consider the social-utility aspects of play. Indeed, the origin of play is really an anthropological rather than sociopsychological question. See E. S. Robinson's article "Play" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 160-161).

Child psychologists have made many observational studies of the play activities of children of different ages and cultures. Bühler's work on Austrian infants (C. Bühler, 1931) indicates that rather definite toy preferences begin at about the eighth month and that attention devoted to the toy will vary from a very short period in the six-month-old child to 20 minutes or more in a year-old child. The play of preschool and school children has been carefully observed in America and in other countries, especially in Russia, where comparisons have been made between children of communistic and those of "reactionary" groups. In America normal children have been compared with brighter and duller children, and sex and racial differences in play activities have been observed. Considerable attention is now being focused on the possibilities of diagnosing and curing personality abnormalities through the analysis of play activities.

The following references are representative of the many now available: *Play therapy in childhood* (C. H. Rogerson, 1939); "The development of certain motor

skills and play activities in young children" (T. D. Jones, 1939); "A method for the study of personality reactions in preschool age children by means of analysis of their play" (J. L. Despert, 1940); "Toward a social psychology of human play" (S. H. Britt and S. Q. Janus, 1941); "Clinical studies in childhood play" (E. Homburger Erickson, 1943); "Young children's play fantasies" (G. R. Bach, 1945); and *Play therapy* (V. M. Axline, 1947).

31. The perennial quest for the roots of ambition has recently reappeared under the heading "level of aspiration." This latter concept has a variety of definitions, and not all the current aspiration studies deal with similar phenomena. For Hoppe, an early German worker in this field, the "level of aspiration" referred to the individual's expectations or goals, in regard to his own future achievement in a given task (F. Hoppe, 1930). Many of the later experimenters followed Hoppe in defining the concept in subjective vein. Gardner and a number of others, however, regarded the term as referring to the objective indications—the statements and other overt acts that the person makes regarding his future performances (J. W. Gardner, 1940).

Fortunately, many of the recent findings stand out with sufficient clarity to transcend the difficulty of definitions. It has been found that good performers set their goals more realistically than do poor performers. Children successful in their schoolwork are more alike in their aspiration levels than are those who are less successful. The latter's responses scatter far more, and understandingly so; for there are probably more reasons for lack of success than for success in schoolwork (P. S. Sears, 1940). Aspiration level, variously defined, has been correlated with a variety of personality tests; but all the correlations are so low that they have no social significance (R. Gould and N. Kaplan, 1940; J. W. Gardner, 1940; S. F. Klugman, 1947).

In several experiments the relation of the frame of reference to the level of aspiration has been studied. As might be expected, great differences in the level of aspiration are found between those situations in which the subject is told frankly his actual scores on a certain test, those in which he is led to believe that certain fictitious scores are his own, and those in which he is given the true or fictitious scores of others to be taken for reference. Thus if the subject is told that a certain score is the average made by a group of lazy workers, the effect will be different from what it would have been had the subject been led to believe that the score represented the average of the performances of a large number of college professors (D. W. Chapman and J. Volkmann, 1939; J. W. Gardner, 1939; R. Gould and H. B. Lewis, 1940; and L. Festinger, 1942). There is still considerable doubt as to the temporal stability of the level of aspiration. This research area is still a live one with many articles and occasional reviews of the literature still appearing (W. McGehee, 1940; E. R. Hilgard and E. M. Sait, 1941; J. D. Frank, 1941; M. G. Preston and J. A. Bayton, 1941; R. Gould, 1941; P. S. Sears, 1941; L. B. Heathers, 1942; F. W. Irwin and M. G. Mintzer, 1942; M. G. Preston, 1942; J. B. Rotter, 1942, 1943, 1945; K. Lewin *et al.*, 1944; R. R. Holt, 1945; E. W. Gruen, 1945; A. F. Ax, 1946; D. C. McClelland and F. S. Apicella, 1947).

32. In several places in the text we have stressed the importance of the stage play as symbolic behavior. Unlike the motion picture, the stage play usually has a selected audience, since its patrons, in our society at least, are largely adults. Thus the censoring of the stage play has not excited as much attention as has the censoring of its rival, the motion picture. Suffice it to say that, where censoring of the stage play has existed, it has had neither logical nor experimental justification

but has been based upon religious convictions or has been enforced for political or personal gains.

Although much has been written concerning the absurdity of censoring motion pictures, those who believe that such censorship is a socially desirable policy have offered little data to substantiate their belief. Up to the present, the attempts to ascertain what effects motion pictures have on children's behavior, although numerous and often expensively conducted, have been so superficial that they deserve only passing mention. The sociological studies in which tabulations have been made of the frequency of motion-picture attendance, the type of plot preferred, the amount of money spent, etc., may make interesting reading; but they are largely irrelevant to the censorship question, for they do not disclose causal factors. It may be interesting to know that 24.4 per cent of delinquent boys attend the movies five or more days a week, whereas of the more moral boys only 1.2 per cent attend as often. But whether motion-picture attendance is the cause or merely a symptom of delinquency is not evident. This issue is almost identical with that which has so long worried psychiatrists: Does alcohol cause certain people to become insane? Or is alcoholism symptomatic of their more basic psychopathy? Psychiatric belief, at the present, leans toward the latter view, recognizing, it is true, that a drinking bout may furnish the stimuli necessary to set off some particular spell of insanity.

On occasion architecture and sculpture possess symbolic value. But, although a building may call up associations with other lines, shapes, and angles (certain lines, for example, may seem to be reaching heavenward), the degree of symbolic meaning scarcely reaches the point where much behavior modeling can occur. Moralists have little to fear in this regard, although their Freudian friends may frighten them with talk of the unconscious sexual significance of the church door, the steeple, spire, and the like. Sculpture is, however, a different matter. The human body can be copied in almost any desired pose or with any part augmented. To one observer a statue may be merely a naughty nude, whereas to the artist it may signify the pioneer spirit of the West, freedom of speech, or whatnot. The possibilities for symbolism are enormous; as a matter of fact, there is even some possibility of patterning one's poses and attitudes after those suggested by a statue. But, whereas the poet or novelist can tell a story—a connected sequence of events—the sculptor can offer only a single scene. The scene will not be understood unless the observer comprehends the sculptor's system of symbols.

Much the same can be said of pictorial art. If an observer is not initiated into the artist's system of symbols, he will react to a picture as he would to a somewhat similar life scene removed from its proper setting. Whatever elements of beauty he perceives depend on his own associations. For this reason, the unsophisticated layman may laugh loudly at the several artistic isms and wonder, perhaps with some reason, whether even the artist's coterie of friends can get meanings from his paintings. But paintings may be suggestive in the sense that they can, to some extent at least, aid in the presentation of models. Paintings of emaciated saints might, for example, help in inducing some already hyperreligious psychopath to diet or to starve himself. Even the memory of a recently seen photograph of a leper might keep one from shaking hands with the leper one sees in the Orient. But it hardly can be expected that the picture of a Catholic saint will alter much the behavior of little Protestant boys. Nevertheless, one of the authors once observed great parental excitement following the use in a school of an otherwise innocuous book that contained one such picture. In their emotional excitement

the parents failed to see that the saintly picture had no model value for their children.

Historians tell us that the early Christians, in the fear that pagan music might somehow destroy their Christian morals, succeeded in destroying almost all the historical documents that described pre-Christian music. The idea that music and Satan were somehow connected has kept recurring throughout the centuries; and, until quite recent years, even the kindly Quakers feared the effects of music. But just what music could conceivably do to morals or, for that matter, to any other part of one's character, is difficult to see.

Through his music the African signal drummer could, of course, pollute the air with improper messages or even descriptions of human beings who might conceivably serve as models for the youth of his tribe (R. T. Clarke, 1934). But most music is not so highly symbolic, even when it is accompanied by words. Just as in poetry, the words need not bear the precise symbolic value they would possess in ordinary conversation. Poetic license is the rule, and exactitude of meaning is often sacrificed in the cause of rhyme and meter. On occasion, the words may have one set of meanings for one group of singers and another for other singers or for the librettist. Thus the Negro spirituals frequently contain words that have vulgar meanings for the Negro; but to the white men who now sing them they have quite respectable connotations.

We do, of course, associate so closely the words and music of many songs that the music alone may call up a symbolism previously associated solely with the words. We may recall the conditions under which a song was written, or perhaps we have been told for what type of celebration it was intended. Again, the music may be associated with a dance and receive the latter's meaning. Thus in the Dutch East Indies and in many another land dance steps have quite definite symbolism. Even in our own culture, the commercial type of jazz music with its simple structure and rather primitive monotony has, for many people, come to be associated with the dance hall and all that is allied to it, whereas the so-called "better" music has been linked with the concert hall or the opera. Given the proper setting, then, music may aid in the formation of either "good" or "bad" models.

But that music per se has a symbolic value does not follow. Some music, undoubtedly, has some meaning. In our own society, for example, slow music of a minor mode tends to call forth sadness, not the castration complex as one of our more imaginative psychoanalysts would have it (A. Montani, 1945); music of a major mode with quicker tempos frequently implies joy. To most people of our part of the world music that resolves well seems finished, at rest; that which is left unresolved appears so unfinished that the story has been repeatedly told of musicians who could not be restrained from rushing to the most readily available piano to complete unfinished resolutions. There are numerous other musical patterns in this and in other societies which somewhat similarly show a trace of symbolism. Yet, in the main, the amount of symbolism is so small in comparison with verbal or gestural behavior that we usually think of music as essentially nonsymbolic.

A few theorists believe that much of what is ordinarily taken to be meaning in music comes, not from other associations, but from the inherent structures of musical forms. "High" tones are not called high because of association with high resonance in the human head or the "upward strains" one gets from trying to sing "too high," but because of an inherent quality of highness that is attached to notes of greater frequency. The issue is too much in the realm of philosophical speculation to warrant further treatment here. See "Music and meaning" (C. C. Pratt, 1943).

Although it is a part of the ritualism of some symphonic music to pretend that each composition "tells" a specific story, it is actually the program note or the announcer who is the narrator. The composer may have been motivated by a love of communism, by the visceral drives that arise in neural syphilis, or by the exuberance of youth, for all the listener can tell from the music itself; there is no way to read the "message" that is supposedly being told. The listener cannot even be certain that the composer is earnestly endeavoring to tell him something. He may be "pulling his leg," as it were; for there is no sincerity test or any other measure to tell us what is good in music. About all the composer can "get across" is a variety of vague moods, except when he uses some musical form that has a definite meaning in a specific culture, such as the military march. To say that music tells a real story is palpably absurd. Its effect on a person depends upon that individual's associations with the particular type of music in question.¹⁰ If he has had no association with it, he may be charmed with the innovations or angered by the lack of familiarity; but he is either deluded or tampering with the truth if he says he "understands just what the composer is trying to say." See "Factors determining the characterization of musical phrases" (R. H. Gundlach, 1935); "The emotional effect of intervals as found in a study of the melodies of art songs" (T. V. Van Vliet, 1935); "The affective value of pitch and tempo in music" (K. Hevner, 1937); "Studies in expressiveness of music" (K. Hevner, 1939); "The affective character of music" (C. P. Heinlein, 1939); "The expression of meanings and emotions in music" (M. G. Rigg, 1942); "Basal emotional patterns expressible in music" (I. G. Campbell, 1942); "A musician's point of view toward emotional expression" (H. Hanson, 1942); "An experimental investigation of the creative process in music" (R. R. Willmann, 1944).

33. The idea of general faculties of memory, imagination, discrimination, perception, reasoning capacity, and the like, although still held by the layman and by an occasional educator, received its psychological death blow at the hands of E. L. Thorndike and R. S. Woodworth in 1901. Since then the idea has been kept rather successfully buried by other experimenters. In place of these hypothetical general faculties, it has been shown that man possesses rather specific abilities. He may have a good memory for faces but a poor one for names, etc. The transfer-benefits one gets from one school subject to another seem to come not from an improvement in one's memory, reasoning ability, or imagination but from the carry-over of specific methods and rules of procedure and from similarities in the materials learned.

In addition to rather specific abilities, such as a memory for names, man has been thought by some to possess at least one fairly general, unitary, or common factor or ability. For this presumed ability the term *g* (general intelligence) was proposed a number of years ago. Of late, many somewhat less general factors have been postulated. The list now includes more than 50 group factors, of which *p* (perseveration), *w* (will factor), *c* (opposite of perseveration), *f* (surgency), *e* (emotionality), *n* (jumpiness), *gd* (pressure toward action), *d* (depression), *r* (shyness), *t* (meditative thinking), *r* (happy-go-lucky quality), *a* (alertness), and *lt* (thinking that is of the problem-solving kind), are typical examples. The most ambitious theorist in this area is R. B. Cattell, who explains all behavior in

¹⁰ Thus a person whose tonal-visual associations are markedly different from those of Walt Disney will quite likely have found his *Fantasia* extremely distasteful (H. B. English, 1943).

terms of surface traits (clusters of characteristics) and source traits (factors). His data are obtained from rating scales (R. B. Cattell, 1943, 1945, 1946). The list of group factors is steadily growing.

Care should be taken to distinguish these factors from the faculties of an older day. A faculty was conceived to be a natural capacity of the organism, independent of the situation and other environmental variables. Factors, on the other hand, derive from statistical manipulations (factor analysis). Each factor is a function of the clusterings of responses to a particular group of test items. Thus the fact that a large number of tests that are intended to measure the voluntary aspects of behavior have been found to yield consistently positive (even though relatively small) intercorrelations has led to the proposal of a *w* or will factor. See "A factor analysis of forty character tests" (H. E. Brogden, 1940); "Factor analysis in the establishment of new personality tests" (J. G. Darley and W. J. McNamara, 1940); "Patterns of behavior of young children as revealed by a factor analysis of trait 'clusters'" (K. M. Maurer, 1941); "Personality traits by factorial analysis" (C. A. Gibb, 1942); "The primary traits in personality items purporting to measure sociability" (H. E. Brogden and W. F. Thomas, 1943); "P-tests and the concept of mental inertia" (K. F. Walker *et al.*, 1943); "Some factors of temperament: a re-examination" (H. A. Reyburn and J. G. Taylor, 1943); "Perseveration and fluency" (B. Notcutt, 1943); "A study of personality syndromes" (D. Horn, 1944); *Dimensions of personality* (H. J. Eysenck, 1947).

34. Psychologists and psychiatrists have long employed association tests by which they have hoped to render the covert behavior of their subjects overt in character. In the simpler sorts of association tests the subject is presented with lists of words and is asked to give the first associations that come to mind. The latter are evaluated in a number of ways—for speed of reaction, quality and commonality of response, etc. (G. H. Kent and A. J. Rosanoff, 1910). In its simpler forms the association test would appear to be quite invalid (I. Lorge and E. L. Thorndike, 1941). One modification of this type of test uses skeletal vowel patterns instead of words (B. F. Skinner, 1936; W. K. Estes, 1940; and D. Shakow and S. Rosenzweig, 1940). Another modification consists of cloud pictures—fantasy stimuli of a meaningless type (W. Stern, 1937). In still another, many moving colors on the order of those of the famous clavi-lux or color organ are used (N. Cameron, unpublished data).

So far the best known of the association tests is that which has been developed by the psychiatrist Rorschach. His test consists of a set of ink blots, some in color. The Rorschach is the best known example of the relatively unstructured or projective test, as opposed to the highly structured questionnaire. That is, while the latter is so built that its stimuli have approximately the same meanings for all members of a given subculture, the stimuli of the Rorschach are deliberately chosen so as to be ambiguous of interpretation. Herein lies the chief merit of the unstructured test, for the testee cannot forecast how he should answer; he has no way of knowing which answers are regarded as good and which as bad. Hence, he naively projects himself into his answers. The test, then, has great possibilities but unfortunately the procedure has become the basis for a cult;¹¹ and its leaders make extravagant claims, *e.g.*, that they can test intelligence, extroversion, and almost everything else that any other test can measure. The validity of the Rorschach test is, however,

¹¹ The Rorschach cult has its own journal, *Rorschach research exchange*, but now is flooding the several clinical journals with articles.

still uncertain; and arguments about standardizations and interpretations are still raging (S. J. Beck, 1937, 1944; B. Klopfer *et al.*, 1939, 1942; R. Bochner and F. Halpern, 1945; M. R. Hertz, 1942, 1943; M. R. Harrower-Erickson and M. E. Steiner, 1945).

Many other projective tests have appeared on the market in the past few years, taking such varied forms as, for example, sentence completions (M. I. Stein, 1947), comic strip characters (E. A. Haggard, 1942), and art work (R. H. Alschuler and LaB. W. Hattwick, 1947), particularly of the finger-painting variety (P. J. Napoli, 1946). But, next to the Rorschach in clinical interest has unquestionably been the Thematic Apperception Test (H. A. Murray, 1938; R. M. Clark, 1944; E. R. Balken, 1945; F. Oppenheimer, 1945; A. W. Combs, 1947; S. S. Tomkins, 1947; M. I. Stein, 1948). Here the stimuli are rather vague pictures, the reactions to which are studied in terms of the story themes, the personal needs, and the environmental pressures. See "Projective methods in the study of personality" (P. M. Symonds and E. A. Samuel, 1941); "Projective methods: their origins, theory and application in personality research" (H. Sargent, 1945); *Projective methods* (L. K. Frank, 1948); and *Projective techniques* (J. E. Bell, 1948).

35. The life-history method is the name given to a variety of techniques that deal with personality by attempting to obtain an over-all view of the subject's life experiences. The use of the method has been stimulated by Dollard who sets for it the following criteria: "1. The subject must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series. 2. The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant. 3. The peculiar role of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized. 4. The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown. 5. The continuous related character of experience from childhood through adulthood must be stressed. 6. The social situation must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor. 7. The life history material itself must be organized and conceptualized." (J. Dollard, 1935, p. 8.)

Sociologists, clinical psychologists, and even psychoanalysts have followed at least the majority of these criteria. Among the more important life-history studies are *Brothers in crime* (C. R. Shaw *et al.*, 1938); "General methods: case study" (W. C. Olson, 1938); "The reliability of life-history studies" (D. Cartwright and J. R. P. French, Jr., 1939); *Minor mental maladjustments in normal people: based on original autobiographies of personality maladjustments* (J. E. W. Wallin, 1939); "How shall a life-history be written?" (N. A. Polansky, 1941); "Personality under social catastrophe: ninety life-histories of the Nazi revolution" (G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, 1941); "Individual and mass behavior in extreme situations" (B. Bettelheim, 1943); and "The dynamism of anti-Semitism in gentile and Jew" (B. Bettelheim, 1947).

When a person can be observed for a long period of time, a systematic collection of anecdotes concerning him may be of considerable value. Anecdotal records should, however, be used only as an adjunct to other methodologies, particularly that of the life history (A. S. Barr, 1941; A. M. McClelland and R. L. McManus, 1941; A. E. Hamalainen, 1943).

Biographical analysis is a variety of the life-history method. Although the writing of most biographies is biased (F. Baumgarten, 1937), biographical analysis will yield much if the checks employed in all good historical research are applied. Thus one analysis of biographical data yielded good evidence that the mental health of fifty of the greatest men of history was normally distributed. Although these men of genius may have had many anxieties and other psychoneurotic symp-

toms that did not get into the records, they displayed no more psychotic symptoms than fifty more ordinary people chosen at random would show (C. C. Miles and L. Wolfe, 1936). An ambitious attempt to make use of biographies can be seen in value analysis (R. K. White, 1947). Value categories are set up and a line-by-line analysis of the document is made. The method is laborious and as yet rather arbitrary. See also "The evaluative attitudes of Jonathan Swift" (L. W. Ferguson, 1939). For broad considerations of the usefulness to the social scientist of all sorts of personal documents, see "The use of personal documents in psychological science" (G. W. Allport, 1942); "The use of personal documents in history, anthropology and sociology" (L. Gottschalk *et al.*, 1945); "Personal document analysis" (R. F. Creegan, 1946); "Radicalism and conservatism toward conventional religion" (P. M. Kitay, 1947).

36. The symbolic nature and the value of thought can be illustrated by the behavior of two men playing chess. Each move that each makes is preceded by a calculation of the consequences. Because there are always a number of possible alternatives, each alternative must be considered in terms of its consequences, so that the most favorable or the least disastrous move may be selected. This calculation cannot be worked out by nonsymbolic trial and error, since, once a chessman is moved, the player cannot retract his decision on the grounds that it was merely a trial that proved to be a failure. He must do the trying out symbolically and, in the main, covertly.

An inexperienced player may ponder the results of each possible move. His lips may move slightly as he verbally traces out what his opponent might do should he move this chessman that way. Possibly he even mutters, "Now, if I move my King there, you could then . . ." His hand may at times hover about a chessman, which he may pretend to move in order more clearly to follow out the consequences of the contemplated act. Thus, by laborious trial and error, he works out a solution to the problem. That trial and error is, however, symbolic; he talks about the trial moves, and he imagines the chessman moved into place and what his opponent may then do. Not until he has found a symbolic solution to the problem does he translate one of these trial moves into nonsymbolic action.

Even the more skillful player presumably goes through a trial-and-error process before he acts nonsymbolically. The more skillful player, however, does this rapidly and covertly; he uses a thought short cut. Although imagination of a visual character may enter into this process—in his "mind's eye" he may see the chessmen moved into place—it is possible that covert speech, in which the "feel" of the muscular positions involved serves for the words themselves, is more important.

37. From the sociological standpoint the most fruitful application of motivational terminology is perhaps that which has been made by Thomas and others who have followed his example. Impressed with the difficulty of classifying the behavior of human beings in terms of behavior units, he has suggested in *The Polish peasant* that all the varied actions of men might be divided into four mutually exclusive motivational categories: the wish for security, the wish for new experience, the wish for recognition, and the wish for response (W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, 1918-1920). Such a division is, however, but one of the many possible ways of classifying what man does; the four wishes do not explain why man does what he does. Dunlap's motivational classification into several "desire" categories¹² probably

¹² Dunlap's nine desires were the alimentary, the excretory, the desire for protection, for activity, for rest, for preeminence, for conformity, the amorous, and the

serves his followers quite as well; since, however, Thomas's classification has received far more attention, it will be discussed at some length here.

The *wish for security* may be used to describe all actions that contribute or appear to contribute to the maintenance of things as they are. Thus the efforts of a man to curry the favor of his employer in order to retain his job, his efforts to retain his wife's affections, or his efforts to prevent a political revolution would be classified under this category.

No doubt a considerable block of human behavior can be interpreted in this way. Men tend to resist changes. Much of the social history of the later Middle Ages is the story of the efforts of a majority to prevent a small minority from introducing novel things and methods. The struggle of early science was the struggle against the characteristic conservatism of men. Even today we tend to cling to old social precepts, however willing we are to accept the newest mechanical gadget.

Whenever a man's economic, physical, or social welfare is threatened, he takes a defensive position, struggling as best he knows how to retain or to regain his customary economic and physical status. From another point of view, it may be said that he has learned to fear, and hence to try to avoid, any threat to his status. Status is, of course, entirely relative to the individual. The man who is accustomed to three good meals a day, a sizable apartment, unlimited credit, and a large balance in the bank will consider these things essential to his security. The man on the dole may feel a need only for his weekly stipend.

Life, fire, sickness, and other insurances constitute one of the most tangible expressions of man's wish to stay secure. Much of the antagonism and abuse showered upon those who would change things—whether it be a change in the system of government, industry, the family, or simply a change in street names—can also be thought of as belonging in the same category.

All man's conservatism—and it runs through much that he does—is traceable to the fact that, once he has learned a reasonably effective pattern of life adjustment, any external changes that may make that pattern less effective are distressing. The efforts, then, that a man makes to prevent such change may be described as an expression of his wish for security.

The *wish for new experience* is the antithesis of the wish for security. It may be used to describe those actions that disturb the *status quo* of the individual. Thus, the fact that a man takes a vacation, quits his job, divorces his wife, or joins a revolutionary political party would be described as an expression of his wish for new experience.

Much of present-day human action may be classed as anticonservative or radical.¹³ With the ordinary man this kind of action may take such forms as an

parental desire (K. Dunlap, 1934).

¹³ Radicalism in religion and economics has been much studied since the pioneer work with Watson's test of "fair-mindedness" (G. B. Watson, 1925). Later studies have shown that the radical is likely to consider himself rejected by his parents; that he is more subject to inferiority feelings; and that he is considered more pessimistic, more handicapped in social relations, and more equipped with special aptitudes than is the conservative (M. H. Krout and R. Stagner, 1939). The radical is also apt to be slightly brighter, more dominant, better informed (E. S. Dexter, 1939), economically poorer (R. H. Gundlach, 1939), and have less race prejudice (S. P. Adinarayaniah, 1941). Radicalism-conservatism appears as

occasional vacation from the humdrum routines of home, office, and club; an occasional change of suit or tie; or an occasional change of house or apartment. Some individuals, however, would seem to be inveterate adventurers. They are explorers of distant and little known lands. Perhaps they explore the new by rising to the stratosphere or sinking deep into the ocean; perhaps they explore the world of the scientific laboratory, finding new facts and constructing new theories; perhaps they are explorers of a possible social future—adventurers in social reconstruction, who may or may not be adventurous along other lines.

All activities that are deviations from social norms may be classified as expressions of the wish for new experience. On the negative side this would seem to imply a boredom with the *status quo*, an effort to escape the fatigue which arises from repetition of a single action pattern. It should be observed, however, that even the most adventurous want the "new" to be composed largely of old and recognizable elements. Things that are too radical are usually disturbing rather than stimulating. To be commercially successful, a new piece of music, a novel, or a joke must ordinarily be no more than an old one in new dress.

Although the distinction between the first two of this fourfold classification is obvious, that between the second pair, recognition and response, is not so apparent. The *wish for recognition*¹⁴ can perhaps be imputed to such activities as a man's flattering an employer in order to get a better position, his taking a correspondence-school course in salesmanship in order to improve his value to his employer, his marrying above his social position, or his becoming a Democrat in the hope of securing a political position. In other words, this wish is used to describe all those actions which lead to increased social and economic prestige for the individual. There are, in addition, many actions that can have little value in themselves; their chief significance to the one who acts is that they serve as a means of drawing the favorable attention of others. Sometimes termed "rivalry," actions of this order are invariably competitive. Although the behavior itself might be described as a consequence of the wish for recognition, we frequently speak of the person who endeavors to assert his superiority in competition with others as an egotist. Illustrative of the forms of behavior that may be described as egotistical are temper tantrums, childish pounding on the piano while guests are present, and buying a new car even though the old one functions well and economically.

In certain types of activity, men seem to work most efficiently under competitive conditions. Utilization of the "competitive spirit" in an effort to intensify work and play efficiency is a commonplace of everyday life. The fact that a man runs his fastest on the track when he is competing with others rather than with his own past scores may be described as motivated by his wish for recognition; so, too, may the fact that a woman puts on her best and newest dress to attend a party, that she wants to keep up with the trend of fashion, or that in a group of other women she talks rapidly in an unusually loud tone of voice. In a like way have been classified the efforts of a man to become known as the "best man on the job" or "the life of the party"; those of the army private to become a lance corporal; those of the multimillionaire to get an appointment to the Court of St. James's; or those of the dictator to increase the number of his subjects.

a common factor in measures of nationalism, racial prejudice, pro-fascist sentiment, and approval of forceful solutions to problems (R. Stagner, 1944).

¹⁴ See "Adjustment problems of university girls arising from the urge for recognition and new experience" (S. H. Jameson, 1941).

In some societies there is little opportunity for the individual to change his social status, and in these there would be less occasion than in our society to speak of a wish for recognition. Whenever social recognition is a matter of birth, competition cannot appear between members of different class, sex, or age groups. In our dynamic and highly competitive society, a great deal of human action would seem to have no other objective than that of asserting the individual's superiority over his associates. We are, in a sense, a society composed of egotists, each endeavoring to rise above the others. Many of our actions may therefore be aptly described as an expression of the wish for recognition.

The actions of a meek man who timidly strikes up a conversation with the one who shares his seat on the train should not be described as the result of egotism or a wish for recognition. His behavior is a noncompetitive form of action, which may be termed "communalism." He may listen earnestly to whatever the other has to say, express opinions of his own only when the other lapses into silence, and likewise reveal a hunger for companionship upon any basis. Man is often spoken of as a gregarious animal—a reference to the fact that men tend to form small communal groups.

In an integrated society, the individual's membership in various social groups is so automatic as to arouse little comment. He belongs. His life is organized, and one phase of that organization is the response he receives to his presence by the members of his various social groups. He does not need, therefore, to seek out companions. People who are accustomed to the comparatively isolated life of modern urban communities are inclined to feel irritated at the constant presence of intimates—which was characteristic, for example, of life on the old-fashioned farm. They may feel a lack of privacy under such conditions. Removed from his usual surroundings, however, even the most self-sufficient urbanite will commonly seek out people with whom he can communicate.

The tendency for people to draw together whenever they are faced with extraordinary circumstances has been described as the result of the *wish for response*. When the fog grows dangerously thick and a sense of uncertainty pervades the passengers on a ship, former social barriers often drop away; and the passengers form close intimate groups. Apparently this sort of thing is but an adult parallel to the child's trick of running to mother for "comfort" when he is overtired or when he is disturbed by some unusual noise or event.

In the modern world many people who as children lived in intimate companionship with others may find themselves removed in later years from such membership. They feel lonely and, as an effort to reestablish themselves, may become joiners. The man who hangs around a low-class poolroom, bar, dance hall, or "rummy" club may be said to evidence a wish for response; so, too, may his social superior who sits and chats idly all afternoon in his luxurious club and goes the rounds of night clubs after dinner. At times the use of books, motion pictures, and the radio may be similarly described. Ours is a busy, unstable society, in which the individual is frequently denied the companionship which was his in childhood and youth.

38. There are at least two types of overt activities that are themselves poorly verbalized; and surely the accompanying covert behaviors must be even less verbalized. First there are those overt activities which are learned during the preverbal period, the period before speech habits are well established. During the first year or so the child must acquire many habits, and no set is more difficult to establish than that having to do with the control of the bladder and the alimentary

tract. Yet no other training is perhaps so clumsily handled. The child is not encouraged to discuss his difficulties. Only signs and baby talk are allowed, and after a time even these are curtailed without adequate explanations. With a hush-hush atmosphere ever present, no frank ironing out of difficulties is possible. In fact failure of eliminative control, as in enuresis, is sometimes employed by the child to control his parents who may call in first an internist and later a psychiatrist, give the enuretic special attentions, and augment his ego in many other ways. It is, therefore, no wonder that there arises a variety of poorly verbalized and un verbalized covert behavior paralleling excretory difficulties—anxieties, long-continued moods, and the like. Many psychoanalysts are so much impressed by the possibilities for major frustrations that they trace many important complexes of later life back to these poorly verbalized moods and attitudes that are said by the analysts to reside in a semimystical unconscious. The term “unconscious” is, however, a misleading one; it is likely to lead the layman to believe that these early habits are kept intact in a magic box of some sort, and to imply that these early habits continually attempt by fair means and foul to escape from their place of confinement. It would be more scientific to say that there exists a poor integration of habits, both overt and covert.¹⁸

Later in the child's life, but earlier than the older books on child psychology would admit, the beginnings of sex play appear. In our somewhat prudish culture such activity is not looked upon as proper. Again the hush-hush attitude appears with prohibition of both the more obvious activities and the few words used to describe them. Again the stage is set for covert conflicts. To the credit of the psychoanalysts it must be said that they have been among the first to appreciate the frustrating nature of such suppressions. Unfortunately, however, certain of the analysts have regarded early sex and eliminative troubles as basic to all later mental troubles. This particularistic sort of explanation, this bringing of all troubles back to a few childish upsets, cannot, we feel, be accepted; but the importance to later adjustment of the poorly verbalized, overt activities of childhood and of their covert accompaniments must not be ignored.

39. The concept of negative and positive identification assists in the analysis of such differential responses as those of humor and tragedy and those of sentimentality and pity. Without this concept, the distinction between the humorous and the tragic situation in the play, the motion picture, and the written story is a baffling one; for the clue lies not in the situations but in the identifications made by the one who finds the situation either humorous or tragic. The situations themselves are highly conventionalized; we laugh at that which we have been taught to laugh at and cry about that which is conventionally a cause for tears. But frequently there is no consistent outward difference between situations which the audience considers humorous and those which the audience feels tragic. The embarrassed country boy in the fashionable salon of a great metropolis can be an object either of humor or of tragedy. The man who trips and falls downstairs to land at the proud dowager's feet may be either a laughable buffoon or a heart-rending unfortunate. Apparently, therefore, it is not the situation per se that makes for

¹⁸ In his attempts to salvage what is worth while in orthodox Freudianism and to combine it with the more common-sense doctrines of the pioneer psychiatrist, Adolph Meyer, Cameron has viewed the unconscious much as have the present authors. For his far more extensive treatment, see *Psychology of behavior disorders* (N. Cameron, 1947).

the difference in the reaction of the audience, but the way in which and the extent to which the members of the audience have identified themselves with the central character.

In witnessing a play or motion picture or in following the narrative of a story, one tends to identify oneself positively with one or more of the characters. In accordance with the dramatic formula, the observer is generally given a hero with whom to make a positive identification and a villain with whom to make a negative identification. Vicariously, the observer can then enjoy the successes of the hero and the misadventures of the villain, an enjoyment intensified by contrast with the occasional vicarious anguish induced by the difficulties of the former and by the achievements of the latter. In the happy-ending type of story, the hero and heroine finally outwit and defeat the villain. In tragedy, however, the villain is frequently an impersonal force—nature or the social system. Thus the success of the villain does not greatly add to the displeasure that the observer feels at the hero's defeat, since the observer is in a sense resigned to victories of nature over man.

In comedy, the observer is led to reverse his usual identifications with the dramatic characters, so that the events that would otherwise be tragic become funny. To accomplish this reversal of identification, the hero, although a tragic figure, is made so unpersonable that the observer will make no positive identification and may make some negative identification with him. To attain this end, comedians are always "comic," *e.g.*, of an appearance that precludes positive identification on the part of the observer. The comic effect is probably heightened when the misfortunes of the comedian are caused by a villain with whom the observer can make a degree of positive identification. Thus in comedy we laugh when the good-natured thug hits the ridiculous policeman over the head with a playful piece of lead pipe, whereas in tragedy we are agonized when the horrible thug hits the noble policeman over the head with a vicious piece of lead pipe.

40. Even though we were to accept, contrary to all evidence (see Appendix note 42), the idea that races can be satisfactorily separated one from another on the basis of anthropological measurements, it would be impossible to accept the thesis of the biological determinists. There is no scientific evidence that one particular "race" is biologically better than the others. In "A study of psychological differences between 'racial' and national groups in Europe," Klineberg found no significant differences in "intelligence" between Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneanians (O. Klineberg, 1931-1932). Nor was any national group consistently superior. One of his French groups was, for example, among his best, whereas another was low.

In America large differences in Binet intelligence and in other abilities have been found among the several European nationals. But the impossibility of divorcing the effects of education and opportunity and the lack of a technique for determining how typical these people are of their respective "races" make doubtful any conclusion as to native differences (G. H. Estabrooks, 1928). Franzblau, who has compared Danes and Italians in both America and Europe, found that, although the American groups show the expected differences in favor of the Danes, the European groups show no significant differences (R. N. Franzblau, 1935). Such studies certainly indicate that the burden of proof should be upon those who maintain that the "racial" differences found between various national groups in America are innate.

When Amerindians and Negroes are compared with whites, the factor of differential social status inevitably intervenes. No one knows the effect that his inferior

social and economic opportunity has on the Negro's intelligence as tested. Certainly the effect must be considerable, although one psychologist (H. E. Garrett, 1945) would seem to deny its very existence. But this extreme position flies in the face of facts (M. J. Herskovits, 1945; M. F. A. Montagu, 1945). Urban residence has been found to be an important variable in the formation of Negro intelligence. In general, the longer the urban residence, the higher the intelligence is likely to be (O. Klineberg, 1935). Negro learning ability, as far as can be judged, is no worse than that of whites (P. Witty, 1945). Amerindians¹⁶ and Negroes (T. G. Alper and E. G. Boring, 1944), however, generally score lower on intelligence tests than do whites; the Chinese and Japanese, on the other hand, compare quite favorably with European immigrants as a group and are far superior to certain of those from the south and east of Europe.

Personality tests have so far shown few consistent "racial" differences; and when slight differences do appear, it is well nigh impossible to interpret the data. See "Personality differences between Negro and white college students, North and South" (J. R. Patrick and V. M. Sims, 1934) and *Thus be their destiny: the personality development of Negro youth in three communities* (J. H. Atwood et al., 1941).

The most striking aspect of the problem of "race" is not that an occasional difference is found but rather that there is such an enormous overlap between groups. On a particular test 40 per cent of a so-called "inferior" race will frequently achieve better scores than that made by the median of a so-called "superior" race. In fact a few will make scores as high as that made by the most intelligent of whites (M. D. Jenkins, 1948). And from every large "race" have come many individuals who on the basis of any criterion have contributed much to the world. Their "intelligence" and other personal qualities invite the closest of scrutinies. Often their status is won in spite of the bitterest of opposition—gained in the presence of social and economic pressures that would not have been invoked against a member of a favored race.

For reviews of the studies on racial differences, see *Race differences* (O. Klineberg, 1935); *Race: science and politics* (R. Benedict, 1940); *Scientific aspects of the race problem* (H. S. Jennings et al., 1941); *Race and rumors of race* (H. D. Odum, 1943); "Physical anthropology and race relations" (W. M. Krogman, 1948).

41. The literature based upon the Aryan myth is as broad as it is shallow. The most notorious of the books on this subject which have appeared in English in recent times is, perhaps, *The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy* (T. L. Stoddard, 1920). Next in rank order is probably *The passing of the great race* (M. Grant, 1921). Many temperate and cautious attacks upon the problem of racial differences have, however, been made. Among these is *Race differences* (O. Klineberg, 1935), mentioned above, in which the attempts to find biological explanations for racial differences in behavior are examined and the idea of biological causation is ultimately rejected.

That much of the variation in the performances of the members of different groups is of social origin seems certain. That the problem is a complex and unsettled one is also true. See, for example, the detailed study of racial mixture in

¹⁶ In one study of Amerindians the average intelligence scores of a sample of 670 children was found to equal the white norm (R. J. Havighurst and R. R. Hilkevitch, 1944).

Race mixture (E. B. Reuter, 1931), a study that will indicate why, as M. J. Herskovits says ("Race mixture," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 41-43), there can at present be no unanimity upon the psychological or social results of racial crossing. See also: *The Negro family in the United States* (E. F. Frazier, 1939); *Children of bondage* (A. Davis and J. Dollard, 1940); *Negro youth at the crossways* (E. F. Frazier, 1940); *Deep South* (A. Davis et al., 1941); "The psychology of the Negro" (H. G. Canady, 1946); "Problem, method and theory in Afroamerican studies" (M. J. Herskovits, 1945).

42. The people of the world cannot be classified on objective biological grounds into mutually exclusive groupings. Nevertheless, we think of people as belonging to some specific race, which we consider as a biological unit; and we frequently act upon this subjective classification. The term "race" has, thus, sociopsychological if not biological significance. For the impossibility of making a biological classification, see F. Boas's article "Race" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 25-36).

The confusion existing between the concept of "race" and that of "cultural similarity" is well illustrated in lay thinking about the Jews. To most gentile laymen "a Jew is a Jew," and it makes very little difference whether the individual's ancestors came from Russia or from Spain. Yet to the specialist in races this is a vital difference. The Russian Jews have practically nothing in common with the Spanish Jews, as blood tests and many other types of measurement show. The two groups have a religion in common—in tradition, if not in fact; and both are often persecuted and socially isolated. It is these cultural factors that cause their being considered Jewish, and so non-Aryan. Genetically speaking, Russian Jews and Spanish Jews come from quite different stocks, each of which is in many respects similar to the group near which it has lived for many centuries.

43. Two sorts of studies have been used in the endeavor to verify the assumption that occupational status is directly related to inherent potentialities.

In the first type of study the intelligence of the children of the members of various occupational groupings is compared. The average intelligence-test score of children of professional men is found to be higher than is that of the children of business and clerical groups; and the mean score made by the children of the latter groups is found to be higher than that made by the children of semiskilled workers, farmers, and unskilled workers. See "The intelligence of Negro college students and parental occupation" (H. G. Canady, 1936); "Socio-economic status and intelligence: a critical survey" (W. S. Neff, 1938); "Intelligence as related to socioeconomic factors" (J. Loevinger, 1940); "Intelligence in its social settings" (N. N. Sengupta, 1942); "Relations between ability and social status in a midwestern community: I. Ten-year-old children" (R. J. Havighurst and L. L. Janke, 1944).

If the intelligence-test scores could be proved to be a function solely of innate potentiality, such data would indeed prove that class position and native intelligence are closely related. But in view of the fact that we do not know to what extent the tests measure differences in innate ability and to what extent the test scores reflect differences in educational and occupational opportunity and other social factors, we cannot go far beyond the simple statement that children of the higher classes achieve a higher average score on a particular intelligence test than do those of the lower occupational classes. The overlapping between the several groups is enormous; in fact, it is frequently so great that fully a third of the children whose fathers belong to a low occupational class will have scores above the average of the children whose fathers are from the next higher class.

In the second type of study, the members of various occupational groups are tested. This procedure also yields a hierarchy of "tested intelligence." Fryer in "Occupational-intelligence standards" (D. Fryer, 1922) demonstrated that engineers who were given the Army Alpha test had a mean score slightly higher than that of clergymen, and that the mean score of these latter was slightly higher than that of accountants, physicians, etc. Other analyzers of the army data have found a similar hierarchy. But here again, several environmental factors—formal education, occupational opportunity, and the like—will work unevenly over the various occupational levels and will make futile any attempt to disclose an organic basis for the measured difference.

Those who are anxious to prove that our present economic system is the best of all possible ones will, nevertheless, argue that class positions are today and were always a reflection of biological status. In so doing, they completely ignore the factors of differential opportunity. One of the worst examples of such rationalization can be found in *American business leaders* (F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, 1932). The eugenicists, too, have often been guilty of making the a priori assumption that social status is a consequence of biological status. See *Racial hygiene* (T. B. Rice, 1929) and a criticism of this book in a review (E. B. Reuter, 1930). Note also the use of this rationalization in *Social mobility* (P. Sorokin, 1927) to "prove" that social revolt is socially unjustified.

For an understanding of the way in which differential social circumstances operate to produce different human "types" of the class order, see the following, which will indicate something of the way in which the "other half" live, no matter what half the reader represents: *The ghetto* (L. Wirth, 1928); *The Gold Coast and the slum* (H. W. Zorbaugh, 1929); "Five generations of a begging family" (H. W. Gilmore, 1932); and A. Livingston's "Theory of the gentleman" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 616-620). To those who still believe that the "four hundred" are as socially important as they think themselves to be, *The theory of the leisure class* (T. B. Veblen, 1926) will prove a good antidote.

44. From mental-test data concerning sex differences in emotional response no definite conclusion emerges. Flemming in "Sex differences in emotional responses" (E. G. Flemming, 1933) claims that his male and female subjects possessed quite similar "interests," "worries," and "ideas concerning what things are wrong" (as shown by scores on X-O tests). Miles and Terman, however, report in "Sex differences in the association of ideas" (C. C. Miles and L. M. Terman, 1929) certain rather consistent sex differences in associations of ideas. Women seemed to give the more introverted, evaluating types of responses. Willoughby reports sex differences, which he believes reflect "chiefly differential environmental pressures brought to bear on the individual from within and without at the different periods of life, rather than congenital factors" (R. R. Willoughby, 1935). See also "Some highlights in the literature of psychological sex differences published since 1920" (W. B. Johnson and L. M. Terman, 1940); "Studies of sex differences: II" (E. B. Skaggs, 1941); "The incidence of emotional symptoms in school children" (J. D. Cummings, 1944); and "Psychological sex differences" (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1946).

Anthropological studies have done much to discourage the assumption that sex differences in behavior have their origin in the biology of sex. Mead claims that there is little correlation between the relation of sex and personality in the three primitive societies that she has compared in *Sex and temperament*. The Arapesh

seem to have no temperamental differences between the sexes, to place a high value on nonaggressiveness, and to recognize no strong sexual urges. On the other hand, among the Mundugumor, a violent people, father and son often compete for the same woman; and the women look upon sex activity with the same violent interest as do the men. In contrast to both of these are the Tchambuli, whose men are artistic and "feminine" according to our standards and whose women dominate and are most active in the economic life of the community (M. Mead, 1935).

Now on the market is a test of masculine and feminine attitudes and interests (L. M. Terman, C. C. Miles *et al.*, 1936; F. L. Goodenough, 1942; J. H. Smith, 1945). The test was developed by the process of finding items that would differentiate certain high-school, college, and adult females from males of comparable scholastic and chronological age. The test is given ostensibly as a measure of interest with the real purpose obscured. The reason for this deception lies in the fact that a person could intentionally answer the test so as to make his score more masculine or more feminine (E. L. Kelly, C. C. Miles, and L. M. Terman, 1936). The test results show that many so-called "he-men" receive scores that are no more masculine than those obtained by less "masculine" men.¹⁷ Similarly, many women who are considered extremely "feminine" do not tend to score significantly more feminine on the test. As the sexes achieve more scholastic interests, their scores tend to meet. Thus, scores achieved by college professors, priests, and authors tend to be more feminine than those made by businessmen.

A scoring key for Strong's *Vocational interest blank*, which distinguishes boys from girls and men from women on the basis of "affirmed likes and dislikes," is described in "Sex differences in occupational interests of high school students" (H. D. Carter and E. K. Strong, Jr., 1933).

45. In the Hartshorne-May (C.E.I.) study of honesty (H. Hartshorne, M. A. May *et al.*, 1929-1930; and H. Hartshorne, 1932) the ethics of a large number of children were tested in school and other situations. The techniques included both paper-and-pencil tests and observational methods. The intercorrelations between the several tests of honesty were very low. It was found that almost any given child may cheat when he is in a classroom where cheating is the expected behavior, but be honest when he is in classrooms where higher standards of ethics exist; and that whenever cheating is made easy (*e.g.*, by the presence of erasers and the absence of the teacher), the typical child may cheat. Tests of cheerfulness also have been found to intercorrelate poorly (P. T. Young, 1937). With tests of conservatism, however, the intercorrelations are considerably higher (T. F. Lentz, 1938).

Although trait-test intercorrelations are generally very low, they are rather consistently positive. This fact has been used by Maller as an argument for generality rather than specificity of traits (J. B. Maller, 1934). It is, of course, always possible to ignore the specificity-generality problem and, from averages of the data, to consider general trends. Thus it can be shown that children from the higher income levels are the more honest (*i.e.*, they average higher on the several

¹⁷ The work of Gilkinson indicates that there is no single objective criterion of physical masculinity. He found extremely low intercorrelations between pitch level of the speaking voice, hip and shoulder dimensions, and distribution of hair over the body (H. Gilkinson, 1937).

honesty tests) and that children in the higher grades are the least truthful and the most tactful (B. J. Horton, 1937). For a survey of the current literature on traits, see "Topical summaries of current literature: personality traits" (C. Schettler, 1939). See also "The concept of traits" (H. A. Carr and F. A. Kingsbury, 1938); "Some antecedent concepts of personality trait" (C. Schettler, 1941); "The 'laws' of relative variability of mental traits" (R. S. Ellis, 1947).

46. At the beginning of the century, Terman reported his pioneering work on school leaders in "A preliminary study of the psychology and pedagogy of leadership" (L. M. Terman, 1904). A few of the more important qualities possessed by the child leaders of his day deserve mention here. As Terman described them, these children were less selfish, more daring, greater readers, better in schoolwork, less emotional, more fluent speakers, of "better" parentage, "better" looking, of larger size, better dressed, and more conspicuous in some respect. Several contemporary Russian investigators have been working on projects similar to that initiated by Terman. Their data would probably prove of great value could they be shown to be truthfully reported.¹⁸ See also "Measurement and prediction of leadership" (D. P. Page, 1935); "Characteristics of group leaders" (L. D. Zeleny, 1939); and "Measuring leadership ability" (A. C. Van Dusen, 1948).

The interesting observation that, at least in the case of children, there must not be too great a disparity in IQ between a leader and those led appears in *Gifted children: their nature and nurture* (L. S. Hollingworth, 1926). Children with extremely high IQ's are likely to become leaders of youngsters of high IQ's but not of children with average IQ's. Those of high IQ tend to be the leaders of these latter.

More than two decades ago two German investigators attempted to get at the qualities of leadership merely by asking school children just what it was that made leaders out of certain of their classmates (A. Leib, 1928; and K. Broich, 1929). Practically all the traditionally "approved" traits were mentioned. Since the answers in such studies must certainly reflect the culture of the times, one wonders what kinds of reports would be obtained at present in the U.S.S.R. One might guess that the "quality of democratic leadership" if mentioned would now have a somewhat different meaning.

In any attempt to study the personality of college leaders, a major difficulty arises from the fact that the school system usually sets some minimum standards of academic achievement for student leaders. In many institutions the student must make grades above a certain level and must keep at this point in spite of the time-consuming nature of his extracurricular activities, for which no grade credits are given. Other institutions may have lower standards; they may even subsidize their athletes openly or secretly or bring pressure on the faculty to "give" good grades to these college leaders, a procedure that cannot help having its effect in the molding of personality. In some instances, the leader himself is able to high-pressure the faculty so that he receives better marks and ratings than he deserves. Then, too, the well-known "halo" and "hearsay" effects may enter in. If a teacher knows that a given student is a leader along one line, the halo or prestige so engendered may cause the teacher to rate this leader as something of a leader in

¹⁸ It should be noted that, wherever dictatorships are functioning (it matters little whether they be left or right), materials that bear on social relations are likely to be censored and warped. Clearly, then, such data cannot be accepted uncritically.

other lines. A comparable effect may result from rumors about this person's conquests in other fields (hearsay effect).¹⁰

Several investigators have, nevertheless, attempted studies of leadership among college students (E. C. Hunter and A. M. Jordan, 1939; M. D. Dunkerley, 1940; N. G. Hanawalt *et al.*, 1943). High-school leadership has been somewhat similarly studied (W. H. Reals, 1938; F. J. Reynolds, 1944).

From the sociological viewpoint, leadership has been discussed at considerable length in *Leaders and leadership* (E. S. Bogardus, 1934); *Leadership or domination* (P. Pigors, 1935); and "A study of the leadership process" (A. J. Murphy, 1941).

47. F. H. Allport and G. W. Allport have published a test of aggressiveness or social dominance which attempts to measure what a subject thinks he would do in certain social situations. The scores on this ascendance-submission test correlate slightly (.30 to .35) with the subjects' and their associates' ratings of dominance (G. W. Allport, 1928). There appears to be no relationship between the scores of mothers and daughters, of fathers and daughters, or of husbands and wives (M. N. Crook and M. Thomas, 1934). This *A-S* test, as it is called, has been revised (R. O. Beckman, 1933).

The personality inventory (R. Bernreuter, 1935) is composed of a single list of questions that can be scored with six sets of weights. One set gives the equivalent of the Allports' ascendance-submission test and is called by Bernreuter the "*B 4 D* test." Scores on this test have been found to check well with data gathered by the interview technique (R. Stagner, 1934). When first starting their academic careers in America, foreign students in American colleges generally rate themselves as highly submissive but gradually change their ratings toward the dominant end of the scale. See also "Some relations between family background and personality" (J. Carpenter and P. Eisenberg, 1938); "An examination of the concepts of domination and integration in relation to dominance and ascendance" (H. H. Anderson, 1940); "Some measures of dominance in college women" (R. Pintner and G. Forlano, 1944); and "Self-esteem (dominance-feeling) and sexuality in women" (A. H. Maslow, 1942).

Examples of the relation of dominance to cultural factors can be seen in the several studies on conversation. Those by Moore (H. T. Moore, 1922) and others by Landis and Burt (M. H. Landis and H. E. Burt, 1924) apparently indicate that in America in "man and woman" conversations there is a tendency for the woman to adapt her interests to those of the man. Observations in London, on the contrary, seem to show that the Englishman adapts his conversation to that of his female companion (C. Landis, 1927). See also "Sex differences in conversational interests" (S. M. Stoke and E. D. West, 1931); "Sex differences in conversation" (J. S. Carlson, S. W. Cook, and E. L. Stromberg, 1936); "Conversation as a reflector of social change" (W. J. Baker and D. McGregor, 1937); "A study of some factors related to conversational ability" (E. T. McDonald, 1945).

Dominance is a pattern of behavior that exists even among the lower animals. Among many species the following sets of variables are closely tied to dominance: relative size, strength, health, and age; conditions attending the first meeting of the ani-

¹⁰ Of course, such spurious elements in our judgments occur outside as well as inside the classroom. Because a man is an authority in one field, we listen to him with bated breath while he talks in a field about which he knows next to nothing. The specialist in one line is regarded by the mass of people as being an expert in many other fields.

mals in question; sex (although in most species the male is dominant at all times, among the chimpanzees the female is dominant during oestrous); familiarity with the territory and "ownership"; and special friendship with a more dominant animal. Among the subhuman primates, submission is often shown through the assumption by males of female sexual postures. See also "Observation of dominance-subordination in cats" (C. N. Winslow, 1938); "Companionship preference and dominance in the social interaction of young chimpanzees" (V. Nowlis, 1941); "A study of cooperation, dominance, grooming, and other social factors in monkeys" (C. J. Warden and W. Galt, 1943); "Dominance, neurosis, and aggression" (J. H. Masserman and P. W. Siever, 1944); "Hormonal modifications of social behavior" (G. Clark and H. G. Birch, 1946).

With humans, dominant behavior appears very early. It shows itself in the infant's reactions even while he is in the crib. Bühler claims that at this stage the older of two infants (older by three months or more) usually dominates the younger (C. Bühler, 1933). Soon, however, enormous numbers of social factors enter; and these operate during the remainder of life to give each human that degree of dominance he will exhibit in each subsequent social situation. See also "The modification of ascendant behavior in preschool children" (M. L. Page, 1936); "Domination and integration in the social behavior of young children in an experimental play situation" (H. H. Anderson, 1937); "Studies in domination and socially integrative behavior" (H. H. Anderson, 1945).

The phenomenon of dominance overlaps and often becomes identical with rivalry. Both clinical and common observation show that rivalry exists in animals (C. N. Winslow, 1944) and in young children (E. A. Graves, 1937; T. H. Wolf, 1938).

One of the best of the early experimental studies is that reported in *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie* (W. Moede, 1920). The willingness of boys twelve to fourteen years of age to withstand so-called "intolerable" pain when alone was compared with their willingness to do so in the presence of others. Willingness to withstand pain was greatest when pairs of boys competed. In a further study, Moede found that children of poor ability in various tests profited on the average relatively more from rivalry than did children of better ability, and that boys would squeeze more vigorously on a dynamometer in front of others and especially when paired with a competitor. But sweeping conclusions regarding the value of competition must not be drawn from the findings of such studies. Triplett has demonstrated scientifically what common sense has long suggested—that certain subjects may be so overstimulated by competition that their work suffers (N. Triplett, 1898). Studies that show that girls are less competitive than boys are of local significance only. With a shift in attitudes girls might become the more competitive (F. Baumgarten, 1922). In "The influence of competition on performance: an experimental study" (I. C. Whittemore, 1924) Whittemore claims that quality of work is frequently adversely affected by competition and offers data to substantiate his claim.

In "Cooperation and competition: an experimental study in motivation" (J. B. Maller, 1929) it is rather clearly shown that competitive effects are greater when children choose their own competitors than when teams are selected for them. The intensity of motivation appeared to be related to the character of the work situation in the following order (from most motivation to least): (a) work for one's own sex, (b) for oneself, (c) for one's team, (d) for one's class, (e) for a group assigned by teacher. See also *Competition and cooperation* (M. A. May and L. W. Doob, 1937); *Memorandum on research in competition and cooperation* (M. A. May et al.,

1937); *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples* (M. Mead, 1937); "A study of competitive and cooperative behavior by the short sample technique" (E. A. Graves, 1937); "Variability as a measure of competitive behavior" (J. Vaughn and E. Geldreich, 1938); and "The experimental psychology of competition" (J. Vaughn and C. M. Diserens, 1938).

Studies have been made that show the effects on level of performance of praise and blame, of verbal suggestions, of material rewards, and of knowledge of improvements in scores—all of which are closely related to rivalry. The findings of these studies are, on the whole, in line with common sense. But, in so far as each experimental situation tends to be relative, it is impossible to assess the comparative values of the various methods of stimulating achievement, except, perhaps, for particular social situations. Typical of the many articles in these fields are "Reward and punishment" (E. R. Guthrie, 1934); "A further study of the function of reward" (H. Wallach and M. Henle, 1942); "Factors influencing the efficacy of punishment and reward" (J. M. Stephens and J. A. Baer, 1944). For references on social facilitation and attempts to differentiate it experimentally from rivalry, see Appendix note 62; for references on level of aspiration, see Appendix note 31.

48. There is no test or rating scale that will automatically classify an individual as an introvert or an extrovert. Test scores fall along a reasonably "normal" curve, the peak of frequencies being at some mid-point, which one psychologist termed the "ambivert" region. The introvert and extrovert regions of the curve are merely the extremes or tails of the distribution. So far as the authors know, only one test of introversion is claimed to yield a bimodal (two-peaked) distribution curve (C. A. Neymann and K. D. Kohlstedt, 1929). A number of experimenters believe that this conclusion must have been reached through error, for none of them has found any bimodality in his own test data.

The psychoanalyst Jung is accredited with the introduction of the terms "introversion" and "extroversion" to psychologists, a number of whom, being test-minded, proceeded to construct a variety of tests based on some modification of Jung's ideas. Unfortunately, the several testers did not agree among themselves; and the various introversion-extroversion tests that have been developed do not correlate well one with another (R. M. Collier and H. Emch, 1938). The Guilfords, in fact, found that in a typical introversion test at least eighteen group factors appear to be involved (J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, 1934). The most important of these factors have been labeled *D* (depression), *S* (shyness), and *T* (thinking of a meditative sort). Another factor, *A* (alertness), seems to be what Jung was attempting to measure (J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, 1939). None of these factors appears to be related to body form (W. B. Pillsbury, 1939) except as this is a matter of sex differences (J. P. Guilford and H. Martin, 1944).

In the construction of tests of introversion it has been a common practice to borrow items from existing questionnaires. One questionnaire that has been much used in this manner is the R. S. Woodworth *Personal data sheet* (S. I. Franz, 1919). Typical of the many paper-and-pencil tests now on the market are the following: Bernreuter's *B 3 I Scale* (R. G. Bernreuter, 1935); the McDougall items to measure introversion (R. W. George, 1936); the *Wisconsin scale of personality traits* (R. Stagner, 1937); the *Neymann-Kohlstedt diagnostic test for introversion-extroversion* (C. A. Neymann and K. D. Kohlstedt, 1929; and A. R. Gilliland and J. J. B. Morgan, 1931); the *Minnesota personal traits rating scales* (E. Heidbreder, 1926); Conklin's *Study of likes and dislikes* (E. S. Conklin, 1927); and the *Minnesota multiphasic personality inventory* (L. E. Drake, 1946). Guthrie has offered a

test of campus information or gossip as a possible measure of introversion (E. R. Guthrie, 1927; and F. B. Davis and P. J. Rulon, 1935). Marston has attempted to measure introversion both by questionnaires and by observations on nonsymbolic behaviors (L. R. Marston, 1925). Although the foregoing and other tests are still being used extensively, their validity is doubtful. In dealing with the practical problems of personality adjustment the tests are rarely found to be of value (G. S. Speer, 1936), although certain of their items are occasionally useful. At best, any single test can tap but a tiny area of life experience. An attempt to bring the concept of introversion back to the Jungian formulation can be seen in a test containing seventy-five items which attempts to separate sensation from intuition and thinking from feelings (H. Gray and J. B. Wheelwright, 1946).

The traits of inadequacy and inferiority have been much discussed by the psychoanalysts. Although sexual difficulties, organ inferiorities, and other physical troubles have often been deemed causative factors, data of an experimental character are scanty. In one of the few experiments in this area Faterson found low but positive correlations between the total number of the subject's recorded physical defects and his inferiority rating (H. F. Faterson, 1931). Some of the other tests of and rating scales for inferiority feeling are the *Personal attitudes test for younger boys* (L. Sweet, 1929); *Character sketches* (J. B. Maller, 1932); the *PN* (R. B. Smith, 1932); selected items (R. K. White and N. Fenton, 1932); and M. E. Smith's schedule (M. E. Smith, 1938). See also *The craving for superiority* (R. Dodge and E. Kahn, 1931); *That inferiority feeling* (J. S. Hoyland, 1937); "Organ inferiority and criminality" (S. Lazarsfeld, 1945).

For more general references on measurement, see *The prediction of personal adjustment* (Paul Horst, 1941); "A technique for correlating measurable traits with freely observed social behaviors" (C. C. Peters, 1941); *The 1940 mental measurements yearbook* (O. K. Buros, ed., 1941); "Applications of personality and character measurement" (J. W. M. Rothney and B. A. Roens, 1941); "Current construction and evaluation of personality and character tests" (A. E. Traxler, 1941); *Social research* (G. A. Lundberg, 1942); "Application of personality and character measurement" (J. G. Darley and G. V. Anderson, 1944); "Current construction and evaluation of personality and character tests" (A. E. Traxler, 1944); "Personality, a symposium" (C. Burt, 1945); *The third mental measurements yearbook* (O. K. Buros, ed., 1949).

49. One of the earliest experiments in stereotyping was that reported in *Quantitative methods in politics* (S. A. Rice, 1928). A list of descriptive terms including "premier," "financier," and "bolshevik" and nine photographs including those of a premier, a financier, and a bolshevik were presented to more than one hundred students, who were asked to select the proper designation for each photograph. There was considerable agreement among the students as to the designation to be attached to each of the several photographs, and the students agreed quite well ($r = .84$) with the members of a farmer's grange. Unhappily, however, neither the students nor the grangers were correct in the designations. For example, the bolshevik pictured had a Vandyke beard, a winged collar, and a mustache (not of the wild and woolly kind); and this configuration was labeled United States Senator by many of the students and grangers. With essentially the same technique Litterer secured almost identical results (O. F. Litterer, 1933). See also "Judgments of occupations from printed photographs" (L. Gahagan, 1933).

That we train our children into the acceptance of stock stereotypes is well shown by Meltzer's study of 200 problem children (H. Meltzer, 1932). In answer

to the question, "Who is the greatest man who ever lived?" 72 per cent gave the names of either Jesus, Washington, or Lincoln. Sixty-four per cent gave the names of either Washington or Lincoln. In answer to the question, "Who is the greatest man living?" 56 per cent of the votes were received by three names. In view of the very large number of men who might have been named, such concentration on a very few is clear evidence that the replies to the questions were in the nature of stereotypes.

The well-known fact that the typical voter casts his ballot for a party name—a stereotype—rather than for a party platform was ably demonstrated in a study of the voters of Centre County, Pennsylvania, in 1934. Although 55.5 per cent were anxious to support "a program of socialization with its promise of enhanced status to the working-class population and a corresponding reduction in the power of the privileged groups through a 'redistribution of wealth'"—the platform of the socialist party—that party polled very few votes. Sixty-one per cent of the voters claimed to dislike the party—really the party name (G. W. Hartmann, 1936, p. 338).

Stereotypes are surprisingly stable (D. W. Seago, 1947) and reflect only very slowly the significant changes in the culture. Apparently our stereotypes can be drastically altered only by arousing intense emotions, *i.e.*, by getting the subjects ego-involved.

That the cartoon can be used to influence stereotyping is shown in "Cartoons as a means of social control" (E. Hines, 1933) and "Shifts in attitude caused by cartoon caricatures" (R. Asher and S. S. Sargent, 1941).

For a suggestion of Nazi attempts at stereotype building, see "Pathological Nazi stereotypes found in recent German technical journals" (E. Lerner, 1942).

50. In a careful checkup of the claims of the older physiognomists, two investigators studied the relation of 122 physical measurements to such matters as intelligence, frankness, will power, judgment, ability to make friends, originality, leadership, and impulsiveness. The correlations ran very close to zero (G. U. Cleeton and F. B. Knight, 1924). This does not mean, however, that we can get nothing from a study of the face. It can, for example, be shown that the relative position on a Binet intelligence scale of the members of a group of youngsters of the same chronological age, but of different mental age, can be estimated with some degree of accuracy. Just what cues are operative in the judgments is not clear, although it appears that the eyes are more important than the mouth and that the expression of the face is more important than are its static measurements. In the classes of one of the authors the pool of the estimates of a group of forty students invariably correlates with the ranking of the true mental ages of children whose photographs are viewed at about .56. The forecasting value of a correlation of even this size is not, however, great.

Husband has shown the fallacy that underlies the use of the photograph as an indicator of personality (R. W. Husband, 1934). The photograph is, however, commonly used in this way by many businessmen and by members of college-entrance boards.

For a survey of the work on the relation between physical and mental characteristics, see *Physique and intellect* (D. G. Paterson, 1930).

Paterson and Ludgate have checked the pronouncements of the physiognomist Blackford about blondes and brunettes by asking each of ninety-four judges to select from his acquaintances two pronounced blondes and two pronounced brunettes and to rate them with respect to each of Blackford's so-called "blonde and brunette

traits." The results indicated that the percentage of brunettes thought to be possessing what Blackford claimed were blonde traits was approximately as large as the percentage of blondes thought to be possessing the allegedly blonde traits. Similar results obtained for the brunette traits (D. G. Paterson and K. E. Ludgate, 1922).

A. L. Evans correlated the precise degree of convexity of profile of each of twenty-five members of a university sorority with a series of character ratings (optimism, activity, ambition, will power, domination, and popularity). The average of her correlations was .01. The values ranged from $-.27$ to $+.39$ with relatively large probable errors.²⁰

51. Kretschmer was only following the tradition when he set up his pyknic and asthenic types (E. Kretschmer, 1925). His pyknic type possesses short legs, a thick neck, and a relatively barrel-shaped trunk; his asthenic or leptosomic possesses long extremities and a relatively small trunk. A subgroup of the latter is the athletic—people who have a more symmetrical development of limbs in relation to trunk. Another subgroup later added is the soft-athletic—people who are tense-muscled, angular, and wiry, with scanty fat and muscle (S. Behn and C. Fervers, 1938). Finally there is the dysplastic type—those inconsiderate people who do not fit into any of the main categories. According to Kretschmer, sufferers from manic-depressive insanity are prone to be of the pyknic build, whereas those who are classified as schizophrenes are far more apt to be asthenics.

Although a number of investigators have thought that their data on insane and criminal populations substantiated Kretschmer's contentions at least to slight degree (E. M. L. Burchard, 1935), other investigators can find no relation between variety of psychosis and body type (E. F. Wells, 1938). One of the most extensive of the American studies on normal groups, "An experimental study of constitutional types" (O. Klineberg, S. E. Asch, and H. Block, 1934), failed to provide evidence that could be construed as favoring Kretschmer's views. Lack of evidence has not, however, prevented Kretschmer from developing a theory that embraces normal personality. Thus, according to his "system," those of our poets who are realists and humorists fall into the manic depressive category, whereas the pathetics, romantics, and formalists fall into the schizophrenic category. Similarly, of our leaders, the jolly organizers, the tough "whole-hoggers," and the understanding conciliators fall into the manic-depressive group, whereas the pure idealists, the despots, the fanatics, and the cold calculators fit into the schizophrenic classification. See also "The relationship between characteristics of personality and physique in adolescents" (P. S. Cabot, 1938) and "Somatology of the schizophrenic patient" (B. J. Betz, 1942).

Another German type-psychology is that of Jaensch (E. Jaensch, 1930). Quite well known is his work on eidetic (photographic) images—mental images so peculiarly vivid that the possessor feels them to be practically on the intensity level of his perceptions. Jaensch has divided people who have such images into several subtypes—the *B* type, *T* type, etc.—and has studied their peculiar biologies. In the expansive manner of pre-World War II German philosopher-psychologists, Jaensch and his followers attempted to explain a fair share of the world's cultural difficulties and differences on the basis of these subgroups (F. Reuther, 1937; and W. Héraucourt, 1938). During the war Jaenschian typology became the official Nazi-approved psychology; and psychology rapidly degenerated, as did Nazi-blessed economics, sociology, and political science.

²⁰ These data are reported by A. L. Evans in *Aptitude testing* (C. L. Hull, 1928).

The philosopher Spranger has considered the following to be man's basic interests or motives in personality: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious (E. Spranger, 1928). To find the relative prominence of these six categories among the members of the various socioeconomic groups, Allport and Vernon constructed a standardized questionnaire (P. E. Vernon and G. Allport, 1931) of 120 questions, 20 of which refer to each of the six values. For other studies on the Spranger types, see "A study of Spranger's value-types by the method of factor analysis" (W. A. Lurie, 1937); "The measurement of interest values" (E. M. Glaser and J. B. Maller, 1940); and "A factorial analysis of interests and values" (L. W. Ferguson *et al.*, 1941). It should be noted that Spranger's typing is somewhat more realistic than that of Kretschmer.

The psychiatrist H. Rorschach has proposed a typology consisting of extratensive and introvertive types. As tested these do not appear to overlap with either the major types offered by Jaensch (D. Bryn, 1936) or the introvertive-extrovertive classes of Jung as measured by Guilford (G. Brown, Jr., 1941).

The attempt to separate people into two or more types has not been successful. The procedure involved in constructive typology is of a different order and gives much greater promise. A cluster of behavioral characteristics, regarded as an "ideal" type, is associated with a particular set of socioeconomic conditions. The investigator tries to locate somewhat similar conditions in other times and cultures and to find an approximation of his "ideal" type in operation. Let us take as illustration the following cluster of characteristics—a closely knit, out-group people whom the in-group members regard as penurious, extremely shrewd traders with Shylock characteristics. This cluster of characteristics or "ideal" type obviously fits the stereotype of the Jewish trader. It fits about equally well the Parsee trader of the west coast of India, the Chinese trader of the Dutch East Indies, the lace-selling Armenian peddler in America, the border Scot²¹ of the sixteenth century who peddled his wares throughout northern Europe, and the Egyptian Greek of the seventh century B.C. Such a configuration of behavioral characteristics has been termed the "marginal trader" type (H. Becker, 1940). The importance to social psychology of this sort of historical research rests in its clear demonstration that behavioral characteristics are not tied to a particular race but to a social setting.

A typology based on early experiences rather than upon body build or adult way of life is that offered by Freud (S. Freud, 1924). His anal-erotic type is characterized by obstinacy, parsimony, and extreme orderliness, characteristics supposedly produced by difficulties with early toilet training. The oral-passive type embraces the person who has, so to speak, remained at the nursing stage. He is unwilling to exert himself and is dependent and immature. The person who is oral-active is said to have been frustrated at nursing and hence turned to biting and other sadistic activities. He is the bitter, sarcastic person. The member of the phallic type has supposedly developed farther toward normality but has become fixated at this next-to-last stage of sexual development. This person is overambitious, seeks to be the center of attention, and takes frustration poorly.

It is true that animal experiments (D. M. Levy, 1934; J. McV. Hunt, 1941) show that interference with feeding and nursing behaviors in dogs and rats leads to definite food hoarding and sucking at older ages. But no definitive studies of humans paralleling these animal researches have been made. And, anyway, such research

²¹ Even today Jewish and Scottish jokes resemble each other in their stress on penuriousness and shrewdness.

could only yield indirect evidence and would certainly not establish the validity of the Freudian types, which were originally set up on the basis of "data" obtained out of psychoanalytic probings.

52. Out of the mass of endocrinological researches there have emerged a few fairly well substantiated findings that bear on the subject of "types":

a. Associated with hyperthyroidism (oversecretion of the thyroid gland) are the symptoms of anxiety, restlessness, and emotional irritability that are often shown by those suffering from exophthalmic goiter.

b. Associated with hypothyroidism (undersecretion of the thyroid gland) are those low-intelligence "types" known as cretinism and myxedema. Cretinism, resulting in a particularly pudgy, stunted build, is a congenital condition. Myxedema is a somewhat similar hypothyroid condition that occurs in adult years and results in both mental and physical sluggishness.

c. Hyperpituitarism, in which there is an excess in the secretions from the anterior portion of the pituitary, is associated with giantism (or gigantism) and acromegaly. Certain giants seem to have normal personalities, others to be lazy and self-satisfied. With those who are maladjusted, it is impossible to ascertain the relative responsibility of the endocrine glands and the environmental factors elicited by the giantism. The sufferer from acromegaly usually lacks initiative and is apathetic.

d. Hypopituitarism is associated with dwarfism. As with giantism, it is impossible to know whether the peculiarities of personality that are occasionally exhibited by dwarfs are conditioned by the glandular defect or by environmental factors.

e. Few physical "types" are found to be associated with malfunctions of the other glands of internal secretion. Claims have been made that the malfunctioning of the parathyroids leads to certain atypicality of behavior. And there is no doubt that the adrenals are important to mental and physical vitality. Yet few have posited parathyroid or adrenal types. Mongolian imbecility is thought by some to be the result of a polyglandular disturbance, but little factual information is available. The eunuch, or castrated male, has been recognized as a type for centuries. Associated with his gonadal defect are a voice quality (important for many years in the church, since it allowed him to remain a soprano) and alterations of personality. One cannot, however, be certain that these alterations of personality are due even in part to his glandular defect; for in most cultures the eunuch is set apart from his fellows and is subjected to quite different treatment. See also Appendix note 15.

53. The Samoan girl reaches and passes through adolescence without visible strain. In this society, puberty does not occur, as it does with us, at a time when the girl's life habits are in the process of being uprooted or when the girl is being forced to shift rapidly to new modes of behavior. Although tremendous shifts occur, they take place some years before, and again some years after, but not during puberty (M. Mead, 1928).

According to Brooks youngsters from sixteen to nineteen show a slightly greater tendency toward instability than do those from twelve to fifteen, who are closer to the onset of puberty (F. D. Brooks, 1929). This finding is contrary to the doctrines of the early educators of the G. Stanley Hall group, who believed that adolescence could be clearly differentiated from preadolescence by the appearance of various types of crisis behavior and that this behavior was of biological rather than social origin. In *The spiritual life* (G. A. Coe, 1900), in *The psychology of religion* (E. D. Starbuck, 1899), and in other sources are described the violent religious conversions that in the days of our grandfathers commonly took place

around the beginning of the adolescent period. Other studies, notably those reported in *The psychology of religious awakening* (E. T. Clark, 1929), have shown that the old-fashioned type of sudden conversion has long since disappeared as an associate of adolescence in so far at least as American youth is concerned.

A number of attempts have been made to verify the theory that girls tend to withdraw from social contacts—that they tend to develop a “negative phase”—shortly before menarche (H. Hetzer, 1927). One study (E. B. Hurlock and S. Sender, 1930) concludes that, when such a phase appears, environment and not the “soon to be reached condition of sex maturity” is responsible. Girls from good homes seldom show such a phase.

Using questionnaire techniques, Willoughby conducted research that led him to the conclusion that in so far as emotionality is concerned “the male trend is . . . more smooth than the female, which shows evidences of peaks of emotionality in early maturity and old age and relative freedom from emotionality in adolescence and middle life” (R. R. Willoughby, 1935, p. 728).

The social factors that make for considerable adolescent difficulty in contemporary society have been studied from many angles and with rather uniform results. See *Social psychology of adolescence* (E. D. Partridge, 1938); “The California adolescent growth study” (H. E. Jones, 1938); “Evaluations of adolescent personality by adolescents” (C. M. Tryon, 1939); *The psychology of adolescence* (K. C. Garrison, 1946); *Emotion and conduct in adolescence* (C. B. Zachry and M. Lightly, 1940); “The problem of adolescence” (H. Yellowlees, 1940); “An analysis of adolescent adjustment problems” (E. M. Howard, 1941); “A survey of recent studies in the measurement of personality, attitudes, and interests, of adolescents” (W. U. Snyder, 1941); “The psychology and direct treatment of adolescents” (D. Hankins, 1943); “Adolescence” (L. Cole, 1946). For excellent general surveys and extensive bibliographies, see M. Van Waters’s article “Adolescence” (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 455–459); “The adolescent” (W. Dennis, 1946); Part I of the 1944 Educational Year Book; and “Adolescent experience in relation to personality and behavior” (P. Blanchard, 1944).

The new point of view concerning the origin of adolescent difficulty has led to an attack upon the sex ideals that are instilled in most of our children. For an analysis of the problem of changing sex morality, see M. A. Bigelow’s article “Sex education and sex ethics” (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 8–13).

54. Possible declines in the physical capacities of older people are masked to some extent by the enhanced motivation that frequently appears. If there were some technique by which all age groups could be forced to work at their tasks with similar enthusiasm and persistence, age declines might be more pronounced than those now reported. It should be kept in mind, therefore, that what is called “capacity” (what the person can do) in accounts of differential age behavior is really “ability” (what he does do). It should also be remembered that laboratory findings frequently do not apply to practical problems, since laboratory and life situations are not necessarily comparable.

Early work on the ability of older people, the researches of Miles and his students (W. R. Miles, 1939; F. L. Ruch, 1933), and other studies (T. Weisenburg, A. Roe, and K. E. McBride, 1935) all demonstrate that work decrements are to be expected in the majority of test situations after the twenties or thirties. The range of the individual differences in ability at any given age is, however, many times larger than the year-to-year decrement. These studies give little support to the rationalizations of those businessmen who wish to retire their employees at

fifty; the majority of decrements are not very large by that age and are frequently more than compensated for by other social and economic factors. The older man will, for example, probably be better satisfied with his job, be less likely to tire himself in social activities, etc.

Not all researchers, however, are so optimistic about the potentialities of the later middle-aged. Gilbert, for example, considers that "the results tend . . . to support the contentions of those who insist on the necessity of a retirement age fixed in the sixties and those who refuse new employment to persons in the sixties" (J. G. Gilbert, 1935, p. 42).

Studies of differential age ability indicate that the extent of the decline for any given age depends on the following factors: (a) the nature of the task, (b) the habits of the persons involved, and (c) the level of achievement under consideration (the point of reference), and, perhaps, still other factors. Ruch's data (F. L. Ruch, 1934) can be taken as illustrative of factor (a). Additional information on this factor has been obtained from experiments on young and old athletes (A. Walton, 1932). Age decrements were found to be large for sports in which speed of movement was of major importance but were far smaller for sports in which precision was of main importance. See also "An investigation of reaction time in older adults, and its relationship to certain observed mental test patterns" (W. Goldfarb, 1941). Comparisons of the intelligence scores made by young and old faculty members emphasizes the importance of good habits—factor (b)—in the preservation of abilities. Although the scores of the older faculty men were in general a trifle poorer than those of the younger men, the members of the older group actually scored higher on the synonym-antonym items (K. Sward, 1945). Sorenson also has shown that adults who keep active intellectually suffer less decline in learning ability than do those who relinquish efforts to learn (H. Sorenson, 1930). The operation of factor (c), the point of reference, is shown in a study of chess masters. A considerable age decrement appears when the matter is considered at the level of the chess masters' ability; age decline in the abilities of chess masters is, however, microscopic when viewed from the ability level of amateur chess players. Thus viewed by other chess masters, the oldsters have become appreciably poorer; but as viewed by ordinary chess players, their decline in ability can scarcely be noticed (P. Buttenwieser, 1935).

Strong has found that young men tend to score on his *Vocational interest blank* somewhat as do scientists, whereas older men tend to score more as do Y.M.C.A. secretaries and ministers. In other words, young men tend to display, at least on paper, more interest in things; older men, more interest in people. Strong has also found that likes, dislikes, interests, and ambitions, as measured by his interest test, change more between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five than between twenty-five and sixty-five years (E. K. Strong, Jr., 1943).

55. The sociopsychological significance of the physiological changes of adolescence arises from the fact that their appearance may force the adolescent into new patterns of behavior. Although sex is not the simple, instinctive "drive" it was once thought to be, we must adapt ourselves to it in some way or another. Sex is in the nature of a capacity, the use of which depends on experience. It is not a hunger that leads the individual unerringly toward a single pattern of adjustment or that, if ungratified, inevitably results in mental instability. Sexual pressures can be in considerable degree ignored; they can be utilized in effective and gratifying ways; or they can become the basis for such psychological tensions as have led Freud to consider sex the primary fact of life. Society, rather than biology, is the

chief determinant of the uses to which the individual will put sexual capacities.

In some primitive communities, such as that of Lesu, adolescent behavior is highly institutionalized. The importance of reaching sexual maturity is impressed upon the youth by means of elaborate and often painful rituals. Of no special value in itself, the initiation rite marks the transition from childhood to maturity, breaks the individual's attachment to preadolescent associates and modes of conduct, and introduces him into the pattern of behavior that is demanded of the sexually mature adult. Since he has observed those who are a year or two older enter into adult status through the portals of the initiation rites, he takes it all as a matter of course and tends to accept the conventional pattern of sexual adjustment as natural and hence normal (H. Powdermaker, 1933).

The primitive initiation at the time of adolescence may or may not involve selection of a sexual mate or mates. In some societies the youth's parents effectively guide him even to the point of picking out his wife. Such was the case in our old patriarchal family, in which the individual exercised no "choice." Even today the practice of arranging marriages for their children is adhered to by the more conservative Chinese and many Europeans. Such systems, and our own as well, officially allow little premarital sexual experimentation. Although it is probable that far too much has been made of the dangers of sexual incompatibility between husband and wife, mismating must occur with considerable frequency under such a system as ours.

In some societies, the adolescent is allowed a considerable period of premarital sex experimentation.²² Parents do not select the wives for their sons or the husbands for their daughters. Through trial and error, but within certain traditional limitations, adolescent boys and girls sort themselves out into compatible couples. Since in many societies no premium is put upon chastity, the psychological strains consequent upon this process are probably no greater than those incident to any form of undirected trial-and-error learning. Some anthropologists have been so much impressed by the adequacy of the sexual adjustments achieved by primitives under these conditions that they urge civilized peoples to resort to this method of handling the problems of adolescence. Certain tendencies in this direction are, in fact, already discernible. But one would be bold, indeed, were he to attempt to predict how far this trend will proceed in our own land.

56. Idealists may cling to the delusion that the typical modern marriage is a beautiful and harmonious relationship between a man and a woman and, perhaps, their children. But it would appear that a considerable measure of distressing disharmony occurs.

During the past few years the problems of marriage have been studied through the use of questionnaires (C. R. Adams, 1946; J. T. Landis, 1947). Although the data suffer from the ills inherent in this tool, definite progress has been made. The data of two extensive cross-sectional²³ studies (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1938 and 1939;

²² Descriptions of the trial-and-error selection of sexual mates in primitive societies will be found in *Coming of age in Samoa* (M. Mead, 1928) and in *Sexual life of savages in North Western Melanesia* (B. Malinowski, 1929). For sharp contrasts in primitive systems of sex training, see *Sex and temperament* (M. Mead, 1935). The general problem of the role of the child in various primitive societies has been treated in "Research on primitive children" (M. Mead, 1946).

²³ In a longitudinal study, the subjects are kept under observation for a long period of time; in a cross-sectional study, they are contacted but once.

and E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr.,²⁴ 1939) and one longitudinal study (E. L. Kelly, 1941) all demonstrate the importance of personality factors in marital adjustment. In Terman's investigations scores on personality and social-background items correlated to the extent of .54 with marital happiness of husbands and .47 with happiness of wives; the sexual-adjustment questions yielded correlations of .49 with happiness both of husbands and wives. "The 10 background circumstances most predictive of marital happiness are:

1. Superior happiness of parents.
2. Childhood happiness.
3. Lack of conflict with mother.
4. Home discipline that was firm, not harsh.
5. Strong attachment to mother.
6. Strong attachment to father.
7. Lack of conflict with father.
8. Parental frankness about matters of sex.
9. Infrequency and mildness of childhood punishment.
10. Premarital attitude toward sex that was free from disgust or aversion" (L. M. Terman *et al.*, 1938, p. 372). More data on the utility of the marital test that Terman devised can be seen in *The gifted child grows up* (L. M. Terman and M. H. Oden, 1947).

It is now clear that the personality characteristics associated with marital happiness determine aptitude for and are not a resultant of marriage. In other words, these characteristics are brought to, rather than produced by, marriage (L. M. Terman, 1939; E. L. Kelly, 1939; R. F. Winch, 1941; E. W. Burgess, 1941).

Spouses resemble each other in most ways, the resemblance being great in attitudes and small in personality and physique (R. Hofstätter, 1937; R. Stagner, 1938; H. M. Richardson, 1939; E. W. Burgess and P. Wallin, 1944). A number of other aspects of marital adjustment have also been attacked (L. W. Ferguson, 1938; R. R. Willoughby, 1938; C. Landis *et al.*, 1940; J. L. Moreno, 1940; B. Solby, 1941; M. Smith, 1946).

57. The earlier studies of the relationship between delinquency and feeble-mindedness, which yielded extremely high coefficients of correlation, have been superseded by more carefully controlled surveys. It now appears that the better the controls, the more the relationship approaches zero. In fact, an examination of the best data to date shows that, when delinquents and nondelinquents are equated on the basis of age, parental background, etc., they tend to have very similar IQ's (M. A. Merrill, 1947). See also "Intelligence and delinquency" (H. M. Williams, 1940).

Factors of family life may of themselves play an important role in molding the child's personality in ways that are antisocial, as has been shown by the following studies: "Note on family position of certain delinquent boys" (R. S. Tolman, 1939); "Family factors in the ecology of juvenile delinquency" (G. H. Barker, 1940); "Affectional identification and delinquency" (H. J. Zucker, 1943); "The problem of birth-order and delinquency" (E. Miller, 1944).

But, in the main, it would appear to be a combination of unsatisfactory family

²⁴ In both cross-sectional studies there were developed tests to forecast marital compatibility. For a study of the validity of the Burgess-Cottrell scale, see "Predicting marital adjustment by comparing a divorced and a happily married group" (H. J. Locke, 1947).

circumstances and numerous antisocial external conditions that makes for the criminal personality. A criminal father may train his son or his daughter in criminal ways. It is apparently more common for the child to be forced by family circumstances to depend on external and unregulated associations for his social development, as is indicated by most of the case studies of juvenile delinquency. See, for example, the following: *Preventing crime* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1936); *New light on delinquency and its treatment* (W. Healy and A. F. Bronner, 1936); *Social treatment in probation and delinquency* (P. V. Young, 1937); *Personality and the cultural pattern* (J. S. Plant, 1937); *Brothers in crime* (C. Shaw et al., 1938); *Youth tell their story* (H. M. Bell, 1938); *Juvenile delinquents grown up* (S. Glueck and E. Glueck, 1940); *Delinquency control* (L. J. Carr, 1940); *The young delinquent* (C. Burt, 1944); "Juvenile behavior problems" (A. Herschel, 1947); *Juvenile delinquency; a critical annotated bibliography* (P. S. deQ. Cabot, 1946).

The dangers in taking a person's own interpretation of the reasons why he is as he is are great (V. P. Robinson, 1928). But, when taken in conjunction with studies of the external setup—such as those reported in *Delinquency areas* (C. Shaw, 1929); *The taxi-dance hall* (P. G. Cressey, 1932); and "Delinquency areas in the Puget Sound region" (N. S. Hayner, 1933)—the personal case method should not be entirely misleading. In interpreting such reports, as much depends, however, on the reader's capacity for human understanding as on the critical insight of the one who recorded the behavior. It is difficult but necessary that both recorder and reader maintain a neat balance between the hard-boiled and the sentimental points of view; for the factors under consideration are far too complex to permit of objective, mechanical analysis that is free from the bias of personal interpretations.

58. In 1917 during World War I, R. S. Woodworth and his Committee on Emotional Fitness studied the symptoms of men who had difficulty in adjusting themselves to trying situations. From more than 200 questions originally considered, a list of 116 made up the so-called *Personal data sheet* (S. I. Franz, 1919). This questionnaire has since been modified in many ways and has appeared in part in many later tests. In fact, almost all modern adjustment inventories greatly resemble it. Perhaps the best known of the present tests of adjustment are *Personality schedule* (L. L. Thurstone and T. G. Thurstone, 1930); *The adjustment inventory* (H. M. Bell, 1934); *The personality inventory* (R. G. Bernreuter, 1935; D. E. Super, 1942); *The Humm-Wadsworth temperament scale* (D. G. Humm, 1942); and the *Minnesota multiphasic* (S. R. Hathaway and J. C. McKinley, 1940). A somewhat different type of adjustment questionnaire is *The Pressey X-O* or cross-out test (S. L. Pressey, 1921), on which the subject crosses out words that represent things he regards as unpleasant, wrong, worrisome, etc.

No adjustment inventory can be taken at its face value. At best it serves to warn the personality adjuster of possible potential dangers and to furnish clues for him to follow. Many treatises have been published for and against the use of inventories (P. R. Farnsworth and L. W. Ferguson, 1938; F. McKinney, 1939; D. W. Dysinger, 1939; R. A. Pedersen, 1940; K. Young, 1940; P. V. Young, 1940; M. E. Bonney, 1941; L. L. McQuitty, 1942; A. E. Traxler, 1942; M. N. Crook, 1943; R. Pintner and G. Forlano, 1943; R. M. Dorcus, 1944; M. J. Pescor, 1945; A. Ellis, 1947; C. Schettler, 1947).

Rating scales are often used in the attempt to measure lack of adjustment (S. M. Harvey, 1938; M. M. Lombardi, 1938; W. V. Bingham, 1939; E. L. Kelly, 1940; D. Akerman et al., 1943; S. E. Asch, 1946; G. H. Hildreth, 1946). Sometimes used

is a simple check list on which the presence or absence of the trait is to be noted. A variation of the check-list method is the technique of having people and descriptions of idiosyncrasies matched (P. E. Vernon, 1936).

There have been a number of attempts to measure what has been termed "emotional maturity"—in a sense, the opposite of emotional instability. Three criteria of maturity have been employed—the tester's own view of what constitutes maturity, typical answers of older as opposed to younger children, and the presence of weak as opposed to strong emotions (as disclosed by examination of controlled diaries). The *Willoughby E. M. scale* (R. R. Willoughby, 1932) is based on the first criterion; *The Pressey interest-attitude tests* (S. L. Pressey and L. C. Pressey, 1933) on the second; and Stratton's controlled diaries (G. Stratton, 1926) on the third. Unfortunately, none of these three procedures yields data at all comparable with the data of either of the other two (P. R. Farnsworth, 1938). We are thus in the semantic difficulty of giving the name "emotional maturity" to several different phenomena. See also *Emotional maturity* (L. J. Saul, 1947); "Emotional maturity" (P. Solomon, 1948).

A rather different approach to the study of instability is developing in sociometry (J. L. Moreno, 1941; H. H. Jennings, 1941). Here, field observation (E. D. Chapple and C. M. Arensberg, 1940) which is somewhat on the order of anthropological research is employed. One phase of sociometry deals with the measurement of attraction-rejection between individuals.²⁸ In a typical sociometric experiment, institutionalized girls were asked to choose their tablemates. Changes were made in accordance with the choices, and from time to time the procedure was repeated. Diagrams were made of the shifting patterns of friendship (H. H. Jennings, 1937). After such changes instabilities tended to be lessened. For other studies in which the shifting of friendships is measured, see "Some factors in friendship selections of high school students" (M. Smith, 1944); and *Leadership and isolation* (H. H. Jennings, 1947).

Moreno's spontaneity stage is a setting that appears to have considerable therapeutic worth. The patient is induced to act out his troubles, i.e., to project them into the character he makes of himself, a process called "psychodrama." If he needs more than one character, members of the staff of the institution assume his various dramatic roles for him and respond in terms of his delusional system (J. L. Moreno, 1941 and 1944). Where several persons improvise a plot that involves some group conflict, the procedure is that of the sociodrama (J. L. Moreno, 1943). Sociodrama has also been used with relatively "normal" individuals in attempting to resolve their marital tangles (J. L. Moreno, 1940).

59. We know that the glands of internal secretion—adrenal, thyroid, pituitary, etc.—have a regulatory function and that this involves numerous effects upon the neural mechanism. From these facts, some endocrinologists have concluded that much—some seem to believe all—mental abnormality is traceable to glandular malfunctioning. In the reestablishment of glandular balance, either through the administration of glandular extracts or through the removal of diseased glands, they see the cure for mental disorders. But although the results of this endeavor

²⁸ Lundberg has studied attraction-rejection patterns for an entire Vermont village. He has linked these patterns to socioeconomic status, church membership, geographic location, and other variables (G. A. Lundberg and M. Steele, 1938). A number of other investigators are engaged in what is essentially sociometric work (R. L. Schanck, 1938; W. I. Newstetter *et al.*, 1938; and L. D. Zeleny, 1941).

are frequently remarkable, it would appear that glandular disorders are often as much the consequence as the cause of psychological abnormality. We are here, as is so often the case in the study of man and his society, dealing not with one-way cause-and-effect action but with interaction. Undoubtedly disease or accident may disturb the delicate balance of the endocrine system, and in turn this disturbance may provide an organic source for mental disorders. But glandular disequilibrium may also be an effect rather than a cause of psychological disturbance.

60. Lewin proposes three easily recognizable types of conflict situations that impel some sort of resolution (K. Lewin, 1935). Type I is the *approach-approach* situation in which the subject is torn between two attractions that are about equal in strength. In type II, *approach-avoidance*, the subject is both attracted to and repelled by the same person or object. Thus, the child may love his parents because he derives many of his comforts from them, and at the same time dislike them because they supply most of the don't's. His attitude toward his parents can be described as ambivalent. Type III, *avoidance-avoidance*, occurs when the subject is forced to choose between two disliked situations. This type of situation is usually the most serious of the three, in that it tends to be followed by psychopathic behaviors.

Type IV, a variant of type II, has been proposed by Hovland and Sears. It embraces situations "in which the organism faces two interlocking type II situations at once (*e.g.*, a man has two desirable appointments at the same hour, the neglect of either of which will produce punishment or disappointment)" (C. I. Hovland and R. R. Sears, 1938, p. 477).

During the past few years a considerable number of studies of conflict and frustration have been made. The theoretical framework for those studies centering at Yale University is given in *Frustration and aggression* (J. Dollard *et al.*, 1939). See also "Factors determining substitute behavior and the overt expression of aggression" (L. W. Doob and R. R. Sears, 1939); "Minor studies of aggression: I. Measurement of aggressive behavior" (R. R. Sears, C. I. Hovland, and N. E. Miller, 1940); "Minor studies of aggression: V. Strength of frustration-reaction as a function of strength of drive" (R. R. Sears and P. S. Sears, 1940); "Individual differences in behavior resulting from experimentally induced frustration" (C. R. Adams, 1940); "Criteria of frustration" (S. H. Britt and S. Q. Janus, 1940); "Experiments on motor conflict: II. Determination of mode of resolution by comparative strengths of conflicting responses" (R. R. Sears and C. I. Hovland, 1941); "Frustration reactions of normal and neurotic persons" (M. Sherman and H. Jost, 1942); "An outline of frustration theory" (S. Rosenzweig, 1944); "Organized and unorganized groups under fear and frustration" (J. R. P. French, 1944); "The hostility pattern" (B. Crider, 1946); "Frustration and aggression" (R. R. Sears, 1946); "Minor studies of aggression" (N. E. Miller and R. Bugelski, 1948); and the *Psychological Review*, 48, pp. 337-366, 1941.

61. The thesis that the incidence of psychological abnormality is fairly uniform from society to society and must, therefore, reflect some uniform biological inadequacy has derived from a number of apparent evidences. Winston (E. Winston, 1934 and 1935) used the data that Mead had gathered from certain Polynesian groups to reverse Mead's conclusion and to show that the incidence of abnormality among these peoples was approximately the same as that among the people of rural America. A number of studies have led to the conclusion that neither war nor depression markedly affects the rates of functional psychoses in the United States or Great Britain (J. S. Jacob, 1938; H. B. Elkind, 1939; and R. E. Hemphill,

1941). It is thought that, if there is any annual increase, it is very small (B. Malzberg, 1940) and is due in greatest part to the senility cases that are bound to appear more frequently in a national population that is getting older (J. D. Page and C. Landis, 1943).

But the use of anthropological data for comparative purposes is a doubtful procedure. The anthropological observations so far made that bear on the problem have been rather casual and unstandardized. In so far as the anthropological investigator uses our Western cultural definition of abnormality, degrees of deviation from the norm that in our society would pass more or less unnoticed may in the primitive society indicate definite abnormality. In a comparatively homogeneous population the slightest deviation stands out, whereas in our society the individual must be very "queer" indeed before he is socially considered to have crossed the vague line that distinguishes the normal from the abnormal.

Data supporting the idea that war and depression do not cause a marked rise in the incidence of abnormality in no wise disprove the view that the functional psychoses are in large part the result of maladjustment and that such maladjustment is fostered by social disorganization and continuing change. These data are necessarily gathered from institutional sources;²⁸ and institutional facilities are limited, are usually operated at capacity, and are but slowly expanded. A considerable increase in the real incidence could occur without being reflected in institutional records. When there is too much pressure for admission to institutions, the standard of abnormality is likely to rise. Moreover, the sociopsychological interpretation does not make necessary a rise in the real incidence of abnormality during periods of war or other crisis. In view of the complex nature of social organization and the effects upon the individual of disorganization, it is quite within the range of possibilities that as many individuals are released from conflict situations by the advent of war or depression as are forced into such situations. Furthermore, abnormal behavior is a delayed response. For all we now know, the abnormal fruits of the depression of 1929-1936 may not ripen for a decade or more, and those of World War II may not appear until we are well on our way to World War III.

The quantitative evidence that most strongly supports the view that social disorganization does foster abnormal behavior is that on the ecological distribution of abnormality within urban regions. The more disorganized urban areas (zones of transition) are said to have a very high incidence of abnormality. Although this evidence is subject to the limitations that were mentioned above, it suggests that some relation may exist between the degree of social disorganization and the incidence of abnormality. See *Mental disorders in urban areas: an ecological study of schizophrenia and other psychoses* (R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, 1939); "The ecological study of mental disorders" (S. A. Queen, 1940); "Schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and socio-economic status" (C. Tietze, P. Lemkau, and M. Cooper, 1941); "Alternative hypotheses for the explanation of some of Faris' and Dunham's results" (M. B. Owen, 1941); "Ecological factors in human behavior" (R. E. L. Faris, 1944); "Social psychiatry" (H. W. Dunham, 1948); and the general discussion of the problem in *Mental conflicts and personality* (M. Sherman, 1938).

62. The phrase "social effects" has occasionally been broadened to include effects

²⁸ Institutional records, poor at best, can give us little or no information as to the incidence of the psychoneuroses, as few "neurotics" are hospitalized.

elicited by the physical presence of others even when there is no cooperation or competition among the members of the group. Many experiments have been set up in an attempt to determine the relative amount of work obtained from subjects when in isolation and when in the presence of others. Isolation situations have been divided into those in which the subject is isolated but knows that others are working simultaneously on similar tasks in other places, and those in which the subject is psychologically as well as physically isolated—in which the subject works alone on a task no one else is doing anywhere at that particular moment (J. F. Dashiell, 1935).

In his *Social psychology* (F. Allport, 1924) Allport claims that the social effects that appear in social situations in which rivalry is presumably reduced to a minimum are due largely to "social facilitation." Visual, auditory, and olfactory stimuli issuing from those near one may act to augment the major responses. It is proverbially difficult to work in a soundproof room in which the ordinary noises are eliminated. For we may have become so much habituated to these very noises, which we carelessly speak of as distractions, that we are "lost" without their contributory effects. These weaker stimuli strengthen the reactions elicited by the more important stimuli, much as a pinch, a loud sound, or a bright light that occurs at the instant the patellar area of the knee is tapped intensifies the knee-jerk. Arguing on the basis of analogies of this sort, Allport suggests that the minor stimuli caused by the presence of others may induce increases in the amount of work normally accomplished.

In general, the processes that function in situations involving rivalry (see Appendix note 47) appear to operate, although perhaps less strongly, when an individual is at work in the presence of others. These effects, it will be recalled, include increases in the amount of work done, particularly when the task is routine and the subjects are of ordinary intelligence, and decreases in the quality of work accomplished. But, as we shall see, the social effects that appear in many social situations do not follow these perhaps oversimplified statements of the effects of rivalry. The numerous published conclusions concerning social facilitation must be for the present considered as tentative only. Many situations are so complex that they defy analysis. It is always possible that what appear to be the effects of social facilitation may in part be effects of rivalry, since in many instances it is impossible to know whether or not rivalry is involved. In fact, it may be that social facilitation is no more than mild rivalry.²⁷

In "The dynamogenic factors in pace-making and competition" (N. Triplett, 1898) and "Ueber Einzel- und Gesamtleistung des Schulkindes" (A. Mayer, 1903) precedents for a long series of studies by others were established. Typical of the many studies that have yielded positive results are *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie* (W. Moede, 1920) and "An investigation of ability to work in groups and in isolation" (N. P. Mukerji, 1940). But Krueger in "Note concerning group

²⁷ Katz and Schanck have taken issue with this notion and have presented evidence which they feel proves the possibility of separating rivalry and social facilitation. They point out that "individuals working alone have their competitive spirit aroused by the knowledge that others are busy at the same task" and that "individuals are . . . more highly motivated when actually confronted with their competitors than when working in isolation with a knowledge of competitors." (D. Katz and R. L. Schanck, 1938, p. 294.) But these data, though interesting, would seem to the present authors to be beside the point.

influence upon Otis S-A test scores" (W. C. F. Krueger, 1936) and Farnsworth in "Concerning so-called group effects" (P. R. Farnsworth, 1928) report little or no social facilitation in certain of their experimental situations—such, for example, as when testing the "college aptitude" of college students while they were alone and while they were in the presence of others. Moreover, in "The comparative effects of social and mechanical stimulation on memorizing" (J. Pessin, 1933) Pessin reports that the social stimuli he used served as distracters.

"Isolation" has meant different things to various investigators, and some of the differences in test results may be traced to this fact. In certain of the experiments, the experimenter was present even when the subjects were supposedly "alone"; in others, the tests were self-administered. In several of the experiments the subjects have been relatively ignorant of the test materials; in others, they were close to their physiological limits. Certain investigators have used very intelligent subjects, others those of average intelligence, and still others dull subjects. And the factor of intelligence would seem to be an important one in that ordinary subjects tend to show more social facilitation than do the very bright, who may even display work decrements. Being too rigid in their habits to adapt well to marked changes in their surroundings, very stupid subjects also may react poorly to being in a group (T. M. Abel, 1939).

Allport (F. H. Allport, 1924, pp. 274-278) has maintained that a judgment made in the presence of a group tends to be less extreme than one made in isolation. Allport's claim is based on experiments in which subjects judged several weights relative to two standard weights, one of which was heavier and one lighter than any of the weights to be judged. In the presence of the group the subjects bunched their judgments; *i.e.*, when judged in the group, no one of the weights was thought to be as near to either of the standards as it was when it was judged in isolation. This study has been checked under better conditions and found to be fairly sound statistically; see "A note on the attitude of social conformity" (P. R. Farnsworth and A. Behner, 1931). However, no such tendency toward social conformity appeared in a study of attitudinal judgments (P. R. Farnsworth, 1945). And in an experiment where college girls judged the attractiveness of college boys (as photographed), the order of judgment was found to be far more important than whether the judgments were given individually or in the group (R. A. Schonbar, 1947).

In "The influence of a social factor upon the appreciation of humor" (R. E. Perl, 1933) Perl reports that, when presented visually to a group, jokes are judged to be funnier than when rated by a subject in private, and the funniest and least funny jokes are much farther apart.

Although certain researchers believe that social factors are operative whenever a number of individual judgments are forced into a single value, such is not the case. Knight found that the average of the student estimates of the temperature of the classroom closely approximated the actual temperature; but that social factors were operative does not follow, nor does Knight presuppose that they were. Each of the class members might just as well have made his judgment while alone in the room (H. C. Knight, 1921). The Knight data have been used in at least one popular address on polling to "prove" that the public is always correct in its judgments. But such a conclusion is obviously absurd, for the public must be informed before it can give meaningful judgments. Thus when college students were asked to estimate the number of adults in the United States who know the meanings of certain words, the average error per judgment varied from 8 to 39 per cent (R. M. W. Travers, 1943). It should be clear that from the Knight study

only two facts can be deduced—that the subjects were fairly well acquainted with the room temperature and that their errors of judgment were such that their ballot values varied equally above and below the true temperature. But if some outside and little understood factor, such as unusual dryness or higher than average moisture content, had been present and had affected all subjects in a more or less similar manner, the errors would have been mainly in the same direction, with the result that the average of the judgments would not have approximated the true temperature.

Such a situation has been demonstrated in experiments in which lifted weights were judged. The size-weight illusion effect was brought into the situation by the presentation of boxes of the same weight, but of varying size. It was found that the average of the judgment values did not approximate the true weights but varied above or below in accordance with the size-weight illusion principle. In these experiments, then, the errors of judgment all tended in the same direction and thus pushed the average of the judgments away from the true value (P. R. Farnsworth and M. F. Williams, 1936).

Several writers have also seized upon social factors as explanatory principles for Gordon's findings on the subject of pooling, which are reported in "Group judgments in the field of lifted weights" (K. Gordon, 1924). Gordon found that two large groups of subjects with comparable social backgrounds will agree quite well in their judgments on even such "subjective" items as the beauty of Oriental rugs. Picked at random, any given person may disagree violently with some other individual; yet the composite or pooled ranks which are given to a set of pictures of rugs by a large group of people will correlate very highly with those which are given to the same pictures by a second large group of people of roughly similar backgrounds. The social factors in these studies are not social facilitation, rivalry, or cooperation, but are merely the results of similarities in the social antecedents of the various individuals. The ranks of the pooled ratings made by one hundred subjects from America will certainly not correlate well with those made by African primitives. See "Further observations on group judgments of lifted weights" (K. Gordon, 1936); "Group judgments in the fields of lifted weights and visual discrimination" (R. S. Bruce, 1936); "Note on the reliability and the validity of the group judgment" (M. G. Preston, 1938); "The validity of judgments as a function of the number of judges" (H. J. Eysenck, 1939); "The validity and reliability of group judgments" (B. B. Smith, 1941); and "Reply: the validity and reliability of group judgments" (H. J. Eysenck, 1941).

The fact that most subhuman animals (even bacteria and plants) live to some extent in a "social atmosphere" even though their "language" behavior is non-existent or very small is made much of in *A handbook of social psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., 1935), in which eight of the twenty-three chapters are devoted to what are designated as nonhuman social situations. The more recent animal studies yield data similar to those obtained on humans; social facilitation (or perhaps rivalry) is found in some social situations, *e.g.*, when certain animals are fed together (H. F. Harlow, 1932), but not in others. See "The effect of the presence of a second animal upon emotional behavior in the male albino rat" (E. E. Anderson, 1939) and "The social facilitation of locomotor behavior in the albino rat" (W. M. Lepley, 1939).

For examples of excellent studies of other aspects of animal social behavior, see "A field study of the behavior and social relations of howling monkeys" (C. R. Carpenter, 1934); "A field study in Siam of the behavior and social relations of

the gibbon (*Hylobates lar*)" (C. R. Carpenter, 1940); *The beginnings of social behavior in unicellular organisms* (H. S. Jennings, 1941); "Social organization in insects, as related to individual function" (T. C. Schneirla, 1941); "Imitation and suggestion in animals" (D. Roberts, 1941); "III. Objective studies of the social behavior of animals" (C. F. Harding, 1943); "Interindividual behavior among animals" (F. A. Beach, 1943); "Group formation determined by social behavior" (J. P. Scott, 1945); "Social biology of subhuman groups" (W. C. Allee, 1945); "Current concepts of play in animals" (F. A. Beach, 1945); "Primate psychology" (H. W. Nissen, 1946).

63. Illustrations of the various points made in the discussion of institutionalized situations in the text have been drawn from many sources—historical, anthropological, and sociological. The following references, in addition to those already given, may help to provide an understanding of the institutional practices of some one people or of the different institutional patterns of different peoples:

Primitive Societies:

The Veddas (C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman, 1911).

Argonauts of the western Pacific (B. Malinowski, 1922).

Crime and custom in savage society (B. Malinowski, 1926).

The material culture and social institutions of the simpler peoples (L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, 1930).

Rebel destiny (M. J. Herskovits and F. S. Herskovits, 1934).

Our primitive contemporaries (G. P. Murdock, 1934).

Savage civilisation (T. H. Harrison, 1937).

A black civilization: a social history of an Australian tribe (W. L. Warner, 1937).

Primitive behavior: an introduction to the social sciences (W. I. Thomas, 1937).

The Baiga (V. Elwin, 1939).

An introduction to cultural anthropology (R. H. Lowie, 1940).

Ancient Societies:

The Aryan household (W. E. Hearn, 1891).

The life of the ancient Greeks (C. B. Gulick, 1903).

The Greek commonwealth (A. E. Zimmern, 1911).

Social life in ancient Egypt (W. M. F. Petrie, 1923).

Roman society in Gaul in the Merovingian age (S. Dill, 1926).

Medieval Society:

The English village community (F. Seebohm, 1896).

History of civilization in Europe (F. P. G. Guizot, 1897).

The growth of the manor (P. Vinogradoff, 1905).

Life on a medieval barony (W. S. Davis, 1923).

Chinese Society:

Village and town life in China (Y. K. Leong and L. K. Tao, 1924).

Chinese political thought (E. D. Thomas, 1927).

China yesterday and today (E. T. Williams, 1929).

The Chinese: their history and culture, vol. II (K. S. Latourette, 1934).

Considerable portions of the materials of sociology, economics, and political science are, of course, descriptive of contemporary American institutions; but the

following may prove a good starting point for the student who wishes to explore this field: *Middletown* (R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, 1929); *Small town stuff* (A. Blumenthal, 1932); *Contemporary American institutions* (F. S. Chapin, 1935); and *Middletown in transition* (R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, 1937).

64. For some years F. H. Allport has been bothered by the traditional procedure of treating mores, customs, and social habits in an all-or-none fashion as though there were only two possibilities of behavior—to conform or not to conform.²⁸ A more realistic treatment, he believes, would be to regard conformity measurements as falling along some continuum. Accordingly he proposes two major types of continua, the empirical and the nonempirical or telic (F. H. Allport, 1934). In empirical continua the measuring units are those typical of the physical sciences. If we wish to plot data having to do with reaching eight-o'clock classes on time, we should thus employ the ordinary temporal units of minute or several-minute intervals. The curve for a college population would resemble two J's placed back to back, and hence the name "double J" given to it by Allport. A very few students would be found to arrive 25 minutes early, a few to arrive 20 minutes ahead of time, more 15 minutes ahead of time, still more 10 minutes early, and so on until a high point or mode is reached. Beyond this point fewer and fewer will be arriving. Allport describes the typical curve as unimodal, likely to be off center (skewed), and steep (F. H. Allport, 1939). One researcher, however, claims that certain of his empirical conformity curves are normal rather than double J in form (G. J. Dudycha, 1937). See also "An analysis of conformity behavior" (R. Chin, 1943).

Conformity data may also be plotted along nonempirical or telic continua. Telic units are in terms of the degree of fulfillment of an end or purpose, e.g., arriving at eight-o'clock classes on time, a little late, very late, etc. For the actions in question to be labelled conformity behavior, 50 per cent or more of the cases must fulfill the institutional purpose, whether it be arriving at an engagement on time, obeying the traffic policeman at the street corner, or the like. A telic continuum is in the shape of a single J (or a J reversed). For a description of the complicated manipulations necessary to change empirical distributions to telic distributions, see "Lengths of conversations: a conformity situation analyzed by the telic continuum and J-curve hypothesis" (F. H. Allport and R. S. Solomon, 1939). For a criticism based in part on the inequality of "telic" units, see "The measurement of conformity" (E. T. Katzoff, 1942).

To illustrate the J curve, one of the present authors has gathered data similar to some collected by Allport. The data contrast the behaviors of automobile drivers at two different crossings—the first, a crossing of two equally important streets in a residential area that is unguarded by stop signs, lights, or policemen; and the second, a crossing guarded by stop signs and occasionally by a policeman. Of 100 cars that arrived at the unguarded intersection, 1 stopped completely, 21 slowed up considerably, 65 slowed up a little, 12 went on as before, and 1 speeded up. Of 100 cars that arrived at the second crossing, 74 cars stopped completely, 20 slowed up considerably, 5 slowed up a little, 1 went on as before, but none went faster. When a policeman, leaning on his motorcycle, observed the cars at the guarded crossing, 98 stopped completely, 1 slowed up appreciably, and 1 (later arrested)

²⁸ Perhaps the sociologists and certainly the anthropologists of a half century ago did actually treat cultural conformity in this all-or-none fashion. No reputable contemporary sociologist or anthropologist would, however, think of doing so.

slowed up only a little. Here was conforming behavior that fitted the J-curve hypothesis.

Another of the many situations in which Allport's J-curve hypothesis appears applicable occurs in the field of sex. When sex behavior is not strongly institutionalized, *i.e.*, when it is left relatively free and unregulated, individual differences are distributed rather normally; but when sex behavior is highly institutionalized, a mode appears at one end of the distribution (O. L. Harvey, 1935). See also "The J-curve hypothesis: certain aspects clarified" (M. Dickens and R. Solomon, 1938); "The J-curve hypothesis: a reply to Dickens and Solomon" (G. J. Dudycha, 1939); "Further theoretical considerations of the J-curve hypothesis" (R. S. Solomon, 1939); "Normative collective behavior: a classification of societal norms" (J. Bernard, 1941); "Conforming behavior and the J-curve hypothesis" (F. Fearing and E. M. Krise, 1941); "The J distribution as a measure of institutional strength" (R. H. Waters, 1941); "Conformity behavior of labor newspapers with respect to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. conflict" (S. H. Britt and R. L. Lowry, 1941); "Is conformity a general or a specific behavior trait?" (R. A. Harper, 1947).

65. Until quite recently there have been no experimental data on the subject of rumor. The studies reported below appear, however, to furnish a good basis for further research on this subject. In the experiments reported in "Experimental studies of the influence of social situations on the behavior of individual human adults" (J. F. Dashiell, 1935), subjects were conducted into a room where they observed the activities of other subjects already present and those of the experimenter. These "original observers" wrote out full accounts of all that they had seen and then passed their written accounts on to "secondhand observers," etc. After passing on his account, each person was given an interrogatory. The accounts and interrogatories were scored in terms of units of the story. Certain of the subjects were retested in 7 days and others in 9 days. The secondhand witnesses were found to have about 60 per cent of the "testimony capacity" of the firsthand observers, and the thirdhand observers to have only a little more than 40 per cent of the capacity of the firsthand observers. The retention experiments showed the following figures: original observers, an assumed 100 per cent; secondhand observers, about 60 per cent (7-day) and 40 to 54 per cent (9-day); thirdhand observers, 44 per cent (7-day) and 30 to 40 per cent (9-day).

In the experiment reported in "A tentative study in experimental social psychology" (C. Kirkpatrick, 1932), observers were presented with headlines, some of which referred to pleasant news and some to unpleasant and bad news. In their retellings of it the observers did not show a readier acceptance of the unpleasant items or a wishful distortion of the news. The preface "It is rumored that" was, however, usually eliminated from those items to which it was attached.

In a British study, reported in *Remembering* (F. C. Bartlett, 1932), subjects were asked to observe a variety of materials. After an interval of from 15 to 30 minutes, the subjects were asked to reproduce in writing what they had seen. These written reports were viewed and reproduced by a second set of subjects, the written reports of the second set of subjects by a third, etc. In the course of this artificially constructed "rumor spread," there appeared certain fairly definite changes, such as omissions, transformations, and biases toward the concrete and away from deductions, opinions, etc.

Continuing these memory studies, Northway found that the changes that appeared in recalled materials tended to be away from the unfamiliar toward the familiar and away from the less meaningful toward the more meaningful (M. L.

Northway, 1936). The researches on rumor of the past few years have followed the pattern of the earlier studies. The one real innovation has been the rumor clinic (G. W. Allport and L. Postman, 1947).

66. An indirect experimental approach to the sociopsychological processes involved in the functioning of committees is reported in "Some psychological aspects of committee work" (E. B. South, 1927). Majority decisions on four types of problems were asked of the subjects who served as committee members. South tried to find the size of the group and the personality and sex mixtures that were most adequate for committee work. He concluded that small groups are better with material that lends itself to prompt formulation of opinion, whereas large groups function better with material for which many hypotheses are needed; that committees composed entirely of one sex are more efficient than those composed of both sexes; and that introverts and extroverts are equally good with abstract material, although the latter are better on personal and concrete problems.

Several social psychologists have recently sought to discover whether or not the discussion group can be used effectively in changing attitudes. While a number of researchers have independently attacked this problem (K. F. Robinson, 1941; W. M. Timmons, 1942), it has been Lewin and his coworkers (K. Lewin, 1947; M. Radke and D. Klisurich, in press) who have done most to extend our knowledge in this area. This group has shown clearly that even such stubbornly held habits as those having to do with food preferences can be more easily altered by group discussion²⁹ than by lectures given by food experts.

Travers, in a series of studies (R. M. W. Travers, 1943 is the latest), has examined in considerable detail the factors that permit a person to judge correctly the level of knowledge in, or the opinions of, some particular group. See also "Individuals' estimates of group opinion" (R. Wallen, 1943).

Other studies on work of a cooperative nature are reported in *A study of mental work done by consulting pairs* (J. F. Bursch, 1927); "An experimental study of the modification of social attitudes" (C. Kirkpatrick, 1936); "On what type of task will a group do well?" (R. L. Thorndike, 1938); and "Cooperative versus solitary problem solution" (R. W. Husband, 1940). Since these studies are pioneering in character, no far-reaching conclusions are warranted. Bursch's work shows that on certain tests the composite score made by two people working together is better than the score made by the brighter one working alone. The duller subject can often answer questions that the brighter cannot. Kirkpatrick's findings indicate that a committee of mixed sex may achieve a compromise midway between the divergent attitudes of the two sexes. Thorndike's data seem to support the hypothesis that group superiority in mental work is greater when the materials permit a large range of response.

During the past few years many articles have appeared concerning the effects on judgment of knowledge of majority opinions, expert opinions, and opinions of well-known, well-liked, or particularly dominant people. The effects are often striking and are rarely, if ever, contrary to what common sense would have suggested. See the following: "Halo prestige" (A. O. Bowden, F. F. Caldwell, and G. A. West, 1934); "The induction of opinion through suggestion by means of 'planted content'" (A. D. Annis and N. C. Meier, 1934); "The degrees of acceptance of dogmatic statements and preferences for their supposed makers" (M. Saadi and P. R. Farns-

²⁹ The Spring, 1948, issue (Vol. 4, No. 2) of the *Journal of Social Issues* is devoted to "The dynamics of the discussion group."

worth, 1934); "Prestige, suggestion, and attitudes" (I. Lorge and C. C. Curtiss, 1936); "Experimental modification of children's food preferences through social suggestion" (K. Duncker, 1938); "The influence of majority and expert opinion on religious attitudes" (H. E. Burtt and D. R. Falkenburg, Jr., 1941).

The legal aspects of the committee situation, especially as seen in the jury, were considered experimentally as early as 1914 and reported in *Psychology and social sanity* (H. Münsterberg, 1914). Among the publications since that time are: "Studies in testimony" (W. M. Marston, 1924); *Legal psychology* (H. E. Burtt, 1931); "An experience in identification testimony" (H. B. Brown, 1934); *Law and the lawyers* (E. S. Robinson, 1935); and "The psychology of testimony" (W. Stern, 1939). Dashiell concludes that "a jury as a whole will give more complete and more accurate account on a definite number of details than an average individual jurymen" (J. F. Dashiell, 1935, pp. 1135-1140).

For further references on the committee and the conference, see: *International conferences* (J. W. Parkes, 1933); *Creative discussion* (A. D. Sheffield, 1933); *The art of conference* (F. Walser, 1933); and *The principles and methods of discussion* (J. H. McBurney and K. G. Hance, 1939).

67. The development of polling services, national and even international in scope, has been of great importance to social psychology. Having started in a small way with attempts to forecast election returns, these services are now, as one expert expresses it, "taking the pulse of the nation" (G. Gallup and S. F. Rae, 1940). In the early days, little attention was paid to the form of the questions, and all data were gathered through the mails. Indeed, it took the sensational failure of the *Literary Digest* polling service (which predicted a Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1936) to prove that the mere flooding of the mails with tons of straw ballots did not guarantee that the returns would be typical of the future actual ballots of the voting public. Personal interviews are now largely used in place of sending out ballots by mail, although there is nothing wrong with the latter method per se (R. Franzen and P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1945). In some situations the poller has replaced the fixed yes-no type of inquiry with a freer type, called the "open-ended," which allows the poller to expand on the question at some length (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1944).

The modern poller pretests his questions by trying them out beforehand on a small part of the population that is presumably typical of the larger population that he later expects to contact (R. F. Sletto, 1940; S. S. Wilks, 1940; A. B. Blankenship, 1941; G. Gallup, 1941; and D. Rugg, 1941). He chooses his interviewers with care, knowing that, if they are careless or poorly trained, they may influence the trend of the poll (A. B. Blankenship, 1940; D. Williams, 1942). The principles followed in selecting the persons to be interviewed have been chosen only after considerable experimentation, for proper weighting schemes spell the difference between success and failure (G. Gallup, 1938; E. Roper, 1940 and 1941; and editors of *Fortune*, 1940).

See as typical of the flood of articles regularly appearing "Editors' attitudes toward opinion polls" (N. C. Meier, 1939); "Polls and the science of public opinion" (F. H. Allport, 1940); "Three criteria: knowledge, conviction, and significance" (D. Katz, 1940); "Studies in secret-ballot technique" (L. E. Benson, 1941); "A comparison of the Gallup and *Fortune* polls regarding American intervention policy" (R. Stagner, 1941); "Do interviewers bias poll results?" (D. Katz, 1942); "Those not at home: riddle for pollsters" (E. R. Hilgard and S. L. Payne, 1944); *Gauging public opinion* (H. Cantril et al., 1944); "The study of man—polls on anti-Semitism"

(S. H. Flowerman and M. Jahoda, 1946); "Some opinion research principles developed through studies of social medicine" (S. L. Payne, 1946); "Interviewing to test for validity and reliability" (A. M. Rose, 1947); "Survey technique and polling procedure as methods in social science" (D. Katz, 1946); "The interview effect in polling" (L. P. Crespi, 1948).

A modified form of the polling technique, known as the "panel," has recently appeared. A number of people who are judged to be typical of some larger group are chosen for repeated interviews. *Fortune*, for example, has selected a panel of corporation heads as representative of big business. So far the panel plan shows considerable promise (P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1940 and 1941). See also "Effects of repeated interviews on the respondent's answers" (F. L. Ruch, 1941); and "Use of the panel in opinion and attitude research" (R. A. Robinson, 1947).

With polling now a "big business" it should not be forgotten that it is still in its infancy as a science. The success that polling for a time had with political forecasting made certain pollsters feel they did not need to demonstrate the validity of their tool in the nonpolitical areas. Since most scientists believe that nothing should be accepted in a priori fashion that can be proved by experiment, this attitude has aroused a controversy of considerable magnitude (L. Rogers, 1941; H. C. Link and A. D. Freiberg, 1942; G. M. Connelly, 1945; Q. McNemar, 1946, 1947; H. S. Conrad, 1946; L. P. Crespi, 1946).

68. In the eighteenth century, the phrase "public opinion" was coined to suggest that leaders under a democratic system of government must be quickly responsive to the wishes (opinions) of those whom they lead (the "public"). Since then, there has been interminable controversy over the question of whether public opinion is a creator or a creation of political leadership. See, for example, *Public opinion* (W. Lippmann, 1922); *The phantom public* (W. Lippmann, 1925); and *The American public mind* (P. H. Odegard, 1930).

At least some of the confusion arises from faulty conceptualization. Political scientists and journalists particularly are prone so to personify the "public" that they lose sight of the fact that it is an abstraction. That there is an expression of public opinion at election time cannot be questioned; but that there is at any given time a single opinion toward public matters that is held by all, or even by a majority of, people is extremely doubtful. For an analysis of the temporary nature and the great multiplicity of publics, see "An age of mass communication" (P. Meadows, 1947).

69. Few terms used by social psychologists are as highly subjective as is "propaganda." Despite efforts to find an objective psychological criterion upon which to divide conversion pressures into those which are educational and those which are propaganda, the terms "education" and "propaganda" seldom signify more than that the user approves of those pressures to which he attaches the former term and disapproves of those to which he attaches the latter. There is, so far as the authors can see, no objective psychological criterion by which to distinguish a mother's persuading her child to behave "properly" from a newspaper editor's distorting news reports to serve his particular political bias. Such distinctions as rational versus irrational appeals, unselfish versus selfish appeals, and apparent source versus hidden source are neither factually nor conceptually sound. Because of the difficulties of separating facts from nonfacts, the distinction between fact and nonfact cannot be used to differentiate education from propaganda. There is, however, a valid and significant quantitative distinction between those pressures (whatever their psychological character) which operate to bring a social minority into

the behavior norms of the majority and those which are efforts of a minority to convert a majority. The former might well be termed "education"; the latter, "propaganda" (R. T. LaPiere, 1935).

The phrase "social pressures" is frequently used to indicate the totality of propagandistic efforts which impinge upon the individual and to distinguish them from other social forces which operate to bring the individual into line with the norms of social conduct. The sources of propagandistic pressures—minorities who are interested in acquiring dominance over the majority in political, economic, or social affairs—have been termed "pressure groups." For a history of such efforts and an excellent bibliography, see R. M. MacIver's article "Social pressures" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 344-348).

Both voters and college students seem more affected by "emotionally"—dramatically—written appeals than by "rationally"—prosaically—written ones. At least the "emotional" leaflets had the greater appeal in an election at Allentown, Pa., in 1935 (G. W. Hartmann, 1936). And "emotional" editorials favoring one side or another of a controversial issue were the more effective with college students (S. C. Menefee and A. G. Granneberg, 1940). Data so far gathered suggest that, when both sides of a rather academic controversial issue are listened to, already existing prejudices will be intensified. If, however, the issue is regarded as close to reality, more open-mindedness is likely to follow (R. L. Schanck and C. Goodman, 1939). In reacting to speeches of a neutral character, each listener tends to regard both the speaker and the contents of the speech as favorable to his own position (A. L. Edwards, 1941). For those who are opposed to the point of view being advocated, it is better to present both sides of the argument (U.S. War Department, 1947).

For references on propaganda, see the following and those listed under the heading of censorship: *Words that won the war: the story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (J. R. Mock and C. Larson, 1939); *Conquering the man in the street: a psychological analysis of propaganda in war, fascism, and politics* (E. Freeman, 1940); *Political propaganda* (F. C. Bartlett, 1940); *War propaganda and the United States* (H. Lavine and J. Wechsler, 1940); "The psychology of propaganda" (R. Money-Kyrle, 1941); "The 'danger' of propaganda" (E. Kris, 1941); "Home propaganda" (*Mass-Observation*, 1942); "Penetration of Axis propaganda" (F. L. Ruch and K. Young, 1942); "The nature of slogans" (L. Bellak, 1942); "A study of certain factors involved in changes of opinion" (T. N. Ewing, 1942); "The psychological analysis of propaganda" (P. F. Lazarsfeld and R. K. Merton, 1944); "The effect of socially disapproved labeling upon a well-structured attitude" (H. G. Birch, 1945); *Paper bullets* (L. J. Margolin, 1946); *Mass persuasion* (R. K. Merton *et al.*, 1946); *Propaganda, communication, and public opinion* (B. L. Smith *et al.*, eds., 1946); *Public opinion and propaganda* (L. W. Doob, 1948).

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND AUTHOR INDEX

Numbers in brackets indicate the pages on which reference is made to the given item.

- Aaron, H., 1940. *Good health and bad medicine* (New York, McBride). [422]
- Abel, T. M., 1939. "Social facilitation in different motor tasks" (*Kwart. Psychol.*, 11, 162-169). [540]
- Abernathy, E. M., 1940. "Further data on personality and family position" (*J. Psychol.*, 10, 303-307). [293]
- Abrahamsen, D., 1944. *Crime and the human mind* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [341]
- Adams, C. R., 1940. "Individual differences in behavior resulting from experimentally induced frustration" (*J. Psychol.*, 10, 157-176). [537]
- Adams, C. R., 1946. "The prediction of adjustment in marriage" (*Educ. psychol. Measmt.*, 6, 185-193). [533]
- Adams, C. W., 1945-1946. "The age at which scientists do their best work" (*Isis*, 36, 166-169). [290]
- Adams, J. T., 1932. "Our whispering campaigns" (*Harper's Mag.*, 165, 444-450). [414]
- Adinarayaniah, S. P., 1941. "A research in colour prejudice" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 31, 217-229). [513]
- Adler, A., 1917. *Study of organ inferiority and its psychical compensation* (Washington, D.C., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Publ.). [489]
- Aginsky, B. W., 1939. "Psychopathic trends in culture" (*Character & Pers.*, 7, 331-343). [340]
- Agoston, T., 1945. "Some psychological aspects of prostitution: the pseudo-personality" (*Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 26, 62-67). [345]
- Agoston, T., 1946. "Some psychological aspects of prostitution: the pseudo-personality—an addendum" (*Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 27, 59). [345]
- Akerman, D., et al., 1943. "A study in the use of a graphic rating scale" (*Proc. Ia. Acad. Sci.*, 50, 303-308). [535]
- Alexander, C., 1946. "Is antipathy the antithesis of sympathy?" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 23, 233-236). [226]
- Alexander, F., and T. M. French, 1946. *Psychoanalytic therapy* (New York, Ronald Press). [24]
- Allard, W., 1941. "A test of propaganda values in public opinion surveys" (*Social Forces*, 20, 206-213). [499]
- Allee, W. C., 1938. *The social life of animals* (New York, Norton). [61, 491]
- Allee, W. C., 1945. "Social biology of subhuman groups" (*Sociometry*, 8, 21-29). [542]
- Allen, B. M., 1933. *Gordon in China* (London, Macmillan). [477]
- Allen, C. N., 1935. "Recent research on sex differences" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 32, 343-354). [242]
- Allen, E., et al., 1939. *Sex and internal secretions* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [495]

- Allport, F. H., 1924. *Social psychology* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [38, 380, 482, 539, 540]
- Allport, F. H., 1934. "The J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 5, 141-183). [543]
- Allport, F. H., 1939. "Rule and custom as individual variation of behavior distributed upon a continuum of conformity" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 897-921). [543]
- Allport, F. H., 1940. "Polls and the science of public opinion" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 4, 249-257). [546]
- Allport, F. H., 1940. "An event-system theory of collective action: with illustrations from economic and political phenomena and the production of war" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 417-445). [382]
- Allport, F. H., 1942. "Methods in the study of collective action phenomena" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 15, 165-185). [486]
- Allport, F. H., and G. A. Hanchett, 1940. "The war-producing behavior of citizens: a scale of measurement, with preliminary results in imagined situations" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 447-490). [498]
- Allport, F. H., and M. Lepkin, 1943. "Building war morale with news-headlines" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 7, 211-221). [273]
- Allport, F. H., and M. Lepkin, 1945. "Wartime rumors of waste and special privilege: why some people believe them" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 3-36). [415]
- Allport, F. H., and R. S. Solomon, 1939. "Lengths of conversations: a conformity situation analyzed by the telic continuum and J-curve hypothesis" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 419-464). [543]
- Allport, G. W., 1928. "A test for ascendance-submission" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 23, 118-136). [523]
- Allport, G. W., 1937. *Personality: a psychological interpretation* (New York, Holt). [184, 190, 253, 490]
- Allport, G. W., 1940. "Motivation in personality: reply to Mr. Bertocci" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 533-554). [489]
- Allport, G. W., 1942. "The use of personal documents in psychological science" (*Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.*, No. 49). [512]
- Allport, G. W., 1944. *ABC's of scapegoating* (Chicago, Central Y.M.C.A. College). [374]
- Allport, G. W., 1945. "The psychology of participation" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 52, 117-132). [486]
- Allport, G. W., J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, 1941. "Personality under social catastrophe: ninety life-histories of the Nazi revolution" (*Character & Pers.*, 10, 1-22). [511]
- Allport, G. W., and B. M. Kramer, 1946. "Some roots of prejudice" (*J. Psychol.*, 22, 9-39). [231]
- Allport, G. W., and H. S. Odbert, 1936. "Trait names: a pscho-lexical study" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 47, No. 211). [250]
- Allport, G. W., and L. Postman, 1947. *The psychology of rumor* (New York, Holt). [411, 545]
- Allport, G. W., and H. R. Veltfort, 1943. "Social psychology and the civilian war effort" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 165-233). [467]
- Allport, G. W., and P. E. Vernon, 1933. *Studies in expressive movement* (New York, Macmillan). [501]
- Alper, T. G., and E. G. Boring, 1944. "Intelligence test scores of Northern and

- Southern white and Negro recruits in 1918" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 471-474). [518]
- Alschuler, R. H., and LaB. W. Hattwick, 1947. *Painting and personality* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [511]
- Ames, L. B., and J. Learned, 1946. "Imaginary companions and related phenomena" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 69, 147-167). [132]
- Ames, R. S., 1935. "The screen enters politics" (*Harper's Mag.*, 170, 473-482). [445]
- Amory, C., 1947. *The proper Bostonians* (New York, Dutton). [51, 406]
- Anderson, E. E., 1939. "The effect of the presence of a second animal upon emotional behavior in the male albino rat" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 10, 265-268). [541]
- Anderson, H. D., and P. Davidson, 1940. *Occupational trends in the United States* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [333]
- Anderson, H. H., 1937. "Domination and integration in the social behavior of young children in an experimental play situation" (*Genet. Psychol. Mongr.*, 19, 341-408). [524]
- Anderson, H. H., 1940. "An examination of the concepts of domination and integration in relation to dominance and ascendance" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 21-37). [523]
- Anderson, H. H., 1945. "Studies in domination and socially integrative behavior" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 15, 133-139). [524]
- Anderson, N., 1940. *Men on the move* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [354]
- Angell, J. R., 1908. *Psychology* (New York, Holt). [26]
- Ankles, T. M., 1939. *A study of jealousy as differentiated from envy* (Boston, Bruce Humphries). [173]
- Annis, A. D., and N. C. Meier, 1934. "The induction of opinion through suggestion by means of 'planted content'" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 5, 65-81). [545]
- Anon., 1932. *I lost my memory: the case as the patient saw it* (London, Faber and Faber). [375]
- Anon., 1941. "Suicides that fail" (*Statist. Bull. Metrop. Life Insur.*, 22, No. 5, 9-10). [369]
- Anon., 1945. "The scapegoat in modern Europe" (*Nature, Lond.*, 156, 380-382). [374]
- Anon., 1946. "Postwar increase in suicide" (*Statist. Bull. Metrop. Life Insur.*, 27, No. 4). [369]
- Ansbacher, H., 1938. "Number judgment of postage stamps: a contribution to the psychology of social norms" (*J. Psychol.*, 5, 347-350). [254]
- Ansbacher, H. L., and K. R. Nichols, 1941. "Selecting the Nazi officer" (*Infantry J.*, 49, 44-48). [467]
- Anthony, S., 1940. *The child's discovery of death* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [292]
- Armattoe, R. E. G., 1948. (*Sci. News Letter*, 54, No. 1, 12). [263]
- Asch, S. E., 1946. "Forming impressions of personality" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 258-290). [535]
- Asch, S. E., 1948. "A doctrine of suggestion, prestige and imitation in social psychology" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 55, 250-276). [122]
- Asch, S. E., H. Block, and M. Hertzman, 1938. "Studies in the principles of judgments and attitudes: I. Two basic principles of judgment" (*J. Psychol.*, 5, 219-251). [496]

- Asher, R., and S. S. Sargent, 1941. "Shifts in attitude caused by cartoon caricatures" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 24, 451-455). [527]
- Atwell, S., 1939. "Color vision in relation to artistic ability" (*J. Psychol.*, 8, 53-56). [489]
- Atwood, J. H., et al., 1941. *Thus be their destiny; the personality development of Negro youth in three communities* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Youth Commission of Amer. Coun. Educ.). [518]
- Ax, A. F., 1946. "A validation study of the Rotter-Jensen Level of Aspiration Test" (*J. Person.*, 15, 166-172). [506]
- Axline, V. M., 1947. *Play therapy; the inner dynamics of childhood* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [506]
- Baber, R. E., 1939. *Marriage and the family* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [301]
- Bach, G. R., 1945. "Young children's play fantasies" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 59, No. 2). [506]
- Backus, E. B., 1940. "Religion and mental health" (*Ment. Hyg. Rev.*, 1, 14-18). [315]
- Bain, R., 1942. "Comment" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 7, 383-387). [486]
- Bain, R., 1945. "The ages of man" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 337-343). [293]
- Baker, W. J., and D. McGregor, 1937. "Conversation as a reflector of social change" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 8, 487-490). [523]
- Bakke, E. W., 1940. *The unemployed worker; a study of the task of making a living without a job* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [333]
- Bakke, E. W., 1940. *Citizens without work; a study of the effects of unemployment upon the workers' social relations and practices* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [333]
- Baldwin, J. M., 1893. *Elements of psychology* (New York, Holt). [26]
- Baldwin, J. M., 1911. *The individual and society: or psychology and sociology* (Boston, Badger). [482]
- Balken, E. R., 1945. "Thematic apperception" (*J. Psychol.*, 20, 189-197). [511]
- Ballin, M., and P. R. Farnsworth, 1941. "A graphic rating method for determining the scale values of statements in measuring social attitudes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 323-327). [498]
- Banay, R. S., 1943. "A study of twenty-two men convicted of murder in the first degree" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 34, 106-111). [343]
- Barahal, H. S., 1939. "Constitutional factors in male homosexuals" (*Psychiat. Quart.*, 13, 391-400). [349]
- Barber, B., 1941. "Acculturation and messianic movements" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 663-669). [473]
- Barham, F., 1841. *The political works of Marcus Tullius Cicero* (London, Spettigue). [11]
- Barker, G. H., 1940. "Family factors in the ecology of juvenile delinquency" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 30, 681-691). [534]
- Barker, L. F., 1942. "Psychotherapy in the practice of geriatrics" (*Pub. Hlth. Rep., Wash.*, Suppl. No. 168, 88-97). [318]
- Barker, R. G., et al., 1946. "Adjustment to physical handicap and illness: a survey of the social psychology of physique and disability" (*Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.*, No. 55). [69, 187, 489, 493]
- Barker, R. G., T. Dembo, and K. Lewin, 1941. "Frustration and regression: an experiment with young children" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, 18, No. 1). [363]

- Barr, A. S., 1941. "On the use of anecdotal records" (*J. educ. Res.*, 34, 358-359). [511]
- Bartlett, F. C., 1932. *Remembering* (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge Univ. Press). [544]
- Bartlett, F. C., 1940. *Political propaganda* (New York, Macmillan). [548]
- Basso, H., 1935. "Huey Long and his background" (*Harper's Mag.*, 170, 663-673). [445]
- Bateman, R. M., and H. H. Remmers, 1941. "A study of the shifting attitude of high school students when subjected to favorable and unfavorable propaganda" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 395-406). [499]
- Bateson, G., 1942. *Civilian morale* (G. Watson, ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [274]
- Bateson, G., and M. Mead, 1942. *The Balinese character* (New York, Trans. N.Y. Acad. Sci.). [127]
- Baumgarten, F., 1922. "Eine Ehrgeizprobe" (*Prakt. Psychol.*, 3, 333-348). [524]
- Baumgarten, F., 1937. "Character traits derived from biographies" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 147-149). [511]
- Bavelas, A., and K. Lewin, 1942. "Training in democratic leadership" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 37, 115-119). [437]
- Bayley, N., 1940. *Studies in the development of young children* (Berkeley, Univ. Calif. Press). [502]
- Bayley, N., 1943. "Size and body build of adolescents in relation to rate of skeletal maturing" (*Child Developm.*, 14, 47-90). [289]
- Bayton, J. A., 1941. "The racial stereotypes of Negro college students" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 97-102). [208]
- Beach, F. A., 1943. "Interindividual behavior among animals" (*Trans. N.Y. Acad. Sci.*, 6, 14-18). [542]
- Beach, F. A., 1945. "Current concepts of play in animals" (*Amer. Nat.*, 79, 523-541). [542]
- Beaglehole, E., 1940. "Cultural complexity and psychological problems" (*Psychiatry*, 3, 329-339). [382]
- Beaglehole, E., 1941. "Interpersonal theory and social psychology" (*Psychiatry*, 4, 61-77). [486]
- Beard, B. B., 1946. "The army of the aged: a sociomedical problem" (*Geriatrics*, 1, 299-304). [318]
- Beck, S. J., 1937. "Psychological processes in Rorschach findings" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 482-488). [511]
- Beck, S. J., 1944. *Rorschach's test. I: Basic processes* (New York, Grune and Stratton). [511]
- Becker, H., 1940. "Constructive typology in the social sciences" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 40-55). [529]
- Beckman, R. O., 1933. "Ascendance-submission test—revised" (*Person., J.*, 11, 387-392). [523]
- Beers, C. W., 1923. *A mind that found itself: an autobiography* (New York, Doubleday). [360]
- Behn, S., and C. Fervers, 1938. "Die Suggestion der Maschine und der eckigsehnige Konstitutionstypus" (*Z. Rassenk.*, 7, 217-234). [528]
- Bell, H. M., 1934. *The adjustment inventory* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [535]

- Bell, H. M., 1938. *Youth tell their story* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Coun. Educ.). [535]
- Bell, J. E., 1948. *Projective techniques* (New York, Longmans, Green). [511]
- Bellak, L., 1942. "The nature of slogans" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 37, 496-510). [548]
- Bender, L., and S. Paster, 1941. "Homosexual trends in children" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 11, 730-743). [349]
- Benedek, T., and B. B. Rubenstein, 1939. "Correlations between ovarian activity and psychodynamic processes" (*Psychosom. Med.*, 1, 245-270). [495]
- Benedict, R., 1933. "Myth" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 178-181). [415]
- Benedict, R., 1934. *Patterns of culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [175, 224, 228, 233]
- Benedict, R., 1934. "Ritual" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 396-397). [398]
- Benedict, R., 1940. *Race: science and politics* (New York, Modern Age). [518]
- Benedict, R., 1946. *The chrysanthemum and the sword: patterns of Japanese culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [235]
- Bennett, E., 1946. "A comparative study of annoyances" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 36, 74-82). [227]
- Benson, L. E., 1941. "Studies in secret-ballot technique" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 5, 79-82). [546]
- Berdie, R. F., 1943. "Psychological processes in the interview" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 3-31). [497]
- Berdie, R. F., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [499]
- Bernard, J., 1941. "Normative collective behavior: a classification of societal norms" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 47, 24-38). [544]
- Bernard, L. L., 1924. *Instinct; a study in social psychology* (New York, Holt). [22, 482]
- Bernard, L. L., 1926. *An introduction to social psychology* (New York, Holt). [121, 123, 483]
- Bernard, L. L., 1933. "Mob" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 552-554). [469]
- Bernard, L. L., 1939. *Social control in its sociological aspects* (New York, Macmillan). [266]
- Bernard, L. L., 1942. "Recent discussion regarding social psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 48, 13-28). [486]
- Bernard, L. L., 1943. "Student interests in social psychology" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 27, 181-190). [486]
- Bernays, E. L., 1934. *Crystallising public opinion* (New York, Liveright). [445]
- Berne, E., 1944. "The problem of masturbation" (*Dis. nerv. Syst.*, 5, 301-305). [349]
- Bernreuter, R. G., 1935. *Manual for the personality inventory* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [523, 525, 535]
- Berreman, J., 1939. *Factors affecting the sale of modern books of fiction: a study in social psychology* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [451]
- Bertholet, A., 1934. "Priesthood" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 388-395). [351]
- Bertocci, P. A., 1940. "A critique of G. W. Allport's theory of motivation" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 501-532). [489]
- Bettelheim, B., 1943. "Individual and mass behavior in extreme situations" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 417-452). [511]

- Bettelheim, B., 1947. "The dynamism of anti-Semitism in gentile and Jew" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 42, 153-168). [511]
- Betz, B. J., 1942. "Somatology of the schizophrenic patient" (*Hum. Biol.*, 14, 192-234). [528]
- Bigelow, M. A., 1934. "Sex education and sex ethics" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 8-13). [531]
- Billings, R. A., 1934. "The Negro and his church" (*Psychoanal. Rev.*, 21, 425-441). [404]
- Bingham, H. C., 1932. *Gorillas in a native habitat* (Washington, Carnegie Inst.). [502]
- Bingham, W. V. D., 1939. "Halo, invalid and valid" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 23, 221-228). [535]
- Bingham, W. V. D., and B. V. Moore, 1941. *How to interview* (New York, Harper). [496]
- Birch, H. G., 1945. "The effect of socially disapproved labeling upon a well-structured attitude" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 301-310). [548]
- Bird, C., 1940. *Social psychology* (New York, Appleton-Century). [485]
- Bishop, W. J., 1947. "Wild men and wolf boys" (*Med. Pr.*, 218, 595-601). [487]
- Bixler, R. H., 1948. "How G. S. became a scapegoater" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 43, 230-232). [374]
- Blackford, K. M. H., and A. Newcomb, 1915. *The job, the man, the boss* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Page). [213]
- Blake, R., and W. Dennis, 1943. "The development of stereotypes concerning the Negro" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 525-531). [231]
- Blanchard, P., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [531]
- Blankenship, A. B., 1940. "The effect of the interviewer upon the response in a public opinion poll" (*J. consult. Psychol.*, 4, 134-136). [546]
- Blankenship, A. B., 1941. "A correction" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 25, 124-127). [546]
- Blankenship, A. B., ed., 1946. *How to conduct consumer and opinion research* (New York, Harper). [433]
- Blanton, S., and M. G. Blanton, 1936. *For stutterers* (New York, Appleton-Century). [504]
- Blatz, W. E., D. Millichamp, and M. Fletcher, 1935. *Nursery education; theory and practice* (New York, Morrow). [134]
- Blau, A., 1938. "Grundgedanken zur vergleichenden Völkerpsychologie" (*Beih. Z. angew. Psychol.*, 79, 148-162). [26]
- Blau, A., 1946. "The master hand" (*Amer. orthopsychiat. Ass. Res. Mongr.*, No. 5). [503]
- Bloch, H. A., 1947. "The personality of inmates of concentration camps" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 335-341). [337]
- Block, M., 1939. *Gypsies, their life and their customs* (New York, Appleton-Century). [353]
- Block, V. L., 1937. "Conflicts of adolescents with their mothers" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 32, 193-206). [294]
- Blockman, N., and S. G. Klebanoff, 1944. "The role of rural socio-cultural factors in the functional psychoses" (*Psychiat. Quart.*, 18, 301-311). [236]
- Bloom, L., 1948. *A controlled attitude-tension survey* (Berkeley, Univ. Calif. Press). [231]
- Bloomfield, L., 1933. *Language* (New York, Holt). [102]

- Blumenthal, A., 1932. *Small town stuff* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [543]
- Blumer, H., 1935. "Moulding of mass behavior through the motion picture" (*Publ. Amer. sociol. Soc.*, 29, 115-127). [69]
- Blumer, H., 1939. *An outline of the principles of sociology* (R. E. Park, ed., New York, Barnes & Noble). [54]
- Blumer, H., 1940. "The problem of the concept in social psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 707-719). [485]
- Boas, F., 1925. *Contributions to the ethnology of the Kwakiutl* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [175]
- Boas, F., 1934. "Race" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 25-36). [519]
- Boas, G., 1935. "The technic of mob rule" (*Harper's Mag.*, 170, 755-761). [445]
- Bochner, R., and F. Halpern, 1945. *The clinical application of the Rorschach test* (2d ed., New York, Grune and Stratton). [511]
- Bodin, J., 1572. *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (Parisii, apud Martinum Juvenem). [15]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1917; 1923. *Essentials of social psychology* (Los Angeles, Univ. So. Calif. Press). [482]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1924; 1942. *Fundamentals of social psychology* (New York, Appleton-Century). [482]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1928. *Immigration and race attitudes* (Boston, Heath). [497]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1933. "A social distance scale" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 17, 265-271). [497]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1934. *Leaders and leadership* (New York, Appleton-Century). [523]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1948. "Social distance in daily vocabulary" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 32, 723-727). [497]
- Bogardus, E. S., 1948. "The social distance differential" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 32, 882-887). [497]
- Boisen, A. T., 1939. "Economic distress and religious experiences: a study of the Holy Rollers" (*Psychiatry*, 2, 185-194). [462]
- Boland, E. W., 1948. "Psychogenic rheumatism" (*Calif. Med.*, 68, 273-279). [372]
- Bolles, M. M., H. F. Metzger, and M. W. Pitts, 1941. "Early home background and personality adjustment" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 11, 530-535). [301]
- Bolton, E. R., 1937. "Measuring specific attitudes toward the social rights of the Negro" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 384-397). [231]
- Bonaparte, M., 1947. *Myths of war* (London, Imago Publ. Co.). [413]
- Bonney, M. E., 1941. "The validity of certain techniques of gathering psychological data, with special reference to personality questionnaires" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 103-122). [535]
- Bonney, M. E., 1941. "Parents as the makers of social deviates" (*Social Forces*, 20, 77-87). [61, 301, 305]
- Bonney, M. E., 1947. *Popular and unpopular children* (New York, Beacon House). [62]
- Bordin, E. S., 1943. "Factor analysis in experimental designs in clinical and social psychology" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 50, 415-429). [486]
- Bossard, J. H. S., 1941. "War and the family" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 330-344). [336]
- Bossard, J. H. S., 1948. *The sociology of child development* (New York, Harper). [70]

- Bowden, A. O., F. F. Caldwell, and G. A. West, 1934. "Halo prestige" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 28, 400-406). [545]
- Bowman, H. A., 1948. *Marriage for moderns* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [313]
- Boynton, P. L., H. Dugger, and M. Turner, 1934. "The emotional stability of teachers and pupils" (*J. juv. Res.*, 18, 223-232). [150]
- Brackett, C. W., 1934. "Laughing and crying of preschool children" (*Child Develpm. Monogr.*, 14). [97]
- Bradbury, D. E., and E. L. Skeels, 1939. *A bibliography of nursery education* (Detroit, Nat. Ass. for Nursery Educ.). [134]
- Brazier, M. A., et al., 1945. "Contrast between electroencephalograms of 100 psychoneurotic patients and those of 500 normal adults" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 101, 443-448). [495]
- Brenman, M., 1940. "The relationship between minority-group membership and group identification in a group of urban middle class Negro girls" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 171-197). [224]
- Breslaw, B. J., 1938. "The development of a socio-economic attitude" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 226). [496]
- Bridges, K. M. B., 1932. "Emotional development in early infancy" (*Child Develpm.*, 3, 324-341). [40]
- Britt, S. H., 1940. "Review of current social psychology" (*Psychol. League J.*, 4, 5-10). [485]
- Britt, S. H., 1941. *Social psychology of modern life* (New York, Rinehart). [485]
- Britt, S. H., and S. Q. Janus, 1940. "Criteria of frustration" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 451-469). [537]
- Britt, S. H., and S. Q. Janus, 1941. "Toward a social psychology of human play" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 351-384). [506]
- Britt, S. H., and R. L. Lowry, 1941. "Conformity behavior of labor newspapers with respect to the A.F.L.-C.I.O. conflict" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 375-387). [544]
- Brock, R. B., 1945. "The effect of motion pictures on body temperature" (*Science*, 102, 259). [69]
- Brodbeck, A. J., and O. C. Irwin, 1946. "The speech behavior of infants without families" (*Child Develpm.*, 17, 145-156). [112]
- Brogden, H. E., 1940. "A factor analysis of forty character tests" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 52, No. 3, 39-55). [510]
- Brogden, H. E., and W. F. Thomas, 1943. "The primary traits in personality items purporting to measure sociability" (*J. Psychol.*, 16, 85-97). [510]
- Broich, K., 1929. "Führeranforderungen in der Kindergruppe" (*Z. angew. Psychol.*, 32, 164-212). [522]
- Brookover, W. B., 1945. "The adjustment of veterans to civilian life" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 579-586). [337]
- Brooks, F. D., 1929. *The psychology of adolescence* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [530]
- Brosin, H. W., 1943. "Panic states and their treatment" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 100, 54-61). [466]
- Brown, F. J., ed., 1939. "Refugees" (*Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. soc. Sci.*, 203). [324]
- Brown, G. E., Jr., 1941. *A comparison of verbal and non-verbal measures of personality* (M. A. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [529]
- Brown, H. B., 1934. "An experience in identification testimony" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 25, 621-622). [546]
- Brown, H. C., 1937. *A mind mislaid* (New York, Dutton). [360]

- Brown, J. F., 1936. *Psychology and the social order* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [484]
- Brown, J. F., 1937. "The field-theoretical approach in social psychology" (*Social Forces*, 15, 482-484). [27]
- Brown, L. G., 1934. *Social psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [484]
- Brown, W., 1946. *Personality and religion* (Bickley, Kent, England, Univ. London Press). [315]
- Bruce, R. S., 1936. "Group judgments in the fields of lifted weights and visual discrimination" (*J. Psychol.*, 1, 117-121). [541]
- Bruner, J. S., and C. C. Goodman, 1947. "Value and need as organizing factors in perception" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 42, 33-44). [67]
- Bryant, G. E., 1941. "Recent trends in racial attitudes of Negro college students" (*J. Negro Educ.*, 10, 43-50). [496]
- Bryn, D., 1936. "The problem of human types: comments and an experiment" (*Character & Pers.*, 5, 48-60). [529]
- Bryson, L., et al., eds., 1944. *Approaches to world peace: a symposium* (New York, Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion). [335]
- Bühler, C., 1930. *The first year of life* (New York, Day). [96]
- Bühler, C., 1931. *Kindheit und Jugend* (Leipzig, S. Hirzel). [505]
- Bühler, C., 1933. *A handbook of child psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [524]
- Burchard, E. M. L., 1935. "Physique and psychosis: an analysis of the postulated relationship between bodily constitution and mental disease syndrome" (*Univ. Pittsb. Bull.*, 32, No. 1, 1-10). [528]
- Burgess, E. W., 1941. "An experiment in the standardization of the case-study method" (*Sociometry*, 4, 329-348). [534]
- Burgess, E. W., and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., 1939. *Predicting success or failure in marriage* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [203, 534]
- Burgess, E. W., and H. J. Locke, 1945. *The family: from institution to companionship* (New York, American Book). [126, 301]
- Burgess, E. W., and P. Wallin, 1944. "Homogamy in personality characteristics" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 475-481). [534]
- Burks, B. S., 1942. *Studies in personality* (Q. McNemar and M. A. Merrill, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [488]
- Burlingame, L. L., 1940. *Heredity and social problems* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [31]
- Buros, O. K., ed., 1941. *The 1940 mental measurements yearbook* (Highland Park, N.J., Mental Measurements Yearbook). [526]
- Buros, O. K., ed., 1949. *The third mental measurements yearbook* (New Brunswick, Rutgers Univ. Press). [526]
- Bursch, J. F., 1927. *A study of mental work done by consulting pairs* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [545]
- Burt, C., 1944. *The young delinquent* (Bickley, Kent, England, Univ. London Press). [535]
- Burt, C., 1945. "Personality, a symposium" (*Brit. J. educ. Psychol.*, 15, 107-121). [526]
- Burt, H. E., 1931. *Legal psychology* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [546]
- Burt, H. E., 1938. *Psychology of advertising* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [421]
- Burt, H. E., and D. R. Falkenburg, Jr., 1941. "The influence of majority and expert opinion on religious attitudes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 269-278). [546]

- Buttenwieser, P., 1935. *Relation of age to skill of expert chess players* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [535]
- Cabot, P. S., 1938. "The relationship between characteristics of personality and physique in adolescents" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 20, 3-120). [528]
- Cabot, P. S., 1946. *Juvenile delinquency: a critical annotated bibliography* (New York, Wilson). [535]
- Calhoon, S. W., 1934. "Relative seating position and ability to reproduce disconnected word lists after short intervals of time" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 17, 723-738). [427]
- Cameron, N. Unpublished data. [510]
- Cameron, N., 1947. *Psychology of behavior disorders* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [516]
- Campbell, A. A., 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [231]
- Campbell, I. G., 1942. "Basal emotional patterns expressible in music" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 55, 1-17). [509]
- Campbell, R. K., 1941. *The relationships of interests to achievement in engineering and social science courses* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [499]
- Canady, H. G., 1936. "The intelligence of Negro college students and parental occupation" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 42, 388-389). [519]
- Canady, H. G., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [519]
- Cantril, H., 1941. *The psychology of social movements* (New York, Wiley). [461, 473, 475]
- Cantril, H., 1943. "Causes and control of riot and panic" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 7, 669-679). [466]
- Cantril, H., 1946. "The intensity of an attitude" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 129-135). [496]
- Cantril, H., 1947. "The place of personality in social psychology" (*J. Psychol.*, 24, 19-56). [486]
- Cantril, H., 1947. *Understanding man's social behavior* (Princeton, N.J., Office of Public Opinion Research). [486]
- Cantril, H., et al., 1944. *Gauging public opinion* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [449, 546]
- Cantril, H., and G. W. Allport, 1935. *The psychology of radio* (New York, Harper). [112]
- Cantril, H., H. Gaudet, and H. Herzog, 1940. *The invasion from Mars* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [433, 466]
- Caprio, F. S., 1946. "Ethnological attitudes toward death: a psychoanalytic evaluation" (*J. clin. Psychopath. Psychother.*, 7, 737-752). [292]
- Carlson, E. R., 1941. *Born that way* (New York, Day). [291]
- Carlson, J. S., S. W. Cook, and E. L. Stromberg, 1936. "Sex differences in conversation" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 20, 727-735). [523]
- Carmichael, L., S. O. Roberts, and N. Y. Wessell, 1937. "A study of the judgment of manual expression as presented in still and motion pictures" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 8, 115-142). [500]
- Caro, J. H., 1939. "Persoon en persoonsbeoordeeling" (*Ned. Tijdschr. Psychol.*, 6, 489-524). [500]
- Carpenter, C. R., 1934. "A field study of the behavior and social relations of howling monkeys" (*Comp. Psychol. Monogr.*, 10). [541]

- Carpenter, C. R., 1940. "A field study in Siam of the behavior and social relations of the gibbon (*Hylobates lar*)" (*Comp. Psychol. Monogr.*, 16, No. 5). [542]
- Carpenter, J., and P. Eisenberg, 1938. "Some relations between family background and personality" (*J. Psychol.*, 6, 115-136). [523]
- Carr, H. A., and F. A. Kingsbury, 1938. "The concept of traits" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 45, 497-524). [522]
- Carr, L. J., 1940. *Delinquency control* (New York, Harper). [535]
- Carrothers, G. E., 1947. "Left-handedness among school pupils" (*Amer. Sch. Bd. J.*, 114, No. 5, 17-19). [503]
- Carter, H., 1945. "Recent American studies in attitudes toward war" (*Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 10, 343-352). [496]
- Carter, H. D., 1944. "The development of interest in vocations" (*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 43, 255-276). [499]
- Carter, H. D., H. S. Conrad, and M. C. Jones, 1935. "A multiple factor analysis of children's annoyances" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 47, 282-298). [227]
- Carter, H. D., and E. K. Strong, Jr., 1933. "Sex differences in occupational interests of high school students" (*Person. J.*, 12, 166-175). [521]
- Cartwright, D., 1946. "American social psychology and the war" (*J. consult. Psychol.*, 10, 67-72). [467]
- Cartwright, D., and J. R. P. French, Jr., 1939. "The reliability of life-history studies" (*Character & Pers.*, 8, 110-119). [511]
- Cattell, R. B., 1938. *Psychology and the religious quest* (New York, Nelson). [315]
- Cattell, R. B., 1941. *General psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., Sci-Art). [32]
- Cattell, R. B., 1942. "The concept of social status" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 15, 293-308). [488]
- Cattell, R. B., 1943. "The description of personality: basic traits resolved into clusters" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 476-506). [510]
- Cattell, R. B., 1945. "The principal trait clusters for describing personality" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 42, 129-161). [510]
- Cattell, R. B., 1946. *Description and measurement of personality* (Yonkers, N.Y., World Book). [510]
- Cattell, R. B., 1946. "The riddle of perseveration" (*J. Person.*, 14, 229-267). [263]
- Centers, R., in press. *The psychology of social classes* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [238, 312]
- Chandler, A. R., 1945. *Rosenberg's Nazi myth* (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press). [19]
- Chant, S. N. F., and M. D. Salter, 1937. "The measuring of attitudes toward war and the galvanic skin reflex" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 28, 281-289). [494]
- Chapin, F. S., 1935. *Contemporary American institutions* (New York, Harper). [543]
- Chapman, D., 1946. "Summary—methods, theory, and appraisal" (*J. soc. Issues*, 2, No. 4, 72-74). [486]
- Chapman, D. W., and J. Volkmann, 1939. "A social determinant of the level of aspiration" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 225-238). [506]
- Chappell, M. N., and C. E. Hooper, 1944. *Radio audience measurement* (New York, Stephen Daye). [433]
- Chapple, E. D., and C. M. Arensberg, 1940. "Measuring human relations: an introduction to the study of the interaction of individuals" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 22, 3-147). [536]

- Chase, S., 1938. *The tyranny of words* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [166]
- Chase, S., and F. J. Schlink, 1927. *Your money's worth* (New York, Macmillan). [422]
- Chen, I., 1943. "The meaning of 'morale' in relation to morale building and morale research" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 50, 311-329). [273]
- Chenault, L. R., 1938. *The Puerto Rican migrant in New York City* (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia Univ.). [324]
- Child, I. L., 1941. "Morale: a bibliographical review" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 393-420). [273]
- Child, I. L., and L. W. Doob, 1943. "Factors determining national stereotypes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 203-219). [205]
- Chin, R., 1943. "An analysis of conformity behavior" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 289). [543]
- Clark, E. T., 1929. *The psychology of religious awakening* (New York, Macmillan). [531]
- Clark, G., and H. G. Birch, 1946. "Hormonal modifications of social behavior" (*Bull. Canad. psychol. Ass.*, 6, 1-3). [524]
- Clark, K. B., 1944. "Group violence: a preliminary study of the attitudinal pattern of its acceptance and rejection: a study of the 1943 Harlem riot" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 19, 319-337). [465]
- Clark, K. B., and J. Barker, 1945. "The zoot effect in personality: a race riot participant" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 143-148). [465]
- Clark, K. B., and M. P. Clark, 1940. "Skin color as a factor in racial identification of Negro preschool children" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 159-169). [224]
- Clark, K. B., and M. P. Clark, 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [224]
- Clark, R. M., 1944. "A method of administering and evaluating the Thematic Apperception Test in group situations" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 30, 3-55). [511]
- Clark, W. H., 1935. "Two tests for perseverance" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 26, 604-610). [263]
- Clarke, R. T., 1934. "The drum language of the Tumba People" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 40, 34-48). [113, 508]
- Cleeton, G. U., and F. B. Knight, 1924. "Validity of character judgments based on external criteria" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 8, 215-231). [527]
- Coe, G. A., 1900. *The spiritual life* (New York, Eaton and Mains). [530]
- Coffin, T. E., 1944. "A three-component theory of leadership" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 63-83). [215]
- Coker, F. W., 1933. "Lynching" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 9, 639-643). [470]
- Cole, L., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [531]
- Collier, R. M., 1944. "The effect of propaganda upon attitude following a critical examination of the propaganda itself" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 20, 3-17). [499]
- Collier, R. M., and M. Emch, 1938. "Introversion-extraversion: the concepts and their clinical use" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 94, 1045-1075). [525]
- Collins, O., 1946. "Ethnic behavior in industry; sponsorship and rejection in a New England factory" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 51, 293-298). [280]
- Columbia Broadcasting System, 1941. *How radio measures its audience; four discussions by research authorities* (New York, Radio Sales Division of Columbia Broadcasting System). [433]

- Combs, A. W., 1947. "A comparative study of motivations as revealed in Thematic Apperception stories and autobiography" (*J. clin. Psychol.*, 3, 65-75). [511]
- Comte, A., 1896. *The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte* (London, Bell). [18]
- Conklin, E. S., 1927. "The determination of normal extravert-introvert interest differences" (*Ped. Sem.*, 34, 28-37). [525]
- Connelly, G. M., 1945. "Now let's look at the real problem: validity" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 9, 51-60). [547]
- Conrad, H. S., 1946. "Some principles of attitude-measurement: a reply to 'Opinion-attitude Methodology'" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 43, 570-589). [547]
- Conrad, H. S., H. E. Jones, and H. H. Hsiao, 1933. "Sex differences in mental growth and decline" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 24, 161-169). [242]
- Cooley, C. H., 1902; 1922. *Human nature and the social order* (New York, Scribner). [21, 27, 124, 221, 224, 481]
- Cooley, C. H., 1923. *Social organization* (New York, Scribner). [493]
- Cooper, C. R., 1939. *Designs in scarlet* (Boston, Little, Brown). [345]
- Coover, J. E., 1917. "Experiments in psychical research" (*Stanford Univ. Publ., Psychical Res. Monogr.*, 1). [86]
- Corey, S. M., 1937. "Professed attitudes and actual behavior" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 28, 271-280). [499]
- Corey, S. M., and G. S. Beery, 1938. "The effect of teacher popularity upon attitude toward school subjects" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 29, 665-670). [151]
- Cottrell, L. S., Jr., 1941. "The case-study method in prediction" (*Sociometry*, 4, 358-370). [28, 497]
- Cottrell, L. S., Jr., 1942. "The analysis of situational fields in social psychology" (*Amer. soc. Rev.*, 7, 370-382). [252]
- Cottrell, L. S., Jr., 1948. *American opinion on world affairs* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [449]
- Cottrell, L. S., Jr., and R. Gallagher, 1941. "Important developments in American social psychology during the past decade" (*Sociometry*, 4, 107-139; 302-324). [486]
- Cottrell, W. F., 1940. *The railroader* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [241]
- Coutu, W., 1936. "The relative prestige of twenty professions as judged by three groups of the professional students" (*Social Forces*, 14, 522-529). [492]
- Cox, O. C., 1948. *Caste, class, and race* (New York, Doubleday). [231]
- Crawford, M. P., 1937. "The cooperative solving of problems by young chimpanzees" (*Comp. Psychol. Monogr.*, 14, No. 68). [502]
- Crawford, M. P., 1939. "The social psychology of vertebrates" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 407-446). [140]
- Crawford, M. P., 1940. "The relation between social dominance and the menstrual cycle in female chimpanzees" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 37, 432-433). [258]
- Creegan, R. F., 1945. "The sociology of personal behavior" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 50, 386-389). [486]
- Creegan, R. F., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [512]
- Crespi, L. P., 1946. "'Opinion-attitude Methodology' and the polls—a rejoinder" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 43, 562-569). [547]
- Crespi, L. P., 1948. "The interview effect in polling" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 12, 99-111). [547]
- Cressey, P. G., 1932. *The tasi-dance hall* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [535]

- Cressey, P. G., 1938. "The motion picture experience as modified by social background and personality" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 516-525). [69]
- Crider, B., 1941. "The reliability and validity of two graphologists" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 25, 323-325). [501]
- Crider, B., 1946. "The hostility pattern" (*J. clin. Psychol.*, 2, 267-273). [537]
- Critchley, M., 1939. *The language of gesture* (New York, Longmans, Green). [86]
- Cronbach, L. J., 1944. "Stereotypes and college sororities" (*J. higher Educ.*, 15, 214-216). [209]
- Crook, M. N., 1943. "A retest with the Thurstone Personality Schedule after six and one-half years" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 28, 111-120). [535]
- Crook, M. N., and M. Thomas, 1934. "Family relationships in ascendance-submission" (*Publ. Univ. Calif. Los Angeles Educ., Phil., Psychol.*, 1, 189-192). [523]
- Cuber, J. F., and R. A. Harper, 1948. *Problems of American society; values in conflict* (New York, Holt). [296, 309]
- Cummings, J. D., 1944. "The incidence of emotional symptoms in school children" (*Brit. J. educ. Psychol.*, 14, 151-161). [520]
- Dacus, J. A., 1877. *Annals of the great strikes* (Chicago, Palmer). [472]
- Darley, J. G., and G. V. Anderson, 1944. "Application of personality and character measurement" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 14, 67-80). [526]
- Darley, J. G., and W. J. McNamara, 1940. "Factor analysis in the establishment of new personality tests" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 31, 321-334). [498, 510]
- Darling, R. P., 1940. "Autonomic action in relation to personality traits of children" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 246-260). [495]
- Dashiell, J. F., 1935. *A handbook of social psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [539, 544, 546]
- Davidson, P. E., and H. D. Anderson, 1937. *Occupational mobility in an American community* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [333]
- Davie, M. R., 1947. *Refugees in America* (New York, Harper). [324]
- Davies, J. G. W., 1939. "The place of interests in vocational adjustment" (*Occup. Psychol., Lond.*, 13, 42-51). [499]
- Davies, V., 1944. "Development of a scale to rate attitude of community satisfaction" (*Rur. Sociol.*, 10, 246-255). [498]
- Davis, A., and J. Dollard, 1940. *Children of bondage: the personality development of Negro youth in the urban South* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Coun. Educ.). [233, 519]
- Davis, A., B. B. Gardner, and M. R. Gardner, 1941. *Deep South; a social anthropological study of caste and class* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [233, 519]
- Davis, E. A., 1937. "The development of linguistic skill in twins, singletons with siblings, and only children from age five to ten years" (*Univ. Minn. Inst. Child Welf. Monogr. Ser.*, 14). [503]
- Davis, F. B., and P. J. Rulon, 1935. "Gossip and the introvert" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 30, 17-21). [526]
- Davis, J., 1927. "Testing the social attitudes of children in the government schools in Russia" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 32, 947-952). [492]
- Davis, K., 1940. "Extreme social isolation of a child" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 554-565). [33]
- Davis, R. A., 1935. *Psychology of learning* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [43]
- Davis, W. S., 1923. *Life on a medieval barony* (New York, Harper). [542]

- Dawson, C. A., and E. R. Younge, 1940. *Pioneering in the prairie provinces: the social side of the settlement process* (New York, Macmillan). [323]
- Day, D. D., 1941. "Methodological problems in attitude research" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 165-180). [499]
- Day, D. D., and O. F. Quackenbush, 1940. "Relation between war attitudes and opinions" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 25, 19-27). [498]
- Deeg, M. E., and D. G. Paterson, 1947. "Changes in social status of occupations" (*Occupations*, 25, 205-208). [492]
- Dembo, T., *et al.*, in press. "Studies in adjustment to visible injuries." [489]
- Dennis, W., 1934. *A manual of exercises and experiments in social psychology* (Mimeogr. at University, Virginia). [484]
- Dennis, W., 1935. "An experimental test of two theories of social smiling in infants" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 6, 214-223). [97]
- Dennis, W., 1941. "The significance of feral man" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 54, 425-432). [487]
- Dennis, W., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [531]
- Dennis, W., and R. W. Russell, 1940. "Piaget's questions applied to Zúñi children" (*Child Developm.*, 11, 181-187). [105]
- Derrick, E. H., 1941. "Suicide and its prevention" (*Med. J. Aust.*, 1, 668-672). [369]
- Despert, J. L., 1940. "A method for the study of personality reactions in preschool age children by means of analysis of their play" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 17-29). [506]
- Destler, C. Mc., 1946. *American radicalism, 1865-1901* (New London, Conn., Connecticut College). [477]
- Detweiler, F. G., 1932. "The rise of modern race antagonisms" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 37, 738-747). [231]
- Deutsche, J. M., 1943. *Child behavior and development* (R. G. Barker *et al.*, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [105]
- Devereux, G., 1939. "Maladjustment and social neurosis" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 844-851). [297]
- Dewey, J., 1897. *Psychology* (New York, Harper). [26]
- Dewey, J., 1899. *The school and society; being three lectures* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [154]
- Dewey, J., 1938. *Logic: the theory of inquiry* (New York, Holt). [18]
- Dewey, R., 1948. *History of sociology* (H. E. Barnes, ed., Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [21]
- Dexter, E. S., 1939. "Personality traits related to conservatism and radicalism" (*Character & Pers.*, 7, 230-237). [513]
- Dickens, M., and R. Solomon, 1938. "The J-curve hypothesis: certain aspects clarified" (*Sociometry*, 1, 277-291). [544]
- Dickey, E. C., and F. H. Knowler, 1941. "A note on some ethnological differences in recognition of simulated expressions of the emotions" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 47, 190-193). [92]
- Dill, S., 1926. *Roman society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age* (London, Macmillan). [542]
- Dimmitt, M., 1936. "The construction and evaluation of a scale to measure audience attitude toward any play" (*Bull. Purdue Univ.*, 37, 275-282). [498]
- Dispensa, J., 1938. "Relationship of the thyroid with intelligence and personality" (*J. Psychol.*, 6, 181-186). [495]

- Dodd, S. C., 1935. "A social distance test in the Near East" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 41, 194-204). [497]
- Dodd, S. C., 1936. "The standard error of a 'social force'" (*Ann. math. Statist.*, 7, 202-209). [180]
- Dodd, S. C., 1939. "A tension theory of societal action" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 7, 56-77). [180]
- Dodge, R., and E. Kahn, 1931. *The craving for superiority* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [526]
- Doll, E. A., 1945. "Influence of environment and etiology on social competence" (*Amer. J. ment. Def.*, 50, 89-94). [241]
- Dollard, J., 1935. *Criteria for the lifehistory—with analysis of six notable documents* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [489, 511]
- Dollard, J., 1937. *Caste and class in a Southern town* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [240]
- Dollard, J., et al., 1939. *Frustration and aggression* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [537]
- Dollard, J., and O. H. Mowrer, 1947. "A method of measuring tension in written documents" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 42, 3-32). [180]
- Donovan, F. R., 1938. *The schoolma'am* (New York, Stokes). [241]
- Doob, L. W., 1941. "War reactions of a rural Canadian community" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 200-223). [496]
- Doob, L. W., 1947. "The behavior of attitudes" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 54, 135-156). [116]
- Doob, L. W., 1948. *Public opinion and propaganda* (New York, Holt). [449, 548]
- Doob, L. W., and R. R. Sears, 1939. "Factors determining substitute behavior and the overt expression of aggression" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 293-313). [537]
- Dorcus, R. M., 1944. "A brief study of the Humm-Wadsworth Temperament Scale and the Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory in an industrial situation" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 28, 302-307). [535]
- Dowd, J., 1936. *Control in human societies* (New York, Appleton-Century). [266]
- Doyle, B. W., 1937. *The etiquette of race relations in the South* (Ph.D. Thesis, Univ. Chicago). [405]
- Drake, L. E., 1946. "A social I.E. scale for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 30, 51-54). [525]
- Drake, R. M., 1942. *Work book in social psychology* (Fredericksburg, Va., publ. by the author). [485]
- Drake, R. M., 1946. *Outline of social psychology, Vol. I.* (Fredericksburg, Va., publ. by the author). [485]
- Draper, G., 1942. "The emotional component of the ulcer susceptible constitution" (*Ann. intern. Med.*, 16, 633-658). [371]
- Dreese, M., and E. Mooney, 1941. *Interest inventory for elementary grades (for grades 4, 5, and 6): Form A* (Washington, D.C., George Washington Univ.). [499]
- Dublin, L. I., and A. J. Lotka, 1935. *Length of life: a study of the life table* (New York, Ronald Press). [290]
- DuBois, C., 1944. *The people of Alor: a social-psychological study of an East Indian island* (Minneapolis, Univ. Minn. Press). [70, 340]
- Dudycha, G. J., 1937. "An examination of the J-curve hypothesis based on punctuality distributions" (*Sociometry*, 1, 144-154). [543]

- Dudycha, G. J., 1939. "The J-curve hypothesis: a reply to Dickens and Solomon" (*Sociometry*, 2, 52-58). [543]
- Dudycha, G. J., 1943. "A critical examination of the measurement of attitude toward war" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 383-392). [496]
- Dukes, E., 1946. "The psychological effects of war on the family and its individual members" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 16, 64-73). [336]
- Dunbar, H. F., 1946. *Emotions and bodily changes: a survey of literature on psychosomatic interrelationships, 1910-1945* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [490]
- Duncker, K., 1938. "Experimental modification of children's food preferences through social suggestion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 489-507). [546]
- Dunham, H. W., 1940. "Topical summaries of current literature: social attitudes" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46, 344-375). [499]
- Dunham, H. W., 1948. "Social psychiatry" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 13, 183-197). [538]
- Dunkerley, M. D., 1940. "A statistical study of leadership among college women" (*Stud. Psychol. Psychiat. Cathol. Univ. Amer.*, 4, No. 7). [523]
- Dunlap, K., 1919. "Are there any instincts?" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 307-311). [22]
- Dunlap, K., 1925. *Social psychology* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [483]
- Dunlap, K., 1927. "The role of eye-muscles and mouth-muscles in the expression of the emotions" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 2, 196-233). [500]
- Dunlap, K., 1934. *Civilized life: the principles and applications of social psychology* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [484, 513]
- Dunlap, K., 1940. "The causes and the prevention of war" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 479-497). [335]
- Dunlap, K., 1940. "The method and problems of social psychology" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 471-485). [28]
- Dunlap, K., 1946. *Religion: its function in human life; a study of religion from the point of view of psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [315]
- Durbin, E. F. M., and J. Bowlby, 1939. *Personal aggressiveness and war* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [335]
- Durea, M. A., 1939. "A study of personality from the standpoint of social stimulus value" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 10, 61-79). [250]
- Dusenbury, D., and F. H. Knower, 1938. "Experimental studies of the symbolism of action and voice. I. A study of the specificity of meaning in facial expression" (*Quart. J. Speech*, 24, 424-435). [500]
- DuVall, E., 1937. "Child-parent social distance" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 21, 458-463). [127]
- Dyer, D. T., 1945. "Are only children different?" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 36, 297-302). [134]
- Dyer, H. S., 1945. "The usability of the concept of 'prejudice'" (*Psychometrika*, 10, 219-224). [227]
- Dysinger, D. W., 1939. "A critique of the Humm-Wadsworth temperament scale" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 73-83). [535]
- Dysinger, W. S., and C. A. Ruckmick, 1933. *The emotional responses of children to the motion picture situation* (New York, Macmillan). [69]
- Eaton, J. W., 1947. "Experiments in testing for leadership" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 523-535). [401]

- Edwards, A. L., 1940. "Four dimensions in political stereotypes" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 566-572). [207]
- Edwards, A. L., 1940. "Studies of stereotypes: I. The directionality and uniformity of responses to stereotypes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 12, 357-366). [207]
- Edwards, A. L., 1941. "Political frames of reference as a factor influencing recognition" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 34-50). [548]
- Edwards, A. L., 1941. "Rationalization in recognition as a result of a political frame of reference" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 224-235). [253]
- Edwards, A. L., 1946. "A critique of 'neutral' items in attitude scales constructed by the method of equal appearing intervals" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 53, 159-169). [498]
- Edwards, A. L., and K. C. Kinney, 1946. "A comparison of the Thurstone and Likert techniques of attitude scale construction" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 30, 72-83). [498]
- Efron, D., 1941. *Gesture and environment* (New York, King's Crown Press). [86]
- Efron, D., and J. P. Foley, Jr., 1937. "Gestural behavior and social setting" (*Z. Sozialforsch.*, 6, 152-161). [92]
- Eisenberg, P., 1937. "A further study in expressive movement" (*Character & Pers.*, 5, 296-301). [90]
- Eisenberg, P., 1937. "Expressive movements related to feeling of dominance" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 211). [500]
- Eisenberg, P., 1938. "Judging expressive movement: I. Judgments of sex and dominance-feeling from handwriting samples of dominant and non-dominant men and women" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 22, 480-486). [501]
- Eisenberg, P., and E. Zalowitz, 1938. "Judging expressive movement: III. Judgments of dominance-feeling from phonograph records of voice" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 22, 620-631). [500]
- Eliot, T. D., 1943. ". . . of the shadow of death" (*Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. soc. Sci.*, 229, 87-99). [292]
- Elkind, H. B., 1939. "Are mental diseases on the increase? The problem of determination" (*Psychiat. Quart.*, 13, 165-172). [537]
- Elliott, M. H., 1935. "Drive and the characteristics of driven behavior" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 42, 205-213). [37]
- Ellis, A., 1947. "Personality questionnaires" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 17, 53-63). [535]
- Ellis, R. S., 1947. "The 'laws' of relative variability of mental traits" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 44, 1-33). [522]
- Ellwood, C. A., 1901. *Some prolegomena to social psychology* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [481]
- Ellwood, C. A., 1917. *An introduction to social psychology* (New York, Appleton-Century). [482]
- Ellwood, C. A., 1925. *The psychology of human society* (New York, Appleton-Century). [483]
- Elmer, M. C., 1945. *The sociology of the family* (Boston, Ginn). [126]
- Elwin, V., 1939. *The Baiga* (London, John Murray). [542]
- Emme, E. E., 1943. "Effective teaching in a post-war world" (*Sch. & Soc.*, 58, 415). [499]
- English, H. B., 1943. "'Fantasia' and the psychology of music" (*J. Aesth.*, 2, No. 7, 27-31). [509]

- Epstein, L. J., 1941. "Attitudinal changes attendant upon variations in experience" (*J. educ. Res.*, 34, 453-457). [499]
- Ericksen, S. C., 1944. "A skeptical note on the use of attitude scales toward war: II. In 1942" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 20, 31-38). [499]
- Ericksen, S. C., 1948. "A skeptical note on the use of attitude scales toward war: III. In 1946" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 27, 79-90). [117]
- Esper, E. A., 1935. *A handbook of social psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [503]
- Estabrooks, G. H., 1928. "The enigma of racial intelligence" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 35, 137-139). [517]
- Estes, S. G., 1938. "Judging personality from expressive behavior" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 217-236). [501]
- Estes, S. G., and D. Horn, 1939. "Interest patterns as related to fields of concentration among engineering students" (*J. Psychol.*, 7, 29-36). [499]
- Estes, W. K., 1940. "A visual form of the verbal summator" (*Psychol. Rec.*, 4, 174-180). [510]
- Estes, W. K., and K. W. Estes, 1944. "Minnesota studies in war psychology: I. A set of miniature scales for the measurement of attitudes related to morale" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 20, 265-276). [273]
- Evans, A. L., 1928. *Aptitude testing* (C. Hull, ed., Yonkers, N.Y., World Book). [528]
- Ewer, B. C., 1929. *Social psychology* (New York, Macmillan). [483]
- Ewing, T. N., 1942. "A study of certain factors involved in changes of opinion" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 16, 63-88). [548]
- Eysenck, H. J., 1939. "The validity of judgments as a function of the number of judges" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 25, 650-654). [541]
- Eysenck, H. J., 1941. "Reply: the validity and reliability of group judgments" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 29, 427-434). [541]
- Eysenck, H. J., 1947. *Dimensions of personality* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.). [510]
- Eysenck, H. J., 1948. "'Neuroticism' and handwriting" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 43, 94-96). [501]
- Fairbanks, G., and W. Pronovost, 1939. "An experimental study of the pitch characteristics of the voice during the expression of emotions" (*Speech Monogr.*, 6, 87-104). [500]
- Fairbanks, H., and L. W. Hoaglin, 1941. "An experimental study of the durational characteristics of the voice during the expression of emotion" (*Speech Monogr.*, 8, 85-90). [500]
- Farago, L., and L. F. Gittler, eds., 1941. *German psychological warfare: survey and bibliography* (New York, Committee for National Morale). [336, 467]
- Faris, E., 1937. "The social psychology of George Mead" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 43, 391-403). [481]
- Faris, E., 1945. "The beginnings of social psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 50, 422-428). [21, 486]
- Faris, R. E. L., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [538]
- Faris, R. E. L., 1948. *Social disorganization* (New York, Ronald Press). [309]
- Faris, R. E. L., and H. W. Dunham, 1939. *Mental disorders in urban areas: an ecological study of schizophrenia and other psychoses* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [538]

- Farnsworth, P. R., 1928. "Concerning so-called group effects" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 35, 587-594). [540]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1933. "Seat preference in the classroom" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 4, 373-376). [427]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1938. "The measure of emotional maturity" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 9, 235-237). [536]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1938. "Aesthetic behavior and astrology" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 335-340). [216]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1941. "Further data on the Adlerian theory of artistry" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 24, 447-450). [489]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1943. "Attempts to distinguish Chinese from Japanese college students through observation of face-photographs" (*J. Psychol.*, 16, 99-106). [61]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1943. "Shifts in the values of opinion items" (*J. Psychol.*, 16, 125-128). [498]
- Farnsworth, P. R., 1945. "Further data on the obtaining of Thurstone scale values" (*J. Psychol.*, 19, 69-73). [540]
- Farnsworth, P. R., and A. Behner, 1931. "A note on the attitude of social conformity" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 2, 126-128). [540]
- Farnsworth, P. R., and L. W. Ferguson, 1938. "The growth of a suicidal tendency as indicated by score changes in Bernreuter's personality inventory" (*Sociometry*, 1, 339-341). [535]
- Farnsworth, P. R., and I. Misumi, 1931. "Further data on suggestion in pictures" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 43, 632). [455]
- Farnsworth, P. R., and M. F. Williams, 1936. "The accuracy of the median and mean of a group of judgments" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 7, 237-239). [541]
- Faterson, H. F., 1931. "Organic inferiority and the inferiority attitude" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 2, 87-101). [526]
- Faulkner, J., 1941. *Men working* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [171]
- Fauset, A. H., 1944. *Black gods of the metropolis. Negro religious cults of the urban North* (Philadelphia, Univ. Penn. Press). [462]
- Fay, P. J., and W. C. Middleton, 1940. "Certain factors related to liberal and conservative attitudes of college students: parental membership in certain organizations" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 12, 55-69). [498]
- Fay, P. J., and W. C. Middleton, 1943. "Judgment of leadership from transmitted voice" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 99-102). [500]
- Fearing, F., and E. M. Krise, 1941. "Conforming behavior and the J-curve hypothesis" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 109-118). [544]
- Federal Security Agency, 1946. *Marriage and divorce in the United States, 1937-1945* (Vital Statistics, Special Reports, 23, No. 9). [307]
- Fenichel, O., 1945. *Psychoanalytic theory of neurosis* (New York, Norton). [24]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1935. "The influence of individual attitudes on construction of an attitude scale" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 6, 115-117). [497]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1936. "Attitudes of Stanford students toward some U.S. presidents" (*Sch. & Soc.*, 44, No. 1128, 190-192). [496]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1938. "Correlates of woman's orgasm" (*J. Psychol.*, 6, 295-302). [348]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1938. "Correlates of marital happiness" (*J. Psychol.*, 6, 285-294). [534]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1939. "The evaluative attitudes of Jonathan Swift" (*Psychol. Rec.*, 3, 26-44). [512]

- Ferguson, L. W., 1941. "A study of the Likert technique of attitude scale construction" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 51-57). [498]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1942. "The isolation and measurement of nationalism" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 16, 215-228). [498]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1944. "Socio-psychological correlates of the primary attitude scales: I. Religionism. II. Humanitarianism" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 19, 81-98). [498]
- Ferguson, L. W., 1948. *Clerical salary administration* (New York, Life Office Management Assoc.). [403]
- Ferguson, L. W., L. G. Humphreys, and F. W. Strong, 1941. "A factorial analysis of interests and values" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 32, 197-204). [529]
- Ferrero, G., 1911. *The criminal man according to the classification of Cesare Lombroso* (New York, Putnam). [212]
- Festinger, L., 1942. "Wish, expectation and group standards as factors influencing level of aspiration" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 37, 184-200). [506]
- Festinger, L., 1947. "The treatment of qualitative data by 'scale analysis'" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 44, 149-161). [498]
- Fink, K., and H. Cantril, 1937. "The collegiate stereotype as frame of reference" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 32, 352-356). [209]
- Fishman, J. F., 1934. *Sex in prison* (New York, National Library Press). [350]
- Fiske, D. W., 1944. "A study of relationships to somatotype" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 28, 504-519). [215]
- Flemming, E. G., 1933. "Sex differences in emotional responses" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 8, 430-445). [520]
- Flowerman, S. H., and M. Jahoda, 1946. "The study of man—polls on anti-Semitism. How much do they tell us?" (*Commentary*, 1, 82-86). [547]
- Foley, J. P., Jr., 1940. "A further note on the 'baboon boy' of South Africa" (*J. Psychol.*, 10, 323-326). [487]
- Folsom, J. K., 1931. *Social psychology* (New York, Harper). [484]
- Folsom, J. K., 1943. *The family and democratic society* (New York, Wiley). [301]
- Forman, H. J., 1933. *Our movie made children* (New York, Macmillan). [69]
- Fortune, Editors of, 1940. "The Fortune survey: its history and development" (*J. educ. Sociol.*, 14, 250-253). [546]
- Frank, J. D., 1941. "Recent studies of the level of aspiration" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 218-226). [506]
- Frank, L. K., 1939. "Dilemma of leadership" (*Psychiatry*, 2, 343-361). [257]
- Frank, L. K., 1948. *Projective methods* (Springfield, Ill., Thomas). [511]
- Franz, S. I., 1919. *Handbook of mental examination methods* (New York, Macmillan). [525, 535]
- Franz, S. I., 1933. *Persons One and Three* (New York, Whittlesey House). [368]
- Franzblau, R. N., 1935. "Race differences in mental and physical traits: studied in different environments" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 177). [517]
- Franzen, R., and P. F. Lazarsfeld, 1945. "Mail questionnaire as a research problem" (*J. Psychol.*, 20, 239-320). [546]
- Fraser Roberts, J. A., 1945. "On the difference between the sexes in dispersion of intelligence" (*Brit. med. J.*, 1, 727-730). [244]
- Frazier, E. F., 1939. *The Negro family in the United States* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [519]
- Frazier, E. F., 1940. *Negro youth at the crossways: their personality development in the middle states* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Coun. Educ.). [233, 519]

- Freeman, E., 1936. *Social psychology* (New York, Holt). [484]
- Freeman, E., 1940. *Conquering the man in the street: a psychological analysis of propaganda in war, fascism, and politics* (New York, Vanguard Press). [548]
- Freeman, G. L., 1948. *Physiological psychology* (New York, Van Nostrand). [36]
- Freeman, G. L., et al., 1942. "The stress interview" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 37, 427-447). [386]
- French, J. R. P., Jr., 1944. "Organized and unorganized groups under fear and frustration" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, 20, No. 409, 229-308). [537]
- Freud, A., and D. T. Burlingham, 1943. *War and children* (New York, Medical War Books). [33]
- Freud, S., 1922. *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego* (London, Allen and Unwin). [482]
- Freud, S., 1924. *Collected papers* (London, International Psychoanalytic Press). [529]
- Freud, S., 1933. *New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis* (New York, Norton). [38]
- Frey, H., A. B. Stokes, and I. R. Ewing, 1940-1941. "Discussion on the psychological aspects of deafness" (*Proc. roy. Soc. Med.*, 34, 309-320). [291]
- Fromm, E., 1936. "Studien über Autorität und Familie" (M. Horkheimer, ed., *Schr. Inst. Sozialforsch.*, 5). [308]
- Fryer, D., 1922. "Occupational-intelligence standards" (*Sch. & Soc.*, 16, 273-277). [520]
- Fulcher, J. S., 1942. "'Voluntary' facial expression in blind and seeing children" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 272). [93]
- Fülöp-Miller, R., 1935. *Leaders, dreamers, and rebels* (New York, Viking). [477]
- Fulton, J. F., 1943. *Physiology of the nervous system* (New York, Oxford). [36]
- Furnas, J. C., 1941. "New styles in unions" (*Sat. Eve. Post*, 214, 12-13). [458]
- Fuson, W. M., 1942. "Attitudes: a note on the concept and its research context" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 7, 856-857). [116]
- Gahagan, L., 1933. "Judgments of occupations from printed photographs" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 4, 128-134). [526]
- Galloway, L., 1934. "Salesmanship" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 519-521). [422]
- Gallup, G., 1938. "What the people want" (*Market Res.*, 8, No. 3, 18-22). [546]
- Gallup, G., 1941. "Question wording in public opinion polls" (*Sociometry*, 4, 259-268). [546]
- Gallup, G., 1948. *A guide to public opinion polls* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [449]
- Gallup, G., and S. F. Rae, 1940. *The pulse of democracy* (New York, Simon and Schuster). [449, 546]
- Gandine-Stanton, D., 1938. "A study of failure" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 321-334). [329]
- Gardner, E., 1947. *Fundamentals of neurology* (Philadelphia, Saunders). [36]
- Gardner, I. C., and H. H. Newman, 1940. "Mental and physical traits of identical twins reared apart" (*J. Hered.*, 31, 119-126). [488]
- Gardner, J. W., 1939. "Level of aspiration in response to a prearranged sequence of scores" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 25, 601-621). [506]
- Gardner, J. W., 1940. "The use of the term 'level of aspiration'" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 47, 59-68). [506]

- Gardner, J. W., 1940. "The relation of certain personality variables to level of aspiration" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 191-206). [506]
- Gardner, L. P., 1947. "An analysis of children's attitudes toward fathers" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 70, 3-28). [127, 308]
- Garrett, H. E., 1945. "Comparison of Negro and white recruits on the Army tests given in 1917-1918" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 58, 480-495). [518]
- Garrett, H. E., 1945. "'Facts' and 'interpretations' regarding race differences" (*Science*, 101, 404-406). [518]
- Garrett, H. E., 1945. "A note on the intelligence scores of Negroes and whites in 1918" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 344-346). [518]
- Garrison, K. C., 1946. *The psychology of adolescence* (3d ed., New York, Prentice-Hall). [311, 531]
- Gates, R. R., 1948. *Human ancestry from a genetical point of view* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press). [31]
- Gault, R. H., 1923. *Social psychology* (New York, Holt). [482]
- Gault, R. H., 1933. "The sensitivity of the finger-tip to vibrations at various frequency levels" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 30, 691-692). [109]
- Gebhart, J. C., 1931. "Funerals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 527-529). [406]
- George, R. W., 1936. "The significance of fluctuations experienced in observing ambiguous figures and in binocular rivalry" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 15, 39-61). [525]
- Gerth, H., 1940. "Nazi party: its leadership and composition" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 517-541). [239, 259]
- Gesell, A., 1941. *Wolf child and human child* (New York, Harper). [487]
- Gesell, A., 1945. *A manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [491]
- Ghiselli, E. E., 1939. "All or none *versus* graded response questionnaires" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 23, 405-413). [497]
- Gibb, C. A., 1942. "Personality traits by factorial analysis (I)" (*Aust. J. Psychol. Phil.*, 20, 1-15). [510]
- Gibson, Q. B., 1945. "Causation in social change" (*Aust. J. Psychol. Phil.*, 23, 57-77). [319]
- Gilbert, J. G., 1935. "Mental efficiency in senescence" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 188). [532]
- Gilkinson, H., 1937. "Masculine temperament and secondary sex characteristics: a study of the relationship between psychological and physical measures of masculinity" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 19, 105-154). [521]
- Gilkinson, H., 1942. "The influence of party preference upon the responses of an audience to a political speech" (*Sociometry*, 5, 72-79). [499]
- Gillespie, R. D., 1941. "Psychoneuroses and other mental conditions arising out of the war" (*Guy's Hosp. Gaz.*, 55, 38-41). [337]
- Gillespie, R. D., 1942. *Psychological effects of war on citizen and soldier* (New York, Norton). [467]
- Gilliland, A. R., and J. J. B. Morgan, 1931. "An objective measure of introversion-extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 26, 296-303). [525]
- Gillin, J., 1939. "Personality in preliterate societies" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 681-702). [246]
- Gillin, J., and V. Raimy, 1940. "Acculturation and personality" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 371-380). [324]
- Gilmore, H. W., 1932. "Five generations of a begging family" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 37, 768-774). [520]

- Gilmore, H. W., 1940. *The beggar* (Chapel Hill, Univ. North Carolina Press). [356]
- Ginsberg, M., 1921; 1922. *The psychology of society* (New York, Dutton). [482]
- Ginsberg, M., 1942. "National character" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 32, 183-204). [235]
- Gist, N. P., et al., 1943. "Selective factors in migration and occupation" (*Univ. Mo. Stud.*, 28, No. 2). [326]
- Gist, N. P., and C. D. Clark, 1938. "Intelligence as a selective factor in rural-urban migrations" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 36-58). [326]
- Glad, D. D., 1946. *Attitudes and experiences of American-Jewish and American-Irish male youths as related to differences in adult inebriety rates* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [374]
- Glaser, E. M., and J. B. Maller, 1940. "The measurement of interest values" (*Character & Pers.*, 9, 67-81). [529]
- Glover, E., 1940. *The psychology of fear and courage* (New York, Penguin). [336]
- Glover, E., 1945. *The psycho-pathology of prostitution* (London, Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency). [345]
- Glueck, S., and E. Glueck, 1936. *Preventing crime. A symposium* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [535]
- Glueck, S., and E. Glueck, 1940. *Juvenile delinquents grown up* (New York, Commonwealth Fund). [535]
- Glueck, S., and E. Glueck, 1943. *Criminal careers in retrospect* (New York, Commonwealth Fund). [341]
- Gobineau, J. A. de, 1915. *The inequality of human races* (New York, Putnam). [19]
- Goitein, P. L., 1942. "The subjective experience in asthma" (*J. nerv. ment. Dis.*, 96, 173-183). [372]
- Goldberg, I., 1930. *Tin pan alley: a chronicle of the American popular music racket* (New York, Day). [450]
- Goldfarb, W., 1941. "An investigation of reaction time in older adults, and its relationship to certain observed mental test patterns" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 831). [532]
- Goldhamer, H., and E. A. Shils, 1939. "Types of power and status" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 171-182). [257]
- Goldstein, H., 1935. "The biochemical variability of the individual in relation to personality and intelligence" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 18, 348-371). [495]
- Goodenough, F. L., 1930. "Inter-relationships in the behavior of young children" (*Child Develpm.*, 1, 29-48). [502]
- Goodenough, F. L., 1940. "New evidence on environmental influence on intelligence" (*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 39 (I), 307-365). [487]
- Goodenough, F. L., 1942. *Studies in personality* (Q. McNemar and M. A. Merrill, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [521]
- Goodfellow, L. D., 1938. "A psychological interpretation of the results of the Zenith radio experiments in telepathy" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 23, 601-632). [86]
- Goodfellow, L. D., 1940. "The human element in probability" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 23, 201-205). [86]
- Goodrich, C., 1933. "Migratory labor" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 441-445). [354]
- Goodsell, W., 1915. *A history of the family as a social and educational institution* (New York, Macmillan). [125]

- Gordon, K., 1924. "Group judgments in the field of lifted weights" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 7, 398-400). [541]
- Gordon, K., 1936. "Further observations on group judgments of lifted weights" (*J. Psychol.*, 1, 105-115). [541]
- Gorer, G., 1943. "Themes in Japanese culture" (*Trans. N.Y. Acad. Sci.*, 5, 106-124). [235]
- Gorer, G., 1948. *The American people* (New York, Norton). [235]
- Gottschalk, L., 1944. "Causes of revolution" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 50, 1-8). [477]
- Gottschalk, L., et al., 1945. "The use of personal documents in history, anthropology and sociology" (*Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.*, No. 53). [512]
- Gottlob, A. B., 1938. "The relationship between brain potentials and personality" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 22, 67-74). [495]
- Gould, K., 1942. *They got the blame* (New York, Association Press). [374]
- Gould, R., 1941. "Some sociological determinants of goal strivings" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 461-473). [506]
- Gould, R., and N. Kaplan, 1940. "The relationship of 'level of aspiration' to academic and personality factors" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 31-40). [506]
- Gould, R., and H. B. Lewis, 1940. "An experimental investigation of changes in the meaning of level of aspiration" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 27, 422-438). [506]
- Gowin, E. B., 1915. *The executive and his control of men* (New York, Macmillan). [262]
- Grant, M., 1921. *The passing of the great race* (New York, Scribner). [518]
- Graves, E. A., 1937. "A study of competitive and cooperative behavior by the short sample technique" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 32, 343-351). [524, 525]
- Gray, H., and J. B. Wheelwright, 1946. "Jung's psychological types" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 34, 3-17). [526]
- Green, E. W., and L. G. Johnson, 1944. "Homosexuality" (*J. crim. Psychopath.*, 5, 467-480). [349]
- Greenspan, H., and J. D. Campbell, 1945. "The homosexual as a personality type" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 101, 682-689). [349]
- Greifer, J. L., 1945. "Attitudes to the stranger" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 739-745). [205]
- Griffith, C. R., 1921. "A comment upon the psychology of the audience" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 30, No. 136, 36-47). [427]
- Groves, E. R., and G. H. Groves, 1947. *The contemporary American family* (Philadelphia, Lippincott). [126]
- Gruen, E. W., 1945. "Level of aspiration in relation to personality factors in adolescents" (*Child Developm.*, 16, 181-188). [506]
- Gruening, E., 1934. "Publicity" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 698-701). [445]
- Guilford, J. P., 1936. "Unitary traits of personality and factor theory" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 48, 673-680). [250]
- Guilford, J. P., and R. B. Guilford, 1934. "An analysis of the factors in a typical test of introversion-extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 28, 377-399). [525]
- Guilford, J. P., and R. B. Guilford, 1939. "Personality factors D, R, T, and A" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 21-36). [525]
- Guilford, J. P., and R. C. Hall, 1937. "The patellar reflex and personality" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 32, 275-287). [495]
- Guilford, J. P., and H. Martin, 1944. "Age differences and sex differences in some introverted and emotional traits" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 31, 219-229). [525]
- Guizot, F. P. G., 1897. *History of civilisation in Europe* (New York, Burt). [542]

- Gulick, C. B., 1903. *The life of the ancient Greeks* (New York, Appleton-Century). [542]
- Gundlach, R. H., 1935. "Factors determining the characterization of musical phrases" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 47, 624-643). [509]
- Gundlach, R. H., 1939. "Emotional stability and political opinions as related to age and income" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 10, 577-590). [513]
- Gundlach, R. H., 1947. "The movies: stereotypes or realities?" (*J. soc. Issues*, 3, (3), 26-32). [68]
- Gurnee, H., 1936. *Elements of social psychology* (New York, Rinehart). [484]
- Guthrie, E. R., 1927. "Measuring introversion and extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 22, 82-88). [526]
- Guthrie, E. R., 1934. "Reward and punishment" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 41, 450-460). [525]
- Guthrie, E. R., 1935. *The psychology of learning* (New York, Harper). [43]
- Guttman, L., 1944. "A basis for scaling qualitative data" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 9, 139-150). [498]
- Guttman, L., 1947. "On Festinger's evaluation of scale analysis" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 44, 451-465). [499]
- Guttman, L., and E. A. Suchman, 1947. "Intensity and zero point for attitude analysis" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 12, 57-67). [496]
- Hadley, J. M., 1940. "Some relationships between electrical signs of central and peripheral activity" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 27, 640-656). [495]
- Haggard, E. A., 1942. "A projective technique using comic strip characters" (*Character & Pers.*, 10, 289-295). [511]
- Hall, C. W., 1938. "Social prestige values of a selected group of occupations" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 35, 696). [492]
- Halliday, J. L., 1948. *Psychosocial medicine* (New York, Norton). [372]
- Hallonquist, T., and E. A. Suchman, 1944. *Radio research, 1942-43* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. N. Stanton, eds., New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce). [428]
- Hallowell, A. I., 1947. "Myth, culture and personality" (*Amer. Anthropol.*, 49, 544-556). [415]
- Hamalainen, A. E., 1943. "An appraisal of anecdotal records" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 891). [511]
- Hamilton, G. V., 1939. *Problems of ageing: biological and medical aspects* (E. Cowdry, ed., Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [318]
- Hamilton, J. A., and N. W. Shock, 1936. "An experimental study of personality, physique, and the acid-base equilibrium of the blood" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 48, 467-473). [495]
- Hamilton, W. H., 1932. "Institutions" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 8, 84-89). [393]
- Hanawalt, N. G., 1944. "The role of the upper and lower parts of the face as a basis for judging facial expressions: II. In posed expressions and 'candid-camera' pictures" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 31, 23-36). [500]
- Hanawalt, N. G., et al., 1943. "Level of aspiration in college leaders and nonleaders" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 534-538). [523]
- Hanawalt, N. G., and K. F. Ruttiger, 1944. "The effect of an audience on remembering" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 19, 259-272). [411]
- Handman, M. S., 1930. "Boom" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 2, 638-641). [453]
- Hanks, D., 1943. "The psychology and direct treatment of adolescents" (*Ment. Hyg., N.Y.*, 27, 238-247). [531]
- Hanks, L. M., 1941. "Cultural definition of objectification and subjectification of

- failure and its relation to certain neurotic reactions" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 582-583). [329]
- Hanson, H., 1942. "A musician's point of view toward emotional expression" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 99, 317-325). [509]
- Harding, C. F., 1943. "III. Objective studies of the social behavior of animals" (*Appl. Anthropol.*, 2, No. 4, 21-39). [542]
- Harding, J., 1941. "A scale for measuring civilian morale" (*J. Psychol.*, 12, 101-110). [498]
- Hardy, M. C., 1937. "Adjustment scores of adolescents having a history of frequent illness during childhood" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 7, 204-209). [291]
- Harlow, H. F., 1932. "Social facilitation of feeding in the albino rat" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 41, 211-221). [541]
- Harms, E., 1937. "Emigrant-immigrant neuroses" (*Psychol. Dig.*, 1, 17-23). [324]
- Harper, R. A., 1947. "Is conformity a general or a specific behavior trait?" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 12, 81-86). [544]
- Harrison, T. H., 1937. *Savage civilization* (New York, Knopf). [542]
- Harrower-Erickson, M. R., and M. E. Steiner, 1945. *Large scale Rorschach techniques; a manual for the Group Rorschach and Multiple Choice Test* (Springfield, Ill., Thomas). [511]
- Harsh, C. M., 1938. "The categorization of an annoyance inventory" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 346-363). [228]
- Hartley, E. L., 1944. "Psychological investigations and the modification of racial attitudes" (*J. Negro Educ.*, 13, 287-294). [231]
- Hartmann, G. W., 1936. "The relative social prestige of representative medical specialties" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 20, 659-663). [492]
- Hartmann, G. W., 1936. "The contradiction between the feeling tone of political party names and public response to their platforms" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 7, 336-357). [527]
- Hartmann, G. W., 1936. "A field experiment on the comparative effectiveness of 'emotional' and 'rational' political leaflets in determining election results" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 99-114). [548]
- Hartmann, G. W., 1941. "A comparison of the public attitudes of 711 eminent business executives with those of 65 distinguished 'progressive' educators" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 541). [498]
- Hartmann, G. W., 1946. "The Gestalt view of the process of institutional transformation" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 53, 282-289). [486]
- Hartmann, G. W., and T. Newcomb, eds., 1939. *Industrial conflict: a psychological interpretation* (New York, Cordon). [472]
- Hartshorne, H., 1932. *Character in human relations* (New York, Scribner). [521]
- Hartshorne, H., M. A. May, et al., 1929-1930. *Studies in the nature of character* (New York, Macmillan). [68, 190, 521]
- Harvey, O. L., 1935. "The institutionalization of human sexual behavior: a study of frequency distributions" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 29, 427-433). [544]
- Harvey, S. M., 1938. "A preliminary investigation of the interview" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 28, 263-287). [535]
- Hathaway, S. R., and J. C. McKinley, 1940. "A multiphasic personality schedule (Minnesota): I. Construction of the schedule" (*J. Psychol.*, 10, 249-254). [535]
- Hatt, P., 1948. "Class and ethnic attitudes" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 13, 36-43). [231]
- Havighurst, R. J., and R. R. Hilkevitch, 1944. "The intelligence of Indian children

- as measured by a performance scale" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 419-433). [518]
- Havighurst, R. J., and L. L. Janke, 1944. "Relations between ability and social status in a midwestern community. I. Ten-year-old children" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 35, 357-368). [519]
- Hayakawa, S. I., 1943. *Language in action* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [502]
- Hayner, N. S., 1933. "Delinquency areas in the Puget Sound region" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 39, 314-328). [535]
- Healy, W., and A. F. Bronner, 1936. *New light on delinquency and its treatment* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [535]
- Hearn, W. E., 1891. *The Aryan household* (New York, Longmans, Green). [542]
- Heathers, L. B., 1942. "Factors producing generality in the level of aspiration" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 30, 392-406). [506]
- Heidbreder, E., 1926. "Measuring introversion and extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 21, 120-134). [525]
- Heidbreder, E., 1933. *Seven psychologies* (New York, Appleton-Century). [24]
- Heidbreder, E., 1939. "William McDougall and his social psychology" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 150-160). [22]
- Heinlein, C. P., 1939. "The affective character of music" (*Proc. 1938 Music Teach. nat. Ass.*, 33, 218-226). [509]
- Helleberg, V. E., 1942. *The social self: the star in the human comedy; an evolutionary social psychology sketch* (Lawrence, Kans., publ. by the author). [481]
- Hellpach, W., 1938. *Einführung in die Völkerpsychologie* (Stuttgart, Enke). [26]
- Hellpach, W., 1939. *Mensch und Volk der Grossstadt* (Stuttgart, Enke). [236]
- Hemphill, R. E., 1941. "The influence of the war on mental disease: a psychiatric study" (*J. ment. Sci.*, 87, 170-182). [537]
- Henderson, J. L., and M. Moore, 1944. "The psychoneuroses of war" (*New Engl. J. Med.*, 230, 273-278). [337]
- Hendrick, I., 1940. "Suicide as wish-fulfillment" (*Psychiat. Quart.*, 14, 30-42). [369]
- Hendrickson, G., and R. Zeligs, 1934. "Checking the social distance technique through personal interviews" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 18, 420-430). [497]
- Henle, M., and M. B. Hubbel, 1938. "'Egocentricity' in adult conversation" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 9, 227-234). [503]
- Henry, C. E., and J. R. Knott, 1941. "A note on the relationship between 'personality' and the alpha rhythm of the electroencephalogram" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 28, 362-366). [495]
- Henry, G. W., 1941. *Sex variants* (New York, Hoeber). [348]
- Héraucourt, W., 1938. *Die Darstellung des englischen Nationalcharakters in John Galsworthys "Forsyte Saga"* (Marburg, G. Elwert). [528]
- Herbert, M. J., and C. M. Harsh, 1944. "Observational learning by cats" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 37, 81-95). [122]
- Herma, H., 1943. "Goebbels' conception of propaganda" (*Soc. Res.*, 10, 200-218). [445]
- Herrington, L. P., 1930. *The physiological psychology of introverts and extroverts* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [495]
- Herrington, L. P., 1942. *Studies in personality* (Q. McNemar and M. A. Merrill, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [495]

- Herschel, A., 1947. "Juvenile behavior problems" (*Soc. Wk. Yearb.*, 9, 261-271). [535]
- Herskovits, M. J., 1934. "Race mixture" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 41-43). [519]
- Herskovits, M. J., 1945. "On 'racial' differences" (*Science*, 101, 200). [518]
- Herskovits, M. J., 1945. "Problem, method and theory in Afro-American studies" (*Afroamerica*, 1, 5-24). [519]
- Herskovits, M. J., and F. S. Herskovits, 1934. *Rebel destiny* (New York, Whitesey House). [542]
- Hertz, M. R., 1942. "Rorschach: twenty years after" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 39, 529-572). [511]
- Hertz, M. R., 1943. "Modification of the Rorschach ink blot test for large scale application" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 13, 191-212). [511]
- Hertzler, J. O., 1946. *Social institutions* (Lincoln, Univ. Nebraska Press). [273, 393, 394]
- Hertzman, M., 1940. "Studies in the principles of judgments and attitudes: III. The functional equivalence of two differently structured references" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 12, 3-19). [254]
- Hetzer, H., 1927. "Systematische Dauerbeobachtungen am Jugendlichen ueber den Verlauf der negativen Phase" (*Z. pädag. Psychol.*, 28, 80-104). [531]
- Hevner, K., 1937. "The affective value of pitch and tempo in music" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 49, 621-630). [509]
- Hevner, K., 1939. "Studies in expressiveness of music" (*Proc. 1938 Music Teach. nat. Ass.*, 33, 199-217). [509]
- Hewitt, L. E., and R. L. Jenkins, 1946. *Fundamental patterns of maladjustment* (Springfield, Ill., State of Illinois). [294, 301]
- Hicks, C., 1934. "Upheaval in the corn belt" (*Harper's Mag.*, 169, 621-632). [475]
- Hildreth, G., 1946. *A bibliography of mental tests and rating scales: 1945 supplement* (New York, Psychological Corp.). [535]
- Hildreth, G., 1948. "Manual dominance in nursery school children" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 72, 29-45). [503]
- Hilgard, E. R., 1948. *Theories of learning* (New York, Appleton-Century). [43]
- Hilgard, E. R., and D. Marquis, 1940. *Conditioning and learning* (New York, Appleton-Century). [42]
- Hilgard, E. R., and S. L. Payne, 1944. "Those not at home: riddle for pollsters" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 8, 254-261). [546]
- Hilgard, E. R., and E. M. Sait, 1941. "Estimates of past and of future performances as measures of aspiration" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 54, 102-108). [506]
- Hiltner, S., 1940. "The contributions of religion to mental health" (*Ment. Hyg., N.Y.*, 24, 366-377). [315]
- Hines, E., 1933. "Cartoons as a means of social control" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 17, 454-464). [527]
- Hitler, A., 1925-1927. *Mein Kampf* (Munich, F. Eher Nachf.). [445]
- Hobhouse, L. T., 1911. *Social evolution and political theory* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [493]
- Hobhouse, L. T., G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, 1930. *The material culture and social institutions of the simpler peoples* (London, Chapman & Hall). [542]
- Hocart, A. M., 1931. "Death customs" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 5, 21-27). [317]
- Hofstätter, R., 1937. "Beziehungen zwischen physiognomischer Ähnlichkeit und Ehe" (*Z. angew. Psychol.*, 52, 107-122). [534]
- Hogben, L., 1933. *Nature and nurture* (London, Williams & Norgate). [31]

- Hohman, L. B., and B. Schaffner, 1947. "The sex lives of unmarried men" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 501-507). [351]
- Hollingshead, A. B., 1938. "Ingroup membership and academic selection" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 826-833). [259]
- Hollingshead, A. B., 1940. "Climbing the academic ladder" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 384-394). [259]
- Hollingworth, H. L., 1935. *The psychology of the audience* (New York, American Book). [423]
- Hollingworth, L. S., 1926. *Gifted children: their nature and nurture* (New York, Macmillan). [522]
- Holt, E., 1922. *The Freudian wish* (New York, Holt). [24]
- Holt, R. R., 1945. "Effects of ego-involvement upon levels of aspiration" (*Psychiatry*, 8, 299-317). [506]
- Homans, G. C., 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [280]
- Homburger Erickson, E., 1943. *Child behavior and development* (R. G. Barker et al., eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [506]
- Hooton, E. A., 1939. *Crime and the man* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press). [212]
- Hooton, E. A., 1939. *The American criminal: an anthropological study: Vol. I. The native white criminal of native parentage* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press) [212]
- Hopkins, P., 1937. "A critical survey of the psychologies of religion" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 16-35). [315]
- Hoppe, F., 1930. "Erfolg und Misserfolg" (*Psychol. Forsch.*, 14, 1-63). [506]
- Horn, D., 1944. "A study of personality syndromes" (*Character & Pers.*, 12, 257-274). [510]
- Horney, K., 1937. *The neurotic personality of our time* (New York, Norton). [312]
- Horney, K., 1939. *New ways in psychoanalysis* (New York, Norton). [24]
- Horowitz, E. L., 1936. "The development of attitude toward the Negro" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 194). [231]
- Horsley, J. S., 1943. *Narco-analysis* (New York, Oxford). [77]
- Horst, P., 1941. *The prediction of personal adjustment* (Washington, D.C., Soc. Sci. Res. Council). [526]
- Horton, B. J., 1937. "The truthfulness of boys and girls in public and private schools" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 398-405). [522]
- Hoskins, R. G., 1941. *Endocrinology; the glands and their functions* (New York, Norton). [36]
- Hovland, C. I., and R. R. Sears, 1938. "Experiments on motor conflict. I. Types of conflict and their modes of resolution" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 23, 477-493). [537]
- Hovland, C. I., and R. R. Sears, 1940. "Minor studies of aggression: VI. Correlation of lynchings with economic indices" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 301-310). [470]
- Howard, E. M., 1941. "An analysis of adolescent adjustment problems" (*Ment. Hyg.*, N.Y., 25, 363-391). [531]
- Howells, T. H., 1938. "A study of ability to recognize faces" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 124-127). [500]
- Hoyland, J. S., 1937. *That inferiority feeling* (London, Allen and Unwin). [526]
- Hughes, E. C., 1937. "Institutional office and the person" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 43, 404-413). [241]

- Hughes, H. M., 1939. *News and the human interest story* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [443]
- Hughes, T. H., 1937. *Psychology and religious origins* (New York, Scribner). [315]
- Hulett, J. E., Jr., 1940. "Social role and personal security in Mormon polygamy" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 542-553). [310]
- Hulett, J. E., Jr., 1945. "The Kenny healing cult: preliminary analysis of leadership and patterns of interaction" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 364-372). [474]
- Hull, C., 1944. *Principles of behavior* (New York, Appleton-Century). [496]
- Hull, C. L., et al., 1940. *Mathematico-deductive theory of rote learning* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [496]
- Humm, D. G., 1942. "Personality and adjustment" (*J. Psychol.*, 13, 109-134). [535]
- Humphrey, E., and L. H. Warner, 1934. *Working dogs* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press). [108]
- Humphrey, N. D., 1945. "The stereotype and the social types of Mexican-American youths" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 22, 69-78). [206]
- Hunt, J. McV., 1941. "The effects of infant feeding-frustration upon adult hoarding in the albino rat" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 338-360). [529]
- Hunt, W. A., 1941. "Recent developments in the field of emotion" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 249-276). [490]
- Hunt, W. A., 1941. "Anchoring effects in judgment" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 54, 395-403). [254]
- Hunter, E. C., and A. M. Jordan, 1939. "An analysis of qualities associated with leadership among college students" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 30, 497-509). [523]
- Huntington, E., 1915. *Civilization and climate* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [491]
- Huntington, E., 1945. *Mainsprings of civilization* (New York, Wiley). [14]
- Hurlock, E. B., and S. Sender, 1930. "The 'negative phase' in relation to the behavior of pubescent girls" (*Child Develpm.*, 1, 325-340). [531]
- Husband, R. W., 1934. "The photograph on the application blank" (*Person. J.*, 13, 69-72). [501, 527]
- Husband, R. W., 1940. "Cooperative versus solitary problem solution" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 405-409). [545]
- Hutchins, R. M., 1936. *The higher learning in America* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [150]
- Huxley, J. S., and A. C. Haddon, 1936. *We Europeans; a survey of "racial" problems* (New York, Harper). [19]
- Ichheiser, G., 1940. "The image of the other man, a study in social psychology" (*Sociometry*, 3, 277-291). [485]
- Ichheiser, G., 1941. "Real, pseudo, and sham qualities of personality: an attempt at a new classification" (*Character & Pers.*, 9, 218-226). [492]
- Inbau, F., 1942. *Lie detection and criminal interrogation* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [77]
- Irving, J. A., 1943. "The psychological analysis of wartime rumor patterns in Canada" (*Bull. Canad. psychol. Ass.*, 3, 40-44). [413]
- Irwin, F. W., and M. G. Mintzer, 1942. "Effects of differences in instructions and motivation upon measures of the level of aspiration" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 55, 400-406). [506]

- Irwin, O. C., 1941. "Research on speech sounds for the first six months of life" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 277-285). [503]
- Irwin, O. C., and H. P. Chen, 1945. "Infant speech sounds and intelligence" (*J. Speech Disorders*, 10, 293-296). [502]
- Jack, N. K., and B. Schiffer, 1948. "The limits of fashion control" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 13, 730-738). [458]
- Jacob, J. S., 1938. "A note on the alleged increase in insanity" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 390-397). [537]
- Jacobi, J., 1943. *The psychology of Jung; an introduction with illustrations* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [38]
- Jaensch, E., 1930. *Eidetic imagery and typological methods of investigation* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [528]
- James, W., 1890. *Principles of psychology* (New York, Holt). [26]
- Jameson, S. H., 1941. "Adjustment problems of university girls arising from the urge for recognition and new experience" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 129-144). [514]
- Janis, I. L., 1943. "Meaning and the study of symbolic behavior" (*Psychiatry*, 6, 425-439). [104]
- Janney, J. E., 1941. "Fad and fashion leadership among undergraduate women" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 275-278). [458]
- Janus, S. Q., 1940. "On the data of social psychology" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 12, 387-392). [486]
- Jasper, H. H., 1941. "Electrical activity of the brain" (*Annu. Rev. Physiol.*, 3, 377-398). [495]
- Jeans, Sir James, 1930. *The mysterious universe* (New York, Macmillan). [13]
- Jellinek, E. M., et al., 1945. *Alcohol, science, and society* (New Haven, Quart. J. of Studies on Alcohol). [374]
- Jenkins, M. D., 1948. "The upper limit of ability among American Negroes" (*Sci. Mon.*, N.Y., 66, 399-401). [518]
- Jennings, H. H., 1937. "Structure of leadership—development and sphere of influence" (*Sociometry*, 1, 99-143). [536]
- Jennings, H. H., 1941. "Sociometry and social theory" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 512-522). [536]
- Jennings, H. H., 1947. *Leadership and isolation; a study of personality in interpersonal relations* (New York, Longmans, Green). [536]
- Jennings, H. S., 1941. *The beginnings of social behavior in unicellular organisms* (Philadelphia, Univ. Penn. Press). [542]
- Jennings, H. S., et al., 1941. *Scientific aspects of the race problem* (New York, Longmans, Green). [518]
- Jensch, K., 1941. "Zur Genealogie der Homosexualität" (*Arch. Psychiat. Nervenkr.*, 112, 527-540; 679-696). [349]
- Jensen, H. E., 1939. "William McDougall's doctrine of social psychology" (*J. soc. Phil.*, 4, 206-219). [22]
- Jersild, A. T., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [40]
- Jewett, S. P., 1942. "Psychosomatic manifestations of gastrointestinal disorders" (*Med. Clin. N. Amer.*, 26, 877-888). [371]
- Jóhannesson, A., 1946. "Origin of language" (*Nature, Lond.*, 157, 847-848). [501]
- Johnson, D. M., 1945. "The 'phantom anesthetist' of Mattoon" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 175-186). [461]

- Johnson, G. B., 1939. "Personality in a white-Indian-Negro community" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 516-523). [325]
- Johnson, H. M., 1943. "Index-numerology and measures of impairment" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 56, 551-558). [499]
- Johnson, M. W., 1939. "Verbal influences on children's behavior" (*Univ. Mich. Monogr. Educ.*, No. 1). [121]
- Johnson, P. E., 1944. *Psychology of religion* (Nashville, Tenn., Abingdon-Cokesbury). [315]
- Johnson, R. W., 1947. *Or forfeit freedom* (New York, Doubleday). [410]
- Johnson, R. W., 1948. "The Maginot Line of America" (*Harper's Mag.*, 197, 23-28). [399]
- Johnson, W., 1946. *People in quandaries* (New York, Harper). [504]
- Johnson, W., and C. B. Wood, 1944. "John told Jim what Joe told him; a study of the process of abstracting" (*Etc. Rev. gen. Semant.*, 2, 10-28). [414]
- Johnson, W. B., and L. M. Terman, 1940. "Some highlights in the literature of psychological sex differences published since 1920" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 327-336). [520]
- Jones, F. N., and J. B. Cooper, 1938. "The relation between college grades and classroom seating position" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 18, 423-427). [427]
- Jones, H. E., 1938. "The California adolescent growth study" (*J. educ. Res.*, 31, 561-567). [531]
- Jones, H. E., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [487]
- Jones, H. E., et al., 1943. *Development in adolescence: approaches to the study of the individual* (New York, Appleton-Century). [311, 497]
- Jones, M. C., 1926. "The development of early behavior patterns in young children" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 33, 537-585). [97]
- Jones, T. D., 1939. "The development of certain motor skills and play activities in young children" (*Child Developm. Monogr.*, No. 26). [506]
- Jones, V., 1942. "The nature of changes in attitudes of college students toward war over an eleven year period" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 33, 481-494). [496]
- Jones, W. L., 1937. *A psychological study of religious conversion* (London, Epworth Press). [462]
- Jost, H., 1941. "Some physiological changes during frustration" (*Child Developm.*, 12, 9-15). [494]
- Jowett, B., 1885. *The politics of Aristotle* (New York, Oxford). [9]
- Jowett, B., 1892; 1920. *The dialogues of Plato* (New York, Oxford). [9]
- Jung, C. G., 1939. *The integration of the personality* (New York, Rinehart). [38]
- Kahn, S., 1937. *Mentality and homosexuality* (Boston, Meador). [349]
- Kammerer, R. C., 1940. "An exploratory psychological study of crippled children" (*Psychol. Rec.*, 4, 47-100). [489]
- Kant, I., 1929. *Critique of pure reason* (New York, Macmillan). [492]
- Kantor, J. R., 1929. *An outline of social psychology* (Chicago, Follett). [483]
- Kantor, J. R., 1946. "The aim and progress of psychology" (*Amer. Scientist*, 34, 251-263). [380]
- Kardiner, A., et al., 1945. *The psychological frontiers of society* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [24, 222]
- Kardiner, A., and R. Linton, 1939. *The individual and his society: the psychodynamics of primitive social organization* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [287]

- Kardiner, A., and H. Spiegel, 1947. *War stress and neurotic illness* (New York, Harper). [337]
- Karpf, F. B., 1932. *American social psychology; its origins, development and European background* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [484]
- Karpman, B., 1948. "Sex life in prison" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 38, 475-486). [350]
- Katona, G., 1942. *War without inflation; the psychological approach to problems of war economy* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [52]
- Katz, D., 1940. "Three criteria: knowledge, conviction, and significance" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 4, 277-284). [546]
- Katz, D., 1942. "Do interviewers bias poll results?" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 6, 248-268). [546]
- Katz, D., 1946. "Survey technique and polling procedure as methods in social science" (*J. soc. Issues*, 2, No. 4, 62-66). [547]
- Katz, D., and K. W. Braly, 1933. "Racial stereotypes of one hundred college students" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 28, 280-290). [207]
- Katz, D., and K. W. Braly, 1935. "Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 30, 175-193). [207]
- Katz, D., and H. Cantril, 1940. "An analysis of attitudes toward fascism and communism" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 356-366). [498]
- Katz, D., and H. Hyman, 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [274]
- Katz, D., and R. L. Schanck, 1938. *Social psychology* (New York, Wiley). [485, 539]
- Katz, M., 1947. "A hypothesis on anti-Negro prejudice" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 53, 100-104). [226]
- Katzoff, E. T., 1942. "The measurement of conformity" (*Psychometrika*, 7, 31-42). [543]
- Kay, L. W., 1943. "The relation of personal frames of reference to social judgments" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 283). [254]
- Keeler, L., 1934. "Debunking the 'lie-detector'" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 25, 153-159). [77]
- Keezer, D. M., 1934. "Press" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 325-343). [443]
- Kellogg, W. N., and L. A. Kellogg, 1933. *The ape and the child* (New York, Whitelessy House). [140, 502]
- Kelly, E. L., 1939. "Concerning the validity of Terman's weights for predicting marital happiness" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 202-203). [534]
- Kelly, E. L., 1940. "A 36-trait personality rating scale" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 97-102). [535]
- Kelly, E. L., 1941. "Marital compatibility as related to personality traits of husbands and wives as rated by self and spouse" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 193-198). [534]
- Kelly, E. L., C. C. Miles, and L. M. Terman, 1936. "Ability to influence one's score on a typical pencil-and-paper test of personality" (*Character & Pers.*, 4, 205-215). [521]
- Kelly, F. K., and M. Rossman, 1944. "The 'GI' and the rumor" (*Infantry J.*, 54, No. 2, 37-38). [413]
- Kendig, I., 1937. "Studies in perseveration: V. Theoretical significance of the perseveration and repetition of conative activity" (*J. Psychol.*, 3, 261-264). [263]
- Kennedy, J. L., 1939. "A methodological review of extra-sensory perception" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 59-103). [86]

- Kent, G. H., and A. J. Rosanoff, 1910. "A study of association in insanity" (*Amer. J. Insan.*, 67, 37-96; 317-390). [510]
- Kiefer, M., 1948. *American children through their books: 1750-1835* (Philadelphia, Univ. Penn. Press). [147]
- Kinsey, A. C., et al., 1948. *Sexual behavior in the human male* (Philadelphia, Saunders). [348]
- Kirk, S. A., 1948. "An evaluation of the study of Bernardine G. Schmidt entitled: 'Changes in personal, social and intellectual behavior of children originally classified as feebleminded'" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 45, 321-333). [32]
- Kirkpatrick, C., 1932. "A tentative study in experimental social psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 38, 194-206). [544]
- Kirkpatrick, C., 1936. "An experimental study of the modification of social attitudes" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 41, 649-656). [545]
- Kirkpatrick, C., 1936. "The construction of a belief-pattern scale for measuring attitudes toward feminism" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 7, 421-437). [498]
- Kirkpatrick, M. E., 1940. "Mental hygiene and religion" (*Ment. Hyg., N.Y.*, 24, 378-389). [315]
- Kitay, P. M., 1947. *Radicalism and conservatism toward conventional religion* (Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ., No. 919). [65, 512]
- Klages, L., 1935. *Graphologie* (Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer). [501]
- Klein, V., 1946. *The feminine character* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, & Co.). [242]
- Kleitman, N., 1945. "The effect of motion pictures on body temperature" (*Science*, 101, 507-508). [69]
- Kline, L. W., and D. E. Johannsen, 1935. "Comparative role of the face and of the face-body-hands as aids in identifying emotions" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 29, 415-426). [500]
- Klineberg, O., 1931. "A study of psychological differences between 'racial' and national groups in Europe" (*Arch. Psychol., N.Y.*, No. 132). [517]
- Klineberg, O., 1935. *Race differences* (New York, Harper). [237, 518]
- Klineberg, O., 1935. *Negro intelligence and selective migration* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [237, 518]
- Klineberg, O., 1938. "Emotional expression in Chinese literature" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 517-520). [103]
- Klineberg, O., 1940. *Social psychology* (New York, Holt). [485]
- Klineberg, O., S. E. Asch, and H. Block, 1934. "An experimental study of constitutional types" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 16, 145-221). [528]
- Klob, W. L., 1948. "Sociologically established family norms and democratic values" (*Social Forces*, 26, 451-456). [273]
- Klopfert, B., et al., 1939. "Shall the Rorschach method be standardized?" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 9, 514-529). [511]
- Klopfert, B., et al., 1942. *The Rorschach technique* (Yonkers, N.Y., World Book). [511]
- Gluckhohn, C., and H. A. Murray, eds., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (New York, Knopf). [70]
- Klugman, S. F., 1947. "Group and individual judgments for anticipated events" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 26, 21-28). [202]
- Klugman, S. F., 1947. "Relationship between performance on the Rotter Aspiration Board and various types of tests" (*J. Psychol.*, 23, 51-54). [506]

- Klüver, H., 1936. "The study of personality and the method of equivalent and non-equivalent stimuli" (*Character & Pers.*, 5, 91-112). [381]
- Knapp, R. H., 1944. "A psychology of rumor" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 8, 22-37). [411]
- Knickerbocker, I., 1948. "Leadership: a conception and some implications" (*J. soc. Issues*, 4, No. 3, 23-40). [257]
- Knight, H. C., 1921. *A comparison of the reliability of group and individual judgments* (M.A. Thesis, Columbia Univ.). [540]
- Knupfer, G., 1946. *Indices of socio-economic status* (New York, Columbia Univ. Dissertation). [488]
- Köhler, W., 1925. *The mentality of apes* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [140]
- Kohn, H., 1933. "Messianism" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 356-363). [473]
- Korzybski, A., 1941. *Science and sanity* (Lancaster, Pa., Int. Non-Aristotelian Library Publ.). [502]
- Kounin, J. S., 1943. *Child behavior and development* (R. G. Barker et al., eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [263]
- Krech, D., and R. S. Crutchfield, 1948. *Theory and problems of social psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [485]
- Kretschmer, E., 1925. *Physique and character* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [528]
- Kris, E., 1941. "The 'danger' of propaganda" (*Amer. Imago*, 2, No. 1, 3-42). [548]
- Krogman, W. M., 1948. "Physical anthropology and race relations" (*Sci. Mon.*, N.Y., 66, 317-321). [518]
- Krout, M. H., 1935. "The social and psychological significance of gestures (a differential analysis)" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 47, 385-412). [86]
- Krout, M. H., 1942. *Introduction to social psychology* (New York, Harper). [485]
- Krout, M. H., and R. Stagner, 1939. "Personality development in radicals: a comparative study" (*Sociometry*, 2, 31-46). [513]
- Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless, 1931. *Social psychology* (New York, Longmans, Green). [484]
- Krueger, W. C. F., 1936. "Note concerning group influence upon Otis S-A test scores" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 27, 554-555). [540]
- Krugman, M., 1946. "Psychosomatic study of fifty stuttering children" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 16, 127-133). [504]
- Kuhlen, R. G., 1945. "Age differences in personality during adult years" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 42, 333-358). [318]
- Kunkel, F., 1943. *In search of maturity* (New York, Scribner). [315]
- Kusunoki, K., 1936. "Nichibei gakusei no mitaru Nippon minzoku no tokusei" (*Jap. J. appl. Psychol.*, 4, 232-237). [208]
- Kuznets, G. M., and O. McNemar, 1940. "Sex differences in intelligence test scores" (*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 39 (I), 211-220). [242]
- Ladieu, G., et al., 1947. "Studies in adjustment to visible injuries" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 42, 169-192). [489]
- Landis, C., 1927. "National differences in conversations" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 21, 354-357). [523]
- Landis, C., 1941. "Psychoanalysis and scientific method" (*Proc. Amer. phil. Soc.*, 84, 515-525). [489]
- Landis, C., et al., 1940. *Sex in development* (New York, Hoeber). [351, 534]

- Landis, C., and M. M. Bolles, 1946. *Textbook of abnormal psychology* (New York, Macmillan). [139]
- Landis, C., and W. A. Hunt, 1939. *The sterile pattern* (New York, Rinehart). [490]
- Landis, J. T., 1946. "The length of time required to achieve adjustment in marriage" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 666-677). [273]
- Landis, J. T., 1947. "Adjustments after marriage" (*Marriage Fam. Living*, 9, 32-34). [533]
- Landis, M. H., and H. E. Burtt, 1924. "A study of conversation" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 4, 81-90). [523]
- Landis, P. H., 1939. *Social control* (Philadelphia, Lippincott). [266]
- Landis, P. H., 1946. *Your marriage and family living* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [126, 313]
- Landis, P. H., 1946. "Rural-urban migration and the marriage rate—an hypothesis" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 155-158). [326]
- Lange, C. G., and W. James, 1922. *The emotions* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [79]
- Lanier, L. H., 1939. "Mr. Dollard and scientific method" (*Sch. Rev.*, 3, 657-672). [240]
- LaPiere, R. T., 1935. "Propaganda and education: the need for a quantitative distinction" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 20, 18-26). [75, 548]
- LaPiere, R. T., 1936. "Type-rationalizations of group antipathy" (*Social Forces*, 15, 232-237). [206]
- LaPiere, R. T., 1938. *Collective behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [387]
- LaPiere, R. T., 1938. "The sociological significance of measurable attitudes" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 175-182). [499]
- LaPiere, R. T., 1946. *Sociology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [142, 394]
- Lassner, R., 1944. "Sex and age determinants of theatre and movie interests" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 31, 241-271). [69]
- Lasswell, H. D., 1930. "Censorship" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 3, 290-294). [447]
- Lasswell, H. D., 1941. "Radio as an instrument of reducing personal insecurity" (*Stud. Phil. soc. Sci.*, 9, No. 1, 49-64). [112]
- Lastrucci, C. L., 1941. *The professional dance musician; a study of the interrelation between the occupational and non-occupational attributes of the dance musician* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [261, 334]
- Latourette, K. S., 1934. *The Chinese, their history and culture*, Vol. 2 (New York, Macmillan). [542]
- Lavater, J. K., 1878. *Essays on physiognomy* (London, Tegg). [212]
- Lavine, H., and J. Wechsler, 1940. *War propaganda and the United States* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [548]
- Lawton, G., 1938. "The study of senescence: psychiatric and sociological aspects" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 280-281). [318]
- Lawton, G., 1946. *Aging successfully* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [318]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., 1940. "Panel studies" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 4, 122-128). [547]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., 1940. *Radio and the printed page; an introduction to the study of radio and its role in the communication of ideas* (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce). [112]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., 1941. "Repeated interviews as a tool for studying changes in opinion and their causes" (*Amer. statist. Ass. Bull.*, 2, 307). [547]

- Lazarsfeld, P. F., 1944. "The controversy over detailed interviews—an offer for negotiation" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 8, 38–60). [546]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., et al., 1948. *The people's choice* (2d ed., New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [447]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., and H. Field, 1946. *The people look at radio* (Chapel Hill, Univ. North Carolina Press). [433]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., and R. K. Merton, 1944. "The psychological analysis of propaganda" (*Various Writers Congress, Proceedings*, Berkeley, Univ. Calif. Press). [548]
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., and F. N. Stanton, eds., 1944. *Radio research, 1942–43* (New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce). [112, 433]
- Lazarsfeld, S., 1945. "Organ inferiority and criminality" (*Indiv. Psychol. Bull.*, 4, 88–90). [526]
- League of Nations Advisory Committee on Social Questions, 1938. *Prostitutes: their early lives* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [345]
- LeBon, G., 1910; 1917. *The crowd: a study of the popular mind* (London, T. Fisher Unwin). [20, 470]
- LeBon, G., 1913. *The psychology of revolution* (New York, Putnam). [470]
- Lee, A. M., and N. D. Humphrey, 1943. *Race riot* (New York, Dryden Press). [465]
- Leeper, R. W., 1948. "A motivational theory of emotion to replace 'emotion as disorganized response'" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 55, 5–21). [490]
- Lehman, H. C., 1942. "The creative years: oil paintings, etchings, and architectural works" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 49, 19–42). [290]
- Lehman, H. C., 1943. "The longevity of the eminent" (*Science*, 98, 270–273). [263]
- Lehman, H. C., 1944. "Man's most creative years; quality versus quantity of output" (*Sci. Mon.*, N.Y., 59, 384–393). [290]
- Lehman, H. C., and W. S. Gamertsfelder, 1942. "Man's creative years in philosophy" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 49, 319–343). [290]
- Lehman, H. C., and D. W. Ingerham, 1939. "Man's creative years in music" (*Sci. Mon.*, N.Y., 48, 431–443). [290]
- Leib, A., 1928. "Vorstellungen und Urteile von Schülern über Führer in der Schulklasse" (*Z. angew. Psychol.*, 30, 241–346). [522]
- Leighton, D., and C. Kluckhohn, 1947. *Children of the people: the Navaho individual and his development* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press). [70]
- Lemert, E. M., 1945. "The Grand Jury as an agency of social control" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 751–758). [278]
- Lemert, E. M., in press. *Social pathology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [338]
- Lentz, T. F., 1938. "Generality and specificity of conservatism-radicalism" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 29, 540–546). [521]
- Leong, Y. K., and L. K. Tao, 1924. *Village and town life in China* (London, Macmillan). [542]
- Lepley, W. M., 1939. "The social facilitation of locomotor behavior in the albino rat" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 24, 106–109). [541]
- Lerner, E., 1942. "Pathological Nazi stereotypes found in recent German technical journals" (*J. Psychol.*, 13, 179–192). [527]
- Leuba, C., 1941. "Tickling and laughter: two genetic studies" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 58, 201–209). [97]

- Levine, J. M., and G. Murphy, 1943. "The learning and forgetting of controversial material" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 507-517). [414]
- Levinson, D. J., and R. N. Sanford, 1944. "Scale for measuring anti-Semitism" (*J. Psychol.*, 17, 339-370). [496]
- Levy, D. M., 1934. "Experiments on the sucking reflex and social behavior of dogs" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 4, 203-224). [529]
- Levy, D. M., 1937. "Studies in sibling rivalry" (*Res. Monogr. Amer. orthopsychiat. Ass.*, No. 2). [293]
- Levy, D. M., 1941. "The hostile act" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 48, 356-361). [293]
- Levy, D. M., 1945. "The war and family life" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 15, 140-152). [336]
- Levy, D. M., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [215]
- Lévy-Bruhl, L., 1923. *Primitive mentality* (New York, Macmillan). [18]
- Lewin, K., 1935. *A dynamic theory of personality* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [537]
- Lewin, K., 1936. *Principles of topological psychology* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [75, 496]
- Lewin, K., 1939. "Field theory and experiment in social psychology: concepts and methods" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 868-896). [27, 382]
- Lewin, K., 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [27, 545]
- Lewin, K., et al., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [506]
- Lewin, K., and R. Lippitt, 1938. "An experimental approach to the study of autocracy and democracy: a preliminary note" (*Sociometry*, 1, 292-300). [437]
- Lewin, K., R. Lippitt, and R. K. White, 1939. "Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created 'social climates'" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 10, 271-299). [437]
- Lewis, W. D., 1945. "Sex distribution of intelligence among inferior and superior children" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 67, 67-75). [242]
- Libo, L. M., 1948. *Attitude prediction in labor relations* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [222]
- Liddy, R. B., 1942. "The field of social psychology" (*J. Psychol.*, 13, 21-29). [486]
- Lind, A. W., 1934. "The modification of Hawaiian character since the advent of the white man" (*Publ. Amer. sociol. Soc.*, 28, 104-105). [233]
- Lind, K. N., 1936. "The social psychology of children's reading" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 41, 454-469). [149]
- Lindesmith, A., and Y. Levin, 1937. "The Lombrosian myth in criminology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 42, 653-671). [213]
- Lindsley, D. B., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [495]
- Link, H. C., 1936. "A test of four personality traits of adolescents" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 20, 527-534). [35]
- Link, H. C., and A. D. Freiberg, 1942. "The problem of validity vs. reliability in public opinion polls" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 6, 87-98). [547]
- Linton, R., 1945. *The cultural background of personality* (New York, Appleton-Century). [24]
- Lippitt, R., 1940. "An experimental study of the effect of democratic and authoritarian group atmospheres" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, 16, No. 3, 43-195). [437]

- Lippitt, R., and M. Radke, 1946. "New trends in the investigation of prejudice" (*Ann. Amer. Acad. polit. soc. Sci.*, 244, 167-176). [227]
- Lippmann, W., 1922. *Public opinion* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [204, 547]
- Lippmann, W., 1925. *The phantom public* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [547]
- Litterer, O. F., 1933. "Stereotypes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 4, 56-69). [526]
- Livingston, A., 1931. "Theory of the gentleman" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 6, 616-620). [520]
- Locke, H. J., 1947. "Predicting marital adjustment by comparing a divorced and a happily married group" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 12, 187-191). [534]
- Locke, N. M., 1936. "A preliminary study of a social drive in the white rat" (*J. Psychol.*, 1, 255-260). [39]
- Loevinger, J., 1940. "Intelligence as related to socio-economic factors" (*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 39 (1), 159-210). [519]
- Lombardi, M. M., 1938. "The inter-trait rating technique" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 760). [535]
- Loge, I., 1939. "The Thurstone attitude scales; II. The reliability and consistency of younger and older intellectual peers" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 10, 199-208). [498]
- Loge, I., and C. C. Curtiss, 1936. "Prestige, suggestion, and attitudes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 7, 386-402). [546]
- Loge, I., and E. L. Thorndike, 1941. "The value of the responses in a free-association test as indicators of personal traits" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 25, 200-201). [510]
- Lowie, R. H., 1940. *An introduction to cultural anthropology* (New York, Rinehart). [542]
- Luchins, A. S., 1947. "Proposed methods of studying degrees of rigidity in behavior" (*J. Person.*, 15, 242-246). [263]
- Lukas, E. J., 1944. "Digging at the roots of prostitution" (*Probation*, 22, 97-100; 109-112). [345]
- Lund, F. H., 1939. *Emotions: their psychological, physiological and educative implications* (New York, Ronald Press). [490]
- Lundberg, G. A., 1940. "The measurement of socioeconomic status" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 29-39). [488]
- Lundberg, G. A., 1941. "Case-studies vs. statistical methods—an issue based on misunderstanding" (*Sociometry*, 4, 379-383). [497]
- Lundberg, G. A., 1942. *Social research* (New York, Longmans, Green). [526]
- Lundberg, G. A., and P. Friedman, 1943. "A comparison of three measures of socioeconomic status" (*Rur. Sociol.*, 8, 227-242). [488]
- Lundberg, G. A., and M. Steele, 1938. "Social attraction-patterns in a village" (*Sociometry*, 1, 375-419). [536]
- Lunden, W. A., 1947. "Suicides in France, 1910-43" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 321-334). [369]
- Lurie, L. A., 1938. "Pituitary disturbances in relation to personality" (*Proc. Ass. Res. nerv. ment. Dis.*, 17, 547-560). [495]
- Lurie, W. A., 1937. "A study of Spranger's value-types by the method of factor analysis" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 8, 17-37). [529]
- Lydgate, W. A., 1944. *What our people think* (New York, Crowell). [449]
- Lynd, R. S., and H. M. Lynd, 1929. *Middletown* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [543]
- Lynd, R. S., and H. M. Lynd, 1937. *Middletown in transition* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [543]

- Lyon, L. S., 1930. "Advertising" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 469-475). [445]
- MacCorquodale, K., and P. E. Meehl, 1948. "On a distinction between hypothetical constructs and intervening variables" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 55, 95-107). [496]
- MacDougald, D., Jr., 1941. *Radio research 1941* (P. F. Lazarsfeld and F. Stanton, eds., New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce). [450]
- MacIver, R. M., 1934. "Social pressures" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 344-348). [548]
- MacIver, R. M., 1940. "The imputation of motives" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46, 1-12). [172]
- Mackay, C., 1850. *Memoirs of extraordinary popular delusions* (Philadelphia, Lindsay and Blakiston). [452]
- MacKinnon, D. W., 1946. "The use of clinical methods in social psychology" (*J. soc. Issues*, 2, No. 4, 47-54). [486]
- MacKinnon, J., 1947. "The homosexual woman" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 103, 661-664). [349]
- Macmecken, A. M., 1939. *The intelligence of a representative group of Scottish children* (Bickley, Kent, England, Univ. London Press). [244]
- McBurney, J. H., and K. G. Hance, 1939. *The principles and methods of discussion* (New York, Harper). [546]
- McCarthy, D. A., 1930. *The language development of the preschool child* (Minneapolis, Univ. Minn. Press). [502, 503]
- McCarthy, D. A., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [503]
- McClelland, A. M., and R. L. McManus, 1941. "Appraising personality; the use of anecdotal records in appraising personality traits" (*Amer. J. Nurs.*, 41, 579-584). [511]
- McClelland, D. C., and F. S. Apicella, 1947. "Reminiscence following experimentally reduced failure" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 37, 159-169). [506]
- McConnell, J. W., 1942. *The evolution of social classes* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Council on Public Affairs). [238]
- McCurdy, H. G., 1943. "Some remarks on the place of the individual in social psychology" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 50, 408-414). [489]
- McDonald, E. T., 1945. "A study of some factors related to conversational ability" (*Speech Monogr.*, 12, 88-93). [523]
- McDonnell, E. K., 1935. "Fashion and the Hollywood handicap" (*Sat. Eve. Post*, 207, 10-11, 42, 46). [458]
- McDougall, W., 1908; 1931. *An introduction to social psychology* (London, Methuen). [22, 482]
- McDougall, W., 1920; 1927. *The group mind* (New York, Putnam). [24, 482, 492]
- McDougall, W., 1929. "The chemical theory of temperament applied to introversion and extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 24, 293-309). [494]
- McDougall, W., 1936. *Psycho-analysis and social psychology* (London, Methuen). [24]
- McFarland, M. B., 1938. "Relationships between young sisters as revealed in their overt responses" (*J. exp. Educ.*, 6, 173-179). [293]
- McGehee, W., 1940. "Judgment and the level of aspiration" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 22, 3-15). [506]
- McGeoch, J. A., 1942. *The psychology of human learning* (New York, Longmans, Green). [43]

- McGranahan, D. V., 1936. "The psychology of language" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 33, 178-216). [501]
- McGraw, M. B., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [491]
- McGregor, D., 1938. "The major determinants of the prediction of social events" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 179-204). [202]
- McKean, D. D., 1940. *The boss; the Hague machine in action* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [259]
- McKinney, F., 1939. "Personality factors of college students as related to factors in personal history" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 23, 660-668). [535]
- McLean, H. V., 1941. "The emotional background of marital difficulties" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 384-388). [314]
- McNemar, Q., 1938. "Special review" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 35, 237-249). [488]
- McNemar, Q., 1946. "Opinion-attitude methodology" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 43, 289-374). [117, 547]
- McNemar, Q., 1947. "Response to Crespi's rejoinder and Conrad's reply to appraisal of Opinion-attitude methodology" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 44, 171-176). [547]
- McNemar, Q., and L. M. Terman, 1936. "Sex differences in variational tendency" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 18, 1-65). [244]
- McNickle, D., 1943. "Peyote and the Indian" (*Sci. Mon.*, N.Y., 57, 220-229). [462]
- McQuitty, L. L., 1942. "Conditions affecting the validity of personality inventories: I-III" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 15, 33-52). [535]
- McWilliams, C. A., 1948. *A mask for privilege: anti-Semitism in America* (Boston, Little, Brown). [231]
- Machiavelli, N., 1916. *The prince* (New York, Dutton). [14]
- Magoon, N. M., 1932. *The relation of failure to pupil seating* (M.A. Thesis, Columbia Univ.). [427]
- Maine, H., 1947. *If a man be mad* (New York, Doubleday). [360]
- Malinowski, B., 1922. *Argonauts of the western Pacific* (New York, Dutton). [542]
- Malinowski, B., 1926. *Crime and custom in savage society* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [542]
- Malinowski, B., 1927. *Sex and repression in savage society* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [308]
- Malinowski, B., 1929. *Sexual life of savages in north western Melanesia* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [533]
- Maller, J. B., 1929. "Cooperation and competition: an experimental study in motivation" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 384). [521, 524]
- Maller, J. B., 1932. *Character sketches* (New York, Bur. Publ., Teach. Coll. Columbia Univ.). [526]
- Malzberg, B., 1940. *Social and biological aspects of mental disease* (Utica, State Hosp. Press). [538]
- Mandelbaum, D. G., 1943. "Wolf-child histories from India" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 25-44). [487]
- Mangus, A. H., 1936. "Relationships between the young woman's conception of her intimate male associates and of her ideal husband" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 7, 403-420). [127]
- Mannheim, K., 1936. *Ideology and utopia; an introduction to the sociology of knowledge* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [166]

- Margolin, L. J., 1946. *Paper bullets; a brief story of psychological warfare in World War II* (New York, Froben). [548]
- Markham, S. F., 1947. *Climate and the energy of nations* (2d ed., New York, Oxford). [14]
- Marks, E. S., 1943. "Standardization of a race attitude test for Negro youth" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 245-278). [496, 498]
- Marquis, D. G., 1944. "Social psychologists in national war agencies" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 41, 115-126). [467]
- Marrow, A. J., and J. R. P. French, Jr., 1945. "Changing a stereotype in industry" (*J. soc. Issues*, 1, No. 3, 33-37). [208]
- Marshall, H., 1941. "Alcohol: a critical review of the literature, 1929-1940" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 193-217). [374]
- Marshall, H., 1947. *A study of the personality of alcoholic males* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [374]
- Marston, L. R., 1925. "The emotions of young children: an experimental study in introversion and extroversion" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, 3, No. 3). [526]
- Marston, W. M., 1924. "Studies in testimony" (*J. crim. Law Criminol.*, 15, 5-31). [546]
- Marston, W. M., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [77]
- Martin, E. D., 1920. *The behavior of crowds* (New York, Harper). [463]
- Maslow, A. H., 1936. "The role of dominance in the social and sexual behavior of infra-human primates: III. A theory of sexual behavior of infra-human primates" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 48, 310-338). [258]
- Maslow, A. H., 1937. "Dominance feeling, behavior, and status" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 44, 404-429). [258]
- Maslow, A. H., 1942. "Self-esteem (dominance-feeling) and sexuality in women" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 16, 259-294). [523]
- Maslow, A. H., 1943. "The authoritarian character structure" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 401-411). [437]
- Maslow, A. H., and S. Flanzbaum, 1936. "The role of dominance in the social and sexual behavior of infra-human primates: II. An experimental determination of the behavior syndrome of dominance" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 48, 278-309). [258]
- Maslow, A. H., and I. Szilagyi-Kessler, 1946. "Security and breast-feeding" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 83-85). [162]
- Masserman, J. H., and P. W. Siever, 1944. "Dominance, neurosis, and aggression" (*Psychosom. Med.*, 6, 7-16). [524]
- Mass-observation, 1942. "Home propaganda" (*Change*, No. 2). [548]
- Mass-observation, 1943. *The pub and the people* (London, Gollancz). [409]
- Masson, A., 1935. *Le travestissement. Essai de psycho-pathologie sexuelle* (Paris, Le François). [350]
- Mauldin, W. P., 1940. "Selective migration from small towns" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 748-758). [326]
- Maurer, D. W., 1939. "Prostitutes and criminal argots" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 546-550). [347]
- Maurer, K. M., 1941. "Patterns of behavior of young children as revealed by a factor analysis of trait 'clusters'" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 59, 177-188). [510]
- Mavity, N. B., 1931. *Sister Aimee* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday). [462].
- Mat, G., 1934. "Prostitution" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 553-559). [345]

- May, M. A., 1943. *A social psychology of war and peace* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [335]
- May, M. A., et al., 1937. *Memorandum on research in competition and cooperation* (Washington, D.C., Soc. Sci. Res. Council). [524]
- May, M. A., and L. W. Doob, 1937. *Competition and cooperation* (Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.). [524]
- Mayer, A., 1903. "Ueber Einzel- und Gesamtleistung des Schulkindes" (*Arch. ges. Psychol.*, 1, 276-416). [539]
- Mayo, E., 1945. *The social problems of an industrial civilization* (Boston, Harvard Univ. Graduate School of Business Administration). [279]
- Mead, G. H., 1934. *Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [124, 481]
- Mead, M., 1928. *Coming of age in Samoa* (New York, Morrow). [128, 131, 530, 533]
- Mead, M., 1930. *Growing up in New Guinea* (New York, Morrow). [120, 128, 295, 307]
- Mead, M., 1932. "An investigation of the thought of primitive children with special reference to animism" (*J. R. anthrop. Inst.*, 62, 173-190). [105]
- Mead, M., 1935. *Sex and temperament* (New York, Morrow). [134, 521, 533]
- Mead, M., 1937. *Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [175, 233, 524]
- Mead, M., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [533]
- Mead, M., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [22]
- Meadows, P., 1945. "The dialectic of the situation; some notes on situational psychology" (*Phil. phenomenol. Res.*, 5, 354-365). [382]
- Meadows, P., 1947. "An age of mass communication" (*Psychiatry*, 10, 405-409). [547]
- Meagher, J. F., 1936. *A study of masturbation and the psycho-sexual life* (Baltimore, William Wood). [349]
- Meenes, M., 1943. "A comparison of racial stereotypes of 1935 and 1942" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 327-336). [205]
- Meier, N. C., 1939. "Editors' attitudes toward opinion polls" (*Psychol. Rec.*, 3, 14-20). [546]
- Meier, N. C., G. H. Mennenga, and H. J. Stoltz, 1941. "An experimental approach to the study of mob behavior" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 36, 506-524). [475]
- Meltzer, H., 1932. "Personification of ideals and stereotypes in problem children" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 2, 384-399). [526]
- Meltzer, H., 1941. "The development of children's nationality preferences, concepts, and attitudes" (*J. Psychol.*, 11, 343-358). [231]
- Meltzer, H., 1943. "Sex differences in children's attitudes to parents" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 62, 311-326). [127]
- Menefee, S. C., and A. G. Granneberg, 1940. "Propaganda and opinions on foreign policy" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 393-404). [548]
- Merriam, C. E., 1938. "The assumptions of aristocracy" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 43, 857-877). [329]
- Merrill, M. A., 1947. *Problems of child delinquency* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [73, 534]

- Merton, R. K., 1938. "Social structure and anomie" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 672-682). [305]
- Merton, R. K., 1940. "Fact and factitiousness in ethnic opinionnaires" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 13-28). [499]
- Merton, R. K., et al., 1946. *Mass persuasion; the social psychology of a war bond drive* (New York, Harper). [473, 548]
- Meusel, A., 1933. "Middle class" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 407-415). [238]
- Meusel, A., 1934. "Proletariat" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 510-518). [238]
- Meyer, M. F., 1934. "Fitting into the silent world: the first six years of life" (*Univ. Mo. Stud.*, 9, 1-106). [102]
- Michaels, J. J., and L. Secunda, 1944. "Relation of neurotic traits to electroencephalogram in children with behavior disorders" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 101, 407-409). [495]
- Middleton, W. C., 1935. "The propensity of genius to solitude" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 30, 325-332). [306]
- Middleton, W. C., 1941. "The relation of height and weight measurements to certain personality qualities as measured by the Bernreuter inventory: some errata" (*J. Psychol.*, 11, 421-422). [289]
- Middleton, W. C., 1941. "The ability of untrained subjects to judge neuroticism, self-confidence, and sociability from handwriting samples" (*Character & Pers.*, 9, 227-234). [501]
- Miles, C. C., 1935. *A handbook of social psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [242]
- Miles, C. C., and L. M. Terman, 1929. "Sex differences in the association of ideas" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 41, 165-206). [520]
- Miles, C. C., and L. S. Wolfe, 1936. "Childhood physical and mental health records of historical geniuses" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 47, 390-400). [263, 512]
- Miles, W. R., 1939. *Problems of ageing: biological and medical aspects* (E. Cowdry, ed., Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [531]
- Miller, D. C., 1940. "Morale of college-trained adults" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 880-889). [498]
- Miller, D. C., 1941. "The measurement of national morale" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 487-499). [274]
- Miller, D. C., 1946. "The social factors of the work situation" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 300-314). [280]
- Miller, E., ed., 1940. *The neuroses in war* (New York, Macmillan). [361]
- Miller, E., 1944. *Mental abnormality and crime* (L. Radzinowicz and J. W. C. Turner, eds., London, Macmillan). [534]
- Miller, N. E., and R. Bugelski, 1948. "Minor studies of aggression: II. The influence of frustrations imposed by the in-group on attitudes expressed toward out-groups" (*J. Psychol.*, 25, 437-442). [537]
- Miller, N. E., and J. Dollard, 1941. *Social learning and imitation* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [121, 463, 470]
- Mills, C. A., 1942. "They mature late in the tropics" (*Harper's Mag.*, 184, 294-298). [289]
- Mills, C. A., 1942. *Climate makes the man* (New York, Harper). [14]
- Mills, C. A., 1944. "The longevity of the eminent" (*Science*, 99, 345). [263]
- Mills, C. W., 1939. "Language, logic and culture" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 670-680). [166]

- Mintz, A., 1946. "A re-examination of correlations between lynchings and economic indices" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 154-160). [470]
- Mittlemann, B., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [372]
- Mock, J. R., and C. Larson, 1939. *Words that won the war: the story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [548]
- Moede, W., 1920. *Experimentelle Massenpsychologie* (Leipzig, S. Hirzel). [524, 539]
- Moersch, F. P., 1943. "The psychoneuroses of war" (*War Med., Chicago*, 4, 490-496). [337]
- Money-Kyrle, R. E., 1941. "The psychology of propaganda" (*Brit. J. med. Psychol.*, 19, 82-94). [548]
- Monjar, E., 1937. "Racial distance reactions" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 21, 559-564). [496]
- Mons, W. E. R., 1941. "Air raids and the child" (*Brit. med. J.*, Part 2, 625-626). [336]
- Montagu, M. F. A., 1942. "On the physiology and psychology of swearing" (*Psychiatry*, 5, 189-201). [250]
- Montagu, M. F. A., 1945. "Intelligence of northern Negroes and southern whites in the first World War" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 58, 161-188). [518]
- Montani, A., 1945. "Psychoanalysis of music" (*Psychoanal. Rev.*, 32, 225-227). [508]
- Moore, H. T., 1922. "Further data concerning sex differences" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 210-214). [523]
- Moore, K., 1941. "Scientific attitudes in relation to climatic fluctuations" (*Trans. Kans. Acad. Sci.*, 44, 366-368). [15]
- Moore, T. V., 1938. "The psychotic and prepsychotic personality" (*Character & Pers.*, 7, 14-18). [361]
- Moore, T. V., 1944. "Religion, psychiatry and mental hygiene" (*Psychiatry*, 7, 321-325). [315]
- Moore, T. V., 1945. "The pathogenesis and treatment of homosexual disorders" (*J. Person.*, 14, 47-83). [349]
- Moore, W. E., 1946. *Industrial relations and the social order* (New York, Macmillan). [279, 410]
- Moreno, J. L., 1937. "Inter-personal therapy and the psychopathology of inter-personal relations" (*Sociometry*, 1, 9-76). [382]
- Moreno, J. L., 1940. "Psychodramatic treatment of marriage problems" (*Sociometry*, 3, No. 1, 1-23). [534, 536]
- Moreno, J. L., 1941. "Foundations of sociometry, an introduction" (*Sociometry*, 4, 15-35). [536]
- Moreno, J. L., 1941. "The philosophy of the moment and the spontaneity theatre" (*Sociometry*, 4, 205-226). [536]
- Moreno, J. L., 1941. "The prediction and planning of success in marriage" (*Marriage Fam. Living*, 3, 83-84). [203]
- Moreno, J. L., 1943. "The concept of sociodrama; a new approach to the problem of inter-cultural relations" (*Sociometry*, 6, 434-449). [536]
- Moreno, J. L., 1944. "Sociodrama; a method for the analysis of social conflicts" (*Psychodrama Monogr.*, No. 1). [382, 536]

- Moreno, J. L., 1944. "Psychodrama and therapeutic motion pictures" (*Sociometry*, 7, 230-244). [536]
- Morgan, T. H., 1934. *A handbook of general experimental psychology* (C. Murchison, ed., Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [31]
- Morris, C., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [215]
- Morris, G. S., 1880. *British thought and thinkers* (Chicago, Griggs). [16]
- Morris, G. S., 1892. *Hegel's philosophy of the state and of history* (Chicago, Griggs). [54, 492]
- Morrison, J., 1940. "A note concerning investigations on the constancy of audience laughter" (*Sociometry*, 3, 179-185). [428]
- Mosca, G., 1939. *The ruling class* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [260]
- Mosier, C. I., 1937. "A factor analysis of certain neurotic tendencies" (*Psychometrika*, 2, 263-287). [362]
- Mosier, R. D., 1947. *Making the American mind: social and moral ideas in the McGuffey Readers* (New York, King's Crown Press). [153]
- Mott, S. M., 1937. "Mother-father preference" (*Character & Pers.*, 5, 302-304). [127]
- Mowrer, E. R., 1939. "A study of personal disorganization" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 475-487). [297]
- Mowrer, O. H., 1939. "An experimentally produced 'social problem' in rats" (Bethlehem, Pa., *Psychol. Cinema Register*, Lehigh Univ.). [237]
- Mueller, J. H., 1938. "Present status of the cultural lag hypothesis" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 320-327). [499]
- Muhsam, H. V., 1947. "Correlation in growth" (*Hum. Biol.*, 19, 260-269). [288]
- Mukerjee, R., and N. N. Sen-Gupta, 1928. *Introduction to social psychology* (Boston, Heath). [483]
- Mukerji, N. P., 1940. "An investigation of ability to work in groups and in isolation" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 30, 352-356). [539]
- Mullan, H., 1948. "The regular-service myth" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 53, 276-281). [401]
- Mullins, C., 1945. *Why crime?* (London, Methuen). [341]
- Münsterberg, H., 1914. *Psychology and social sanity* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Page). [546]
- Munn, N. L., 1940. "The effect of knowledge of the situation upon judgment of emotion from facial expressions" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 324-338). [490]
- Murchison, C., 1929. *Social psychology* (Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [483]
- Murchison, C., ed., 1935. *A handbook of social psychology* (Worcester, Clark Univ. Press). [484, 541]
- Murdock, G. P., 1934. *Our primitive contemporaries* (New York, Macmillan). [48, 542]
- Murphy, A. J., 1941. "A study of the leadership process" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 674-687). [523]
- Murphy, G., ed., 1945. *Human nature and enduring peace* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [335]
- Murphy, G., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [86]
- Murphy, G., 1947. *Personality, a biosocial approach to origins and structure* (New York, Harper). [37, 186]
- Murphy, G., and R. Likert, 1938. *Public opinion and the individual. A psychologi-*

- cal study of student attitudes on public questions, with a retest five years later (New York, Harper). [498]
- Murphy, G., and L. B. Murphy, 1931. *Experimental social psychology* (New York, Harper). [484]
- Murphy, G., L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, 1937. *Experimental social psychology* (New York, Harper). [484, 504]
- Murphy, L. B., 1937. *Social behavior and child personality: an exploratory study of some roots of sympathy* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [225]
- Murphy, L. B., and H. Ladd, 1944. *Emotional facts in learning* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [40]
- Murray, H. A., 1938. *Explorations in personality: a clinical and experimental study of fifty men of college age* (New York, Oxford). [511]
- Mussen, P. H., and R. G. Barker, 1944. "Attitudes toward cripples" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 351-355). [364]
- Myerson, A., 1934. *Social psychology* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [484]
- Myerson, A., and R. Neustadt, 1942-1943. "Bisexuality and male homosexuality" (*Clinics*, 1, 932-957). [349]
- Myrdal, G., 1944. *An American dilemma* (2 vols., New York, Harper). [230]
- Myster, A. M., 1944. "Further validation of the Wert-Myster farming attitude scale" (*Rur. Sociol.*, 9, 226-232). [498]
- Napoli, P. J., 1946. "Finger-painting and personality diagnosis" (*Genet. Psychol. Monogr.*, 34, 129-230). [511]
- Neff, W. S., 1938. "Socio-economic status and intelligence: a critical survey" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 35, 727-757). [519]
- Nelson, V. F., 1933. *Prison days and nights* (Boston, Little, Brown). [350]
- Nettler, G., 1945. "A test for the sociology of knowledge" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 10, 393-399). [298]
- Nettler, G., 1946. "The relationship between attitude and information concerning the Japanese in America" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 177-191). [206]
- Nettler, G., and E. H. Golding, 1946. "The measurement of attitudes toward the Japanese in America" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 31-39). [499]
- Newcomb, T. M., 1943. *Personality and social change; attitude formation in a student community* (New York, Dryden Press). [324]
- Newcomb, T. M., 1946. "Influence of attitude climate upon some determinants of information" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 291-302). [324]
- Newcomb, T. M., 1948. *Methods of psychology* (T. G. Andrews, ed., New York, Wiley). [486]
- Newcomb, T. M., and E. L. Hartley, eds., 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (New York, Holt). [485]
- Newcomb, T. M., and G. Svehla, 1937. "Intra-family relationships in attitude" (*Sociometry*, 1, 180-205). [498]
- Newman, H. H., F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, 1937. *Twins: a study of heredity and environment* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [488]
- Newstetter, W. I., M. J. Feldstein, and T. M. Newcomb, 1938. *Group adjustment: a study in experimental sociology* (Cleveland, School of Applied Sciences, Western Reserve Univ.). [536]
- Neymann, C. A., and K. D. Kohlstedt, 1929. "A new diagnostic test for introversion-extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 23, 482-487). [525]
- Nimkoff, M. F., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [302]

- Nimkoff, M. F., 1947. *Marriage and the family* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [126, 301]
- Nimkoff, M. F., and A. L. Wood, 1948. "Courtship and personality" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 53, 263-269). [313]
- Nissen, H. W., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [140, 542]
- Nissen, H. W., A. H. Riesen, and V. Nowlis, 1938. "Delayed response and discrimination learning by chimpanzees" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 26, 361-386). [78]
- Norman, E. H., 1945. "Mass hysteria in Japan" (*Far East Surv.*, 14, 65-70). [474]
- Northrop, H. D., 1904. *World's greatest calamities: the Baltimore fire and Chicago theatre horror* (Philadelphia, National Publ.). [466]
- Northway, M. L., 1936. "The influence of age and social group on children's remembering" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 27, 11-29). [545]
- Notcutt, B., 1943. "Perseveration and fluency" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 33, 200-208). [510]
- Nowlis, V., 1941. "Companionship preference and dominance in the social interaction of young chimpanzees" (*Comp. Psychol. Monogr.*, 17, No. 1). [524]
- Odegard, P. H., 1930. *The American public mind* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [547]
- Odlum, D. M., 1947. "Some observations on the reaction of children to wartime conditions as seen in a child guidance clinic" (*Z. Kinderpsychiat.*, 13, 173-180). [336]
- Odum, H. W., 1943. *Race and rumors of race; challenge to American crisis* (Chapel Hill, Univ. North Carolina Press). [518]
- Ogburn, W. F., 1937. "The influence of inventions on American social institutions in the future" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 43, 365-376). [319]
- Ogden, C. K., and I. A. Richards, 1930. *The meaning of meaning* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [104, 166]
- Oldfield, R. C., 1941. *The psychology of the interview* (London, Methuen). [496]
- Olson, T., 1935. "Brother, can you share a dime?" (*The New Republic*, 83, 43-44). [454]
- Olson, W. C., 1938. "General methods: case study" [*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 37, (II), 329-332]. [511]
- Omwake, K. T., E. S. Dexter, and L. W. Lewis, 1934. "The interrelations of certain physiological measurements and aspects of personality" (*Character & Pers.*, 3, 64-71). [495]
- Oppenheimer, F., 1945. "Pamela: a case study in status symbols" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 187-194). [511]
- Orlansky, H., 1943. "The Harlem riot; a study in mass frustration" (*Soc. Analysis*, No. 1). [465]
- Osgood, C. E., and R. Stagner, 1941. "Analysis of a prestige frame of reference by a gradient technique" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 25, 275-290). [492]
- Owen, M. B., 1941. "Alternative hypotheses for the explanation of some of Faris' and Dunham's results" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 47, 48-52). [538]
- Pace, C. R., 1940. "Stated behavior vs. stated opinions as indicators of social-political-economic attitudes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 369-381). [498]
- Page, D. P., 1935. "Measurement and prediction of leadership" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 41, 31-43). [522]

- Page, J. D., and C. Landis, 1943. "Trends in mental disease, 1910-1940" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 518-524). [538]
- Page, M. L., 1936. "The modification of ascendant behavior in preschool children" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Child Welf.*, 12, No. 3). [524]
- Paget, R., 1936. "Sign language as a form of speech" (*Nature, Lond.*, 137, 384-388). [91]
- Paget, R., 1944. "The origin of language" (*Science*, 99, 14-15). [501]
- Parkes, J. W., 1933. *International conferences* (Geneva, Switzerland, International Student Service). [546]
- Parrish, C. H., 1946. "Color names and color notions" (*J. Negro Educ.*, 15, 13-20). [224]
- Partridge, E. D., 1938. *Social psychology of adolescence* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [311, 531]
- Pascal, G. R., 1943. "Handwriting pressure: its measurements and significance" (*Character & Pers.*, 11, 234-254). [501]
- Paterson, D. G., 1930. *Physique and intellect* (New York, Appleton-Century). [527]
- Paterson, D. G., and K. E. Ludgate, 1922. "Blonde and brunette traits: a quantitative study" (*J. Person. Res.*, 1, 122-127). [528]
- Patrick, J. R., 1934. "Studies in rational behavior and emotional excitement. II. The effect of emotional excitement on rational behavior in human subjects" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 18, 153-195). [41]
- Patrick, J. R., and V. M. Sims, 1934. "Personality differences between Negro and white college students, North and South" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 29, 181-201). [518]
- Patterson, C. H., 1943. "Note on Bernreuter personality of mothers and some measures of child personality" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 89-92). [126]
- Paul, R. W., 1947. *California gold* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press). [278]
- Payne, S. L., 1946. "Some opinion research principles developed through studies of social medicine" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 10, 93-98). [547]
- Peak, H., 1945. "Observations on the characteristics and distribution of German Nazis" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 59, No. 6). [235]
- Pearl, R., 1925. *The biology of population growth* (New York, Knopf). [491]
- Peatman, J. G., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [112]
- Pedersen, R. A., 1940. "Validity of the Bell adjustment inventory when applied to college women" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 227-236). [535]
- Perl, R. E., 1933. "The influence of a social factor upon the appreciation of humor" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 45, 308-312). [540]
- Pescor, M. J., 1945. "Woodworth Personal Data Sheet as applied to delinquents" (*J. clin. Psychopath. Psychother.*, 7, 383-393). [535]
- Pessin, J., 1933. "The comparative effects of social and mechanical stimulation on memorizing" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 45, 263-270). [540]
- Peterman, J. N., 1940. "The 'program analyzer'" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 24, 728-741). [428]
- Peters, C. C., 1941. "A technique for correlating measurable traits with freely observed social behaviors" (*Psychometrika*, 6, 209-219). [526]
- Petersen, W. F., and M. E. Milliken, 1936. *The patient and the weather* (Ann Arbor, Mich., Edwards). [14]

- Peterson, T. D., 1936. "The relationship between certain attitudes of parents and children" (*Bull. Purdue Univ.*, 37, 127-144). [498]
- Petrie, W. M. F., 1923. *Social life in ancient Egypt* (London, Constable). [542]
- Piaget, J., 1926. *The language and thought of the child* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [503]
- Piaget, J., 1929. *The child's conception of the world* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [105]
- Pigors, P., 1935. *Leadership or domination* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [523]
- Pillsbury, W. B., 1939. "Body form and introversion-extroversion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 400-401). [525]
- Pintner, R., and G. Forlano, 1937. "The influence of attitude upon scaling of attitude items" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 8, 39-45). [497]
- Pintner, R., and G. Forlano, 1943. "Consistency of response to personality tests at different age levels" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 62, 77-83). [535]
- Pintner, R., and G. Forlano, 1943. "Season of birth and mental differences" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 40, 25-35). [14]
- Pintner, R., and G. Forlano, 1944. "Some measures of dominance in college women" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 19, 313-315). [523]
- Plant, J., 1937. *Personality and the cultural pattern* (New York, Commonwealth Fund). [535]
- Podolsky, E., 1946. "The causes and the management of what is termed frigidity" (*Med. World, New York*, 64, 265-266). [351]
- Poffenberger, A. T., 1942. *Principles of applied psychology* (New York, Appleton-Century). [421]
- Polansky, N. A., 1941. "How shall a life-history be written?" (*Character & Pers.*, 9, 188-207). [511]
- Pollak, O., 1943. "Conservatism in later maturity and old age" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 8, 175-179). [321]
- Porterfield, A. L., 1937. "Education and race attitudes" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 21, 538-543). [231]
- Postman, L., and C. Zimmerman, 1945. "Intensity of attitude as a determinant of decision time" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 58, 510-518). [496]
- Powdermaker, H., 1933. *Life in Lesu* (New York, Norton). [131, 294, 533]
- Powdermaker, H., 1939. *After freedom; a cultural study in the deep South* (New York, Viking Press). [331]
- Pratt, C. C., 1943. "Music and meaning" (*Proc. Music Teach. nat. Ass.*, 113-117). [508]
- Pratt, K. C., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [41, 92]
- President's Research Committee on Social Trends, 1933. *Recent social trends in the United States* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [491]
- Pressey, S. L., 1921. "A group scale for investigating the emotions" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 16, 55-64). [535]
- Pressey, S. L., and L. C. Pressey, 1933. "Development of the interest-attitude tests" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 17, 1-16). [536]
- Preston, M. G., 1938. "Note on the reliability and the validity of the group judgment" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 22, 462-471). [541]
- Preston, M. G., 1942. "Use of the coefficient of correlation in the study of the D-score for the level of aspiration" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 55, 442-446). [506]

- Preston, M. G., and J. A. Bayton, 1941. "Differential effect of a social variable upon three levels of aspiration" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 29, 351-369). [506]
- Pronko, N. H., 1946. "Language and psycholinguistics" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 43, 189-239). [501]
- Pullias, E. V., 1937. "Masturbation as a mental hygiene problem—a study of the beliefs of seventy-five young men" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 32, 216-222). [349]
- Queen, S. A., 1940. "The ecological study of mental disorders" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 201-209). [538]
- Queen, S. A., 1941. "The concepts social disorganization and social participation" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 307-316). [297]
- Queen, S. A., and J. R. Gruener, 1940. *Social pathology; obstacles to social participation* (New York, Crowell). [297]
- Radke, M., and D. Klisurich, in press. "Experiments in changing food habits." [545]
- Rand, H. A., 1947. *Graphology; a handbook* (Cambridge, Mass., Sci-Art). [501]
- Raths, L. E., and F. N. Trager, 1948. "Public opinion and Crossfire" (*J. educ. Sociol.*, 21, 345-368). [499]
- Raube, S. A., 1947. "Factors affecting employee morale" (*Conf. Bd. Rep. Stud. Personnel Policy*, No. 85). [274]
- Reals, W. H., 1938. "Leadership in the high school" (*Sch. Rev.*, 46, 523-531). [523]
- Reckless, W. C., 1940. *Criminal behavior* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [341]
- Redfield, R., 1947. "The folk society" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 293-308). [88]
- Reed, R., 1942. *The single woman* (New York, Macmillan). [351]
- Reid, I. DeA., 1939. *The Negro immigrant; his background, characteristics and social adjustment, 1899-1937* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [324]
- Reinhardt, J. M., 1937. "Personality traits and the situation" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 2, 492-500). [382]
- Reinhardt, J. M., 1938. *Social psychology* (Philadelphia, Lippincott). [485]
- Remmers, H. H., and E. B. Silance, 1934. "Generalized attitude scales" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 5, 298-312). [498]
- Remmers, H. H., and L. Whisler, 1938. "Interrelationships of attitudes of parents and children" (*Stud. higher Educ., Purdue Univ.*, 34, 114-125). [498]
- Remmlein, M. K., 1938. "Analysis of leaders among high-school seniors" (*J. exp. Educ.*, 6, 413-422). [257]
- Renshaw, S., V. L. Miller, and D. P. Marquis, 1933. *Children's sleep; a series of studies on the influence of motion pictures; normal age, sex and seasonal variations in motility; experimental insomnia; the effects of coffee; and the visual flicker limens of children* (New York, Macmillan). [69]
- Reuter, E. B., 1930. "Review of *Racial hygiene etc.* by T. B. Rice" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 35, 670-671). [520]
- Reuter, E. B., 1931. *Race mixture* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [519]
- Reuter, E. B., 1939. "Review of E. A. Hooton's *Crime and the man*" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 123-126). [212]
- Reuter, E. B., 1940. "Some observations on the status of social psychology" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46, 293-304). [28]
- Reuther, F., 1937. "Das Gefühlsleben in seiner typologischen Bedeutung bei E. R. Jaensch" (*Z. angew. Psychol.*, 52, 179-242). [528]
- Révész, G., 1944. "The language of animals" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 30, 117-147). [502]
- Reyburn, H. A., and J. G. Taylor, 1943. "Some factors of temperament: a re-examination" (*Psychometrika*, 8, 91-104). [510]

- Reynolds, F. J., 1944. "Factors of leadership among seniors of Central High School, Tulsa, Oklahoma" (*J. educ. Res.*, 37, 356-361). [523]
- Rhine, J. B., et al., 1940. *Extra-sensory perception after sixty years* (New York, Holt). [86]
- Rhine, R., 1943. "Explicit denotation in language: a psychological contribution to methods in the social sciences" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 331-363). [502]
- Ribble, M. A., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [303]
- Rice, S. A., 1928. *Quantitative methods in politics* (New York, Knopf). [526]
- Rice, T. B., 1929. *Racial hygiene; a practical discussion of eugenics and race culture* (New York, Macmillan). [520]
- Rich, G. J., 1933. "Some relationships between personality and body chemistry" (*J. neur. psychopath.*, 14, 132-138). [495]
- Richardson, H. M., 1939. "Studies of mental resemblance between husbands and wives and between friends" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 104-120). [534]
- Richardson, J., and A. L. Kroeber, 1940. *Three centuries of women's dress fashions: a quantitative analysis* (Berkeley, Anthropological Records). [456]
- Riezler, K., 1943. "On the psychology of modern revolution" (*Soc. Res.*, 10, 320-336). [477]
- Rigg, M. G., 1940. "The relative variability in intelligence of boys and girls" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 56, 211-214). [244]
- Rigg, M. G., 1942. *Philosophical essays in honor of Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr.* (F. P. Clarke and M. C. Nahm, eds., Philadelphia, Univ. Pa. Press). [509]
- Riker, B. L., 1944. "A comparison of methods used in attitude research" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 24-42). [499]
- Roback, A. A., 1944. *Dictionary of international slurs* (Cambridge, Mass., Sci-Art). [205]
- Roberts, D., 1941. "Imitation and suggestion in animals" (*Bull. Animal Behav., London*, 1, 11-19). [542]
- Robertson, A. E., and E. L. Stromberg, 1940. "A comparison of the personality test scores of rural and urban college women" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 11, 411-414). [236]
- Robinson, D., and S. Rohde, 1946. "Two experiments with an anti-Semitism poll" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 41, 136-144). [406]
- Robinson, E. S., 1934. "Play" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 12, 160-161). [505]
- Robinson, E. S., 1935. *Law and the lawyers* (New York, Macmillan). [546]
- Robinson, K. F., 1941. "An experimental study of the effects of group discussion upon the social attitudes of college students" (*Speech Monogr.*, 8, 34-57). [545]
- Robinson, R. A., 1947. "Use of the panel in opinion and attitude research" (*Int. J. Opin. Attitude Res.*, 1, 83-86). [547]
- Robinson, V. P., 1928. "Some difficulties in analyzing social interaction in the interview" (*Social Forces*, 6, 558-561). [535]
- Robinson, W. J., 1929. *The oldest profession in the world* (New York, Eugenics Publ.). [345]
- Roethlisberger, F. J., and W. J. Dickson, 1939. *Management and the worker* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press). [279]
- Rogers, A. K., 1907. *A student's history of philosophy* (New York, Macmillan). [12]
- Rogers, L., 1941. "Do the Gallup polls measure opinion?" (*Harper's Mag.*, 183, 623-632). [547]

- Rogerson, C. H., 1939. *Play therapy in childhood* (New York, Oxford). [505]
- Roheim, G., 1932. "Psycho-analysis of primitive cultural types" (*Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 13, 224). [308]
- Roos, A. J., 1943. "The scuttle butt afloat. A study in group psychology" (*Arch. Neurol. Psychiat., Chicago*, 50, 472-474). [413]
- Roper, E., 1940. "Sampling public opinion" (*J. Amer. statist. Ass.*, 35, 325-334). [546]
- Roper, E., 1941. "Checks to improve polling accuracy" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 5, 87-90). [546]
- Rose, A. M., 1947. "Interviewing to test for validity and reliability" (*Int. J. Opin. Attitude Res.*, 1, 100-101). [547]
- Rosen, S. M., and L. Rosen, 1941. *Technology and society; the influence of machines in the United States* (New York, Macmillan). [297]
- Rosenbaum, B. B., 1937. "Neurotic tendencies in crippled girls" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 423-429). [489]
- Rosenzweig, S., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [537]
- Rosenzweig, S., and R. G. Hoskins, 1941. "A note on the ineffectualness of sex-hormone medication in a case of pronounced homosexuality" (*Psychosom. Med.*, 3, 87-98). [349]
- Roslow, S., 1940. "Nation-wide and local validation of the P.Q. or Personality Quotient Test" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 24, 529-539). [35]
- Roslow, S., 1943. "Measuring the radio audience by the personal interview roster method" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 27, 526-534). [433]
- Ross, E. A., 1908; 1925. *Social psychology* (New York, Macmillan). [121, 482]
- Rossman, J., 1935. "A study of the childhood, education, and age of 701 inventors" (*J. Pat. Off. Soc., Wash.*, 17, 411-421). [260]
- Rosten, L. C., 1941. *Hollywood: the movie colony—the movie makers* (New York, Harcourt Brace). [328]
- Rothney, J. W. M., and B. A. Roens, 1941. "Applications of personality and character measurement" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 11, 94-108). [526]
- Rotter, J. B., 1942. "Level of aspiration as a method of studying personality. I. A critical review of methodology" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 49, 463-474). [506]
- Rotter, J. B., 1942. "Level of aspiration as a method of studying personality. II. Development and evaluation of a controlled method" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 31, 410-422). [506]
- Rotter, J. B., 1943. "Level of aspiration as a method of studying personality. III. Group validity studies" (*Character & Pers.*, 11, 254-274). [506]
- Rotter, J. B., 1945. "Level of aspiration as a method of studying personality: IV. The analysis of patterns of response" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 21, 159-177). [506]
- Roucek, J. S., 1937. "The mind of the prisoner" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 375-383). [350]
- Roucek, J. S., ed., 1947. *Social control* (New York, Van Nostrand). [266]
- Rubin, S., and K. M. Bowman, 1942. "Electroencephalographic and personality correlates in peptic ulcer" (*Psychosom. Med.*, 4, 309-318). [495]
- Ruch, F. L., 1933. "Adult learning" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 30, 387-414). [531]
- Ruch, F. L., 1934. "The differential decline of learning ability in the aged as a possible explanation of their conservatism" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 5, 329-337). [298, 532]

- Ruch, F. L., 1941. "Effects of repeated interviews on the respondent's answers" (*J. consult. Psychol.*, 5, 179-182). [547]
- Ruch, F. L. Unpublished data. [503]
- Ruch, F. L., and K. Young, 1942. "Penetration of Axis propaganda" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 26, 448-455). [548]
- Rudolph, H. J., 1947. *Attention and interest factors in advertising* (New York, Funk and Wagnalls). [445]
- Ruesch, J., and K. M. Bowman, 1948. "Personality and chronic illness" (*J. Amer. med. Ass.*, 136, 851-855). [291]
- Rugg, D., 1941. "Experiments in wording questions: II." (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 5, 91-92). [546]
- Rusk, G. Y., 1941. "The methodology of social psychology" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 3-89). [486]
- Russell, D. H., and I. V. Robertson, 1947. "Influencing attitudes toward minority groups in a junior high school" (*Sch. Rev.*, 55, 205-213). [499]
- Ryans, D. G., 1938. "The meaning of persistence" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 19, 79-96). [263]
- Ryans, D. G., 1939. "The measurement of persistence: an historical review" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 715-739). [263]
- Saadi, M., and P. R. Farnsworth, 1934. "The degrees of acceptance of dogmatic statements and preferences for their supposed makers" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 29, 143-150). [546]
- Saenger, G., 1940. "The psychology of the refugee" (*Contemp. Jewish Rec.*, May-June, 264-273). [324]
- Salmon, G., 1932. "Hero worship" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 336-338). [155]
- Samuels, M. R., 1939. "Judgment of faces" (*Character & Pers.*, 8, 18-27). [88]
- Sanford, F. H., 1942. "Speech and personality" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 39, 811-845). [108]
- Sanford, F. H., and R. R. Holt, 1943. "Psychological determinants of morale" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, 93-95). [273]
- Sanford, G. A., 1940. "Selective migration in a rural Alabama community" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 759-766). [326]
- Sanford, R. N., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [215]
- Sapir, E., 1934. "Symbolism" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 14, 492-495). [499]
- Sappenfield, B. R., 1942. "Attitudes and attitude estimates of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish students" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 16, 173-197). [253]
- Sarbin, T. R., 1943. "The concept of role-taking" (*Sociometry*, 6, 273-285). [50]
- Sargent, H., 1945. "Projective methods: their origins, theory and application in personality research" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 42, 257-293). [511]
- Sargent, S. S., 1939. "Emotional stereotypes in the Chicago Tribune" (*Sociometry*, 2, No. 2, 69-75). [210]
- Saul, L. J., 1947. *Emotional maturity: the development and dynamics of personality* (Philadelphia, Lippincott). [536]
- Schanck, R. L., 1932. "A study of a community and its groups and institutions conceived of as behaviors of individuals" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 43, No. 2). [406]
- Schanck, R. L., 1938. "Personality of individuals and the rural community pattern" (*Rur. Sociol.*, 3, 159-171). [536]
- Schanck, R. L., and C. Goodman, 1939. "Reactions to propaganda on both sides of a controversial issue" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 3, 107-112). [548]

- Scheinfeld, A., and M. D. Schweitzer, 1939. *You and heredity* (New York, Stokes). [31]
- Schettler, C., 1939. "Topical summaries of current literature: personality traits" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 234-258). [522]
- Schettler, C., 1941. "Some antecedent concepts of personality trait" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 48, 165-175). [522]
- Schettler, C., 1947. "Objective measurements of personality traits" (*J. Person.*, 15, 292-299). [535]
- Schiller, A., 1935; 1936. "Theories of handedness" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 19, 694-703; 20, 77-92). [504]
- Schmeidler, G. R., and G. W. Allport, 1944. "Social psychology and the civilian war effort" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 20, 145-180). [467]
- Schmidt, B. G., 1946. "Changes in personal, social, and intellectual behavior of children originally classified as feeble-minded" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 60, No. 5). [32]
- Schmidt, B. G., 1948. "A reply" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 45, 334-343). [32]
- Schmidt, D. G., 1946. "Levels of intelligence of prison inmates" (*Amer. J. ment. Def.*, 51, 63-66). [341]
- Schneider, H. W., 1934. "Religious revivals" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 363-366). [462]
- Schneider, J., 1937. "Social class, historical circumstances, and fame" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 43, 37-56). [47, 260]
- Schneider, J., 1937. "The cultural situation as a condition for the achievement of fame" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 2, 480-491). [47, 260]
- Schneider, J., 1938. "The definition of eminence and the social origins of famous English men of genius" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 3, 834-849). [260]
- Schneider, J., 1940. "Class origin and fame: eminent English women" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 700-712). [260]
- Schneirla, T. C., 1941. "Social organization in insects, as related to individual function" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 48, 465-486). [542]
- Schonbar, R. A., 1947. "The modification of judgments in a group situation" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 37, 69-80). [540]
- Schuessler, K. F., 1948. "Social background and musical taste" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 13, 330-335). [65]
- Schuler, E. A., and V. J. Parenton, 1943. "A recent epidemic of hysteria in a Louisiana high school" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 221-235). [461]
- Schuman, F. L., 1933. "Mutiny" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 11, 166-167). [471]
- Scott, J. P., 1945. "Group formation determined by social behavior" (*Sociometry*, 8, 42-52). [542]
- Seago, D. W., 1947. "Stereotypes: before Pearl Harbor and after" (*J. Psychol.*, 23, 55-63). [207, 527]
- Sears, L., 1932. *Responsibility: its development through punishment and reward* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [121]
- Sears, P. S., 1940. "Levels of aspiration in academically successful and unsuccessful children" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 498-536). [506]
- Sears, P. S., 1941. "Level of aspiration in relation to some variables of personality: clinical studies" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 311-336). [506]
- Sears, R. R., 1943. "Survey of objective studies of psychoanalytic concepts" (*Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.*, No. 51). [39]
- Sears, R. R., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [537]

- Sears, R. R., and C. I. Hovland, 1941. "Experiments on motor conflict. II. Determination of mode of resolution by comparative strengths of conflicting responses" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 28, 280-286). [537]
- Sears, R. R., C. I. Hovland, and N. E. Miller, 1940. "Minor studies of aggression: I. Measurement of aggressive behavior" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 275-294). [537]
- Sears, R. R., and P. S. Sears, 1940. "Minor studies of aggression: V. Strength of frustration-reaction as a function of strength of drive" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 297-300). [537]
- Seashore, R. H., and K. Hevner, 1933. "A time-saving device for the construction of attitude scales" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 4, 366-372). [498]
- Seebohm, F., 1896. *The English village community* (New York, Longmans, Green). [542]
- Seldes, G., 1934. "The poisoned springs of world news" (*Harper's Mag.*, 169, 719-731). [445]
- Seligman, C. G., and B. Z. Seligman, 1911. *The Veddars* (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge Univ. Press). [542]
- Seltzer, C. C., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [215]
- Sengupta, N. N., 1942. "Intelligence in its social settings" (*Indian J. Psychol.*, 17, 170-174). [519]
- Seward, G. H., 1942. "The 'validation' of drives" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 49, 88-95). [37]
- Shakow, D., and S. Rosenzweig, 1940. "The use of the tautophone ('verbal summator') as an auditory apperceptive test for the study of personality" (*Character & Pers.*, 8, 216-226). [510]
- Shaw, C. R., 1929. *Delinquency areas* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [535]
- Shaw, C. R., et al., 1938. *Brothers in crime* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [325, 511, 535]
- Shaw, F. J., and A. Spooner, 1945. "Selective forgetting when the subject is not 'ego-involved'" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 35, 242-247). [164]
- Sheffield, A. D., 1933. *Creative discussion* (New York, The Inquiry). [546]
- Sheldon, W. H., S. S. Stevens, and W. B. Tucker, 1940. *The varieties of human physique* (New York, Harper). [214]
- Sheppard, H. L., 1947. "The Negro merchant; a study of Negro anti-Semitism" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 53, 96-99). [224]
- Sherif, M., 1936. *The psychology of social norms* (New York, Harper). [253, 272]
- Sherif, M., 1947. "Some methodological remarks related to experimentation in social psychology" (*Int. J. Opin. Attitude Res.*, 1, 71-93). [486]
- Sherif, M., 1948. *An outline of social psychology* (New York, Harper). [117, 272, 485]
- Sherif, M., and H. Cantril, 1945. "The psychology of 'attitudes': Part I" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 52, 295-319). [116]
- Sherif, M., and H. Cantril, 1946. "The psychology of 'attitudes': Part II" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 53, 1-24). [116]
- Sherif, M., and H. Cantril, 1947. *The psychology of ego-involvements* (New York, Wiley). [124, 225, 266]
- Sherman, M., 1928. "Emotional character of the singing voice" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 11, 495-497). [500]
- Sherman, M., 1938. *Mental conflicts and personality* (New York, Longmans, Green). [538]

- Sherman, M., and H. Jost, 1942. "Frustration reactions of normal and neurotic persons" (*J. Psychol.*, 13, 3-19). [537]
- Shock, N. W., 1944. *Personality and the behavior disorders* (J. McV. Hunt, ed., New York, Ronald Press). [495]
- Shryock, H. S., Jr., and H. T. Eldridge, 1947. "Internal migrations in peace and war" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 12, 27-39). [326]
- Silverman, B., 1935. "The behavior of children from broken homes" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 5, 11-18). [308]
- Simmons, L. W., 1945. *The role of the aged in primitive society* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [296]
- Simonds, W. A., 1938. *Henry Ford and Greenfield Village* (New York, Stokes). [326]
- Simpson, M., 1935. "Parent preferences of young children" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 652). [127]
- Sims, N. L., 1939. *The problem of social change* (New York, Crowell). [319]
- Sinclair, R. D., 1928. "A comparative study of those who report the experience of the divine presence and those who do not" (*Univ. Ia. Stud. Character*, 2, No. 3). [496]
- Skaggs, E. B., 1941. "Studies of sex differences: II" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 91-97). [520]
- Skinner, B. F., 1936. "The verbal summator and a method for the study of latent speech" (*J. Psychol.*, 2, 71-107). [510]
- Skinner, B. F., 1948. *Walden two* (New York, Macmillan). [265]
- Sletto, R. F., 1940. "Pretesting of questionnaires" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 193-200). [546]
- Smellie, K., 1934. "Riot" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 13, 386-388). [465]
- Smith, B. B., 1941. "The validity and reliability of group judgments" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 29, 420-426). [541]
- Smith, B. L., et al., eds., 1946. *Propaganda, communication, and public opinion; a comprehensive reference guide* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press). [449, 548]
- Smith, C. E., 1936. "A study of the autonomic excitation resulting from the interaction of individual opinion and group opinion" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 138-164). [494]
- Smith, F. T., 1943. "An experiment in modifying attitudes toward the Negro" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 887). [499]
- Smith, G. H., 1946. "Attitudes toward Soviet Russia: II. Beliefs, values, and other characteristics of pro-Russian and anti-Russian groups" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 23, 17-33). [498]
- Smith, H. C., and S. Boyarsky, 1943. "The relationship between physique and simple reaction time" (*Character & Pers.*, 12, 46-53). [215]
- Smith, J. H., 1945. "The relation of masculinity-femininity scores of sorority girls on a free association test to those of their parents" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 22, 79-85). [521]
- Smith, J. J., 1930. *Social psychology; the psychology of attraction and repulsion* (Boston, Badger). [483]
- Smith, M., 1940. "Attitude homogeneity and length of group association" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 573-578). [223, 498]
- Smith, M., 1942. "A revised behavioristic approach to social psychology" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 26, 222-231). [486]

- Smith, M., 1943. "An empirical scale of prestige status of occupations" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 8, 185-192). [492]
- Smith, M., 1944. "Some factors in friendship selections of high school students" (*Sociometry*, 7, 303-310). [536]
- Smith, M., 1945. "The psychology of the corporate act" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 52, 100-108). [486]
- Smith, M., 1946. "A research note on homogeneity of marriage partners in selected physical characteristics" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 226-228). [534]
- Smith, M. E., 1938. "A study of the causes of feelings of inferiority" (*J. Psychol.*, 5, 315-332). [526]
- Smith, M. M., 1938. "Comparative social attitudes" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 28, 681-693). [498]
- Smith, R. B., 1932. "Development of an inventory for the measurement of inferiority feelings at the high school level" (*Arch. Psychol. N.Y.*, No. 144). [526]
- Snyder, W. U., 1941. "A survey of recent studies in the measurement of personality, attitudes, and interests, of adolescents" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 25, 403-420). [531]
- Snyder, W. U., 1947. "Do teachers cause maladjustment?" (*J. except. Child*, 14, 40-46; 63; 73-78). [150]
- Solby, B., 1941. "The psychodramatic approach to marriage" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 523-530). [534]
- Sollenberger, R. T., 1940. "Some relationships between the urinary excretion of male hormone by maturing boys and their expressed interests and attitudes" (*J. Psychol.*, 9, 179-189). [289, 495]
- Solomon, P., 1948. "Emotional maturity" (*Ann. West. Med. Surg.*, 2, 12-15). [536]
- Solomon, R. S., 1939. "Further theoretical considerations of the J-curve hypothesis" (*Sociometry*, 2, 59-63). [544]
- Sorenson, H., 1930. "Adult ages as a factor in learning" (*J. educ. Psychol.*, 21, 451-459). [532]
- Sorenson, H., 1938. *Adult abilities* (Minneapolis, Univ. Minn. Press). [318]
- Sorokin, P. A., 1927. *Social mobility* (New York, Harper). [520]
- South, E. B., 1927. "Some psychological aspects of committee work" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 11, 348-368; 437-464). [545]
- Speer, G. S., 1936. "The use of the Bernreuter personality inventory as an aid in the prediction of behavior" (*J. juv. Res.*, 20, 65-69). [526]
- Speer, G. S., 1937. "The measurement of emotions aroused in response to personality test items" (*J. Psychol.*, 3, 445-461). [494]
- Speier, H., 1939. "Class structure and 'total war'" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 370-380). [335]
- Spencer, H., 1893-1897. *Principles of sociology* (New York, Appleton-Century). [19, 493]
- Spoerl, H. D., 1942. "Abnormal and social psychology in the life and work of William James" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 37, 3-19). [26]
- Spranger, E., 1928. *Types of men: the psychology and ethics of personality* (New York, Steckert). [529]
- Sprowls, J. W., 1927. *Social psychology interpreted* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [483]
- Stagner, R., 1934. "Validity and reliability of the Bernreuter personality inventory" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 28, 413-418). [523]

- Stagner, R., 1937. "The Wisconsin scale of personality traits" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 31, 463-471). [525]
- Stagner, R., 1938. "Marital similarity in socio-economic attitudes" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 22, 340-346). [534]
- Stagner, R., 1941. "Psychological causes of war" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 38, 484-488). [335]
- Stagner, R., 1941. "A comparison of the Gallup and Fortune polls regarding American intervention policy" (*Sociometry*, 4, 239-258). [546]
- Stagner, R., 1944. "Studies of aggressive social attitudes" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 20, 109-120). [514]
- Stagner, R., 1948. *Psychology of personality* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [184]
- Stagner, R., and M. H. Krout, 1940. "Correlational study of personality development and structure" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 35, 339-355). [127]
- Stagner, R., and C. E. Osgood, 1941. "An experimental analysis of a nationalistic frame of reference" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 14, 389-401). [222]
- Stanton, F. N., 1940. *How radio measures its audience* (New York, Columbia Broadcasting System). [433]
- Starbuck, E. D., 1899. *The psychology of religion* (New York, Scribner). [530]
- Starch, D., 1911. "Unconscious imitation in handwriting" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 18, 223-228). [504]
- Stein, M. I., 1947. "The use of a sentence completion test for the diagnosis of personality" (*J. clin. Psychol.*, 3, 47-56). [511]
- Stein, M. I., 1948. *The thematic apperception test* (Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Press). [511]
- Steinbeck, J., 1939. *The grapes of wrath* (New York, Viking). [334]
- Steinmetz, H. C., 1945. "Directive psychotherapy: V. Measuring psychological understanding" (*J. clin. Psychol.*, 1, 331-335). [222]
- Stephens, J. M., and J. A. Baer, 1944. "Factors influencing the efficacy of punishment and reward" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 65, 53-66). [525]
- Stephenson, W., 1935. "Perseveration and character" (*Character & Pers.*, 4, 44-52). [263]
- Stern, W., 1937. "Cloud pictures: a new method for testing imagination" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 132-146). [510]
- Stern, W., 1939. "The psychology of testimony" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 34, 3-20). [546]
- Stevens, R. B., 1940. "The attitudes of college women toward women's vocations" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 24, 615-627). [492]
- Stewart, J. Q., 1948. "Social physics" (*Sci. News Letter*, 53, 364-365). [19]
- Stoddard, T. L., 1920. *The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy* (New York, Scribner). [518]
- Stogdill, R. M., 1936. "Experiments in the measurement of attitudes toward children: 1899-1935" (*Child Developm.*, 7, 31-36). [133]
- Stogdill, R. M., 1937. "Survey of experiments on children's attitudes towards parents: 1894-1936" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 51, 293-303). [127]
- Stogdill, R. M., 1948. "Personal factors associated with leadership; a survey of the literature" (*J. Psychol.*, 25, 35-71). [257]
- Stoke, S. M., and E. D. West, 1931. "Sex differences in conversational interests" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 2, 120-126). [383, 523]
- Stolz, K. R., 1937. *The psychology of religious living* (Nashville, Tenn., Abingdon-Cokesbury). [315]

- Stone, C. P., *et al.*, 1935. "A comparative study of sexual drive in adult male rats as measured by direct copulatory tests and by the Columbia obstruction apparatus" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 19, 215-241). [488]
- Stone, C. P., and R. G. Barker, 1937. "Aspects of personality and intelligence in postmenarcheal and premenarcheal girls of the same chronological age" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 23, 439-445). [289]
- Stone, C. P., and R. G. Barker, 1939. "The attitudes and interests of premenarcheal and postmenarcheal girls" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 54, 27-71). [289]
- Stonequist, E. V., 1937. *The marginal man: a study in personality and culture conflict* (New York, Scribner). [325]
- Stott, L. H., 1939. "Personality development in farm, smalltown, and city children" (*Res. Bull. Neb. agric. Exp. Sta.*, No. 114). [236]
- Straker, A., and R. H. Thouless, 1940. "Preliminary results of Cambridge survey of evacuated children" (*Brit. J. educ. Psychol.*, 10, 97-113). [33]
- Stratton, G. M., 1926. "Emotion and the incidence of disease" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 21, 19-23). [536]
- Stratton, G. M., 1944. "Violence between nations; deeper sources; the way of liberation" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 51, 85-101). [335]
- Strauss, A., 1944. "The literature on panic" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 317-328). [466]
- Strauss, A., 1945. "The concept of attitude in social psychology" (*J. Psychol.*, 19, 329-339). [116]
- Strauss, A., 1946. "The influence of parent-images upon marital choice" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 11, 554-559). [127]
- Strong, E. K., Jr., 1933. "Aptitudes versus attitudes in vocational guidance" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 30, 585). [499]
- Strong, E. K., Jr., 1938. *Psychological aspects of business* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [421]
- Strong, E. K., Jr., 1943. *Vocational interests of men and women* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [499, 532]
- Strong, S. M., 1946. "Negro-white relations as reflected in social-types" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 52, 23-30). [205]
- Stroup, H. H., 1945. *The Jehovah's Witnesses* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [462]
- Subcommittee on Technology of U.S. National Resources Committee, 1937. *Technological trends and national policy, including the social implications of new inventions* (Washington, U.S. Gov. Print. Off.). [319]
- Sullivan, H. S., 1933. "Mental disorders" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 10, 313-318). [361]
- Super, D. E., 1940. *Avocational interest patterns: a study in the psychology of avocations* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [499]
- Super, D. E., 1941. "A comparison of the diagnoses of a graphologist with the results of psychological tests" (*J. consult. Psychol.*, 5, 127-133). [501]
- Super, D. E., 1942. "The Bernreuter personality inventory: a review of research" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 39, 94-125). [535]
- Sutherland, E. H., ed., 1937. *The professional thief: by a professional thief* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [342]
- Sutherland, E. H., 1940. "White-collar criminality" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 1-12). [344]
- Svendsen, M., 1934. "Children's imaginary companions" (*Arch. Neurol. Psychiat., Chicago*, 32, 985-999). [132]

- Sward, K., 1945. "Age and mental ability in superior men" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 58, 443-479). [532]
- Sward, K., 1948. *The legend of Henry Ford* (New York, Rinehart). [279]
- Sweet, L., 1929. *Personal attitudes test for younger boys* (New York, Association Press). [526]
- Sweet, W. W., 1944. *Revivalism in America; its origin, growth, and decline* (New York, Scribner). [462]
- Symonds, P. M., 1940. "Economic problems and interests of adolescents" (*Sch. Rev.*, 48, 97-107). [499]
- Symonds, P. M., and E. A. Samuel, 1941. "Projective methods in the study of personality" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 11, 80-93). [511]
- Taeuber, C., I. Taeuber, and C. C. Taylor, 1937. *The people of the drought states* (Washington, Works Progress Adm.). [335]
- Taeuber, I. B., et al., 1947. *Post-war problems of migration* (New York, Milbank Memorial Fund). [324]
- Tappan, P. W., 1949. *Juvenile delinquency* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [73]
- Tarde, G., 1903. *The laws of imitation* (New York, Holt). [20, 121]
- Taussig, F. W., and C. S. Joslyn, 1932. *American business leaders* (New York, Macmillan). [520]
- Taylor, L., 1945. "The social adjustment of the only child" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 51, 227-232). [302]
- Taylor, W. S., and M. F. Martin, 1944. "Multiple personality" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 39, 281-300). [368]
- Teicher, J. D., 1947. "A study in attempted suicide" (*J. nerv. ment. Dis.*, 105, 283-298). [369]
- Terman, L. M., 1904. "A preliminary study of the psychology and pedagogy of leadership" (*Ped. Sem.*, 11, 413-451). [522]
- Terman, L. M., 1939. "The effect of happiness or unhappiness on self-report regarding attitudes, reaction patterns, and facts of personal history" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 36, 197-202). [534]
- Terman, L. M., et al., 1938. *Psychological factors in marital happiness* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [203, 348, 533, 534]
- Terman, L. M., et al., 1946. *Manual of child psychology* (L. Carmichael, ed., New York, Wiley). [242, 520]
- Terman, L. M., and W. B. Johnson, 1939. "Methodology and results of recent studies in marital adjustment" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 4, 307-324). [533]
- Terman, L. M., C. C. Miles, et al., 1936. *Sex and personality: studies in masculinity and femininity* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [521]
- Terman, L. M., and M. H. Oden, 1947. *The gifted child grows up* (Stanford Univ., Stanford Univ. Press). [534]
- Thewlis, M. W., 1946. *The care of the aged (geriatrics)* (St. Louis, C. V. Mosby). [318]
- Thomas, E. D., 1927. *Chinese political thought* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [542]
- Thomas, W. F., and P. T. Young, 1938. "Liking and disliking persons" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 9, 169-188). [499]
- Thomas, W. I., 1937. *Primitive behavior; an introduction to the social sciences* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [542]
- Thomas, W. I., and F. Znaniecki, 1918-1920. *The Polish peasant in Europe and America* (Boston, Badger). [324, 512]
- Thomas-Baines, D. M., 1936. "The construction and evaluation of a scale to meas-

- ure attitude toward any proposed social action" (*Bull. Purdue Univ.*, 37, 252-258). [498]
- Thompson, J., 1941. "Development of facial expression of emotion in blind and seeing children" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 264). [97]
- Thomson, W. A., 1938. "An evaluation of the P.Q. (personality quotient) test" (*Character & Pers.*, 6, 274-292). [35]
- Thomson, W. A., 1941. "An inventory for measuring socialization-self-seeking and its relationship to the Study of Values Test, the ACE Psychological Examination, and the Strong Vocational Interest Blank" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 25, 202-212). [499]
- Thorndike, E. L., 1934. "Experiments in euphony" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 31, 679-680). [101]
- Thorndike, E. L., 1944. "Sectional variations in welfare especially of the white population" (*Sociometry*, 7, 384-396). [235]
- Thorndike, E. L., 1945. "The association of certain sounds with pleasant and unpleasant meanings" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 52, 143-149). [101]
- Thorndike, E. L., 1946. "The psychology of semantics" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 59, 613-632). [101]
- Thorndike, R. L., 1938. "On what type of task will a group do well?" (*J. abnorm., soc. Psychol.*, 33, 409-413). [545]
- Thorndike, R. L., 1938. "The effect of discussion upon the correctness of group decisions, when the factor of majority influence is allowed for" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 9, 343-362). [545]
- Thornton, G. R., 1940. "How general is the factor of 'persistence'? A reexamination and evaluation of Ryans' results" (*J. gen. Psychol.*, 23, 185-189). [263]
- Thornton, G. R., 1943. "The effect upon judgments of personality traits of varying a single factor in a photograph" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 18, 127-148). [501]
- Thorpe, M., 1939. *America at the movies* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [69]
- Thouless, R. H., 1938. "Scientific method in the study of the psychology of religion" (*Character & Pers.*, 7, 103-108). [315]
- Thrasher, F. M., 1936. *The gang. A study of 1313 gangs in Chicago* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [72, 136]
- Thurstone, L. L., and E. J. Chave, 1929. *The measurement of attitude; a psychophysical method and some experiments with a scale for measuring attitude toward the church* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [497]
- Thurstone, L. L., and T. G. Thurstone, 1930. "A neurotic inventory" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 1, 3-30). [535]
- Tiebout, H. M., 1947. "Alcoholism" (*Soc. Wk. Yearb.*, 9, 45-50). [374]
- Tietze, C., P. Lemkau, and M. Cooper, 1941. "Schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, and socio-economic status" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 47, 167-175). [538]
- Timmons, W. M., 1942. "Can the product superiority of discussors be attributed to averaging or majority influences?" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 15, 23-32). [545]
- Tolman, E. C., 1932. *Purposive behavior in animals and men* (New York, Appleton-Century). [496]
- Tolman, E. C., 1942. *Drives toward war* (New York, Appleton-Century). [335]
- Tolman, R. S., 1939. "Note on family position of certain delinquent boys" (*Amer. J. Orthopsychiat.*, 9, 635). [534]
- Tomkins, S. S., 1947. *The thematic apperception test* (New York, Grune and Stratton). [511]
- Torrance, P., 1945. "The influence of the broken home on adolescent adjustment" (*J. educ. Sociol.*, 18, 359-364). [308]

- Toynbee, A. J., 1948. *Civilization on trial* (New York, Oxford). [3]
- Travers, R. M. W., 1943. "A study of the ability to judge group knowledge" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 56, 54-65). [540]
- Travers, R. M. W., 1943. "The general ability to judge group-knowledge" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 56, 95-99). [545]
- Travis, L. E., 1940. "The need for stuttering" (*J. Speech Disorders*, 5, 193-202). [504]
- Travis, L. E., and W. Johnson, 1934. "Stuttering and the concept of handedness" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 41, 534-562). [504]
- Traxler, A. E., 1941. "Current construction and evaluation of personality and character tests" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 11, 57-79). [526]
- Traxler, A. E., 1942. "The use of tests and rating devices in the appraisal of personality" (*Educ. Rec. Bull.*, No. 23). [535]
- Traxler, A. E., 1944. "Current construction and evaluation of personality and character tests" (*Rev. educ. Res.*, 14, 55-66). [526]
- Trescott, P. H., 1947. "The broad gap between rural and urban opinion" (*Int. J. Opin. Attitude Res.*, 1, 87-92). [236]
- Triplett, N., 1898. "The dynamogenic factors in pace-making and competition" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 9, 507-533). [524, 539]
- Trotter, W., 1940. "Panic and its consequences" (*Brit. med. J.*, Part I, 270). [466]
- Truxal, A. G., and F. B. Merrill, 1947. *The family in American culture* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [126]
- Tryon, C. M., 1939. "Evaluations of adolescent personality by adolescents" (*Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Developm.*, 4, No. 4). [531]
- Tulchin, S. H., 1939. *Intelligence and crime* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [341]
- Tuttle, H. S., 1940. "Selective application of Thurstone test" (*J. educ. Res.*, 33, 705-709). [499]
- Tyler, L. E., 1947. *The psychology of human differences* (New York, Appleton-Century). [168]
- Uhrbrock, R. S., 1928. "An analysis of the Downey Will-Temperament Tests" (*Contr. Educ.*, No. 296). [501]
- U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947. *The effects of strategic bombing on German morale, Vols. 1 and 2* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Office). [274]
- U.S. War Department, 1947. *Readings in social psychology* (T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., New York, Holt). [548]
- Utterback, W. E., 1937. "An appraisal of psychological research in speech" (*Quart. J. Speech*, 23, 175-182). [501]
- Vaillant, G. C., 1941. *Astecs of Mexico* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday). [405]
- Valentine, C. W., 1936. "La psychologie génétique du rire" (*J. Psychol. norm. path.*, 33, 641-673). [97]
- Van Dusen, A. C., 1948. "Measuring leadership ability" (*Personnel Psychol.*, 1, 67-79). [522]
- Van Riper, C., 1942. *Speech correction: principles and methods* (New York, Prentice-Hall). [504]
- Van Vliet, T. V., 1935. "The emotional effect of intervals as found in a study of the melodies of art songs" (*Peabody Bull.*, 31, 30-35). [509]
- Van Waters, M., 1930. "Adolescence" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 1, 455-459). [531]
- Vaughn, J., and C. M. Diserens, 1938. "The experimental psychology of competition" (*J. exp. Educ.*, 7, 76-97). [233, 525]

- Vaughn, J., and E. Geldreich, 1938. "Variability as a measure of competitive behavior" (*J. exp. Educ.*, 7, 71-75). [525]
- Vaughn, W. F., 1948. *Social psychology* (New York, Odyssey Press). [485]
- Veblen, T. B., 1926. *The theory of the leisure class* (New York, Vanguard Press). [520]
- Veltfort, H. R., and G. E. Lee, 1943. "The Cocoanut Grove fire: a study in scape-goating" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 38, No. 2, Suppl., 138-154). [468]
- Vernon, M. D., 1940. "A study of some effects of evacuation on adolescent girls" (*Brit. J. educ. Psychol.*, 10, 114-134). [33]
- Vernon, M. D., 1941. "The relationship of occupation to personality" (*Brit. J. Psychol.*, 31, 294-326). [492]
- Vernon, P. E., 1936. "The matching method applied to investigations of personality" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 33, 149-177). [536]
- Vernon, P. E., 1941. "An analysis of the conception of morale" (*Character & Pers.*, 9, 283-294). [273]
- Vernon, P. E., and G. W. Allport, 1931. "A test for personal values" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 26, 231-248). [529]
- Vico, G., 1844. *La Science nouvelle* (Paris, Renouard). [15]
- Vinogradoff, P., 1905. *The growth of the manor* (New York, Macmillan). [542]
- von Hentig, H., 1947. *Crime: causes and conditions* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [341]
- Waelder, R., 1939. *Psychological aspects of war and peace* (Geneva, Switzerland, Geneva Res. Centre). [336]
- Walker, K. F., 1941. "Sociology and psychology in the prediction of behavior" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 48, 443-449). [486]
- Walker, K. F., et al., 1943. "P-tests and the concept of mental inertia" (*Character & Pers.*, 12, 32-45). [263, 510]
- Wall, J. H., 1944. "The psychiatric problem of suicide" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 101, 404-406). [369]
- Wallach, H., and M. Henle, 1942. "A further study of the function of reward" (*J. exp. Psychol.*, 30, 147-160). [525]
- Wallen, R., 1943. "Individuals' estimates of group opinion" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 17, 269-274). [545]
- Wallenstein, N., 1937. "Character and personality of children from broken homes" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 721). [316]
- Waller, W., 1938. *The family: a dynamic interpretation* (New York, Cordon). [301, 313]
- Waller, W., ed., 1940. *War in the twentieth century* (New York, Random House). [336]
- Waller, W., 1940. *War and the family* (New York, Dryden). [336]
- Wallin, J. E. W., 1939. *Minor mental maladjustments in normal people: based on original autobiographies of personality maladjustments* (Durham, N.C., Duke Univ. Press). [511]
- Wallis, J. H., 1935. *The politician* (New York, Stokes). [445]
- Walser, F., 1933. *The art of conference* (New York, Harper). [546]
- Walter, E. J., 1946. "Die Bedeutung der Charakterologie für die Sozialpsychologie" (*Schweiz. Z. Psychol. Anwend.*, 5, 191-199). [486]
- Walter, W. G., 1939. "Electro-encephalography in the study of epilepsy; demonstration" (*J. ment. Sci.*, 85, 932-939). [495]

- Walton, A., 1932. *The effect of age on motor abilities in athletes* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford Univ.). [532]
- Walton, W. E., 1937. "The affective value of first names" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 21, 396-409). [101]
- Warden, C. J., 1931. *Animal motivation; experimental studies on the albino rat* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press). [488]
- Warden, C. J., 1936. *The emergence of human culture* (New York, Macmillan). [491]
- Warden, C. J., and W. Galt, 1943. "A study of cooperation, dominance, grooming, and other social factors in monkeys" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 63, 213-233). [524]
- Warden, C. J., and L. H. Warner, 1928. "The sensory capacities and intelligence of dogs, with a report on the ability of the noted dog 'Fellow' to respond to verbal stimuli" (*Quart. Rev. Biol.*, 3, 1-28). [108]
- Warner, W. L., 1937. *A black civilization: a social history of an Australian tribe* (New York, Harper). [542]
- Warner, W. L., B. H. Junker, and W. A. Adams, 1941. *Color and human nature: Negro personality development in a northern city* (Washington, D.C., Amer. Coun. Educ.). [224]
- Warner, W. L., and J. O. Low, 1947. *The social system of the modern factory* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [279]
- Waters, R. H., 1941. "The *J* distribution as a measure of institutional strength" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 13, 413-417). [544]
- Watson, G. B., 1925. "The measurement of fair-mindedness" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 176). [513]
- Watson, G. B., 1941. "Some hypotheses concerning social change" (*J. educ. Sociol.*, 14, 554-560). [319]
- Watson, G. B., 1942. *Civilian morale* (G. Watson, ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin). [273, 275, 333]
- Watson, J., 1895. *Hedonistic theories from Aristippus to Spencer* (New York, Macmillan). [10]
- Watson, J., et al., 1948. "A study in urban conversation: sample of 1001 remarks overheard in Manhattan" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 28, 121-133). [409]
- Watson, J. B., 1924-1925. *Behaviorism* (New York, Norton). [22, 32]
- Waugh, C., 1947. *The comics* (New York, Macmillan). [147]
- Weatherly, U. G., 1934. "Multiple groupings and loyalty patterns" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 40, 204-213). [223]
- Wecter, D., 1937. *The saga of American society; a record of social aspiration, 1607-1937* (New York, Scribner). [329]
- Weeks, H. A., 1940. "Male and female broken home rates by types of delinquency" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 5, 601-609). [308]
- Wegrocki, H. J., 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [358]
- Weigall, T. H., 1932. *Boom in paradise* (New York, A. King). [452]
- Weinberg, A. K., 1935. *Manifest destiny; a study of nationalist expansionism in American history* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press). [167]
- Weisenburg, T., A. Roe, and K. E. McBride, 1935. *Adult intelligence* (New York, Commonwealth Fund). [531]
- Weiss, A. P., 1923. "The aims of social evolution" (*Ohio J. Sci.*, 23, 115-134). [142]

- Weiss, A. P., 1929. *A theoretical basis of human behavior* (Columbus, Ohio, Adams). [27, 381]
- Weiss, P., 1943. "The social character of gestures" (*Phil. Rev., New York*, 52, 182-186). [86]
- Wells, E. F., 1938. "The relation between psychosis and physical type; a statistical study" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 51, 136-145). [528]
- Wells, G. R., 1929. *Individuality and social restraint* (New York, Appleton-Century). [24]
- Wenzl, A., 1937. *Graphologie als Wissenschaft* (Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer). [501]
- Werth, A., 1934. *France in ferment* (New York, Harper). [475]
- Wessel, R., ed., 1947. *A case work approach to sex delinquents* (Philadelphia, Penn. School of Social Work). [345]
- Weymouth, A., 1940. *A psychologist's war-time diary* (New York, Longmans, Green). [336]
- Wheeler, R. H., 1935. "Organismic vs. mechanistic logic" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 42, 335-353). [15]
- Wheeler, R. H., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [15]
- Wheeler, R. H., and T. Gaston, 1941. "The history of music in relation to climatic and cultural fluctuations" (1940 *Proc. Music Teach. nat. Ass.*, 432-438). [15]
- Whipple, G. M., ed., 1940. *The thirty-ninth yearbook of the national society for the study of education* (Bloomington, Ill., Public School Publ.). [488]
- White, L., 1947. *The American radio* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [441]
- White, R. K., 1947. "Black boy: a value-analysis" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 42, 440-461). [512]
- White, R. K., et al., 1948. "Studies in adjustment to visible injuries" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 43, 13-28). [489]
- White, R. K., and N. Fenton, 1932. "Item-validation of a test of inferiority feeling" (*J. juv. Res.*, 16, 231-245). [526]
- White, T. H., ed., 1948. *The Stilwell papers* (New York, Sloan Assoc.). [405]
- Whitehead, T. N., 1938. "Social motives in economic activities" (*Occup. Psychol., Lond.*, 12, 271-290). [233]
- Whitney, V. H., 1948. "Rural-urban people" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 54, 48-54). [236]
- Whittemore, I. C., 1924. "The influence of competition on performance: an experimental study" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 19, 236-253). [524]
- Whyte, W. F., 1941. "Corner boys: a study of clique behavior" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46, 647-664). [136]
- Whyte, W. F., 1948. *Human relations in the restaurant industry* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [273]
- Wiese, M. J., and S. G. Cole, 1946. "A study of children's attitudes and the influence of a commercial motion picture" (*J. Psychol.*, 21, 151-171). [68]
- Wightwick, M. I., 1945. "Vocational interest patterns" (*Teach. Coll. Contr. Educ.*, No. 900). [499]
- Wile, I. S., and R. Davis, 1948. *Personality in nature, society, and culture* (C. Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., New York, Knopf). [293]
- Wilks, S. S., 1940. "Representative sampling and poll reliability" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 4, 261-269). [546]
- Williams, D., 1942. "Basic instructions for interviewers" (*Publ. Opin. Quart.*, 6, 634-641). [546]
- Williams, E. T., 1929. *China yesterday and today* (New York, Crowell). [542]

- Williams, F., and H. Cantril, 1945. "The use of interviewer rapport as a method of detecting differences between 'public' and 'private' opinion" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 22, 171-175). [406]
- Williams, H. M., 1940. "Intelligence and delinquency" (*Yearb. nat. Soc. Stud. Educ.*, 39 (1), 291-297). [534]
- Williams, J. M., 1922. *Principles of social psychology* (New York, Knopf). [482]
- Willmann, R. R., 1944. "An experimental investigation of the creative process in music" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 57, No. 1). [509]
- Willoughby, R. R., 1932. "A scale of emotional maturity" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 3, 3-36). [536]
- Willoughby, R. R., 1935. "Emotionality as a function of age, sex and conjugal condition" (*Psychol. Bull.*, 32, 728). [520, 531]
- Willoughby, R. R., 1937. "The emotionality of spinsters" (*Character & Pers.*, 5, 215-223). [351]
- Willoughby, R. R., 1938. "The relationship to emotionality of age, sex, and conjugal condition" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 6, 920-931). [534]
- Wilson, L., 1942. *The academic man* (New York, Oxford). [259]
- Wilson, P. T., 1934. "A study of twins with special reference to heredity as a factor determining differences in environment" (*Hum. Biol.*, 6, 324-354). [488]
- Winch, R. F., 1941. "Personality characteristics of engaged and married couples" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 46, 686-697). [524]
- Winslow, C. N., 1937. "A study of the extent of agreement between friends' opinions and their ability to estimate the opinions of each other" (*J. soc. Psychol.*, 8, 433-442). [498]
- Winslow, C. N., 1938. "Observations of dominance-subordination in cats" (*J. genet. Psychol.*, 52, 425-428). [524]
- Winslow, C. N., 1944. "The social behavior of cats" (*J. comp. Psychol.*, 37, 297-313; 315-326). [524]
- Winston, E., 1934. "The alleged lack of mental disease among primitive groups" (*Amer. Anthropol.*, 36, 234-238). [537]
- Winston, E., 1935. "The assumed increase of mental disease" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 40, 427-439). [537]
- Winston, S., 1937. "Bio-social characteristics of American inventors" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 2, 837-849). [260]
- Winter, J. E., 1936. "A comparison of the cardio-pneumopsychograph and association methods in the detection of lying in cases of theft among college students" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 20, 243-248). [77]
- Wirth, L., 1928. *The ghetto* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [520]
- Wirth, L., 1938. "Urbanism as a way of life" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 1-24). [326]
- Wirth, L., 1939. "Social interaction: the problem of the individual and the group" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 44, 979). [382]
- Wirth, L., 1948. "Consensus and mass communication" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 13, 1-15). [449]
- Wittenborn, J. R., et al., 1943. "A comparison of interest measurement by the Kuder Preference Record and the Strong Vocational Interest Blanks for men and women" (*Educ. psychol. Measmt.*, 3, 239-257). [499]
- Witty, P. A., 1934. "The relative frequency of gifted boys and girls in the secondary school" (*Educ. Am. Supervis.*, 20, 606-612). [242]
- Witty, P. A., 1945. "New evidence on the learning ability of the Negro" (*J. abnormal. soc. Psychol.*, 40, 401-404). [518]

- Wolf, T. H., 1938. "The effect of praise and competition on the persistent behavior of kindergarten children" (*Univ. Minn. Inst. Child Welf. Monogr. Ser.*, No. 15). [524]
- Wolff, W., 1943. *The expression of personality; experimental depth psychology* (New York, Harper). [501]
- Wolman, I. J., 1943. "The child in war" (*Amer. J. med. Sci.*, 205, 858-869). [336]
- Wood, L. F., and J. W. Mullen, eds., 1943. *What the American family faces* (Chicago, Eugene Hugh). [126]
- Woodworth, R. S., 1941. "Heredity and environment: a critical survey of recently published material on twins and foster children" (*Soc. Sci. Res. Coun. Bull.*, No. 47). [488]
- Wortis, J., 1937. "A note on the body build of the male homosexual" (*Amer. J. Psychiat.*, 93, 1121-1125). [349]
- Wright, C. A., 1939. "The sex offender's endocrines" (*Med. Rec., N.Y.*, 149, 399-402). [349]
- Wundt, W., 1916. *Elements of folk psychology* (New York, Macmillan). [26, 492]
- Wyatt, R. F., 1945. "Improvability of pitch discrimination" (*Psychol. Monogr.*, 58, No. 2). [34]
- Yates, N., and H. Brash, 1941. "An investigation of the physical and mental characteristics of a pair of like twins reared apart from infancy" (*Ann. Eugen., Camb.*, 11, 89-101). [488]
- Yellowlees, H., 1940. "The problem of adolescence" (*Lancet*, 238, 233-235; 279-282; 326-329). [531]
- Yerkes, R. M., 1925. *Almost human* (New York, Appleton-Century). [140]
- Yerkes, R. M., 1943. *Chimpanzees: a laboratory colony* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press). [140]
- Yerkes, R. M., and B. W. Learned, 1925. *Chimpanzee intelligence and its vocal expressions* (Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins). [502]
- Young, K., 1927. *Source book for social psychology* (New York, Knopf). [483]
- Young, K., 1930. *Social psychology; an analysis of social behavior* (New York, Appleton-Century). [483]
- Young, K., 1932. "Imitation" (*Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, 7, 586-587). [121]
- Young, K., 1940. *Personality and problems of adjustment* (New York, Appleton-Century). [297, 535]
- Young, K., 1942. *Studies in personality* (Q. McNemar and M. A. Merrill, eds., New York, McGraw-Hill). [310]
- Young, P. T., 1936. *Motivation of behavior* (New York, Wiley). [37]
- Young, P. T., 1937. "Is cheerfulness-depression a general temperamental trait?" (*Psychol. Rev.*, 44, 313-319). [521]
- Young, P. T., 1943. *Emotion in man and animal* (New York, Wiley). [490]
- Young, P. T., 1948. *Methods of psychology* (P. G. Andrews, ed., New York, Wiley). [37]
- Young, P. V., 1937. *Social treatment in probation and delinquency* (New York, McGraw-Hill). [535]
- Young, P. V., 1940. "The validity of schedules and questionnaires" (*J. educ. Sociol.*, 14, 22-26). [535]
- Zabriske, E. G., and A. L. Brush, 1941. "Psychoneuroses in wartime" (*Psychosom. Med.*, 3, 295-329). [337]

- Zachry, C. B., and M. Lightly, 1940. *Emotion and conduct in adolescence* (New York, Appleton-Century). [531]
- Zawadzki, B., 1948. "Limitations of the scapegoat theory of prejudice" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 43, 127-141). [374]
- Zeleny, L. D., 1939. "Characteristics of group leaders" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 24, 140-149). [522]
- Zeleny, L. D., 1940. "Measurement of social status" (*Amer. J. Sociol.*, 45, 576-582). [488]
- Zeleny, L. D., 1941. "Measurement of sociation" (*Amer. sociol. Rev.*, 6, 173-188). [225, 536]
- Zeligs, R., 1941. "Influencing children's attitudes toward the Chinese" (*Sociol. soc. Res.*, 26, 126-138). [496]
- Zeligs, R., 1945. "Social factors annoying to children" (*J. appl. Psychol.*, 29, 75-82). [227]
- Zimmerman, C. C., 1947. *Family and civilization* (New York, Harper). [301]
- Zimmerman, F. T., et al., 1946. "Effect of glutamic acid on mental functioning in children and adolescents" (*Arch. Neurol. Psychiat., Chicago*, 56, 489-506). [32]
- Zimmern, A. E., 1911. *The Greek commonwealth* (New York, Oxford). [542]
- Zingg, R. M., 1940. "Feral man and extreme cases of isolation" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 53, 487-517). [487]
- Zingg, R. M., 1940. "More about the 'baboon boy' of South Africa" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 52, 455-462). [487]
- Zingg, R. M., 1941. "A reply to Professor Dennis" (*Amer. J. Psychol.*, 54, 432-435). [487]
- Zipf, G. K., 1946. *Encyclopedia of psychology* (P. L. Harriman, ed., New York, Philosophical Library). [501]
- Znaniecki, F., 1925. *The laws of social psychology* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [483]
- Zorbaugh, H. W., 1929. *The Gold Coast and the slum* (Chicago, Univ. Chicago Press). [520]
- Zubin, J., 1938. "A technique for measuring like-mindedness" (*J. abnorm. soc. Psychol.*, 33, 508-516). [223]
- Zucker, H. J., 1943. "Affectional identification and delinquency" (*Arch. Psychol.*, N.Y., No. 286). [534]

SUBJECT INDEX

A

- Abnormal behavior, 358, 537
 - organic versus functional, 361
 - social consequences of, 375
 - and social disorganization, 362
 - and war, 337
- Abnormal situations, 460
- Adolescence, 289, 294, 308, 311, 460, 495, 530
 - and sibling position, 293
- Amnesia, 375
- Animal society, 491
- Aristotelian views, 8, 21, 166
- Aryanism, 19, 231, 517
- Aspiration, 137, 408, 506
- Astrology, 216
- Attitudes, 226, 495, 521, 545
 - measurement of, 83, 117, 133
 - parent-child, 127, 498
 - polls on, 117
 - public versus private, 406
 - verbal nature of, 116
- Atypical behavior, 338
 - and maladjustment, 339
 - prostitution as, 345
 - sex perversion as, 348
 - and social change, 356
- Audience, 423
 - conversional, 425
 - density of, 430
 - educational, 426
 - fanatique*, 315, 461
 - and hypothetical listener, 427
 - interstimulation, 429
 - measurement of, 428, 433
 - theater, 423

B

- Baconianism, 16
- Basic personality type, 221

- Behaviorism, 27, 32, 77, 141, 481, 495
- Bereavement, 316
- Biological determinism, 31, 229, 491, 517
- Booms, 452

C

- Causation, 53, 68, 200, 380, 493, 507
- Celibate, 350
- Censorship, 447, 507
- Child society, 135
- Class differences, 237, 312, 405, 519
- Class mobility, 327
- Climatic determinism, 14, 26, 491
- Collective behavior, 54, 379
- Comics, 146
- Committees, 418, 545
- Communication, 86, 101, 142, 500, 508
- Compensations, 363, 489
 - daydreaming as, 364
 - dissociation as, 366
 - fiction as, 365
- Competition, 175, 524
- Conditioning, 42
- Conferences, 418
- Conflict situations, 179, 358, 362, 537
- Conformity behavior, 266, 543
- Congenial situations, 408
 - arranged, 416
- Conventional situations, 390
- Co-twin control, 491
- Covert (implicit) behavior, 77, 159, 253
 - measurement of, 77
 - nonsymbolic, 171, 494
 - and other types, 83
 - versus overt, 76, 139
 - symbolic, 163, 192
- Crazes, 453
- Criminal personality, 325, 340, 350, 535
 - habitual, 342
 - incidental, 343
 - and juvenile delinquent, 344

Criminal personality, socially defined,
341

Crowd, 463
and mob, 469

Culture, 45
and personality, 24

D

Daydreaming, 164, 364

Delayed response, 78, 179

Delinquency, 308, 345, 534
factors determining, 72, 344
and motion pictures, 69, 146, 507

Determinism, biological, 31, 229, 491,
517

climatic, 14, 26, 491

and positivism, 18

racial, 19, 25, 230

Deviates, 246
defined, 250, 338
sex, 270, 348

Dipsomania, 373

Dissociation, 366

Dominance, 500, 523

Dramatic pattern, 143, 516
and rumor, 411

Drives, 37, 488, 489

E

Education, 27, 59, 72
artificiality of, 149

formal, 149

function of, 154, 311

nursery, 134

and propaganda, 75

and thinking, 170

Ego-involvement, 124, 225, 266, 516

Eminence, 47, 260, 263

Emotions, 39, 91, 490, 500, 509, 520
as covert nonsymbolic behavior, 176,
494

James-Lange theory, 79
socially acquired, 40

Empiricism, 16, 26

Environment, symbolic, 140

Environmentalism, 32

Escape mechanisms, 368

Eugenics, 25

F

Faculty psychology, 150, 509

Fad, 450

Family, 125, 300, 310, 313

Fantasy, 132, 164

Fashion, 455

Feral man, 34, 487

Fixations, 127

Folk psychology, 26, 492

Foster children, 34, 487, 488

Frame of reference, 253

Free will, 11, 25

Freudianism, 23, 38, 76, 162, 174, 185,
308, 489, 508, 516, 529

Frustration, 363, 437, 537

Fugitive patterns, 410, 449

G

Gang, 136

Genius, 243, 260, 263, 306

Genotypical similarity, 75

Gestalt psychology, 27

Gesture, 86, 500
and abstract ideas, 99
acquisition of, 93
individual differences in, 94, 97
as language, 86, 92
limitations of, 99
pantomime, 90, 490
response to, 93
social origin of, 91
vocal, 87, 99, 104, 500

Graphology, 501

Group, and the individual, 7, 481

Group mind, 24, 54, 492

H

Habitational norms, 234

Hedonism, 10, 25

Hereditarianism, 31, 486, 488, 519

Hero worship, 155

Hippocratic typology, 213

Honesty, 68, 190, 252, 501, 521

Human nature, 220

Hypochondria, 369

I

- Identical twins, 34, 488, 491
- Identification, 198, 273
 - negative, 225, 516
 - positive, 224, 516
- Imitation, 20, 26, 121, 463, 481, 504
- Inadequacy, 256, 489, 513, 526
- Individuality, 185, 196, 246, 255
- In-group, 222, 259, 398
 - and positive identification, 224
- Insecurity, 162
 - economic, 333
- Instability, 256, 307, 530
- Instinctivism, 21, 26
- Institutional situations, 392, 542
 - and social disorganization, 393
- Interactional situation, 379, 386
- Interactionism, 8, 32
 - and the situational approach, 28
- Interests, 499, 521, 532
- Interpersonal situations, 408
- Intervening variables, 160, 495
- Introspection, 26, 44
- Introversion, 256, 500, 525, 529
- Intuition, 89
- Isolation, social, 305, 352

J

- Jaenschian typology, 528
- J curve, 543

K

- Kretschmerian typology, 213, 528

L

- Language, animal, 103, 107
 - gesture as, 86, 92
 - origins of, 101, 501
- Leadership, 385, 409, 522
 - in audience, 428
 - defined, 257
 - democratic, 438
 - dictatorial, 439, 522
 - nominal, 257
 - politic, 419
 - prestige, 455, 522, 545
 - regimental, 436
 - in revolution, 475

- Leadership, specificity of, 261
 - traditional, 435
 - traits of, 256, 262
- Learning, 41
 - and age, 531
 - and conditioning, 42
 - and emotions, 40
 - by experience, 119
 - by human example, 120
 - insightful, 43
 - and maturation, 41
 - by trial and error, 42, 122
- Legalistic view, 11
- Legend, 415
- Level of aspiration, 408, 506
- Lie detection, 77
- Life-history method, 162, 511
- Logic, 17, 166, 253
- Lynching, 470

M

- Machiavellianism, 13
- Marginal man, 324
- Marital adjustment, 203, 256, 272, 295, 307, 313, 348, 533
- Mass movement, 473
 - and abnormal personality, 376
- Maturation, 41, 288, 491
 - social, 129, 295, 536
- Meanings, 66, 101, 104, 508
- Memory, 164
- Mimicry, 463
- Mob, 469
 - and social disorganization, 471
- Mobility, 323, 327, 332, 354
- Models, composite, 155, 508
 - fixation, 127
 - human, 123
 - negative, 128
 - play, 132
 - primary, 125
 - secondary, 130
 - selection of, 124
 - social control of, 130
 - symbolic, 142, 145
 - teacher as, 150
- Morale, 273, 279, 420
- Motion picture, 67, 87, 125, 146, 334, 391, 428, 506, 516

Motivation, 37

- functional autonomy of, 489
- organic basis, 37, 488, 489
- and sex differences, 524
- social aspects of, 39, 173, 408, 506
- subjective terms, 171
- Thomas's four wishes, 512

Myth, 415**N****Neuroglandular system, 35, 530, 536****Nonsymbolic behavior, 82, 496**

- covert, 171, 494
- and other types of, 83
- overt, 119, 140, 149, 515
- versus symbolic, 80, 116, 499

Norms, 253, 271

- habitational, 234
- occupational, 241, 261, 273, 280
- personality, 185, 196, 220
- sex, 242

Numerology, 216**O****Occupational norms, 241, 261, 273, 280****Occupational role, 295, 492**

- and intelligence, 502, 519
- maladjustment to, 311, 332
- and sex, 242

Opinion, measurement of, 83, 117, 238, 312, 433, 449, 494, 496, 546**Out-group, 222**

- and negative identification, 225

Overt behavior, 76

- versus covert, 76, 139
- nonsymbolic, 119, 140, 149, 515
- and other types, 83
- and personality, 186
- symbolic, 86, 101
- and thinking, 170

P**Pain, gestures of, 96**

- words of, 107

Palmistry, 216, 317**Panic, 463, 465**

- prevention of, 467
- and war, 467

Pantomime, 90, 490**Perseverance, 263****Personal documents, 512****Personality, 183**

- abnormal, 360, 537
- analysis, 185
- and culture, 24
- defined, 183
- deviant attributes of, 185, 196, 246, 255
- disorganization, 297
- dissection of, 194
- factor theory of, 509
- measurement of, 523, 525, 535
- normal, 359
- normative attributes of, 185, 196, 220
- organization, 190
- and physique, 214, 262, 364, 489, 493, 495
- psychopathic, 360
- stereotyping, 185, 195, 200, 204
- types, 213
- and war, 33, 335, 538

Personality maladjustment, 284, 511

- and the abnormal, 358
- and the atypical, 339
- and mobility, 323, 327
- and occupation, 332
- and social change, 319

Phenotypical similarity, 75**Phrenology, 212****Physiognomy, 212, 527****Physique, 214, 262, 349, 489, 493, 495, 521, 527****Platonic views, 8, 27****Play, 132, 410, 505****Pleasure, gestures of, 97**

- words of, 106

Polling, 117, 238, 312, 433, 449, 496, 546**Positivism, 18, 26****Predictions, pooled, 202****Prejudice, 227****Prepotent reflexes, 38****Projective techniques, 510**

- Rorschach methodology, 510, 529

Propaganda, 443, 548

- counter, 448
- and education, 75, 547

Propaganda, effectiveness of, 446
techniques, 444

Prostitute, 345

Psychoanalysis, 23, 38, 76, 162, 174, 185,
308, 489, 508, 516, 529
Adlerian, 38, 489
Jungian, 38, 525, 529
neo-Freudian, 24, 308, 363

Psychodrama, 203, 536

Psychosomatic disabilities, 369

Public opinion, 83, 117, 448, 496, 546

Public relations, 208, 222

Publics, defined, 432, 547

functions of, 435
measurement of, 433
newspaper, 442
recreational, 440

R

Race, cultural origin of, 232
differences, 504, 518
stereotypes of, 205, 224, 325

Race riots, 465, 470

Racism, 19, 25, 230, 517

Radicalism, 65, 321, 513

Radio, 87, 112, 146, 365, 433, 500

Rationalism, 13

Rationalization, 13, 229, 253, 374
of stereotypes, 211

Regional differences, 234

Regression, 363

Religion, 315, 404, 462, 530

Repression, 161

Restructuring, 192

Revolution, 335, 475

Rigidity, 263

Riot, coordinated, 469, 475
labor, 472
race, 465, 470
uncoordinated, 463

Rivalry, 409, 524, 539

Role, deviant, 268
dynamics of, 193
self, 124, 155, 160, 190
social, 50, 293, 296, 481

Rumor, 410, 544

and war, 413

Rumor clinics, 415

Rural-urban differences, 236, 325

S

Scapegoating, 374

Science and behavior, 151

Semantics, 166, 502

Senescence, 291, 295, 317, 531, 538

Sex, adjustment to, 310, 350

Sex differences, 134, 242, 291, 520, 523,
524
variability of, 243

Sex perversion, 348

Siblings, 293, 302, 502

Situations, 266
abnormal, 460
audience, 423
congenial, 408, 416
conventional, 390
exchange, 420
formal, 404
institutional, 392, 542
interactional, 379, 386
overlapping, 187
types of, 386

Social atmospheres, 437, 541

Social change, 297
and atypical behaviors, 356
and deviant behaviors, 264
and maladjustment, 319

Social control, 185, 265
methods of, 277
of models, 130
and morale, 276
and personality maladjustment, 284

Social disorganization, 300
and abnormal behavior, 362
and institutions, 393
and mobs, 471
and personality, 244, 264, 296

Social facilitation, 382, 539

Social movements, 461

Social psychology, 7, 481
animal, 45, 107, 140, 491, 501, 524, 529,
541
and war, 467

Socialization, 9, 59
cumulative character of, 66
and status, 62

Society, as an abstraction, 47, 52
"animal," 491
child, 135

Society, defined, 52, 491

dynamics of, 287

and the individual, 45, 54

organic analogy of, 493

personified, 54

Sociodrama, 382, 536

Sociology of knowledge, 166

Sociometry, 382, 536

Sociopath, 338

Somatotypes, 214

Speech, 101

and abstract ideas, 105

acquisition of, 106, 110, 503

defects, 109, 503

egocentric, 503

elements of, 102, 107

functions of, 103

differences in, 108, 110, 518, 523

limitations of, 112

response to, 106

and writing, 113

Status, 51, 71, 487, 492, 502, 519

earned, 62

initial, 60

and socialization, 62

of women, 242

Stereotyping, 89, 185, 195, 200, 204, 250, 500

control of, 445

individualized, 210

measurement of, 526

racial, 205, 224, 325

rationalization of, 211

Stress interview, 386

Strikes, 472

Sublimation, 25, 489

Substitute responses, 363

Suicide, 369

Symbolic behavior, 80

covert, 163

versus nonsymbolic, 80, 116, 499

and other types, 83

overt, 86, 101

versus symbolism, 499

Symbolic environment, 140, 506

Sympathy, 225

T

Telepathy, 86, 317

Television, 87

Tensions, 179

and abnormal behavior, 362

release of, 460

Theological views, 11, 16, 25

Thinking, 165

creative, 168, 512

and overt behavior, 170

Traits, 185, 250

adequacy-inadequacy, 256

analysis of, 252

competitiveness, 175, 524

dominance, 500, 523

honesty, 68, 190, 252, 501, 521

instability, 256, 307, 530

introversion-extroversion, 256, 500, 525, 529

of leadership, 256, 262

measurement of, 523

perseverance, 263

radicalism, 65, 321, 513

rigidity, 263

Twins, 34, 488, 491, 502

Typology, constructive, 529

personality, 213, 490, 529

physical, 213, 521, 527

V

Vagrancy, 353

Variables, 63

intervening, 160, 495

situational, 186, 380

Verbalisms, 115

Vocal gestures, 87, 99, 104, 500

W

War, and morale, 273

and panic, 467

and personality, 33, 335, 538

and rumor, 413

Women, changing status of, 242

Writing, 113

